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The State as a Standard of Civilisation: Assembling the Modern State in Lebanon 
and Syria, 1800-1944 
 
This thesis critiques the conceptualisation of the state as a rational product of modernity that 
places importance on institutional capacity and typological criteria. Tied to this history is a 
distinct set of knowledges and practices that inform international relations and politics, 
including those of contemporary development and state building. The expansion of these 
knowledges and practices through colonialism, imperial modernisation, and global 
governance have established a global standard of civilisation of statehood that fails to give 
credence to the specific history of the state in the non-West. This thesis argues that in order 
to better understand the state in the non-West, it is necessary to examine the process of state 
formation as one that is linked to colonialism, imperial modernisation, and the advent of 
global governance, which produced a global standard of civilisation, altering the relationship 
between the domestic social field in the global peripheries and structures of governance. It 
traces how colonial knowledges and practices were assembled onto and interacted with pre-
existing knowledges and practices in the political, economic, and social environments and 
the consequence of these assembled knowledges and practices.  
 
Through the use of archival material triangulated with secondary source histories, the thesis 
examines the history of state formation in the Middle East, focusing on Lebanon and Syria, 
previously the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, from 1800 to 1944. It examines the 
social, economic, and political transformations that occurred during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries in Lebanon and Syria; taking into account Ottoman imperial 
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The people of the dhimma or dhimmi, refers to the non-Muslim people, ‘citizens’ or 
‘subjects’ (Jews and Christians), belonging to an Islamic state. 
‘Asabiyyah 
Translated as ‘social solidarity’ or ‘group feeling’, it refers a kind of communalism 
based on family, clan, village, or city quarter, which ordered and governed over the 
people therein, a form of household authority. 
Ayan 
Or Ayan ve Esraf, were a notable class of Muslim individuals and included land owners 
and dynasts. 
Baratakli 
A category for notable individuals who were exempt from taxes, including Muslims, 
Christians, and Jews.  
Devshirme / Devşirme  
A blood tax or tribute on young Christian boys from the Balkan territories to serve 
the Ottoman Empire. 
Eid al-Adha  
The ‘Feast of the Sacrifice’ is a Muslim holiday that celebrates Abraham’s willingness 
to sacrifice his son to obey God’s command.  
Ferdeh 
A tax that was applied to all adult males during periods of war with the amount 
depending on the means available to them.  
Fez / Tarbouche  
A cylindrical red hat that became popularised in 1826, as an egalitarian measure, 
following a set of imperial reforms.  
Firman 
 An imperial decree or edict. 
Ghazal 
 A poetic form typically discussing beauty, loss, and pain.  
Hatt-ı Şerif  
A note written by the noble (Sultan or transcribed by the Grand Vizier), with regards 
to its use in this thesis, it refers to the Edict of Gülhane (1839), an imperial reform. 
Hatt-ı Hümayun 
A document handwritten by the Sultan (the imperial), with regards to its use in this 
thesis, it refers to the Islâhat Fermânı (1856), an imperial reform. 
Jizya 
An annual tax levied on non-Muslims permanently residing within an Islamic state, 
often allowing for the exemption of military service but to remain protected.  
Mejlis 
 An assembly, or parliament, of governors or representatives. 
Millet 
A court adjudicating personal law following confessional guidelines (Muslim, 
Christian, or Jewish)  
Mushir 
 A field marshal or counsellor of state.  
Mutassarifate 
 A form of split authority, or sub-divided authority within a territory.  
Pashalik / Vilayet 




The administrator for a community within the system of the Mutassarifate (split 
authority). 
Sandjak 
 Local administrative units within an Ottoman province.  
Sandjak-Bey 
 The administrator for a local administrative unit within an Ottoman province. 
Shari’a 
 A system of law based on Islam. 
Tanzimat 
 A period of reform referring to the re-organisation of the Ottoman Empire. 
Ulema 










1  Introduction 
The advent of the modern state in the fifteenth and sixteenth century is characterised by the 
assertion of sovereignty over territory and population through the establishment of social, 
economic, and political order by a centralised administrative organisation.1 However, there 
has been much debate on how to define the state,2 the role of the state in society,3 and its 
role in the international state system.4 Debates on the state are not only concerned with its 
definition, but also with regards to what constitutes a good state, a strong state, and how to 
measure and fix weak and failing states.5 While critiques of the dominant knowledges and 
practices of modern statehood do exist, such debates rarely challenge the epistemological 
assumptions of the modern state.   
 
The assumptions that are perpetuated and reproduced in the ongoing debates on the modern 
state, posit that the modern state is a central actor in international relations, political science, 
and development studies. The theoretical inquiries on the state, from the various tenets of 
realism, liberalism, Marxism, and post-colonialism, work with the assumption that the state 
maintains a central authority, a structure that organises the means of production, 
monopolises the use of force, and is capable of participating in the international state system 
where the state navigates inter-state and institutional relations.6 From these inquiries, the 
state is analysed as a product of both the international and domestic environments. With 
regards to the former, the state functions within a set of constraints that limits and allows it 
to pursue certain decisions due to the environment of systemic anarchy, as argued by realists, 
or with regards to its position in international society, according to English School scholars.7  
 
Discussions and studies on the modern state are varied in focus, ranging from institutions, 
the economy, state-society relations, cultural productions, and identity. However, the 
different theoretical frameworks begin with the common assumption that each individual 
modern state in the international state system maintains similar-enough characteristics.8 The 
characteristics that are often applied to descriptions or definitions of the state, however, are 
																																																						
1 Coles 1957, p. 340.  
2 Engels 2010; Bourdieu 2012; Vincent 1987; Lomas 2014. 
3 Reinoud 2012; Rubenstein 2015; Holsti 1996. 
4 Sen 1999; Menon 2016; Wimmer 2012. 
5 Patrick and Rice 2008; Patrick 2006; Rotberg 2004; Ghani and Lockhart 2009; Easterly 2006. 
6 Weber 1946; Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001; Bull 1977/2012; Hobson 2000; Bhabha 1994; Bhambra 2007; Said 1978.  




products of a specific European history. While domestic cultural distinctions between states 
do exist, there has been little evidence of a tenable link between cultural distinction and state 
capacity or ability to govern.9 By locating the modern state and, by extension, the European 
state system (a precursor to the international state system), in European history, it becomes 
evident that the historical experience of European state formation is a global exception that 
has constructed a unique set of knowledges and practices. Although the history of the 
modern state is distinctly European, or Western, it was through European expansion that a 
set of dominant concepts and categories, had been broadcast globally. In doing so, global 
governance has reproduced and reinforced a specific understanding of statehood, which 
contrasts with experience of statehood in the non-West.  
 
This chapter examines discussions on the modern state in the social sciences and continues 
by examining how the knowledges and practices that reinforce the concept of the modern 
state are applied through contemporary development and state building projects. This 
chapter subsequently outlines the argument that the post-colonial modern state is the result 
of the application of a standard of civilisation by the European powers10 during imperial and 
colonial interactions of the nineteenth century and was formalised through the establishment 
of institutions of global governance in the twentieth century. It then describes the methods 
and methodology used in developing the thesis before providing a brief chapter outline.  
 
1.1 Conceptualising the Modern State in the Social Sciences 
The modern state is often discussed as an objective and methodical entity that can exist in 
any global region. By framing the state in this manner, it is considered to be a structure that 
is flexible enough to adapt to the cultural environment in which it exists but rigid enough to 
produce a centralised form of politics and economics. The modern state, according to John 
Ruggie, is dependent on a framework of international law and international norms that 
separates the state from other systems of governance, emphasising the principle of territorial 
sovereignty.11 The concept of sovereignty centres on the ability of a political entity – a 
government or sovereign – to make claims that they have the right to exercise final authority 
within delineated boundaries. The sovereign authority of the government is contained and 
bounded by the territory where the government has sole authority over everything within its 
																																																						
9 Goddard 2002; Abed 1995; Tessler 2002.  
10 European powers, as it is used throughout this thesis, refers to the states that had been at the forefront of imperial and 
colonial expansion into the global peripheries, or global south, during the nineteenth century (France, Britain, and Russia), 
which were active participants in the production of distinct knowledges and practices of law, governance, religion, and 
society.  
11 Ruggie 1993, pp. 148-51.  
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specified territory.12 Sovereignty is a foundational principle that is upheld within the 
international state system. Without territorial sovereignty and the recognition of sovereignty 
by states in the international state system, the state system could be subject to instability 
caused by a lack of constraints on state actions.  
 
Sovereignty provides the government, as the sole responsible authority in the state, with the 
right to discipline through a legal framework that is upheld by state coercion and without 
interference from third parties.13 State coercion does not necessarily refer to the direct use 
of force but to the regulation of society through an all-seeing system of police, military, and 
legal vigilance that binds society to a set of social norms and accepted actions, enforcing 
social, economic, and political rituals through the threat of force.14 Ultimately, it is the 
recognition of these rights of internal authority by other actors in the international state 
system that provides the government with the ability to discipline, pacify, and control the 
populations unimpeded under the premise of non-interference. The production and 
establishment of these norms and practices “gives” the state in the international system its 
sovereignty;15 a necessary condition for the continued existence of the state, and is a question 
of legitimacy.  
 
International recognition of the modern state, the production of external legitimacy, 
however, relies on internal factors. The government gains its legal status and authority 
through a process of internal recognition and consent from civil and political society. Internal 
consent, as argued by Antonio Gramsci and Pierre Bourdieu is required for a government to 
administer its authority within the delineated territory.16 Consent from the population does 
not have to take active forms, but can be passive. According to Pierre Bourdieu, passive 
consent, granted by most of the population is necessary for the continued existence of the 
state.17 On the other hand, the concept of the state is upheld even by those who actively 
dissent against existing state institutions and governments. Active dissent is more often 
concerned with, and seeks to transform, the character of social, economic, and political 
governance. Although one can argue that secessionist movements dissent against the modern 
state, they also seek to assert statehood and sovereignty. In this manner, secessionist 
movements reinforce the concept of the state, seeking to reproduce the state and its 
																																																						
12 Biersteker and Weber 1996.  
13 Chalcraft 2016, 30; Femia 1981, p. 28. 
14 Foucault 1995; Kertzer 1988, pp. 1-3; Belge 2013, p 17.  
15 Ruggie 1993.  
16 Bourdieu 2012; Gramsci 1999, pp. 542-550, 784. 
17 Bourdieu explains passive consent as being akin to the acceptance of our conception of time, Bourdieu 2012, pp. 13-22. 
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governing structures in an image that reflects the ideological and national character of the 
secessionist movement.18  
 
Consent and dissent play important roles in the state, having the ability to maintain the status 
quo or affect change with regards to the relationship between governance and the 
management of society.19 The relationship between society and the state is described by 
Migdal who argues that  
 
the state is a field of power marked by the use and threat of 
violence [it is] shaped by 1) the image of a coherent, controlling 
organisation in a territory, which is a representation of the people 
bounded by that territory, and 2) the actual practices of its 
multiple parts.20  
 
Migdal’s discussion of the modern state, overestimates how democratic modern states are by 
taking a pluralist approach to how the state is negotiated. In his explanation of how the state 
transforms over time, Migdal asserts that public and private actors within the state make 
demands and negotiate with the state in a variety of ways.21 Similarly, other pluralist 
approaches highlight the importance of a variety of overlapping and interconnected social 
forces that function in relation to governance and state institutions. These social forces are 
motivated by political, economic, and social factors – inclusive of identity.22 On the other 
hand, Marxist approaches to the state examine social forces from an analytical perspective 
that places importance on economic stratification rather than the multiple categories of 
identity that are produced by public and private actors. Karl Marx argues that the modern 
‘liberal’ state supports the interests of a small and economically privileged class of society. 
Indeed, the proletariat, for Marx, will eventually rise to dismantle the bourgeois society, to 
create a more egalitarian society, giving ascent to the classless ideal of communism.23 While 
Marx is primarily concerned with an economic class struggle, the means of production, and 
capitalism, he disregards the significance of economic class as an identity construct that is 
layered upon other forms of identity.  
 
																																																						
18 Prominent cases include Quebec, Kosovo, the former Czechoslovakia, and the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey; Tripp 2013, 
20-68.  
19 White 2013, p. 4. 
20 Migdal 2001, pp.  15-16. 
21 Migdal 2001, pp.  15-16. 
22 Jessop 1982; Offe and Ronge 1982, pp. 249-250; (b) Mann 2012, p. 45.  
23 Hobson 2000, pp. 110-113. 
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The idea of multiple social forces that are identifiable through political and social categories, 
according to Marxists, can be reduced to economic class. With similar disregard to social 
forces, Gaetano Mosca argues that by maintaining a structure of organisation and 
communication, explicated by institutionalised laws and social norms, administered by an 
organised means of coercion, elites can ensure that the masses are organised, pacified, and 
compliant with laws and social norms.24 Adding to Mosca’s elitist approach to the modern 
state, Michael Mann notes that ‘the masses comply because they lack collective organisation 
to do otherwise, because they are embedded within collective and distributive power 
organisations controlled by others. They are ‘organisationally outflanked’.25 The state, which is 
physically delineated, is represented by a government that manages the threat and application 
of violence. The activities of the population, which are ordered and managed through the 
use and threat of violence, are further organised within the institutional practices of the state, 
where the state manages the life processes of society.  
 
Unlike Marxist approaches to the state, which are concerned with capitalist expansion and 
class hierarchies, and elitist approaches that focus on the struggle for state power between 
elites, modernist approaches to the state focus on the changes in the means of production, 
consumption, and of scientific and social progress. Modernist approaches explain 
centralisation and bureaucratisation of governance over a delineated territory as a result of 
change in the social, economic, and political environments. It is argued that social and 
technological developments were processes that bore the groundwork for the development 
of a liberal social environment encompassing individual rights and liberties.26  
 
Max Weber, like Friedrich Engels, argues that the disintegration of household authority is 
caused by modernity, the rise of capitalist enterprise, and the emergence of socio-political 
institutions and organisations that individuals order themselves in. Weber and Engels 
continue by arguing that with modernity came the fragmentation of the household as a socio-
political and economic actor, shifting the onus of acquiring and managing capital onto the 
individual, ultimately changing the relationship between societal and state authority.27 This is 
particularly grounded in histories of state formation that not only describe the rise of the 
state and shed light on how the state is described and defined in international relations, 
political science, and development scholarship, but also helps to explain the rise of the liberal 
																																																						
24 Mosca 1939, p. 53.  
25 (a) Mann 2012, p.7. 
26 Gellner 2008, pp. 63-87.  
27 Weber 2013, p. 375; Engels 2010.   
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social environment that divided areas controlled by the state, the public sphere, from that of 
the private sphere, such as the family; and gave rise to the individual’s direct relationship with 
structures of authority. 
 
Whether an approach is concerned with the state being constituted by social forces, a small 
group of elites, a structure for capitalist enterprise, or is viewed as the product of modernity, 
the state maintains the characteristics of a government, whose power and authority is 
territorially delineated. In other words, the state is tantamount to the territory that the 
diffusion of authority is bound to, lest it infringes on another’s sovereignty; it is within this 
territory that the institutions of authority organise and regulate the actions of individuals.28  
 
Despite difference in how the state is studied and the focus of these studies, the scholarship 
discussed above reproduces theoretical interventions on the state from a Westphalian,29 or 
Weberian, lens. Such a lens asserts that the state is contingent on ‘[…] a human community 
that (successfully) claims the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory’.30  Weber’s definition of the state, stripped of nationhood and cultural peculiarities, 
is a set of institutions that are globally replicated and viewed as objective in their global 
application by maintaining characteristics of an ideal type; an abstract and hypothetical 
concept that establishes an international benchmark – or a standard of civilisation. In this 
case, the ideal type with regards to the concept of the state is its associated institutional 
characteristics and functions, that do not correspond to any single case.31  
 
1.2 Reinforcing the Ideal of the Modern State: Development, State Building, and 
Global Governance  
Definitions and conceptions of statehood assume that the modern state and its political 
institutions are objective, void of cultural peculiarities and applicable to any global region. 
Indeed, conceptualising statehood through the Weberian lens allows one to assume that the 
modern state, in its application to the global peripheries,32 will adapt to the cultural 
environment while organising politics and economics and, in turn, will make the region 
accessible to international actors (other states and international organisations). By 
																																																						
28 Durkheim 1996, pp. 32-33.  
29 The Westphalian framework will be discussed further in Chapter 1.  
30 Weber 1946, p. 77. 
31 Weber 1997, p. 90. 
32 The concept of a global periphery is associated with world-systems analysis and dependency theory (Wallerstein 1979), 
it is particularly useful in the case of the nineteenth century because it helps to formulate a better understanding of the 
global regions which were targeted during the period of European economic and political expansion, also see Rosenberg 
2010.   
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conceptualising the state as an ideal-type, it is possible to view and measure the state through 
a measurement of capability and capacity. Measuring the state in this manner creates a scale 
of incapability to capability, from failure and weakness to strength. In this regard, state 
weakness and failure requires determined development and state building projects to re-
establish order by rebuilding or fixing deficiencies in institutions.  
 
By conceptualising the state as an objective and methodical entity, meaning devoid of 
emotional, cultural, or historical influences, and based on factual and scientific reasoning, 
produced and established through a systemic procedure, development and state building 
projects seek to reinforce its associated institutions. Development and state building projects 
typically begin by measuring state capacity and developing programmes with the aim to 
alleviate states of deficiencies. Development focuses on specific sectors of the state through 
targeted development programmes, which are often concentrated on economic capacity, 
whereas state building encompasses a wider project of social, political, and economic 
transformation. Individuals, organisations, and states involved in development and state 
building projects employ a set of practices with the assumption that the modern state is a 
dominant superstructure that can order society into new, modern, and effective forms. By 
reordering political and economic rituals in ways that reflect the modern state in the West, 
development and state building projects attempt to establish a rationality to society and 
governance.33 In other words, development and state building projects attempt to pacify 
populations that are deemed subversive, to replace political rituals that are viewed as 
illegitimate, barbaric, and uncivilised. This is done by building institutions and establishing 
new political rituals that are perceived as legitimate by development and state building 
practitioners. It is the continued attempt to facilitate practices associated with concepts of 
progress and modernity on states that are viewed as weak, failing, or failed.34  
 
The creation of institutions that can be internationally recognised and which are deemed 
efficient signal legitimate authority that can facilitate interactions with external powers. 
Legitimacy, regarding the state, refers to the acceptance of an individual or political entity 
through relationships created by social exchanges and can be external or internal. External 
legitimacy refers to the relationships between the state and external actors within the 
international state system, whereas internal legitimacy refers to the relationship between the 
																																																						
33 Rationality refers to the ability to make decisions based on scientific reason, to sufficiently disentangle the mind from 
wider obstacles created by barriers such as religion, kinship, or political favouritism. MacFarlane 1992, p.123. 
34 Scott 1998, pp. 4-5.  
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state and domestic population.35 With regards to the aims of development and state building, 
parallels can be drawn to modernisation projects of the imperial and colonial era, particularly 
in their attempts to create institutions that were deemed externally legitimate.  
 
Although imperial and colonial modernisation is temporally different and categorised 
differently from development and state building projects, imperial and colonial 
modernisation as well as development and state building are concerned with external 
recognition to facilitate economic and geo-political access, and to create an environment 
amenable to the rationalisation and civilising of society.36 The focus on institutional 
engineering during imperial and colonial modernisation, although developed to achieve 
particular interests, they were justified based on early scientific ideas of human progress. 
Similarly, contemporary state building projects are implemented in states and justified based 
on an analysis of state capacity; a measurement of strength that discerns a state’s ability to 
function within domestic and international environments. While the type of method used to 
measure the state in imperial and colonial periods is different to the measurement of 
contemporary state capacity, the paternalistic conception of modernity and progress is 
maintained at the foundation of the studies and the projects that followed into the post-
colonial era. The indicators that measure strength for contemporary development and state 
building projects are used to label states with a typology, either strong, weak, failing, failed; 
a practice of measurement, the hierarchizing of the state on a scale of effectiveness that 
assumes rationality and irrationality, order and disorder, civilised and uncivilised. 
Development and state building projects, as did imperial and colonial modernisation, seek 
to replace knowledges and practices that are perceived as uncivilised in an effort to order 
nature and society within a rational design that is ‘commensurate with the scientific 
understanding of natural laws’.37 
 
By measuring capability and capacity, development and state building attempt to use 
scientific methods to justify interference and intervention. Robert Rotberg and Stewart 
Patrick describe state failure and weakness as the inability or unwillingness of the governing 
bodies to provide the elements that are required for statehood such as, legitimate political 
institutions that provide a framework for economic management, social welfare, and physical 
security.38 Rotberg argues that indicators of state failure include: enduring violence, 
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victimization of citizens by the state, loss of control over peripheral territory, growth of 
criminal violence, flawed institutions, deteriorating infrastructure, lacking provisions of basic 
services, uneven economic opportunity, and widespread corruption.39 Susan Rice and 
Stewart Patrick have developed a similar set of indicators as Rotberg to employ when 
examining state capacity, and also propose a set of actions that focus on the development of 
institutions.40 These measurements, using the framework of the ideal-type of state, dissect 
the state to reveal the institutions and mechanisms that are deemed necessary to increase the 
strength of the state. The indicators, however, leave out a host of other sociological variables, 
including customary political, economic, and social hierarchies, that cannot be measured 
through institutional capacity and which could affect how institutions function.  
 
K. Adalbert Hampel critiques the measurement of state capacity and the production of state 
typologies as being fundamental to an inconsistency between historical narratives of the 
organic polity of the modern-state and the outcomes of global hegemony that reinforce a 
particular political form at an international level.41 In a similar vein, Branwen Gruffydd Jones 
argues that the language of state weakness and failure in the post-colonial world conjures 
notions of ‘a general lack of capacity to develop, to rule or to be peaceful’.42 The language of 
state weakness and failure echoes that of the colonial civilising missions that attempted 
largescale assimilation of the global peripheries within the dominant norms of governance in 
the European state system.  
 
In contrast to the critiques of development and state building, Amartya Sen argues that 
development, if concerned with the ends, is the practice that gives people new freedoms. 
Like Hegel’s conception of the state as an environment that permits freedoms which would 
otherwise not be enjoyed,43 Sen argues that  
 
Development requires the removal of major sources of 
unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic 
opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of 
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public facilities as well as intolerance or over activity of 
repressive states.44 
 
Similarly, Rotberg asserts that notwithstanding the elements that may be inducing failure and 
weakness, states can be revived through the development of a stabilised environment by 
driving forward notions of law and order. Once a relative peace has been established, three 
goals should be pursued concurrently: economic development, rejuvenation of civil society, 
and the reintroduction of rule of law.45 The goals outlined by Rotberg are commensurate 
with establishing effective control, however, the structure of legitimate economic 
development, rejuvenation of civil society, and the reintroduction of rule of law are narrowly 
understood by those pursuing these goals. They reflect, not the political, economic, and social 
customs of the society where the projects are being developed, but those of the modern state 
as an ideal type.  
 
Although these approaches to development are bound by good intentions, the conviction 
that freedom can be obtained through institutional development and capacity building 
neglects the lack of international safeguards in reducing economic and political exploitation, 
which can reduce freedoms. While poverty, tyranny, social deprivation, social neglect, and 
intolerance are global political, economic, and social problems, the means pursued to alleviate 
society from these conditions reproduces paternalistic practices that employ Western 
frameworks reminiscent to colonial governance and imperial modernisation. For example, 
Sen is concerned with abolishing poverty, yet he seeks to further integrate underdeveloped 
regions into the global economic systems, which are responsible for exploitation and 
poverty.46 While the impact of these projects may provide an ends in which the measurement 
of state capacity can produce a typology of strength, they can also produce new forms of 
repression and political violence, as well as new areas of poverty.   
 
Responding to criticisms of development and state-building, Sen argues that rights and 
freedoms are not post-institutional developments, but are universal standards that reflect 
global human progress.47 However, this produces an analysis that assumes human progress 
is unilinear and any divergence from this progress is viewed as moving backwards. It finds 
fault with the customary domestic institutions rather than the international institutions and 
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structures that reinforce ideas of social barbarity where rejection of universal (hegemonic) 
standards exist. In other words, the continued focus on political, economic, and social 
deficiencies in the non-West reproduces a Western-Non-Western, developed-
underdeveloped, and civilised-uncivilised binaries that subordinate society and politics in the 
non-West to the ideas of progress and advancement of the West. Although he argues that 
focus should be placed on the outcome of development projects, the desirable outcome is 
extremely difficult to achieve if global institutions undercut independent growth and 
development.  
 
Sen also addresses the critique of cultural exceptionalism with regards to universal rights and 
freedoms, arguing that there are many parallels between contemporary Western political 
ideas and Asian political thought, such as Confucianism.48 While Sen is not wrong in arguing 
that parallels between the West and non-West do exist and that there is potential to transcend 
separate cultural regions by emphasising these parallels rather than focusing on difference, 
there is a problem with conflating Western concepts with Eastern philosophy and assuming 
a universality; particularly with regards to Western conceptual definitions and worldviews. 
As stated by Muhammad Asad,  
 
One should always remember that when the European or 
American speaks of “democracy,” “liberalism,” “socialism,” 
“theocracy,” “parliamentary government,” and so forth, he uses 
these terms within the context of Western historical experience. 
 
It is this historical experience which gives these terms their specific meaning in Western 
society and a - potentially - separate meaning in Eastern philosophies.49  
 
By arguing that parallels between Western and Eastern philosophical frameworks can be 
used in development and state building projects also depends on the belief of global human 
progress as being linear and path dependent. By bringing progress to the global peripheries, 
Sen argues that new avenues of prosperity are created. However, the means to reorder, 
reconstitute, and civilise the other, creates harm.50  Whether this is through economic aid, 
localised development projects that encourage civil society activity, or large scale state 
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building projects, the exercise of prescribing solutions to create a stabilised environment 
almost always requires the threat and/or use of force, resulting in armed state building; the 
practice of exercising military power to compel the political classes of weak, failing, or failed 
states into governing through new frameworks and institutions that reflect the political, 
economic, and social sensibilities of the prescribing power.51 
 
Practices of development and state building, whether they are focused on economic aid, 
institutional development, civil society programmes, largescale political projects, are framed 
within a narrative of conflict prevention and humanitarian intervention – to alleviate the 
condition of unfreedom. Although often noble regarding the intent of those pursuing the 
projects, they are primarily concerned with Western conceptions of progress; emphasising 
institutional capacity and the prevalent categories used at any given period of time.52 Ashraf 
Ghani and Clare Lockhart demonstrate this problem with the case of Nepal:  
 
A civil society leader in Nepal recounted how the aid system 
reinvents itself with new methods and languages, and the Nepali 
leaders spend their time learning those languages to meet the 
criteria of the moment. But as soon as they have mastered them 
and rewritten their documents, the approach changes, and the 
cycle begins all over again: poverty reduction, sustainable 
development, millennium development goals, capacity 
building.53 
 
In addition to the emphasis on Western conceptions of progress, focused on institutional 
capacity, and reconfigured into new terminologies with new requirements, which – as in the 
case of Nepal – had become an exercise in bureaucratic expediency, Raja Menon argues that 
‘humanitarian intervention can never become an ethically driven pursuit disentangled from 
power and interests’.54  
 
Menon continues to criticise development and state building, questioning its actual 
humanitarian application by arguing that it is a ‘comprehensive solution – applicable 
worldwide, based on universal agreement’.55 He argues that this comprehensive solution is 
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not relevant to all states that are deemed weak, failing, or failed, and as such, states can pick 
to intervene based on interests and the balance of power in the international state system.56 
Menon highlights the case of the Kurdish population in Iraq, and argues that the U.S. had 
only begun to intervene on behalf of the Kurdish population after the Iran-Iraq War (1980-
1988) and had ignored the brutality of Saddam Hussein’s regime during the period of the 
war in order to facilitate the fight against Iran.57 Using the Iraqi-Kurdistan case as an example, 
Menon argues that the act of intervention and advocacy is aimed at producing favourable 
outcomes for the external party that intervenes. Whether this is to achieve regional stability, 
an allied partner, or to gain access to new economic markets and resources, harm is created 
by institution building and the dissemination of knowledges and practices, that require 
physical intervention and occupation, or armed social work;58 bearing much similarity to the 
practices of colonialism.  
 
The act of physical intervention and occupation with the aim of facilitating progress and 
development, through institution building, in order to create competitive international actors 
or stability, maintains characteristics similar to colonialism. Indeed, William Easterly argues 
that the era of development and state building, or what he calls postmodern imperialism, is 
the continuation of the previous colonial era.59 Patricia Owens, describing instances of 
counterinsurgency, argues that those involved in the deployment of force seek to control 
populations, which is effectively the practice of domestic governance building and 
institutional engineering. Owens goes as far as to call these practices a distinctive type of 
government through armed social work.60 The continuity between colonialism and 
contemporary interventions was a result of, according to Easterly, practices of colonialism 
that impaired economic and political development; breeding conditions that motivated the 
‘new White Man’s Burden to clean up the mess left behind by the old White Man’s Burden’.61 
The practices of colonialism led to the creation of badly structured institutions and 
administrations that had lasted beyond the period of decolonisation, which has required 
continuous interventions by Western states through institutions of global governance.  
 
However, global governance amounts to the provision of order by the most powerful actors 
in the system. For this reason, a specific ideal of the state is reinforced,62 this ideal places 
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emphasis on the capacity of institutions by measuring and comparing efficiency. Ultimately 
assigning the state to a place on a scale, justifying the need to repair weak, failing, and failed 
states. In addition to critiques that development and state building reproduce colonial 
relationships through the vocabulary of development and state building, and in the attempt 
to repair institutional deficiencies for the sake of efficiency and progress, creating a cyclical 
problem of development and state building, Hamza Alavi argues that practices of 
development and state building can lead to overdevelopment. Alavi defines 
overdevelopment as the extreme bureaucratisation of structures of governance which tends 
to strengthen the state military apparatus as a source and provider of social order.63 
Nevertheless, despite criticisms regarding the knowledges and practices of development and 
state building, the modern state in its idealised conception, is upheld and reinforced.  
 
The state, as the primary actor in the international state system, is essential to global 
governance. It is the state that enters negotiations and signs treaties on behalf of their 
populations. Although other actors, such as non-governmental organisations do play a role, 
the state is represented in global politics as a single unit that global governance orders and 
delineates; constraining units with regards to legitimate and illegitimate activities. Global 
governance, according to Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, refers to the practice of governing 
international reform, global environmental policy, global health policies, global 
environmental policies, gender policies, weapons proliferation, international trade, and 
peace-keeping.64 At the same time, it is the state that gives global governance its power in 
norm creation and dissemination.65  
 
Practices of global governance, including development and state building, rely on the threat 
and use of force to produce externally legitimate political rituals. In doing so, it is evident 
that these political rituals of modern statehood are not objective, despite the conceptual 
framing of the modern state as an objective set of institutions that can be implemented and 
developed in the global regions to order, civilise, and pacify the populations. Attempts to 
impose the idealised conception of the modern state in the non-West amount to oppressive 
practices that are representative of the international condition of the modern state in the 
non-West as subordinate to Western political, economic, and social ideals. At the heart of 
this problem is the idealised concept of the state, one that does not exist – even in the West 
– but which informs contemporary development and state building practices as a 
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continuation of previous knowledges and practices of imperialism and colonialism. It is 
evident that the language has changed in contemporary and historic practices, overtime it 
has become increasingly embedded in scientific categories and characterisations of how 
societies function and react, while maintaining the knowledge and practice of a standard, or 
benchmark, for the non-West to accede to.  
 
1.3 The Standard of Civilisation and Nineteenth Century European Expansion 
By examining the imperial and colonial knowledges and practices that are reproduced in 
contemporary development and state building, it is evident that the modern state constitutes 
a standard of civilisation, embedded in a history of European state formation, modernity, 
and expansion. Discussed above, the categories and the language regarding the benchmark 
of success (civilisation) have changed overtime, but the fundamental measure of success 
against an ideal-type has reproduced a standard that contributes to the continued exploitation 
and colonial interests of the West. This section outlines the scholarship on the standard of 
civilisation, discussing why and how it was applied to the global peripheries.  
  
As described by David Fidler, the origins of the standard of civilisation emerged in the 
nineteenth century from ‘the collision between Western civilisation and non-Western 
civilisation’ through the expansion of European and American commerce and political 
influence, which required that the non-West accede to norms and laws developed by Western 
states. Polities in the non-West were required to create institutions that paralleled the 
political, economic, legal, and moral values of Western civilisation in order to be viewed and 
treated as equal participants.66 Only under these conditions would the global peripheries be 
able to assert sovereignty, which would have had limited the ability of European states to 
fulfil economic and political interests.  
 
This standard, which persists through development and state building, established a 
benchmark of capability and efficiency. However, the concept of civilisation has undergone 
transformation over time, in pre-modern Europe civilisation emphasised Christianity, 
chivalry, and trade to become conceptualised as the ability ‘to undertake binding 
commitments under international law and whether it was able and willing to protect 
adequately the life, liberty, and property of foreigners’.67 In practice, the two definitions were 
not mutually exclusive, John Westlake points to civilisation being the ability of governments 
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to govern white men and because non-Western states could not provide governance to the 
appropriate standard, foreign nationals who were resident in the non-West were governed 
under separate legal systems administered through their national consuls.68 The inability of 
the global peripheries to be civilised was seen as the result of a biological inability linked to 
racial and religious difference. It can therefore be argued that the transformation, from 
civilisation being encompassed by Christianity to a rational and positivist undertaking of a 
legal framework is an artificial rupture.69  While modern notions of civilisation are often 
viewed as separate from histories of Christianity, chivalry, and pre-modern trade, 
emphasising the ability ‘to undertake binding commitments’ as a sign of rationality and 
progress, Christianity, chivalry, and trade did not disappear from the framework of 
civilisation.  
 
The values that informed the nineteenth and early twentieth century standard of civilisation 
emerged from the Enlightenment and industrialisation, and were shaped by political and 
economic revolutions that had occurred throughout Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Ideas from this period formed the foundation of European modernity, the crux of 
inter- and intra- European politics, with Enlightenment thinkers concluding that public 
institutions would improve societies, if they were ‘guided by a more realistic understanding 
of the universal or recurrent features of human existence’.70 During this period, the study of 
societies became subject to the developments and reasoning of the natural sciences, believing 
that rational inquiry, could allow for the emergence of laws governing society as Sir Isaac 
Newton had discovered laws governing physical reality.71 By linking scientific thought to 
institution building and social engineering, society, and by extension – the social field,72 could 
be understood in a positivist manner, removing social order from the realm of pure chance.73   
 
Through this understanding of the social world, ‘social Darwinism’ and ‘scientific racism’ 
gave an ‘objective’ ‘scientific’ basis to ‘the superiority of Western culture’.74 Western culture 
was shaped by institutions that instilled order, and education, according to radical 
Enlightenment thinkers, became the tool to disseminate equality, introduce authority, and 
eventually allow the masses to become emancipated from uncivilised and irrational 
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knowledges and practices.75 As Western culture became focused on a scientific understanding 
of order as the crux of modern civilisation, Western dominance in the global peripheries 
became an ‘expression of scientific laws rather than an accident of power politics’, and 
Enlightenment ideas of progress, liberal ideas of civilisation, the influence of trade, were 
believed to have pacifying effects on the uncivilised.76 
 
The impact of Enlightenment, industrialisation, and political revolutions in Europe 
transformed Christian-European international society into the modern European state 
system, a precursor to the contemporary international state system. But the changing patterns 
of relations between Europe and the global peripheries was limited. Where, in Europe the 
concept of ‘civilisation’ was historically viewed as being analogous to ‘Christianity, chivalry, 
and trade’, which justified Christian-European domination, the emergence of the modern 
European state system, which maintained oppressive force over the global peripheries, did 
so by justifying others to the realm of ‘disorder’ and ‘savagery’.77 The pre-modern categories 
related to a religious worldview were replaced by new linguistic categories that reflected the 
modern scientific rationality of European civilisation, however, practices subordinating the 
global peripheries went unchanged, providing continued European dominance through 
attempts to civilise the global peripheries.  
 
European domination in the global peripheries was justified by conceptions of civilisation 
that were reflected in an ordered and pacified society characterised by the consolidation of 
the modern sovereign state, the distinctive international state system, and the configuration 
of global peripheries into colonial empires.78 As Gerrit Gong argues, the standard of 
civilisation was used to help navigate practical and philosophical problems during the period 
of European expansion. For example: it gave way to the requirement that non-Western 
societies would allow legal protections to Western citizens residing in foreign lands according 
to a Western standard. The standard of civilisation established a benchmark denoting which 
societies could come to acquire legal recognition and legal personality under international 
public law.79 The benchmark for becoming a member of the international state system was 
to become a recognised state that guaranteed basic rights for foreign nationals, an organised 
political bureaucracy and the maintenance of a monopoly of force, a Western-style system 
of domestic law with codified laws, equal administration of justice throughout all territories, 
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the ability to engage in international relations through diplomatic institutions and resources, 
and acquiescence to international law; conforming to Western customs and norms.80 
 
Inscribed in this standard was the idea that it appealed to a set of universal moral values, 
attainable by every society to accede to modernity.81 According to Barry Buzan, this is one 
reason why the Ottomans, the Egyptians, the Japanese and others embraced modernising 
projects during the long 19th century – the implementation of legal, administrative and fiscal 
reforms held out the promise, in theory if rather less so in practice, of a pathway towards 
equality of status within the international state system.82  
 
Accession to the European state system as a full sovereign member was a key motivation for 
the Ottoman modernisation project, as the alternative was continued subordination. Just as 
the European state system was a consequence of modernity, subordination of the global 
peripheries was also a condition of modernity, which required the global peripheries to be 
subject to European desires and interests. Accession as a full sovereign member would 
guarantee the rights of non-interference and limit social, political, and economic 
interventions made by colonial and imperial powers. Imperial modernisation of the Ottoman 
Empire and subsequent colonisation of the Syrian provinces, sought to diminish the 
difference between polities categorised as civilised and those that were categorised as 
barbarian.83 While the global peripheries challenged Western dominance, particularly 
following the Second World War, the states in the non-West ‘did not reject the constitutive 
principles of [Western] society, such as the ideas of sovereignty and non-intervention’,84 and 
many newly independent states attempted to reassert these principles - principles these 
regions had actively sought to achieve through imperial modernisation with the aim of 
invoking rights to non-interference and non-intervention.   
 
With the advent of the modern state in Europe and the development of the European state 
system, the standard of civilisation was not only enforced through legal frameworks, 
including the ability of the global peripheries to assert legal character over Europeans residing 
in their countries and accession to international law. It was also asserted through nineteenth 
century imperial modernisation and colonialism that sought to order, civilise, and rationalise 
the populations in the global peripheries through institutional engineering and coercion. 
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Such projects were early attempts to force a framework of modern European statehood on 
the global peripheries with the goal of civilising the populations.  
 
1.4 The Modern State as a Standard of Civilisation: The Problem of Modern Non-
European State Formation   
In making the argument that the modern state in the global peripheries is the product of a 
standard of civilisation, the modern state is deployed through a specific set of assumptions, 
including conceiving it as a centrally administered means to organise politics, the economy, 
and society – to produce order and efficiency by creating civilised groupings of people. 
Although ‘civilisation’ has been used to distinguish people living within cultural fault-lines,85  
it is used here with reference to society being refined, orderly, and polite, separate from 
societies’ barbarianism and savage tendencies that characterised Europe’s pre-modern past. 
Discussing the French conceptualisation of civilisation, Dena Goodman states:  
 
‘By the eighteenth century, French men of letters had come to 
identify French culture with sociability and sociability with the 
polite society of men and women […] They viewed their own 
culture as the best in the world […] it [their culture] had reached 
the highest point civilisation had yet attained.’86 
 
This quote places emphasis on the characteristics of civilised society, describing civilisation 
– in a global sense – as being a scalable concept and with French high society being at the 
uppermost point of civilisation. Although society had become refined, ordered, and polite, 
it did not constitute a rupture from pre-modern knowledges, particularly with regards to how 
the ‘other’ was characterised and categorised. Through the process of modernity, tied to 
enlightenment and industrialisation, to be civilised – as a society – meant to be managed by 
the state’s centralised institutions, which orders, and organises society by maintaining a 
monopoly of force, controlling the economic markets, and managing the life processes of its 
citizens. However, as argued by Menon, this form of development and state building cannot 
be separated from motivating interests, and, as argued by Gong, the standard of civilisation 
provided a means to navigate the practical and philosophical problems, justifying the pursuit 
of interests while maintaining the rhetoric of good intentions. 
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This thesis highlights the importance of history in the development of the modern state. It 
focuses on the interactions between the West and the non-West in the production of 
knowledges and practices regarding the standard of civilisation, the development of the ‘self’ 
as well as the ‘other’ in the categories and associated characteristics that were central to 
understanding the international. By arguing that the modern state in the global peripheries is 
the result of the application of a standard of civilisation, this thesis contends that the history 
of imperial and colonial interactions with customary knowledges and practices requires 
consideration in the conceptualisation of the modern state. In doing so, it considers the 
history of the post-colonial state, specifically in Lebanon and Syria, the implications of 
European politics and European hegemony, global governance, and the maintenance of a 
standard of civilisation.  
 
Using the case of the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, particularly the territories 
that encompass the modern states of Lebanon and Syria, and covering the period between 
1800 and 1944, this thesis explores how the state, as a standard of civilisation, was applied in 
the creation of Lebanon and Syria. In particular, the thesis examines how the export of 
knowledges and practices of modern European statehood impacted the development of 
authority and governance in Lebanon and Syria, creating permanent colonial structures that 
reconfigured customary authority into modern political categories.  
 
The state as a standard of civilisation has its history in the formation of the modern European 
state, which was a culturally and socially specific outcome to a set of domestic social 
processes rooted in intellectual and technological developments, where political, economic, 
and social change was reflected by transformations in governance. These transformations 
led to the expansion of the European state system into the global peripheries, which 
emphasised the idea that the organisation of the modern state was superior and provided a 
solution to the other forms of political, economic, and social organisation, which were 
perceived as irrational, barbaric, and fanatical.  
 
With the expansion of the European state system, the modern state in Europe was 
established as a benchmark for the global peripheries. However, European expansion into 
the global peripheries enforced knowledges and practices of European statehood through 
imperialism and colonialism, establishing a relational dynamic of subordination to European 
superiority. This relationship required the global peripheries to replicate the institutions, 
norms, and forms of governance of the modern European state in order to ascertain 
30	
	
independence.87 In doing so, peripheral polities would eventually have their sovereignty 
recognised, their legal character would become legitimate, and they would be able to 
participate within the institutions and frameworks of the international state system.  
 
In exporting the knowledges and practices of the modern state into the global peripheries, 
the institutions and ideas of the modern state created disruptions within the social field. The 
social field refers to the conceptual space where groups – tribal, religious, ethnic, linguistic, 
political, and economic – form alliances and come into conflict to produce hierarchies and 
governance.88 In other words, the social field is the environment where alliances and conflicts 
emerge between various groups, producing and facilitating politics and the economy.89 As 
Pierre Bourdieu describes it, the social field is multidimensional with regards to the way in 
which agents operate in relation to economics, politics, and other agents. Bourdieu makes te 
argument that relations in the social field are never occurring separate from the other 
elements in the social field.90 Within this field, that is bound by a central authority, a variety 
of factors – including norms, laws, institutions – constrain and provide opportunities to 
agents, impacting how society develops and relates to authority. As well as how changes in 
the social field (economic, political, industrial, intellectual, etc.) and the expanding or 
condensing boundaries of the social field, can provide opportunities for agents to alter 
authority and norms, laws, and institutions. For example, with continued European 
interventions, the expansion of European knowledges and practices altered and disrupted 
the relations within the social field in the Ottoman Empire. As a result of these interventions, 
the social field expanded to include European actors. The hierarchies and norms produced 
by these new relations within the social field led to social and political transformations with 
regards to the relationship between agents and institutions of authority. The pursuit of 
interests by European powers impeded the replication of the modern European state in the 
global peripheries. The application of the modern state as an objective set of knowledges 
and practices, separate from their historical development, was subject to the European state 
system and the governments of the Ottoman Empire, leading to difference in the knowledges 
and practices of the modern state outside Europe. 
 
While the European powers held the global peripheries to the standard of modern statehood 
that had emerged in Europe, arguing that the replication of the European state would relieve 
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the global peripheries of their inferior position, the development of the modern state in the 
global peripheries was produced under the conditions of colonial and imperial violence, 
economic exploitation, and the destruction of political, economic, and cultural knowledges 
and practices that were perceived as backwards by the European powers. Although it can be 
argued, as it was during the nineteenth century, that colonial and imperial interventions 
brought modern technology, political and social order, and opened the economies to global 
markets, colonial and imperial powers were primarily interested in achieving a set of 
economic and political interests that were beneficial to their own status. The consequence of 
this experience resulted in resistance to European encroachment through the strengthening 
of certain customary knowledges and practices but also the adoption of knowledges and 
practices associated with the modern state.   
 
Although knowledges and practices of statehood were being adopted, the inferior position 
of the global peripheries was to the benefit of European geo-strategic and economic 
interests. Despite modernisation, the subordination of the global peripheries to the 
European states was maintained due to the enduring form of pre-modern and customary 
political, economic, and social customs, as well as engagement in acts of resistance. The 
expansion of the European state system into the global peripheries was primarily motivated 
by the development of a global economic system and colonial and imperial geo-strategic 
interests,91 rather than a humanitarian desire to civilise. Nevertheless, the justification for 
continued interference was one of moral authority that was upheld in the establishment of 
the modern state in Europe and which would do the same in the global peripheries.   
 
The European powers of the nineteenth century, primarily Britain, France, and Russia, had 
come to believe that the knowledges and practices of modern statehood in Europe were the 
pinnacle of civilisation, establishing a benchmark for the global peripheries to accede to, 
while, at the same time subordinating the global peripheries to pursue political and economic 
interests. Still, the modern state was viewed as a set of institutions that could be objectively 
applied in a universal fashion, despite the historically specific environment in which they 
emerged. The modern state as a standard of civilisation affirmed that the global peripheries 
could accede to the European state system once internal political, economic, and social 
dynamics successfully replicated those in Europe. Only under these conditions could the 
state in the global peripheries obtain the degree of international legal character that would 
permit its equal legal status and the assertion of sovereignty. 
																																																						




The European powers had unwittingly been active participants in their own social 
development, a result of social, political, and economic transformations, that altered existing 
forms of governance, norms, and institutions to better navigate the changing reality. By no 
means was this an easy task, these transformations often brought violence, revolution, and 
dissent, but the end result of the transformation was the standard, often in an idealised and 
stylised form, to which the global peripheries were required to accede to. While compliance 
to this standard was being demanded of polities in the global peripheries, it was also in 
constant transformation in Europe.  
 
The ongoing transformations occurring in Europe are not only reflected in European history, 
but also the changing nature of the European relationship with the global peripheries and 
the demands that were being made by European powers. In addition to these demands 
changing with continued transformations in Europe, the application of a standard of 
civilisation was a tool that was used by European states to make gains and attain interests. In 
this manner, the standard of civilisation was a moving benchmark that was purposefully 
shifted when attainment was close. By moving the benchmark of what it meant to be 
civilised, the European powers were able to justify continued interventions and interference 
on the premise that the target polity had failed to act as an agent in its own civilising process.  
  
1.5  Sources, Method, and Methodology 
The thesis examines the case of the nineteenth century Syrian provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire (1800-1918) followed by the twentieth century French Mandate in Lebanon and 
Syria (1920-1943). By applying a case study approach the thesis provides an ‘intensive study 
of a single unit for the purpose of the understanding of a larger class of (similar) units’.92 
Selection of this case study was based on characteristics such as imperial and colonial 
interactions within the context of an emerging international state system and its role as a 
peripheral actor in the European state system. The purpose for selecting on this criteria is to 
analyse the multilateral interactions that occurred between various actors at various levels of 
analysis, such as the international, the state, and the local domestic levels. Through this case 
study, the thesis examines the relationships between each level and within each level. For 
example, when discussing the relationships between levels, it examines actors within the 
European state system, the Sublime Porte,93 and the local forms of authority and the 
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interactions across all three. When discussing the relationships within each level, it examines 
the relationships between European state actors, or between actors within the Sublime Porte, 
or within the local levels. In a similar fashion, when discussing the French Mandate (1920-
1943), the thesis considers the relationship between Britain, France, Lebanon and Syria 
through a multi-level analysis. Through the case study approach, future research can be 
conducted in a similar fashion with the aim to better understand the sociological dynamics 
of statehood in a particular region.    
 
The use of the case of the Syrian provinces in the Ottoman Empire (1800-1918) and the 
French mandate of Lebanon and Syria (1920-1943) relies primarily on archival documents: 
newspapers, travel diaries, political despatches, treaties, legislation, records of parliamentary 
sessions, and official speeches, in order to reconstruct a history of state formation in 
Lebanon and Syria that puts the state – as a product embedded in the social field and 
international state system – at the centre of analysis. Data was collected from the British 
National Archives, the British Parliamentary Archives, the British Library, the French 
Diplomatic Archives, the French National Archives, the Lebanese National Archives, and 
the archives at l’Université Saint-Joseph in Beirut. By examining these archival documents, I 
was able to gain insight into the various political narratives of the representatives of the 
European powers. This was achieved through close analysis of despatches from British and 
French ambassadors, consuls, and consular managers, to their governments in London and 
Paris. In these archives were also memoirs, personal letters, and newspapers by British and 
French citizens living in, or travelling through, the territories that now compose Lebanon 
and Syria, as well as individuals who were native to Lebanon and Syria, subjects of the 
Ottoman Empire more generally, or individuals who had entered the Ottoman Empire 
seeking refuge from political events in Europe.  
 
In using these archives, I was primarily concerned with information regarding European 
perceptions of Lebanese and Syrian society and governance in the Ottoman Empire, 
Lebanese and Syrian perceptions of the state – including the Ottoman Empire and the 
French Mandate, and Lebanese and Syrian perceptions of the European powers. By looking 
at how these relationships developed within the context of material interests, ideological 
pursuits, state centralisation and bureaucratisation, and nationalist developments, a story 
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about state formation in Lebanon and Syria emerges within the context of a global standard 
of civilisation.  
 
In producing this research, I have come across contradictions in the primary source 
documents, which aroused uncertainty. In resolving this issue, I have attempted to triangulate 
the information available in the primary source documents with secondary source histories 
or I have returned to the archives with the aim of drawing conclusions. The use of archival 
documents triangulated with secondary source histories has provided me with the ability to 
undertake a mixed methods approach, using historical analysis, content analysis, and 
discourse analysis. Through a historical analysis, this research attempts to reconstruct history. 
In doing so, it considers historical development as an assemblage of knowledges and 
practices. It maintains that customary knowledges and practices were assembled, not into 
perfect reproductions of modern European knowledges and practices, but into an 
amalgamated forms, that blended ‘pre-modern’ and ‘modern’, non-European and 
European.94 Indeed, Sandra Halperin and Ronen Palan argue that the institutions and logics 
of past polities do not entirely disappear, instead, their mark is left on the ‘structures and 
processes and on the institutions, cultures, politics and legal systems of the peoples who 
inhabit [these] territories’.95 By thinking in terms of assemblage and by tracing the history of 
state formation in chronological order it is possible to uncover layered forms of organisation, 
networks, and politics that undermine the assumption that knowledges and practices can be 
perfectly replicated through state building and development.96 Assemblage allows researchers 
to consider, for example, how modern social structures and customary social systems 
produce hybridity within institutions.   
 
Additionally, I carefully reject the idea of historical ‘facts’ in the use of archival documents 
for the reconstruction of the history of the state in the Lebanon and Syria, by understanding 
history as being the product of a story which represents the situated knowledge and action 
of the individual or group who is narrating. For this reason, the research attempts to accord 
historical accounts to interests, power relationships, and goals.97 In doing so, this research 
employs content analysis in order to reveal underlying meanings and ideas in the narration 
of historical accounts in the primary source documents.98 At times, this research employs a 
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discourse analysis, particularly when meanings and ideas require contextualisation with 
regards to power. Using discourse analysis, this research also draws on language as source of 
power that influences, reinforces, and legitimates the worldviews, actions, and positions of 
the actors involved.99 From this, it is possible to decipher intent and interests including, the 
motivating factors of actors in the decision-making process. In providing a historical analysis, 
content analysis, and discourse analysis of the primary source documents, this research aims 
to answer three questions: what is the document’s purpose? How does this document fulfil 
its purpose? What knowledges or worldviews are being created or reinforced through this 
document?  
 
1.6  Thesis Outline  
By arguing that the state in Lebanon and Syria, and more generally, the global peripheries, 
constitutes a standard of civilisation, this thesis examines how the state as a standard of 
civilisation was applied, impacting the knowledges and practices of statehood in Lebanon 
and Syria. 
 
Chapter 2 provides a theoretical and conceptual framework that is used in exploring the 
argument. It begins by examining the scholarship on the emergence of the modern state in 
Europe and follows by examining the conditions of modernity through nineteenth century 
interactions between the European powers, the Sublime Porte, and the Syrian provinces; to 
better comprehend the pre-modern and the modern knowledges and practices, which framed 
European actions. However, the chapter also places importance on the form of governance 
within the Sublime Porte that had developed prior to the nineteenth century European-
Ottoman interactions as well as authority within the social field in the Syrian provinces 
(focusing on the territories with contemporary Lebanon and Syria).  
 
Chapter 3 examines the initial development and application of the standard of civilisation to 
governance and authority in the Ottoman Empire. It considers the relationship that 
developed between Britain and France and the Sublime Porte during the Greek War of 
Independence (1821-1832) and the Egyptian occupation of the Syrian provinces (1831-
1841). By examining these events, the chapter highlights the strategies of Britain and France 
to pursue national interests and assert a civilisational benchmark on governance, taking 
advantage of the dislocation between the social field and governance.  
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Chapter 4 examines the consequences of the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839) as the product of a 
civilisational standard that facilitated the pursuit of European interests. It considers how the 
reform decree dislocated the social field from governance and authority, creating 
opportunities for the British, French, and Russian governments to engage in the pursuit of 
interests. This chapter examines the consequences of this pursuit by highlighting the 
development of the Crimean War (1853-1856), the resulting Hatt-ı Hümayun (1856), and the 
Sublime Porte’s constrained position in governance.  
 
Chapter 5 examines the destructive impact of modernisation reforms and European 
interference, with the case of the Damascus Massacre of 1860. It continues by analysing the 
consequence of violent resistance to modernity and European interference as the expansion 
of imperial knowledges. This chapter subsequently highlights the Young Ottoman faction 
within the Sublime Porte, which reproduced the knowledges and practices of modernity 
within the framework of Islam, developed to accede to the civilisational benchmark and to 
maintain domestic legitimacy.  
 
Chapter 6 considers the consequences of the failures of the political project put forward by 
the Young Ottomans. This includes an analysis of British and French responses to Sultan 
Abdul Hamid II’s centralisation of power and the development of Arab nationalist sentiment 
in the Syrian provinces.  
 
Chapter 7 examines the role of the Arab nationalist movement and Turkish nationalist 
movements within the Ottoman Empire in attempting to uphold principles of the modern 
state. This chapter highlights that while the institutions, structures, and concepts of modern 
statehood had been disseminated, the character of the modern state, the form of household 
authority, was still contested.  It examines this experience within the context of European 
instability, the outbreak of the First World War (1914-1918), and the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire (1918).  
 
Chapter 8 analyses the context of the reproduction of the standard of civilisation under the 
French Mandate for Lebanon and Syria through the establishment of global governance and 
within the framework of state building. It examines how French interests continued to 
dominate in the development and reconfiguration of the state and the consequences French 




The thesis concludes with a discussion of the argument and empirical evidence, highlighting 
how the state was the product of a standard of civilisation, which distorted customary 
household authority through the creation of imperial and colonial institutions and categories 
had been employed for the benefit of European interests. Subsequently, it discusses the 




Chapter 2:  History and Theory: The European State, Modernity, and the Syrian 
Provinces of the Ottoman Empire 
 
2 Introduction  
Discussions and studies on the modern state typically reproduce an ideal-type, often 
concerned with a centralised government that is able to assert authority over a delineated 
territory that can be considered in a Weberian framework. Authority in this manner consists 
of a monopoly of force, structured and efficient political and economic institutions managed 
by a central government, responsible for the life processes of its citizens, and which organise 
and discipline society. By conceptualising the state in this manner, it is perceived as a means 
to organise the political, economic, and social environment into an efficient framework, one 
that is measured and that can be categorised into a typology of failure, weakness, and 
strength. The measurement of the state, particularly in practices of development and state 
building, reproduce a colonial dynamic between the West and states in the global peripheries. 
The typology of weakness and failure, and subsequent development and state building 
projects and policies that are produced from these typologies, subordinates the global 
peripheries to imperialistic knowledges and practices under the façade of bringing progress 
and civility. The state, in its ideal form, and exported in this manner, is a universal goal to be 
attained; a standard of civilisation that represents rational governance, efficiency, and 
progress that is upheld and reinforced through development and state building, and which 
emerged in the nineteenth century. 
 
This chapter establishes a framework to examine how the state, as a standard of civilisation, 
was applied to the global peripheries and the knowledges that were imposed during its 
application, specifically in the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. This chapter begins 
by analysing the history of modern state formation in Europe. From this analysis, it is 
possible to expose the pre-modern knowledges and practices that were applied to the non-
West during the period of European expansion. It considers the modern state, as it is 
conceived of in the West, as being informed by specific social traditions that were then 
shaped by the unique contexts of the industrialisation and the Enlightenment. This includes 
a worldview informed by Christian-European knowledges and practices that were assembled 
with ideas of rational order and scientific progress in the development of a standard of 




This chapter follows with a discussion on the expansion of the European state system into 
the global peripheries during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, drawing on 
examples of how nineteenth century and early twentieth century European ideas were put 
into practice to replicate the modern state. While this history is concerned with a narrative 
of domination, of knowledge and practice production, often by coercive means in the pursuit 
of national interest, there exists a history of resistance. The modern state was applied to the 
global peripheries in the pursuit of economic and political interests, aspects of statehood 
were also adopted by those being dominated with the aim to assert sovereignty and resist 
continued interference and exploitation. 
 
The modern state was not simply applied through European domination or Ottoman 
reforms, but through interaction between European states and the Sublime Porte, as well as 
between European States, the Sublime Porte, and the social field in the Syrian provinces. In 
order to understand the impact of the standard of civilisation on the Ottoman Empire and 
the Syrian provinces, this chapter subsequently examines how Ottoman governance in the 
Syrian provinces developed. By outlining the development of Ottoman governance prior to 
the nineteenth century period of modernisation, it is possible to understand how the social 
field became dislocated from governance during early periods of modernisation, and how 
aspects of the social field were used by the European powers in the pursuit of interests. 
 
2.1 Modern State Formation in Europe: The Emergence of a Civilisation  
The state defined in Weberian terms is implicitly accepted as a starting point in the disciplines 
of international relations, political science, and development studies. Because the state 
emerged from a specific understanding of Western, and particularly European, history, it is 
through this historical understanding that the concept of the state has developed and been 
applied, often going uncontested.1 The history of state formation in the international state 
system typically refers to the Peace of Westphalia, 1648. Although its importance is debated, 
it was through the Peace of Westphalia that the rulers of European states acknowledged state 
authority through national government and undermined ‘the pope’s claim to universal 
authority’.2 The consequence of this recognition was the regulation of relations between 
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According to Henry Snow, the Peace of Westphalia formed a community of ‘the civilised 
world […] composed of a body of states wholly independent and only morally bound by 
such agreements as they might choose to make, for such time as they might choose to keep 
them’.4 While it established a community of nations, it also emphasised the authority and 
independence of leaders in Europe. The combination of community and independence, as 
stated by Sebastian Schmidt, were ‘strange bedfellows’,5 because the independence of the 
European state was bound to, and restricted by, a set of communal agreements. The 
emergence of the modern state and its recognition by other modern states provided the basis 
of sovereignty, leading to the production of the international state system. This particular 
system of state independence and international community produced a framework of 
legitimacy that emerged through the history of state formation in Europe. 
 
Although the emergence of the modern state in Europe and the Peace of Westphalia 
represents a shift in global political history, it does not present a historical rupture. The 
modern state is often considered to be a symbol of progress and civilisation, the product of 
political, economic, and social interactions that developed during modernity, which stands 
in contrast to the pre-modern European condition, which was uncivilised and backwards. By 
exploring the histories of state formation in Europe, the sharp contrast between the pre-
modern and modern conditions that existed in Europe is contested, it becomes evident that 
the modern state represents an assemblage of modern knowledges and practices with 
distinctly pre-modern foundations. By examining the histories of European state formation, 
it is possible to trace the pre-modern underlying aspects to the modern state. 
 
State formation, according to Charles Tilly, was the product of conflict and war, which 
helped establish borders, encouraged increased material and agricultural production due to 
taxation, that helped develop regulated economic systems, and necessitated social cohesion 
through the creation of an external enemy. Tilly’s explanation also provides an understanding 
of how networks of individuals wielding authority expanded over territories, negotiated with 
competitors, eliminated competitors, and developed centralised institutions to manage the 
functions of their communities,6 relating state formation to organised crime.   
 
Tilly’s description of state formation, informed primarily by the European experience, 
maintains a comprehensive focus on political, economic, and social development through 
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war-making. On the other hand, Julia Adams develops a narrower explanation by exploring 
the impact of elite politics. Adams examines the relationships between elites, focusing on 
rulers, families, and staff who were driven by the need to secure control of capital and 
territory. Where Tilly argues that the slow expansion through conquest and absorption led 
to the development of centralisation and institutionalisation, occurring out of necessity, 
Adams argues that the individuals’ desire to fulfil self-interest altered the structures of 
governance and administration and thus the role of the state.7 
 
Between Tilly’s analysis of competition between, and expansion of, political regions in the 
formation of states and Adams’ narrative of institutional development tied to individual 
interests, Hendrik Spruyt focuses on elite politics as being central to the proliferation and 
reinforcement of ideas between competing groups with regards to governmental 
organisation and order.  Using the case of pre-1400 France, Spruyt emphasises the role of 
French Capetian Kings (987-1328), who along with the burghers and acquiescence of 
nobility, favoured authority structures built around territorial boundaries and ownership. 
Feudal elites and the clergy, however, preferred authority governed by personal ties and 
lineage. According to Spruyt, competition between the two groups was sufficient for 
centralisation to occur, which fostered unique national identities that helped in the 
establishment of the modern state.8 Although Spruyt considers the role of the clergy, who 
sought to fulfil a specific set of political interests, Philip S. Gorski argues that it was not the 
interests of religious men but the importance of a value system that maintained a robust and 
comprehensive hierarchy which led to the institutional development of the state. Focusing 
on Calvinism in seventeenth century Holland, Gorski argues that religion had a major role 
on how Dutch capitalism and society was structured, impacting the development and 
efficiency of state structures.9 
 
While centralisation, territoriality, and efficiency are discussed in these histories, there was 
no determined path to modern statehood in Europe. Whether state formation occurred 
through war and competition, elite politics, or hierarchical norms propagated through 
religious belief or political ideology and affecting politics and the economy, the development 
of political and economic authority was eventually bound to a defined territory that required 
the policing of borders. Although the modern state in Europe was eventually established 
with fixed borders, the state, and prior to the development of international norms of 
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sovereignty was an expansive entity in Europe. In addition to the importance of political and 
economic authority as aspects in shaping identities, worldviews, and relations between states, 
technological and intellectual advancements from the industrialisation and Enlightenment 
also contributed to the emergence of the modern state. Progress related to industrialisation 
and the Enlightenment changed perceptions of time and space, distances became shorter to 
travel and culture and economic trade from the capitals to neighbouring regions increased. 
It was therefore easier to assert power from a central authoritative structure outwards into 
areas that were previously considered ungovernable. The increased ability of political 
authority to assert itself over regions further afield led to expansion and a rationalisation of 
state institutions that would allow efficient management society and the economy.  
 
Norbert Elias concurs that as power centralised under a monarchy, society increasingly 
became ordered and pacified by increasingly stable monopolies on taxation and violence. 
The civilising character of this transformation provided ‘pacified social spaces […] which are 
normally free from acts of violence’.10 Centralisation of governance released society from the 
instability of multiple power centres and the constant threat of force that had accompanied 
it.11 The tamed environment also tempered the emotional responses of society by binding 
society in social norms, creating an interdependence between the individual, society, and the 
state: ‘[…] from this interdependence of people arises an order sui generis, an order more 
compelling and stronger than the will and reason of the individual people composing it’.12 
The result of this process was the transformation of social order, the civilising of society, 
which was tied to the emergence of the modern state, where the modern state became the 
symbol of the ability to be civilised.13 
 
As argued by Andrew Linklater, economic and military demands, such as taxation and 
inscription, on the population by the central political authority led to a civilizing process that 
elevated the role and duty of customary social forms, which had been responsible for 
managing the life processes of individuals within customary networks, into the state.14 
Increasingly, centres of authority looked towards political ideas of Enlightenment thinkers, 
changing the dynamics of the royal household to include bourgeois elements in the royal 
courts, creating a new emphasis on public interest, and altering the dynamic of state-society 
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relations.15 The interplay between state expansion and the changing character of centralised 
governance led to stronger emphasis on the relationship between the individual and the state, 
the former navigating the institutions of the state as they once had navigated the customary 
groups and networks. In turn, the state was increasingly responsible for ordering and 
pacification of individuals and the management of life processes, which had been the 
responsibility of the customary household prior to the establishment of the modern state.  
 
The modern state, able to organise and civilise society, was considered an indication of a 
society’s ability to be modern. Ferdinand Toennies argues that through modernisation man 
moves from Gemeinschaft, a social order based on the premise of kinship and managed 
through household authority, to instrumentalised relationships between individuals to make 
gains regarding profit and power. Toennies calls the latter phenomenon Gesellschaft; 
describing it as a condition of modernity and increased production and wealth.16 Perceptions 
of modern governance encompassed freedom from the limits of household obligations and 
freedom to act within the legal confines of statehood so as improve one’s individual 
condition. 
 
The centralisation of governance, the monopolisation of taxation and violence through 
centralised institutions, as argued by Elias and in a similar fashion to Tilly, was crucial to the 
development and formation of the modern state. While society was ordered and civilised 
through the formation of the state, Michael Mann, in agreement with Migdal, argues that 
societies are heterogeneous, containing multiple overlapping and intersecting networks of 
power, which cannot be considered as a single unit for analysis.17 Heterogeneous society, 
according to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, is composed of civil society groups that seek 
the fulfilment of particular interests, which would benefit their position and status. Hegel 
contends that these groups must work within the state, which is composed of legislative, 
executive, and judicial institutions that mediate and implement decisions that affect the 
universal community within the territory of the state.18 Despite the heterogeneity of society, 
society functions within a framework that is universally administered and is composed and 
regulated by the state. This framework is institutional, and while society is understood as a 
principal component of the state, institutions order the social organisation by managing the 
demands and administering governance. In other words, these institutions were systems to 
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distribute power in society, allowing change but maintaining organisational superiority over 
society.19 These institutions, although often associated with modernity have a history in 
customary forms of organisation, inclusive of religion, as argued by Spruyt and Gorski.  
  
As the state centralised, the social field underwent a transformation, the customary networks 
that had previously managed life processes had been replaced by institutions that emphasised 
the role of the individual and individual’s relationship to the state. Although Weber and 
Engels conclude that the state emerged in tandem with the disintegration of household 
authority, household authority never ceased to exist. The social environment, whether 
characterised by elites or social forces, played an important role in forming the state and its 
institutions, which scaled-up the management of life processes that had been organised 
through and reliant on household authority, including the distribution of capital, the 
organisation of the workforce, security, and welfare. By examining the role of the state in 
society in this manner, it is possible to argue that the state is a scaled-up version of household 
authority that is reflective of the social history and environment in which it exists. The state 
therefore undertakes these processes that were once managed through customary forms of 
household management, but to the extent in which it is delineated by society. By 
conceptualising the state in this manner, Patricia Owens refutes ‘the basic liberal premise that 
large-scale forms of household rule were eliminated in modern capitalist states’.20  
 
As argued by Owens, customary household authority did not disintegrate or disappear with 
the establishment of the modern state, instead the modern state can be more effectively 
conceptualised as a distinctive ‘bureaucratic form of household rule’.21 By conceptualising 
statehood in this manner, the state emerged due to the changing nature of the economy 
through capitalism and politics through the social contract. In other words, the modern state 
became a largescale form of household authority, Owens equates household authority and 
governance, with oikonomia, the management over those who reside within the household, 
arguing that household governance, in all its forms, is reflected in the political governance of 
communities and states.22 
 
By conceiving of the state as a scaled-up version of household authority, it is possible to find 
parallels between the management of life processes that had been attributed to pre-modern, 
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or customary, ‘households’ and the modern state. The role of household authority was the 
organisation and discipline of its members by a leader who commanded and monopolised 
the use of force and capital extraction and redistribution. Through technological and 
intellectual developments that altered perceptions of distance and time, the ability to 
broadcast authority was transformed, leading to its centralisation. The impact of 
technological and intellectual advancements, and centralised authority that changed the 
patterns of relations in the social field, relocated customary household authority from being 
held by local groups, to being controlled by an overarching centralised authority, the state. 
Owens describes this transformation as an abstraction that provided ‘the language to 
formulate new distinctions between bureaucratic-state ‘government’ and ‘economy’, public 
and private’.23 
 
In agreement with Owens, Thomas Paine states that governance ‘has its origin in the 
principles of society and the natural constitution of man’.24 Authority and governance are, as 
argued by Paine, a social phenomenon and the development of authority and governance is 
dependent on the consent of the society, which provides legitimacy to political systems and 
the boundaries of authority. Similarly, Shmuel Eisenstadt argues that ‘the political system is 
a basic part of any society’s organisation’ explaining that ‘different types of political systems 
develop and function under specific social conditions, and the continuity of any political 
system is also related to such specific conditions’.25 Here Eisenstadt argues that society is 
itself a political organisation dependent on the conditions in which it exists.  
 
What is evident by examining the state through state formation is that its emergence is tied 
to a specific history of social, economic, and political change caused by conflicts, alliance 
formation, and modernity. These changes altered the social field,26 redirecting authority to 
centralised systems of governance and reorganising communities by placing emphasis on the 
individual. While the state was produced in a historically specific social field, its continuation 
as a stable political entity has relied on the acknowledgement of territorial sovereignty and 
non-interference by other similar states. Similarity between states, according to Elias, was 
civilisational, and created an ease in relations that structured behaviour and regulated 
interstate relations, which is also evidenced with regards to the Peace of Westphalia (1648). 
Although the modern state is discussed as a liberal form of governance, and, as Owens 
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argues, an abstraction, which produces a universalist objectivity in its application to global 
regions, it is difficult to disassociate the modern state from its historical origins. Whether 
those origins are discussed through the framework of conflict and war, elite politics, religion, 
or technological and intellectual progress, the modern state conceived of in the Weberian 
framework is inherently a social enterprise rooted in pre-modern European history.  
 
The modern state in Europe is reflective of its historical origins, including war and conflict, 
elite politics, or religious frameworks of order. Its development through modernity was an 
assemblage of new knowledges and practices onto pre-modern knowledges and practices, 
transforming household authority and scaling it up into the centralised institutions of the 
modern state. Instead of conceptualising the state as a form of scaled-up household authority 
and tied to a specific set of knowledges and practices informed by history, the state was 
considered to be a set of objective and methodical institutions, which had the ability to 
rationalise and order societies throughout the global regions. However, the experience of 
modernity and state formation in the global regions, specifically the Middle East, was 
different to that of Europe.   
 
2.2  Modernity and the Expansion of the European State System into the Global 
Peripheries 
The condition of modernity, with its technological transformations that altered the means of 
production, and the intellectual development that led to norm creation among European 
states, enabled European expansion into the global peripheries.27 With European expansion, 
under the guise that the modern state was a civilised entity, the pursuit of economic and geo-
political interests presented a philosophical problem in the Ottoman Empire, as well as a 
practical problem with regards to the achievement of European interests. By establishing the 
modern state as a standard of civilisation, the philosophical and practical problems were dealt 
with by emphasising the benevolence of the modernisation process.  
 
The long nineteenth century, the period between 1789 and 1914, beginning with the French 
Revolution and concluding with the end of the First World War, is associated with the 
development of global modernity.28 This period is viewed as a crucial turning point in global 
history, one that is often discussed as a rupture caused by the Enlightenment and the 
industrialisation that concluded a period of darkness in human political, economic, and social 
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history. Discussions on politics, economics, and the social environment were transformed 
by the language of modern science that emphasised progress and rationality – as universal 
principles.29 The transformations experienced by the European states led to a general 
improvement of domestic conditions for individuals, regional stability, and global strength. 
Accompanying these transformations was the belief that modernity could be disseminated 
and achieved elsewhere through coercive reordering with the aim of replacing customary 
knowledges and practices with those that were prevalent in Europe.  
 
In Egypt in the nineteenth century, the British attempted to condition society through 
restrictive force, and to discipline the domestic environment into a particular set of 
institutions. Timothy Mitchell argues that it was not the type of discipline and control that 
differed from the previous organisation of society, but the organisation of the domestic 
environment into rational and hierarchal components whose actions and activities could be 
controlled and delineated and whose bodies could be counted in a quantifiable manner.30 
Although the British were actively pursuing a project to modernise the Egyptian state and 
society, their primary interests in Egypt were strategic and economic.  
 
The modernisation project that was produced in Egypt had a detrimental impact on the 
relationship between authority and the domestic environment.31 Dislocation between 
authority and the domestic environment was caused by the implementation of modern 
knowledges and practices through restrictive force without any point of reference for the 
social field, which was being disrupted and reorganised. Discussing the Ottoman Empire of 
the late nineteenth century, Benjamin Fortna makes a parallel argument, stating that ‘the 
changing international situation, national identification and organization presented 
formidable challenges to the Ottoman system of communal relations’. The modernization 
of the Ottoman Empire was one of institutional, social, economic, and political change, 
altering the customs to which imperial authority and the domestic environment were 
governed.32 As Charles Tripp explains, this ‘was the dark side of industrial and technological 
progress […] the ways in which internal social bonds were being undermined, weakening the 
cohesion of society.’ 33 
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Where the Europeans viewed the Ottoman Empire as politically, socially, and economically 
backward, the Ottoman authorities, equally, sought to reform towards a European 
framework of modernity. Ussama Makdisi argues that ‘as such, Ottoman modernization […] 
was as much a project of power within the empire as it was an act of resistance to Western 
imperialism’.34 The Empire had to protect itself by adopting modern European norms in 
order to accede to the European state system as a full and sovereign member, and in doing 
so, it had to assert its power over its territories in an effort to prevent European 
encroachment. Modernisation required the displacement of accepted knowledge and 
practices in favour of European notions of science and progress, the ability to measure the 
natural and social world. 
 
However, failure to properly administer the reforms could not be explained through the 
scientific worldview of the European powers in the nineteenth century. Instead, the 
European powers relied on pre-modern Christian-European knowledge and tradition, which 
continued to inform European interactions with the global peripheries. The interactions 
between the European powers and the global peripheries prior to the influence of modernity 
was one of hierarchy and subordination, justified through the privation of a Christian God 
in the global peripheries, leading the Europeans to reason that the darkness of man was 
caused by the lack of light (God) and was akin to the darkness of evil. With the rejection of 
a Christian worldview in favour of a modern scientific understanding of the world, what had 
been once justified by a religious understanding of good and evil, was replaced with ideas 
that the ability to be modern and civilised was a biological condition of the individual, which 
was determined by ethno-sectarian and racial difference.35 Here it is possible to discern how 
pre-modern knowledges informed modern worldviews, the modern perception of ethno-
sectarianism and race as limiting an individual’s capability to be civilised, relied on a pre-
modern Christian understanding of the world, although dropping the reference to God, and 
combining the understanding of good and evil, light and dark, with a scientific understanding 
of nature.  
 
In colonial America, for example, Bernard Romans, in reference to the indigenous 
populations, is quoted as saying ‘God created an original man and woman in this part of the 
globe, of different species from any in other parts […] a people not only rude and 
uncultivated, but incapable of civilisation’. In the colonial gaze, the practices and knowledges 
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of the other were produced through comparative deduction. The colonisers accepted the 
indigenous populations as part of the human race, however, their ‘savagery’ and 
‘barbarianism’ was attributed to a lack of enlightened thinking, which could only be explained 
as a biological deficiency that prevented them from finding God. In order to rectify the socio-
biological deficiencies of the indigenous other, colonisers viewed it as necessary to ‘cross the 
breed’ of the population, to diminish the biological inadequacies that prevented the 
population from achieving the European standard of civilisation, and providing the 
biological components for the indigenous populations to become civilised.36  
 
The characterisation of societies as civilised or uncivilised based on religious and racial 
categories was due to the inability to explain resistance to modernisation that destroyed 
customary forms of life. Reliance on these categories is clearly expressed by the French 
military captain, M. de Torcy, in 1880 in Syria, who noted that ‘it is difficult to distinguish 
between race, as much of the primitive population has bred with the Arabs and even the 
uniqueness of the Turks has nearly disappeared in Syria’.37 Indeed, strategies formed in the 
pursuit of European interests sought to ‘cultivate and maintain’, according to Secretary 
General, Robert de Caix, ‘all the phenomena, requiring our arbitration, that [the social] 
divisions give [us]’.38  
 
Racial characterisations were used in the deployment of ethno-sectarian categories to explain 
unwillingness or inability to abandon customary knowledges practices and ascend to 
modernity. The condition of modernity was viewed by the European states as a highpoint of 
civilisation and reluctance or resistance to its application by maintaining customary 
knowledges and practices was perceived to be a consequence of a natural irrationality. This 
framework that was employed by the European powers did not provide the possibility to 
consider the alternatives, that resistance to modernisation was a reaction to its resulting 
dislocation from accepted forms of authority, or as a response to the violence of imperialism 
and colonialism. In order to contain and extinguish resistance, the British and the French 
employed strategies of cultural erasure by replacing symbols and signs, reordering the 
physical environment, as had been done in Egypt, and employing force to discipline and 
order society into acceptable modernised frameworks of statehood.  
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Iain Jackson, examining the British occupation of Iraq from the First World War and the 
Mandate period, demonstrates how the reorganisation of the physical environment was 
integral to British interests of creating an ordered and pacified society, whose nationhood 
and state would be created in the image of Britain. The re-creation of the British image in 
foreign lands occurred through the deployment of projects centred on identity and function; 
using names of places familiar to the British psyche, such as Piccadilly Circus, Old Kent 
Road, amongst others, and the construction of universities, palaces, museums to help 
develop new historical narratives of Iraq. Function on the other hand, was characterised by 
the creation of railways, strategic military zones, and widened roads which helped with the 
political pacification of the population by allowing the deployment of force. Although, the 
roads and railways would later be employed in a rebellion against the British.39 
 
While the British attempted to recreate the image of British society through identity and 
function, the French in Syria employed strategies that had been established in other colonies, 
particularly in Algeria. French colonisation of Algeria, lasting from 1830 until 1962, was 
multifaceted. The French administration in Algeria attempted to reconstruct its history, and 
reorder the social and physical environment as an attempt to replicate French order and 
society in the colony.40 Similarly, in Syria, French colonial strategy included building new 
towns, beginning in 1920, first in Palmyra and then in al-Qamishli. Daniel Neep argues that 
the creation of these towns conformed to Foucault’s description of disciplinary space; a 
method to make individuals visible, to expose and control movement of the populations. 
The French forces asserted that the strategy had a ‘positive influence on the Syrian residents 
of the town [Palmyra]’, which was attributed to the French forces leading by example and 
the use of coercion.41 While the aim was to pacify the population and assert dominance, the 
use of coercion was also employed to reorder society into spaces that were easy to manage. 
Doing so altered the relationship between the social field and physical space, changing the 
ways in which intercommunal relations developed.  
 
Other strategies employed by colonial powers, such as Britain and France, throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries included the sponsorship of local groups, creating 
domestic agents for colonial control through customary networks that were deemed 
uncivilised and irrational.42 This process was considered a norm in colonial governance, 
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however, it contradicted the intent of the modernisation project, which was one of a civilising 
process. By elevating the status of allied customary groups and networks, the British and the 
French validated their existence and the function of customary knowledges and practices. 
Concurrently, the colonial powers were producing centralised institutions of governance to 
replace the customary groups and networks, and altering the physical environment changing 
the manner in which customary groups and networks interacted.43 By elevating the status of 
specific customary groups and networks and by enforcing the authority of centralised 
institutions, the British and the French created new areas of conflict between communities 
within the social field, and between the social field and governance.  
 
Despite the negative impact of imperial and colonial modernisation, the European powers 
persisted, employing the logic, as Ernest Gellner contends, that the condition of modernity 
was better than that of traditional society, and with modernity came the promise of rational 
thought, scientific progress, and the superiority of the West through ‘an enormous 
infrastructure, not merely of political order, but educationally, culturally, in terms of 
communication and so forth’.44 As Toby Dodge argues, British modernisation and 
occupation of Iraq tried ‘to legitimate itself in terms of the betterment of the population;’45 
creating a common thread, not just with regards to practices of force and occupation, but 
with the discursive and intellectual reasoning that colonial intent paralleled that of 
contemporary development and state building.  
 
Gellner continues that the global transition between the primitive and modern mentality was 
universally possible; stressing the ability for all people to attain worldviews that are ‘‘rational’, 
non-magical, non-enchanted’.46 The logic of modernity, according to Gellner, could be 
disseminated beyond the boundaries of where it had been established and the West had the 
extraordinary capability of ensuring that the scientific rationale of modernity could be 
established. Similar to Gellner’s argument that modernity was an attainable condition, one 
that could be taught in order to transition society from its primitive natural state to a modern 
and evolved form, Elizabeth Dore argues that it was  
 
Not […] only in Europe that those trends of cumulative change 
were at work – trends towards the rule-bound civility which 
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could take the swordsman and debunk the cleric, towards rule 
by rules rather than by people, towards reflective attempts at 
understanding nature and at using that understanding for 
productive ends, towards the acceptance, indeed the celebration, 
of individual choice and market contract.47 
 
The rationality of modernity, whether that meant ‘rule-bound civility’ or the utility of nature 
‘for productive ends’ was perceived as a global desire, and one that societies were 
endeavouring towards. The difference was in the framework of those developments, which 
produced culturally specific structures. Indeed, the advent of European modernity in this 
way was a culturally specific framework and structure. While these transformations may have 
been underway in the global social and political environments as a separate phenomenon 
from European modernity, Robert Price argues that this experience was skewed due to 
European interventions and interference.  
 
Organisations whose formal aspects have been transplanted 
from highly industrial societies, and which therefore appear to 
the observer as ‘modern’ social structures, are in reality 
penetrated by aspects of the indigenous (‘traditional’) social 
system, and […] this produces hybrid institutions, many of 
whose features are dysfunctional to the successful achievement 
of organisational goals.48  
 
The combination of modern social structures and customary social systems producing hybrid 
– or assembled – institutions emphasises the inability of imperial modernisation and colonial 
projects to replace existing knowledges and practices, leading to an assembled form, or 
‘hybrid’. According to Shmuel Eisenstadt and Robert Hefner, the inability to reproduce 
modernity as it was experienced in Europe led to a variety of experiences of modernity, and 
the emergence of multiple modernities.49  
 
The experience of modernity may have been different throughout the global regions, 
dependent on its application and the response, but modernity itself was not multiple. Rather, 
modernity was a singular global phenomenon that prioritised the interests of the West and 
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capital-creating classes globally. The experience of modernity in Europe benefitted from the 
centralised character of state authority. The conditions of modernity in Europe resulted in 
the scaled-up form of household management that placed importance on centralised 
governments to strengthen institutions and laws to moderate inequalities within the social 
field.50 However, the experience of modernity in the Ottoman Empire, was different. 
Modernity, as a European development that expanded outwards into the global peripheries 
benefitted Europe and subordinated the former, including the Ottoman Empire, to a set of 
standards that were repressive.  
 
By examining the experiences of modernity in the Ottoman Empire as a result of the 
interactions - the actions, reactions, and responses - between European powers, the Sublime 
Porte, and the social field in the Syrian provinces, it is possible to understand how conditions 
of modernity were accepted and resisted.51 Sati’ al-Husri, a prominent Arab nationalist, born 
in the late nineteenth century in Sana’a, Yemen to an Aleppine family, discussed the state in 
a manner that reflected a European conceptualisation of the nation-state. However, al-
Husri’s writings were not simply a product of colonial indoctrination or knowledge 
reproduction, but a reflection of his intellectual and material environment. Al-Husri’s 
worldview was established as a form of resistance to the oppressive experience of modernity, 
his writings propagated ideas of unity among the Arabs while arguing for sovereign rights 
based on a great civilisational history, to justify the end of European interference.52  
 
Although al-Husri desired the establishment of an Arab state, he argued that the formation 
of a modern state system through the European Mandate was a ‘Pandora’s Box’ that would 
divide the Arab nation and leave it ‘[…] subject to all the evils of the world’.53 Al-Husri’s 
opposition was not only based on the threat of physical division, but the threat of centralised 
bureaucratic governance on a nation that could be subdivided in multiple ways, threatening 
the possibility of exclusion, and severing the multiple centres of authority that provided 
sources of political authority and legitimacy to different customary groups and networks. 
 
Similar to al-Husri’s rejection of European interference and the creation of modern states in 
the Arab territories, Nazih Ayubi argued that the structures and institutions of the modern 
state alienated the Arab populations, particularly those situated in the lower economic classes. 
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The modern centralised institutions of the state dislocated a considerable proportion of 
society by failing to reflect the political, economic, and social traditions of the population.54 
Local value systems, or customary knowledges and practices, as argued by Homi Bhabha, 
formed an important source of resistance, opposition, and agency against colonial 
interference and interventions.  
 
Where theorists of modernisation argue that ‘local value systems survived because they were 
functionally necessary to maintain local social systems that had little contact with 
modernity’,55 Bhabha argues that cultures ‘may be contingent to modernity, discontinuous or 
in contention with it, resistant to its oppressive, assimilationist technologies; but they 
[sometimes] also deploy the cultural hybridity of their borderline conditions’.56 Bhabha 
acknowledges how the expansion of modernity impacted the global peripheries, recognising 
that those populations and cultures existed alongside modernity, appropriating and opposing 
its associated knowledges and practices at once and in various ways. Bhabha therefore 
advocates a narrative of history that undertakes an analysis of the dominant power and the 
subordinate subject as interconnected and multiple; where an action produces a response, 
the two are interconnected. 
 
2.3 Illuminating the Other: The Organisation of the Ottoman Empire 
The dichotomy between modernity and tradition maintains the assumption that traditional 
societies are vulnerable to modern domination, and in doing so, agency is easily removed 
from traditional societies, as they become subjects of domination rather than active 
participants in domination or resistance.57 The global peripheries, subjected to European 
knowledges and practices, were not subjects devoid of knowledges and practices, and their 
indigeneity, though typically viewed as inferior through the lens of European hegemony, can 
be used to understand the other beyond the Eurocentric construction.58 By illuminating non-
European culture, economics, and politics exogenous to their European utility, the subaltern 
subject is elevated from their subservient status within the dominant narratives. However, as 
Bhabha, argues, elevating the status of the subaltern subject does not reduce other subjects 
to subservience, but allows for other histories to be given importance.59  
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By examining the form of governance that had become prevalent in the Ottoman Empire 
following the sixteenth century conquests of the Arab territories, it is possible to better 
understand how European forms of modernity became assembled with Ottoman systems of 
governance; how governance and value systems in the Ottoman Empire became crucial to 
the resistance of continued European interference; and how nineteenth century 
modernisation projects in the Ottoman Empire impacted the development of authority, 
governance, and the state in Lebanon and Syria. Most importantly, it also provides a better 
understanding of the practical and philosophical problems that arose during European 
expansion and how the state as a standard of civilisation was applied to navigate these issues.  
 
Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was functioning within the 
European state system, of which members were regulated by an agreed set of norms 
composing an early international legal order. While the Ottoman Empire was increasingly 
becoming subject to this expansive system, it had not been granted membership as a 
sovereign entity, free from interference and intervention, but as a subordinate power. The 
position of the Ottoman Empire in relation to the European states reflected the characteristic 
of modern expansion: to bring societies out of the darkness through the development of a 
rational ordering of society, by the governance of public affairs, and the ‘exit from self-
incurred immaturity’60 through the provision of scientific reason; the need to reveal truth, to 
remove humanity from blind faith, and overhaul ancient authority in order to establish a 
modern form of civilisation commensurate with the global norms and institutions was 
characteristic of European expansion and modernity.61 
 
The European state system is discussed as an expansive system, similarly, albeit with a 
different set of knowledges and practices, so was the Ottoman Empire. The European state 
system was in a dominant position to the Ottoman Empire; the latter retaining a dominant 
position within the Syrian provinces. However, the European state system and the Ottoman 
Empire expanded through different methods. While the expansion of the European state 
system is often discussed in terms of colonisation, oppression, and coercion, with the aim to 
replace customary systems with those that matched Europe, the Sublime Porte undertook a 
different approach, although not devoid of the use of violence, it was reflective of a 
worldview and established set of norms that had developed through a distinct set of 
principles informed by Islamic philosophy and legal interpretations.     
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The early expansion of the Ottoman Empire encouraged early state building through trade 
and domination: ‘as the Ottomans were expanding, they incorporated important trading 
ports, bringing cities on trade routes under their control’.62 The expansion of the Ottoman 
Empire led to an increasingly culturally, religiously, and ethnically, diverse population, 
creating ‘mobile markers of difference’63 and integrating populations through ‘fictional 
genealogies [which] gave outsiders equal status’ within the Empire.64 Karen Barkey describes 
this as the telling of ‘analogous narratives’, cohabitation, and ‘increasingly adopting each 
other’s characteristics’.65 The management of diversity was brokered through the Sultanate, 
by establishing relations with the various communities within the geographic confines of the 
Sultan’s authority.66 The framework of governance and authority in which the Sublime Porte 
operated was ‘a hub-and-spoke network structure of which [the Ottomans] became the 
centre’, the result of ‘building relations across otherwise separate and competing groups and 
communities’.67  
 
The organisation of the early Ottoman Empire in a manner that reflected a negotiated 
settlement was both practical and necessary in order to maintain power, especially as the 
Empire expanded eastwards. With the Arabian conquests in the sixteenth century Islam 
became an important identity marker for the Ottoman Empire, whereby the development of 
a strong institutional Islamic identity was not prevalent in the initial frontier and expansion 
of the Ottoman Empire. Still, Ottoman governance was constructed on the Islamic 
interpretation of the concept of toleration, rather than equality. ‘Toleration refers to the 
relations among different religious (and ethnic) communities and secular authorities, and is 
the outcome of networked, negotiated, and pragmatic forms of rule’.68 The negotiated 
settlement of the Ottoman Empire, particularly following the sixteenth century, required 
obedience to imperial Islamic order and was separate from the management of local and 
individual affairs. 
 
The Sublime Porte harnessed the influence of an Islamic philosophical understanding of the 
world from early Islamic texts, which only became a significant feature because of a 
																																																						
62 Barkey 2008, p. 40. 
63 Barkey 2008, p. 41. 
64 Antony Black (2001) states that ‘the early Ottomans appear to have ruled their territories partly on the basis of tribal 
and nomadic ideas; fictional genealogies gave outsiders equal status’, p. 199.   
65 Barkey 2008, p. 41. 
66 Barkey 2008, pp. 45-46. 
67 Barkey 2008, p. 29.	
68 Barkey 2008, p. 110. 
57	
	
‘heterodox understanding of Islam’, where tradition and sacred space between Muslims and 
Christians, but also Jews became increasingly blurred.69 The development of an institutional 
Islamic identity in the sixteenth century did not undermine the multi-religious character of 
the Ottoman Empire, but reinforced important boundaries, by drawing on Islamic 
jurisprudence.70  For example, Jews and Christians (ahl al-dhimma), according to Muhammed 
ibn al-Hassan al-Shaybani, an eighth century Islamic jurist, were required to be protected 
within the territories governed by Islamic authority. Such protections, however, came at the 
cost of tribute, a head-tax (jizya) that would permit non-Muslims to maintain a livelihood, 
free of persecution, within the framework of the polity.71 A practice that was upheld by the 
Ottomans and which came to be viewed as illiberal by the nineteenth century European 
powers.72 Reliance on Islamic jurisprudence, the integration of the ulema, or Muslim scholars 
of law and theology, provided the Sultan a legal and administrative framework in which 
authority could be established, and provided the Sultan with legitimacy with regards to the 
Muslim populations.73  
 
The management and brokering of relations with and between divergent communities, in a 
flexible manner, as discussed by Karen Barkey, required ‘greater […] need for 
accommodation and flexible provincial and frontier arrangements’.74 By managing authority 
in a flexible manner, the Sublime Porte did not negotiate a strict Ottoman identity. Instead, 
identity was the product of autonomous communal management. While the Sublime Porte 
maintained authority by brokering relations with and between groups, governance and social 
order was managed at a local level, relying on notables (ayan),75 governor generals, and district 
governors. By localising authority, the Ottomans were able to allow varying degrees of 
autonomy in the provinces.   
 
The ‘hub-and-spoke’ system of governance allowed local communal leadership to negotiate 
agreements with Ottoman rulers, in order to ‘maintain their religious autonomy and 
community existence free from interference’.76 This system was sustainable as long as the 
relational framework, which was characterised through its flexibility, was maintained. Ibn 
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Khaldun, a fourteenth century historian, writing on the production of authority within a 
polity, notes that it is not the defeat of a dynasty that propels the termination of a civilisation, 
but the dissolution of the relationship constructed between the social elements and the 
dynasty.77 Society, as conceived by Ibn Khaldun, was not an organization independent from 
religious, political, economic, military, and cultural spheres – rather, they were interconnected 
and overlapping.78 They produced various social groups and networks, or what is referred to 
as ‘asabiyyah. The latter, often translated as ‘social solidarity’ or ‘group feeling’.79  
 
As discussed by Leila Fawaz, the ‘asabiyyah, was a communalism based on ‘family, clan, 
village, or city quarter’ it ordered society and provided a source of authority, it ‘dominated 
one’s worldview rather than larger social or political affiliations’, and its maintenance in the 
larger political context was necessary for leadership to receive broad consent.80 However, by 
the end of the eighteenth century, the structures of the Ottoman Empire were beginning to 
change, segmented groups became connected and interdependent, altering the ability of the 
Imperial centre to broker separate relations between communal leaders.81 The internal 
relational changes placed new pressures on the Ottoman Empire by displacing its role as a 
power broker.  
 
In addition to internal changes, global politics and relations in the eighteenth century were 
transforming with the industrial revolution in Britain and, more generally, Western Europe. 
Agricultural innovations, changes in the means of production, advances in science, meant 
transformations in the economic market, aided by improved methods of transportation, 
political centralisation, bureaucratisation, and creating new social and political relations 
between social groups and individuals within those groups.82 Such innovations and 
transformations were not contained to the borders of Western Europe and as the Ottomans 
suffered a series of defeats and territorial losses in the eighteenth century, ‘European 
diplomats intervened in post-war negotiations with the Ottomans to prevent rivals from 
gaining too many concessions’.83 The increased interactions between the Ottoman Empire 
and Western European states provided European states with a political and economic 
foothold within in the Ottoman Empire, placing additional pressure on the Sublime Porte 
to engage in reforms.  
																																																						
77 Ibn Khaldun 1967, pp. 263-295. 
78 Baali 1988, p. 31.  
79 Ibn Khaldun 1967, pp. 263-295, 25; Fuad Baali 1988, p. 43-44.  
80 Fawaz 2014, p. 9. 
81 Barkey 2008, p. 195. 
82 Stearns 2007, pp. 21-27. 




The transformations in society, caused by Ottoman modernisation, global politics, and 
European interference, changed the dynamics between authority, territoriality, and society, 
and as argued by the fourteenth century philosopher and historian Ibn Khaldun, altered and 
transformed the identity and politics of the populations.84 For stability to prevail, the social 
field had to be reflected within the structures of governance and authority, and therefore had 
to consider the political, economic, and social structures of society in order to effectively 
govern.85 As the Empire began to transform during the late eighteenth century, schisms 
between the social field and structures of governance began to widen, and provided the 
European powers with the ability to develop relations with customary groups and networks 
within the social field by securing alliances with individuals in positions of authority. This 
was done by providing them with the promise of economic benefits, security, access to 
governance, and by establishing relations based on common identities.   
 
Just as customary household authority did not cease to exist with the emergence of the 
modern state in Europe, forms of household authority within the Syrian provinces continued 
to wield influence. Household authority can be compared to the ‘asabiyyah. The ‘asabiyyah is 
described as a source of authority that is located within the framework of the family, clan,86 
tribe,87 village, or city quarter,88 and religion. 89 As a source of authority, it produced order 
within the social field and formed the prevalent communal networks in the Ottoman Empire, 
persisting and transforming into the period of French colonial administration and into 
independence. 
																																																						
84 Taiaiake and Corntassel 2005, pp. 597-600. Ibn Khaldun 1967, pp. 25, 263-295. 
85 Taiaiake and Corntassel 2005, pp. 597-600. Ibn Khaldun 1967, pp. 25, 263-295. 
86 Family and clan organisations can be organised through performative association, where kinship or clan membership is 
intersubjective and can constitute a multitude of forms including myths of descent and intermarriage resulting in extended 
networks and loyalties. Kinship and clan membership can also be biologically relational, tied to procreation and lineage, 
see Sahlins 2013, p. 62. Farsoun (1970, p. 280), for example, highlights how political loyalty was sustained by kinship 
networks which formalised into political parties, men’s and women’s clubs, and welfare and aid societies. 
87 The Sultanate, in the sixteenth century, had brokered relations with the Mawali tribe to secure safe passage through the 
Syrian Desert, however, they were overrun by ‘Anaiza tribal confederation, resulting in uneven control throughout the 
Desert, requiring the Sultanate to broker a new set of relations, see Masters 2006, p. 190.  The term tribe is contested as a 
colonial construct, while others attempt negotiate its use by asserting that terms ‘tribe,’ ‘tribal,’ and ‘tribalism’ are intended 
to be loose frameworks that encompass a wide set of informal organisations and groups that act for communities through 
politics and economics. The term ‘tribe,’ within the Western discourses, connotes a form of inferiority in relation to the 
Western organised polity; nevertheless, it is a term that is often used throughout historical, anthropological, and 
sociological texts. Colson 1968, pp. 201-206; Colson 1986, pp. 5-19; Fried 1968, pp. 3-20; Helm 1968; Mafese 1971, pp. 
253-261; Tapper 1979, pp. 6-7; Tapper 1990, pp. 48-73.  
88 The city formed an urban centre to a constellation of rural villages and towns, creating economic and political 
connections beyond limits of an urban region. The city was traditionally divided into quarters, with each quarter being 
maintained by an ethno-religious community, providing a separate physical space for cultural and religious practice, Blame 
1980, p. 221; Hourani 1991, pp. 107-108; Smith, Nancy, Al-Any et al. 1969, p. 71,165; Stirling 1965, p. 169.   
89 The millet system recognised the autonomy of religious minorities and provided the leadership of religious minorities 
the right to adjudicate on personal law. It can be described as a pre-modern method of managing a multi-religious 
societie, either in relation to social norms or the division of labour, see Mayer 1997; Sachedina 2001; Issawi 2014, pp. 160-




The role of household authority, or ‘asabiyyah, in the Ottoman Empire was crucial for 
maintaining the Sublime Porte’s legitimacy by providing the opportunity for different 
customary communal groups and networks with the ability to negotiate their role within the 
empire and the degree of autonomy from the Sublime Porte. This system allowed for the 
continuation of customary knowledges and practices, toleration of different identities, and 
helped organise the social field.90 By understanding the form of governance that had been 
developed within the Ottoman Empire, it is possible to understand how modernisation, the 
centralisation of authority and governance, impacted the social field, and generated reactions 
within the social field. In other words, how changes to accepted forms of governance 
dislocated the social field from authority, and the consequences of dislocation for the state 
in Lebanon and Syria.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The modern state is often discussed as a methodical set of institutions, applicable to any 
region or culture due to its objective and rational structure, with these assumptions being 
reproduced through contemporary development and state building projects, it comes to 
stand that the concept of the modern state retains a universal framework. However, the 
modern state in Europe formed through a slow process of competition and conflict, one that 
required centralisation and institutionalisation in order for authority wielders to secure their 
control of sprawling territories and increasing populations. Such development required 
organisation and order, which was informed by the conditions of modernity developed from 
the Enlightenment and industrialisation, and that created a changing set of value systems and 
interests. As is evident from examining the history of state formation in Europe, changes in 
the political, economic, and social environment were assembled onto pre-modern 
knowledges and practices. While knowledges and practices of the modern state were viewed 
as rational, a form of scientific progress, they continued to be informed by a pre-modern 
Christian-European worldview, thus refuting the idea of rupture between the irrational pre-
modern and the rational modern state of man. 
 
The expansion of the European state system into the global peripheries asserted a set of 
political structures and concepts necessary for the non-European states to become partners 
in a global system. For the Ottoman Empire, which had maintained a decentralised form of 
																																																						
90 Organisation of the social field in this manner was made possible through ‘the politics of notables’, the notables were 
important local power wielders who used their social prominence to attain positions of authority in exchange for 
legitimacy. See Davison 1963, p. 17; Khoury 2006, pp. 152-155.  
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authority on the principles of toleration and negotiation and justified by interpretations of 
Islamic jurisprudence, accession to the European system required modernisation; the 
abandonment of irrational, disordered, and pre-modern forms of governance, authority, and 
life. Reforms that were undertaken by the Sublime Porte and with pressure from the 
European powers, including centralised governance and equality before the law, dislocated 
the social field from the accepted form of governance; providing opportunities for the 
European powers to pursue their interests.  
 
The expansion of the European state system, and the pursuit of political and economic 
interests, were veiled under the assumption that the modern condition could, and should be, 
exported to the global peripheries in order to save the peripheries from their ‘self-incurred 
immaturity’.91 In exporting the modern state into the global peripheries, the standard of 
civilisation was applied to the Ottoman Empire, providing a path for the Ottoman Empire 
to be recognised as a sovereign and civilised member of the European state system. To 
accede to this standard, the European powers emphasised that the Ottoman Empire was 
required to abandon cultural and political difference and centralise authority through the 
creation of social and political institutions that replicated those that existed in the modern 
European state. In reaction to this requirement, there were many debates within the Ottoman 
Empire, particularly in the Sublime Porte, on how to reconcile the European standard of 
civilisation with cultural difference. However, the institutions that developed in Europe did 
so from a particular political, economic, and social environment, built on the foundations of 
pre-modern knowledges and worldviews, and interactions with modernity and between each 
other. The inability of the Ottoman Empire to accede to the benchmark established by the 
European states meant that it would be extremely difficult to have its civility recognised as a 
member of the European state system, despite its efforts.  
 
On the one hand, the application of a standard of civilisation on the Ottoman Empire was 
justified by the argument that the dissemination of rational and scientific knowledges and 
practices would relieve the Sublime Porte of its barbarity and fanaticism. On the other hand, 
increased interference in the domestic affairs and organisation of the Empire was viewed as 
necessary for the establishment of principles of equality, citizenship, secular national 
identities, institutional development, and centralisation of governance. It was believed that 
the modern state could be engineered by creating a rule based society, asserting new political 
rituals that would replace unmodern, or customary, knowledges and practices. Once 
																																																						
91 Immanuel Kant quoted in Deligiorgi 2002, p. 154. 
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completed, the population would become part of the civilised world and the polity would be 
able to accede to the European state system, international law, and in doing so, be able to 
assert sovereignty through statehood.  
 
The export of the state into the global peripheries was done with the conviction that 
modernity and the conditions of modernity, which were enshrined in the state, were 
universal. However, the European powers had failed to recognise the importance of the 
historical development in the production of knowledges and practices of modernity. The 
failure to understand the importance of history in the production of modernity and the 
modern state was due, in part, to the creation of a rhetorical rupture between the pre-modern 
and modern state of being. The notion of rupture, and the conviction that the modern 
condition was the pinnacle of civilisation, facilitated the failure to contend with the reality of 
deeply embedded existing institutions, identities, and politics of the regions that the modern 
state was being exported to. By looking at history, it is evident that the export and application 
of the concept of the state was not one that effaced existing knowledges and practices in the 
global peripheries, but interacted and shaped the politics of the region and population.  
 
By arguing that the intention of the European powers was that of civilising the Ottoman 
Empire, specifically the governing structures of the Sublime Porte and the social field of the 
Syrian provinces, by ordering society through ideas of rational governance, the European 
powers were able to serve their economic and political interests. Pressure placed on the 
global peripheries to modernise through colonial interventions were viewed as humanitarian 
endeavours with the aim of providing order and civilisation, and to free societies of barbarity 
and fanaticism. Doing so would provide the Empire with the freedoms associated with 
statehood and the security of sovereignty, relinquishing the Empire of its unmodern customs. 
Such conceptions had been produced under the guise that European modernity was 
objective in its ability to reorder the politics and economics of any society, whereby the failure 
of a society to achieve the standard was due to a natural inability. As the European powers 
sought to export their form of household authority into the global peripheries by asserting, 
not only, an organisational and intellectual superiority, but also a global structural framework 
of governance, they did so with the belief that it was objective; it could be applied evenly and 





Chapter 3: The Ottoman Empire in the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century: 
International Order, Imperial Reform, and Social Order  
 
3  Introduction 
The relationship between the social field and governance in its temporal context is important 
in understanding the formation of the modern European state and the expansion of the 
European state system. European expansion into the global peripheries was particularly 
influenced by the context of industrialisation, which had an influential effect on global 
economic and political interests, and the Enlightenment, which established a framework of 
civilisation based on ideas of scientific progress and rational governance. The knowledges 
and practices that were produced through European expansion, particularly that of the state 
as a standard of civilisation, produced the foundations of the modern state in Lebanon and 
Syria.  
 
This chapter examines two crucial aspects to the argument that the export of the state into 
the global peripheries was a standard of civilisation. It considers the establishment of a 
standard of civilisation, that required the Ottoman Empire to adopt a series of reforms in 
order to accede to a benchmark in order to secure continuity and independence. It also 
considers the impact of these reforms, and analyses the effect of knowledge and practice 
production within the Ottoman Empire, first with the Greek War of Independence (1821-
1832) and subsequently with the Egyptian occupation of the Syrian provinces (1831-1841). 
While this chapter highlights the role of that the European powers played, in the pursuit of 
national interests, which shaped the developments within the Ottoman Empire with respect 
to the Sublime Porte as well as the social field, it also considers decision making within the 
Sublime Porte and the political cost of European aid within the European state system.  
 
This chapter begins by analysing the early reforms of Sultan Selim III and Mahmud II, 
contextualising the reforms within the domestic and international contexts in which they 
were promulgated. Subsequently, it examines the impact of European interference with 
regards to the Greek rebellion and Greek War of Independence and the unintended 
consequences that followed, such as the Egyptian occupation of the Syrian provinces. 
Specifically, this chapter considers the European colonial interests that were pursued within 
the Ottoman Empire and in the context of the Greek War of Independence and the Egyptian 
occupation of the Syrian provinces, the outcome of which was the first Tanzimat reform, the 
Hatt-ı Şerif (1839). The Tanzimat was a process of modernisation that embodied the interests 
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of the European powers, through the export of the modern state as a standard of civilisation, 
but was also a tool crafted by the Sublime Porte in an attempt to be recognised as a sovereign 
member of the European state system. This chapter continues by discussing the converging 
interests between the European powers, particularly Britain, and the Sublime Porte, 
regarding the Hatt-ı Şerif. However, despite these converging interests, the Sublime Porte 
was faced with a series of domestic and international constraints that hindered its immediate 
application in the Syrian provinces.    
   
3.1 Initiating Modernisation in the Early Nineteenth Century: Sultan Selim III’s 
Reforms 
Following several military defeats in the eighteenth century the Ottoman Empire was in 
crisis. It had become evident to the Sultan that in order to compete in the European state 
system, the Ottoman military would need to be reorganised and modernised to reflect the 
organisation and capabilities of its European counterparts. This had little to do with 
admiration for Europe, though some did – and some did not – admire Europe, and more to 
do with necessity and survival. The need to reorganise and modernise the Ottoman military 
led to a series of reforms called Nizam-I Djedid (Nizam-I Çedid) by Sultan Selim III (7 April 
1789-29 May 1807) which sought to eventually replace the Janissary Corps. The Janissaries 
were primarily recruited from the devshirme (devşirme), a blood tax or blood tribute, from non-
Muslim populations of the Ottoman Empire. The abolition of the devshirme in the eighteenth 
century developed into an institutional breakdown of the Janissary Corps. Coupled with 
economic problems in the Empire, the Janissary began to take up practices of corruption 
and involve themselves in civilian trades and businesses, blurring the once well demarcated 
lines between military and civil life.1 
 
The Nizam-I Djedid Army was composed of soldiers trained in a European tradition, with 
new equipment.  By creating a parallel army with new equipment, trained in a European 
manner, Selim III was attempting to slowly do away with the Janissary Corps, who had 
become increasingly economically and politically powerful through their alliances with 
networks of merchants and craftsmen. However, the Janissary were vehemently opposed to 
any changes to their role and position in the state and society.2  
 
																																																						
1 Çaksu 2014, pp. 118 – 119. 
2 Emecen 2001; Beydilli 2001, pp. 70-71.  
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Further to Selim III’s attempt to replace the Janissary Corps with the Nizam-I Djedid, Selim 
III implemented changes that included the reorganisation of the civil administration that 
sought to review the mechanisms of justice in the provincial administrations, which were 
being misused by notables – or ayan – and warlords. The administration under Selim III 
sought to make manageable adjustments over time to avoid sudden and abrupt changes that 
would cause upset in the provinces. This was a deliberate strategy of Selim III to help 
establish order and discipline.3 Reflecting the state of disarray of the civil administration, the 
play, titled The Magistrates, written in 1772 by Mirza Feth-Ali Akhoud-Zaide, reflects on local 
government, administration, tradition, society, and change within these areas. The beginning 
pages explain the story of a young woman who has no family except an aunt, and whose 
brother had just passed away. As per religious tradition, the brother’s wealth would be 
provided to the young woman, Sekine-Khanoun. However, her brother had a temporary 
marriage, unrecognised by law, and the wife, keen to get her hands on the fortune, filed a 
suit against her sister-in-law, Sekine-Khanoun. As the plot deepens, we find that Sekine-
Khanoun is in love with a heretic, although cunning and well connected, he is not of the same 
faith. Additionally, the elites of the village collaborate with the widow and plot against Sekine-
Khanoun, agreeing to divvy up the wealth after they have paid witnesses to lie in the court.4 
The story reflects the social and political environment: the corruption of local governors who 
acted with various elites in making economic and political gains, the strong undertone of 
rebellion against tradition and custom, and the dissipating importance of religious boundaries 
with the young urban elite. The latter portrayed through the protagonists’ refusal to marry 
the socially and religiously acceptable man, as well as her will to be an independent woman. 
If literature and art are reflections of the general social and political environment,5 then what 
can be extracted from this play is the changing social norms and structures, a tepid form of 
secular modernity arising through small instances of social rebellion. Although this would 
have been scandalous, the fact that the story was written reflects the transforming social 
norms.  
 
In addition to domestic reforms, Selim III sought to elevate the Empire’s position in the 
changing European system by assigning ambassadors to European cities beginning in 1793 
with London followed by Paris, Vienna, and Berlin in 1797. Prior to the placement of 
ambassadors in European cities, bilateral relations and affairs were conducted by Ottoman 
Christians or within Istanbul through European ambassadors. Despite the stronger bilateral 
																																																						
3 Beydilli 2001, pp. 71-73. 
4 Akhoud-Zaide 1772, pp. 25-66. 
5 Wolff 1993; Luhmann 2000. 
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relations that Selim III attempted to establish, France had been in the midst of domestic 
turmoil resulting in the French Revolution (1789-1799) and the French Revolutionary Wars 
(1792-1802). The latter arrived at the shores of the Ottoman Empire with the invasion of 
Egypt in 1798. The propagated narrative of the French Revolutionary Wars was that of 
establishing and encouraging the freedom and independence of nations. However, in 
practice, France sought the expansion of its own colonial peripheries, where freedom and 
independence coincided with French authority.6   
 
Aggravated by the invasion and the possibility of further French expansion into the Empire, 
Selim III aligned the Empire with Russia on January 3, 1799 and England on January 5, 1799. 
Russia viewed the alignment as an opportunity to gain access to the Mediterranean via the 
Turkish Straits. Access and control of the waterways was a cornerstone of Russian Foreign 
Policy in the region, while Britain was particularly concerned with French control of Egypt, 
as Egypt was Britain’s first stop on the voyage to India. Following the departure of France 
from Egypt on August 30, 1801, England and Russia sought to protect their interests. 
England moved to establish a permanent foothold in Egypt and Russia began to incite unrest 
amongst the Christian populations – many of whom lived in the European territories of the 
Ottoman Empire. English and Russian pressure exerted on the Ottoman Empire, redirected 
the Ottoman alliance towards France with the Treaty of Paris, on July 25, 1802.7 As the 
Ottoman Empire entered the European state system, its place in the system had become 
subject to a hierarchy, and it was at once subordinated under the dominant states due to its 
difference from domestic European organisation and its Islamic character.   
 
Faced with continued uncertainty and instability and aware of the precarious situation that 
the Ottoman Empire had succumb to, Selim III, writing under the pseudonym Ilhami, makes 
known the stress of, and his discontent with, his responsibilities on the throne.  
 
Midst the orchard of the world though empire may appear delight, 
Still, if though wouldst view it closely, empire is but ceaseless fight.  
Vain let no one be who ruleth kingdoms in these woeful days; 
If in justice lie thy pleasure – then is empire truly right. 
Reacheth e’en one lover union in the space of thousand years? 
Let whoever sees it envy – empire is of faithless plight. 
																																																						
6 Beydilli 2001, p. 74. 
7 Beydilli 2001, p. 74. 
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Think, O heart, alas! the revolutions of the rolling Sphere! 
If at times ‘tis joy, far oftener empire bringeth dire affright. 
Do not envy, do not covet, then, the Kingship of the world;  
O! take heed, Ilhami, empire bides not, swift indeed its flight.8  
 
In the last sentence of the ghazal,9 Selim III remarks that the Empire is not a constant, that 
it could disappear. He was clearly acknowledging the necessity to reform the Empire, to 
transform with the changing international system. But to do so would risk destabilising the 
Empire that he wanted to save. Despite his desires to stabilize the empire, demonstrated by 
peace with Austria, Selim III had to contend with the rise of Muhammed Ali of Egypt in July 
of 1805, war with Russia and Britain in 1806 over the abrogation of their alliance with the 
Ottoman Empire, and resistance to the Nizam-I Djedid by the Janissary Corps. The 
culmination of these events led to such great opposition and military revolt that Selim III 
was deposed on May 29, 1807, and all his reform provisions were cancelled.10 Following the 
removal of Selim III from the throne, Mustafa IV was crowned as Sultan, but his tenure 
lasted just over a year, being forced from his position on July 28, 1808, and being replaced 
with Mahmud II (July 28, 1808-July 1, 1839).  
 
3.2 Sultan Mahmud II’s Reforms 
Until the nineteenth century the Sublime Porte had become increasingly decentralised and 
Mahmud II was aware that the continuation of decentralised authority would leave Ottoman 
territories susceptible to the wills of foreign powers and the possibility of secession. On this 
basis, reforms were developed in order to centralise the state and develop institutions and 
structures that replicated the modern European state. It was believed that reforming the 
institutions of the Sublime Porte would help the Ottoman Empire compete with the 
advances made by the European states and safeguard against the possibility of social 
disintegration into separate politicised parts that could challenge the legitimacy of the 
Sublime Porte. However, these reforms did not always result in more efficient and centralised 
control. Instead, they alienated significant portions of the populations who were threatened 
by change and the resulting transformation of social order, which required the renegotiation 
of the social field.  
 
																																																						
8 Gibb 1901, p. 171.  
9 A particular style of poetic form that rhymes couplets and a refrain. It often refers to heartbreak, pain, loss or the beauty 
of love despite pain and loss. It emerged from North Africa and the Middle East and is a traditional Arabic style of poetry, 
see Shackle 2004.  
10 Beydilli 2001, pp. 76-78. 
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In an attempt to rein in the power of local notables and ensure his authority, Mahmud II 
developed the ‘Document of Agreement’ in 1808. The document, signed by provincial 
notables and governors, acted as a pledge of allegiance and loyalty to the Sultan. In return, 
the Sultan saw to the application of a fair and even tax law across the territories – but only if 
revenues were not diverted. Another condition outlined in the agreement was the premise 
that notables would help in recruiting men from their regions for military service. In return, 
the Sultan agreed to limit the power of the Janissary Corps in the provinces; providing the 
provincial notables with greater authority.11 This agreement between the Sultan, provincial 
notables, and provincial governors, was an attempt to reverse aspects of decentralisation, 
assert the basis for loyalty to the crown, and rebuild essential coercive force to defend 
territory and order society, while providing notables with economic and political assurances.   
 
Some of these notables had understood the assurances made in the ‘Document of 
Agreement’ as a licence to act above their position in society. Viewing this as unacceptable, 
Mahmud II in 1812 attempted to limit the power of local notables who were acting in their 
own interests rather than the interests of the Empire. The notables had traditionally served 
as intermediaries between the governors and the local domestic populations, becoming more 
powerful as they became increasingly networked into local society, which affected politics 
and the economy. In a bid to re-establish authority, the Sultan sent troops from neighbouring 
provinces to attack and confiscate lands and titles from the offending notables. Mahmud II 
was able to stop the offending notables, particularly with the elimination of the leading 
notables along the Black Sea in 1812 and 1813. Following the use of force, Mahmud II 
limited the inheritance of local positions to heirs, sending these heirs to other provinces in 
the Empire and appointing new officials from Istanbul to replace them. This helped to place 
Thrace, Macedonia, Wallachia, and the Danubian shores under control of the throne.12 
Mahmud II’s strategy was to shift the responsibility of the notables back to the Sultan from 
the domestic population by placing notables (ayan) into new local networks with the hope to 
hinder corruptive practices. However, the notables were quite strong, maintaining great 
influence in their regions, and the new Ottoman governors faced distrust from the locals, 
making it difficult for the central Ottoman administration to assert authority over many of 
the regions.13 The inability to influence and reorder society through the employment of 
																																																						
11 Shaw and Shaw 1977, pp. 2-3.  
12 Kettering 2001; Quataert 2005, p. 64; Gökçek 2001, pp. 242-243.  
13 Reilly 2002, p. 25. 
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governors reflected the communal political authority that was wielded at a family, clan, 
village, and city quarter level.14 
 
Mahmud II, following the attempt made by Selim III to replace the Janissary Corps, also 
targeted the once prestigious army of the Sultanate. Over time, the prestige of the Janissaries 
had become overblown and their role within the Empire was distorted. Not only were they 
no longer able to compete with the rising strength of the European armies, their ability to 
maintain the boundaries of social order waned as their sights were set on living lives of 
opulence and status. The Janissaries had once maintained order through the pacification of 
the populations for the interests of the Empire, they had become self-interested actors. Like 
Selim III’s proposed Nizam-I Djedid, Mahmud II developed an alternative coercive force 
called the Eshkenjis (Asakir-I Mansure-I Muhammadiye / The Victorious Mohammedan 
Soldiers), made up exclusively of Muslims.15  
 
Angered by the threat of being replaced but unwilling to undergo internal reform, the 
Janissaries met their demise when they began a violent revolt in al-Maidan, a southern suburb 
of Damascus, in 1826 that was crushed by the Eshkenjis.16 The defeat of the Janissary Corps 
opened the gates to political, economic, and military reform, providing the Sultanate with a 
rejuvenated sense of power over the Empire with the hopes to establish a new, centralised, 
social order.17 This new social order was one that could provide the Ottoman administration 
with the ability to accede to the European state system internationally, allowing the Empire 
to compete as an equal player by exhibiting its capability in maintaining sovereign authority 
over its territories.  
 
While the destruction of the Janissary Corps heralded a renewed potential for reform, the 
Empire was burdened by the creation of the new military. Military modernisation came at a 
great cost, and funds were diverted from provincial administrations to the central Ottoman 
administration.18 The use of provincial funds for the maintenance and modernisation of the 
military force created a precedent that allowed the imperial treasury to extract funds from 
the provinces at the expense of the wellbeing of domestic communities in the provinces.  
 
																																																						
14 As discussed by Leila Fawaz (2014) and Ibn Khaldun (1967) 
15 Sell 1915, pp. 7-8. 
16 For more information on the settlement of Janissaries in particular towns and cities see al-Khafaji 2004, pp. 103-108; Sell 
1915, pp. 86-87; Engelhardt 1882, pp. 7-8. 
17 Quataert 1997, p. 404. 
18 Beydilli 2001, p. 87. 
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In another attempt to affect social order Mahmud II issued a decree in 1829 requiring that 
all males, regardless of ‘ancient community’ and occupation, with the exception of the ‘Ulema 
and non-Muslim leaders, to wear identical headgear – the fez or tarbouche – in order to have 
all men appear equal and to transform identity from one tied to religion, ethnicity, or 
occupation, to an identity based on the state.19 While previous reforms sought to centralise 
political capability through governance and control over the military, the 1829 law sought to 
replace established social norms of dress with symbols that could be equated with an imperial 
identity. This reflected the emerging national identities of the European states by reducing 
the importance the headgear that provided a marker for religion, class, status, and rank and 
establishing a sign of Ottoman identity in its place. However, many of the Ottoman artisanal 
workers and craftsmen who were once tied to the Janissary Corps, rejected the new law. The 
rejection of the new dress code was anchored in the fear of the continued replacement of 
social conventions and markers that would further disturb the class comfort of various 
sectors of society. However, the middle and upper class non-Muslim merchants, embraced 
the change, seeing it as a new form of freedom. In the case of the 1829 law, Donald Quataert 
notes an emerging division based on religious association, with Muslims standing in 
opposition to their declining social status and economic access, while non-Muslims had 
generally moved to support the reforms for better social and economic prospects.20   
 
The reforms that attempted to limit the power of local notables (1812-1820) resulted in the 
destruction of Janissary Corps (1826) and those that attempted to reorganise established 
notions of identity (1829) sent the Empire into a period of mild disorder caused by political, 
economic, and social instability that dislocated accepted customary practices from the state.21 
In an effort to centralise power, the Sublime Porte sought to interfere in areas where it had 
not previously interfered, including the management of social order. These reforms 
attempted to tackle two problems: first, there were pressures resulting from competition with 
Europe that changed the balance of power between the European states and the Ottoman 
Empire, requiring that the Sublime Porte reform in order to compete. Second, localised 
autonomy posed the threat of secession to the Empire as well as potential for direct 
European interference. Overall, the reforms sought to reorder society, placing the Sublime 
Porte in the centre of social, economic, and political life, thus removing any symbols of 
difference where meaning could be manufactured and empowered to help with programmes 
of dissent. For example, establishing the tarbouche as a symbol of equality, mandated by the 
																																																						
19 Quataert 2005, p. 66; Quataert 1997, p. 403.  
20 Quateart, 1997, pp. 412-417.  
21 Engelhardt, 1882, p. 14. 
71	
	
Empire, it could be used as a symbol of the authority of the Sublime Porte replacing symbols 
of customary political, economic, or social groups and networks.  
 
In producing these early reforms, the Sultanate looked west to Europe, imitating aspects of 
the European nation-state by trying to centralise authority and create state-associated 
symbols. The reforms, however, altered the social field by changing the relational dynamics 
between communal groups and networks. The result of this change was the renegotiation of 
the social field by customary communal groups and networks, amongst each other but also 
with the Sublime Porte, creating new areas of exclusion. The consequence was social 
fragmentation and a crisis of legitimacy that provided opportunities for the European powers 
to develop deeper relations with customary communal groups and networks, making gains 
and fulfilling interests; a development that became pronounced following the Egyptian 
occupation of the Syrian provinces (1831-1841) and following the promulgation of the first 
Tanzimat decree in 1839 by Sultan Abdulmecid I (1839-1861). Although the Sublime Porte 
acted in its own self- interest, a mixture of survival and desire to be an equal and active 
participant in the developing European state system, the international and domestic fields in 
which the Sublime Porte had to navigate with regards to reforms constrained and limited the 
decisions it could make.  
 
3.3 The Egyptian Occupation of the Syrian Provinces (1831-1841): Transforming 
the Social Field 
The diffusion of enlightenment ideas, public political legitimacy based on secular, rational, 
and scientific thought began to replace tenets of absolutism and ideologies that provided 
support and authority to the ancien régime of kings. The propagation of these ideas had a 
resounding impact on ‘middle class Balkan Orthodox Christians, who were either ethnic 
Greeks, or largely acculturated into the Greek ethnie, or under heavy Grecophone 
influences’,22 helping to amass support for a revolt in 1821 that invited the attention of 
France, Britain, and Russia, who sided with the Greeks in their putsch against the Sublime 
Porte. The basis to which the European powers offered support was conceived of as 
supporting an enlightened civilisation as they entered political modernity, against the 
oppression of fanatical authority of the Sublime Porte.23 
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23 St Clair 2008; Dakin 1973. 
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In an effort to suppress the revolt against the Sublime Porte, the Ottomans requested the 
help of Muhammed Ali of Egypt and his military forces. Unable to combat the European 
powers, the Egyptian navy was destroyed at Navarino in 1827, defeating the Egyptian and 
Ottoman forces, and the independent modern state of Greece was subsequently formally 
acknowledged through the conclusion of the Treaty of London in 1830 and the Treaty of 
Constantinople in 1832.24  
 
The loss of Greece dealt a great blow to the Ottoman Empire’s prestige and power, as 
evidenced, first, by Russian declarations of war (1828-1829) and the terms of peace that 
followed, and then by the Egyptian occupation of the Syrian provinces. The consequence of 
these events further constrained Ottoman decision-making and forced the hand of the Sultan 
to make concessions to the materially stronger European powers. The Russian declaration 
of war on the Sublime Porte on April 26, 1828, was, as argued by the Sublime Porte, a betrayal 
to existing treaties, particularly the Peace of Bucharest (1812) and the Treaty of Ackerman 
(1826).25 The Sublime Porte, in June 1828, responded to Russia’s declaration of war, stating 
that the reasons for declaring war were unfounded, rejecting every argument mentioned in 
the Russian declaration.26 Given the deteriorated state of the Ottoman Empire, the war did 
not last long and was concluded with the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829. Though hostilities 
between Russia and the Ottoman Empire were concluded, the Ottomans were forced into 
agreeing to free trade for Russians in the Ottoman Empire, free passage to Russian merchant 
vessels in the Straits of Istanbul and the Bosporus, freedom of trade and navigation in the 
Black Sea, reparation payments of 1.5million ducats of Holland to be made within 18 
months, as well as the secession of territories along the Black Sea to Russia.27 
 
As payment for the losses that the Egyptian forces sustained, Muhammed Ali sent his son, 
Ibrahim Pasha, to occupy the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire in 1831, igniting the 
first Egyptian-Ottoman War (1831-1833). Russian intervention on behalf of the Ottoman 
Empire during the Egyptian-Ottoman War incited British and French action due to concerns 
that Russia would continue to gain new advantages. Involvement of France and Britain 
prevented the Egyptian forces from advancing further and an agreement, the Convention of 
Kütahya, was reached between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire on May 14, 1833. The 
agreement specified that the administration of Egypt, Crete, Damascus, Jeddah, and Adana 
																																																						
24 (a) Hetslet 1875, pp. 769-774. (Treaty no. 136). 
25 (b) Hetslet 1875, pp. 777- 784. (Treaty No. 138). 
26 (b) Hetslet 1875, pp. 787- 797. (Treaty No. 140). 
27 (b) Hetslet 1875, pp. 814-823. (Treaty No. 145).  
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would be left in the hands of Muhammed Ali Pasha. However, the Convention of Kütahya 
was perceived as a temporary agreement by Muhammed Ali and the Ottoman Sultan, and 
the Sultan therefore attempted to establish additional security agreements. On July 8, 1833, 
following the Convention of Kütahya, the Russians and the Ottomans signed an additional 
agreement, the Hünkâr İskelesi Agreement, which promised that Russian forces would come 
to the aid of Sultan Mahmud II should Muhammed Ali of Egypt try to push his occupation 
further inland. In return, the Turkish Straits would be open to the Russians for an eight-year 
period but closed to Russian enemies, drawing further attention to the geo-strategic 
importance of the Ottoman Empire to Britain and France.28 
 
On the heels of the Convention of Kütahya, British General Consul John William Perry 
Farren describes the social order in Damascus as militaristic in comparison to previous visits. 
Writing on February 7, 1834, Farren recounts the richness of the city, its population, and the 
abundance of economic opportunities. He also tells of a society that has been largely 
impenetrable to European ideas. In this letter to Viscount Palmerston, Farren argues that it 
is in Britain’s interests  
 
to break down by the moral influence of its national power this 
besotted opposition to the just and natural relations of states, 
and be the first to open this field of commercial enterprise to 
European commerce, and to establish on a respected basis in 
these parts the rights of Christian civilisation.29  
 
In the same letter, Farren relays how Ibrahim Pasha is now the means of social order and 
organisation. In stating so, he acknowledges that the increased social order witnessed on his 
landing in Damascus could be due to fear of repercussions by Muhammed Ali and his army.30 
From early on, the British, the French, and the Russians had approached the Ottoman 
Empire and the Syrian provinces with a colonial and imperial gaze that was not bound to 
																																																						
28 The Hünkâr İskelesi Agreement (1833) was followed by the Treaty of Munchengraetz on September 18, 1833. The latter 
was an agreement signed between Russia, Austria, and Prussia to protect the sovereignty of the monarchy should it be 
threatened. Following the eight year term of the Hünkâr İskelesi Agreement, a new treaty had been signed in London, The 
Straits Convention, July 13, 1841, which outlined the legal status of the Straits and significantly reduced Ottoman 
sovereignty of the waterways. Beydilli 2001, pp. 86-91.  
29 FO/78/243, February 7, 1834, sent to Lord Palmerston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from J.W. Farren, 
Damascus. 
30 Although Farren admires the logics of the new social order under Egyptian forces, he is aware of its violence and brutality. 
FO/78/243, February 7, 1834.  
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economic and geo-strategic interests.31 It included the export of ideas that equated European 
civilisation with a rational logic and European ideas of statehood as a moral and enlightened 
right, separate from the fanatical and oppressive authority of the Ottoman Empire.   
 
Although Russian interests in the Syrian provinces had a strong ecclesiastical focus with 
regards to Orthodox communities, they were primarily driven by political and military 
strategy, particularly with regards to Russian imperial expansion and unfettered access to the 
Turkish Straits. Similar to British and French concerns of Russian influence, Russia was 
apprehensive of the diplomatic and religious activities of other European diplomats and 
missionaries within the region, finding it necessary to establish a base of support amongst 
the local populations, as the British and French were doing.  
 
In order to escape the suspicion of European powers, the Russian foreign ministry sent the 
chief official of the Russian Orthodox Church, Porfirii Uspenskii, to the Ottoman Empire 
with orders to report back on the relationships between the Orthodox community and the 
Empire as well as the Orthodox community and the other European foreign powers.32 While 
traveling throughout the Syrian provinces, Uspenskii, describes the fair governance of 
minorities under the rule of Ibrahim Pasha, who provided equal status to non-Muslims, 
allowed for foreign missionary activity, and permitted European consulates to open in 
Damascus and Jerusalem.33 Crucially, the reforms made under Egyptian occupation gave 
Ibrahim Pasha the ability to participate in global politics as a rational actor akin to European 
leaders. However, Egyptian capability to participate as an equal actor in the European state 
system was limited. Rather than acquiescing to Egyptian sovereignty, the European powers 
penetrated the social field in the Syrian provinces, due to the schisms created under Egyptian 
rule. The reforms that were administered during the Egyptian occupation altered the social 
order and had significant consequences regarding stability and the rise of inter-communal 
violent conflict.  
 
In his travels across Syria, Uspenskii described several incidents highlighting how the premise 
of equal status negatively altered communal relations. For Muslim inhabitants in the Syrian 
provinces, equality diminished their once prominent political, economic, and social status, 
while the Christian communities enjoyed their new elevated status. In addition to 
																																																						
31 Colonialism being the act of conquering and governing the population through direct imposition and imperialism as the 
expansion and domination of ideas, politics, and economics into geographic areas, and administering direct or indirect 
administration, see Adas 1998. 
32 Hopwood 2014, pp. 133-134. 
33 Hopwood 2014, p. 141. 
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inadvertently creating animosity directed at the Christian communities, Ibrahim Pasha openly 
and severely punished Muslims who were unhappy with the shift away from the status quo. 
The result was social conflict, violence, and retribution. In one example, after Ibrahim 
Pasha’s reforms were decreed, a prominent Orthodox family decided to celebrate a wedding. 
No longer feeling that it was necessary to keep the celebration muted, the family left the 
windows of their house open. Annoyed by such an open celebration, a group of Muslims 
entered the house, “[…] scattered the guests and set fire to the house.”34  
 
From Uspenskii’s reflections on the state of society in the Syrian provinces under Egyptian 
occupation, it is apparent that changes to the existing social order had a severely negative 
impact. The redistribution of status through the premise of equality between ecclesial 
communities may have removed barriers, but in doing so provided a pathway to entrench 
divisions based on sectarian identities due to the loss of socio-political status. The drastic 
change to the social order dislocated the relationship between the polity and society, giving 
Ibrahim Pasha only tenuous support from the population and creating the desire from many 
under the Pasha’s authority to return to the authority of the Sublime Porte.  
   
3.3.1  European Colonial Interests and the Second Egyptian-Ottoman War (1839-
1841) 
The occupation of the Syrian provinces by Egyptian forces attempted to institute a form of 
governance that reflected the prevalent norms established in Europe. The establishment of 
these norms, particularly the norm of equality, provided legitimacy to the French alliance 
with Egypt, with the French arguing that the Egyptians had produced a legitimate 
civilisational standard. Writing on October 21, 1840, following the outbreak of the Second 
Egyptian-Ottoman War (1839-1841) the French Consul General in Aleppo recalls the large 
number of Ottoman subjects who, at the beginning of the Egyptian occupation of the Syrian 
provinces, emigrated from territories still under the control of the Ottoman Empire to escape 
the tyranny of the Ottoman Pashas.35 In making sense of the French consul’s description of 
tyranny, it could be argued that the repression by Muhammed Ali’s occupation and the rule 
of his son, Ibrahim Pasha, was one that instilled order, while the tyranny of the Pashas within 




34 Hopwood 2014, p. 144. 
35 166PO/D1/46, October 21, 1840 (no. 51), sent to Comte de Pontois, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], 
from Henry Guys, Aleppo.    
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The French perceptions of Egyptian rule in comparison to Ottoman rule were influenced by 
French colonial interests in Algeria that could be attained by accommodating Egyptian rule 
in the Syrian provinces.36 The pursuit of these interests was thinly veiled by the argument 
that the French sought to protect the Egyptian premise of equality and rational governance. 
On the other hand, the British thought it necessary to maintain good relations with the 
Ottoman Empire due to British interests in Mesopotamia and Persia, as well as the expansion 
of their trade agreement with the Ottoman Empire into the Syrian provinces.37 By engaging 
and aligning themselves with Muhammed Ali or Mahmud II, the French and British could 
respectively make gains within and beyond the Ottoman Empire, fulfilling a wider set of 
interests. The different colonial interests and the different alignments put the British and 
French into conflict, but also impacted the development of the Ottoman Empire itself by 
constraining domestic and international policy options. 
 
In addition to the French aligning themselves with Muhammed Ali and the British with 
Mahmud II, both Farren and Consul D. Sandison discussed the various relationships Britain 
maintained with the domestic communities and the interests of Britain at the time. Farren 
noted that the Jewish and Christian communities viewed Britain with ‘profound respect’. It 
was alluded to, in these despatches, that a strategy to penetrate the social order and increase 
British influence through the alignment with these communities was plausible and could be 
strategised. Conversely, Sandison discussed Britain’s need to stop and reverse Russian gains 
within the Ottoman Empire.38 From this despatch, it is evident that there was a clear aim 
that the British were interested in maintaining a position of influence within the Ottoman 
Empire, while trying to ensure Russia’s influence did not increase, and in turn, receded.  
 
While the French highlighted the Sultan’s unpopularity with his subjects, Sandison wrote to 
Lord Posonby that Mahmud II had been a strong sovereign, one who had been open to 
reform and policy change.39 Although he noted the gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire 
and the efforts of the Sultan to limit the shortcomings of his authority, Sandison also wrote: 
 
																																																						
36 FO/78/410, January 23, 1840, sent to John Bidwell, Foreign Office, from N.W. Ulerry, Damascus.  
37 FO/78/410, January 18, 1840, sent to Lord Palmerston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from N.W. Ulerry, 
Damascus; June 23, 1840 (no. 9), sent to Lord Palmerston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from N.W. Ulerry, 
Damascus; Palmer 1992, p. 112. 
38 FO/78/243, February 7, 1834; FO/78/252, January 13, 1835 (no. 14), sent to Lord Posonby, from D. Sandison, 
Constantinople [Istanbul]. 
39 FO/78/252, January 13, 1835.  
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In many districts [of Istanbul]40 all classes are comfortable and 
thriving. Order and obedience have replaced among the Turks 
their hereditary habits of turbulence in the capital and provinces. 
The old Janissary party appears to be perfectly insignificant, nor 
was its destruction ever any subject of national regret. The mass 
of the people has become accustomed to the Sultan’s military 
reforms and to perceive in the various innovations introduced.41 
 
Here, Sandison states that the Empire is doing well, there is marked change in the institutions 
regarding authority and the Ottoman subjects, particularly in the capital, have adapted to 
these changes. Sandison subsequently states that the individuals in the Syrian provinces who 
had come under Egyptian occupation have generally become tired of Muhammed Ali and 
his son, Ibrahim Pasha.42 Despite his support for the Ottoman Empire and the discrediting 
of Egyptian authority, Sandison reiterates the language of scientific racism, describing the 
disorder caused by the Turks as a hereditary trait, amplifying the hierarchical racial, ethnic, and 
the pre-modern Christian European worldview. 
 
Concerned with the possibility of capitulations by the Sublime Porte to the Russians, the 
French alliance with the Egyptians, and the possibility of further diminishment of the 
Sublime Porte in the region given that the British relationship with Mahmud II had been 
secured, the British offered material support to combat the Egyptian occupation of the Syrian 
provinces in return for several economic and political concessions. The signing of the Anglo-
Ottoman commercial treaty of Balta Liman (1838) provided the British with the ability to 
carve out their special status within the Ottoman Empire by imposing what was essentially a 
free trade agreement, granting Britain the right to obtain privileges granted to other 
European powers.43 These concessions, secured by the British, undermined the influence of 
competing European powers but also opened the floodgates to further political and 
economic concessions in return for European material and diplomatic support.44 Crucially 
economic and judicial capitulations made to the European powers by the Ottoman Empire 
diminished Ottoman sovereignty by providing the Europeans power over affairs occurring 
in Ottoman territories and secured the Ottoman Empire’s place in the European hierarchy 
																																																						
40 Constantinople is used in the original European documents.  
41 FO/78/252, January 13, 1835. 
42 FO/78/252, January 13, 1835. 
43 Convention of Commerce, Balta Liman, August 16, 1838; Findley 1989, p. 28. 
44 The French consul writes that the English are making gains in the city of Aleppo through engaging with the indigenous 
population in the formation of trade agreements 166PO/D1/46, March 12, 1840 (no. 37), sent to Duc de Dalmatie, 
President of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from Henry Guys, Aleppo.  
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as a subordinate state. The changes that had already taken place during the Egyptian 
occupation politicised the social cleavages within the social environment, altering the 
dynamics between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities as well as the relationship 
between both communities and structures of governance.  
 
3.3.2  The Hatt-ı Şerif (1839): A Junction of European and Ottoman Political 
Interests   
The reign of Mahmud II was characterized by considerable social and political reforms. 
Arguably, these reforms set the foundation for the reforms promulgated by Sultan 
Abdulmecid I (July 1, 1839 – June 25, 1861), son of Mahmud II, who promulgated the Hatt-
ı Şerif, or the Gulhane Decree, on November 3, 1839. Although there were very few 
immediate and significant changes that occurred in the Syrian provinces following the 
promulgation of the decree because of the continued Egyptian occupation, it can be 
described as a provocation by European powers who maintained influence over the Grand 
Vizier, Mustafa Reshid Pasha, who was perceived as the architect of the decree.45 
 
During the Second Egyptian-Ottoman War (1839-1841) Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia 
came together to help dislodge the Egyptian occupation of the Syrian provinces, motivated 
by regional geo-strategic interests – including British access to Mesopotamia and Persia and 
Russian interest in the Turkish Straits – and aimed to salvage the relationship between Egypt 
and the Sublime Porte.46 In contrast, the French offered their alliance to the Egyptians with 
the hopes of fulfilling imperial interests in Algeria and disguised it as protecting principles of 
equality and rational governance.47 But, because of the European alignment against Egypt, 
France was forced into a position of neutrality while Muhammed Ali and Ibrahim Pasha were 
forcibly removed. The European powers, excluding France, subsequently assumed the ‘right 
to advise the Sultan in Syrian affairs because, with the exception of France, they had helped 
him recover [the] province’. By this point, the Sublime Porte had already administered several 
reforms, including the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839), although they had not been administered in the 
Syrian provinces due to the Egyptian occupation.48 The promulgation and the administration 
of the Hatt-ı Şerif was a necessary step for the Ottoman Empire to be considered an equal 
partner in the European state system, subject to the same rights and privileges as the 
European states. In contrast, for the European states, the Ottoman Empire’s slow accession 
																																																						
45 Mardin 2000, p. 162; Findley 1989, pp. 30-31. 
46 18PO/A/11, November 5, 1840, Séance Royale, Discours du Roi.    
47 FO/78/410, January 23, 1840.  
48 Šedivý 2010, p. 99.  
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to the European state system provided new opportunities to be had, including the ‘right to 
advise the Sultan’. 
 
To argue that the Hatt-ı Şerif was influenced by Western powers is controversial, but the 
European role in the formulation of the modernisation decree cannot be ignored. The 
Ottoman Empire had been the target of European demands to establish provisions of 
equality from as early as 1830 and these demands were used as a bargaining chip in offering 
material support against the Egyptian occupation of the Syrian provinces.49 The Hatt-ı Şerif  
‘had as its goal the establishment of a social order such that modern rights of citizenship 
would be guaranteed, inferior government would be eliminated and both Muslim and non-
Muslim subjects would enjoy the same personal rights’.50 Such provisions were established 
to replicate the social and political conditions of modern Europe. 
 
The Ottoman Empire could not fully achieve the conditions demanded by the European 
powers or that had been set out in the Hatt-ı Şerif  without radically transforming its existence 
as a Muslim empire; a Muslim empire that was centred on a specific interpretation of Shari’a 
Law, which was incompatible with European notions of equality.51 Indeed, the Empire did 
not have the kind of secular judicial system that could support these provisions as the 
judiciary itself was wedded to the adjudication of Shari’a law, which gave preference to 
Muslim subjects.52 The legal provision of equality within the Ottoman Empire created a great 
amount of tension between the real capabilities of the Sublime Porte and European demands, 
as well as between Muslim and non-Muslim communities.  
 
The concept of equality as understood within European thought developed through periods 
of social and political upheaval and was, at the time, not even being fully implemented in 
Europe.53 It can be argued that the insistence by European powers on establishing the 
provision of equality in the Ottoman Empire was based on specific worldviews established 
on Enlightenment ideas of rationality and progress, subordinating the Ottoman Empire with 
a moral hierarchy that justified scientific racism. The moral hierarchy that was established 
was one that had been assembled on pre-modern knowledges and practices that emerged 
with the idea of a Christian European civilisation, where the advent of modernity and the 
scientific categorisation of the world led to the belief that progress was a biological condition 
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tied to race and religion. In turn, this led to a European narrative of Islamic fanaticism. Where 
the Muslim body, would consistently have difficulty in achieving the standard of civilisation 
established by in Europe and the European state system.54 
 
Despite the moral hierarchy established through scientific racism, the expansion of the 
European state system into the global peripheries was premised by the idea that modernity 
was an attainable condition, that government reforms could redevelop the social field into 
an ordered framework that replicated European society. Upon declaration of the decree in 
the Syrian provinces, and according to the French consul in Damascus, the Hatt-ı Şerif  was 
met with great indifference in the provinces.55 This is in stark contrast to the despatch by the 
British consul in Damascus, who, on January 18, 1840, writes that the promulgation of the 
Hatt-ı Şerif  has ‘produced considerable sensation among the population, though [it is] very 
imperfectly understood.’56 Unless the political alliances are considered, it is difficult to 
comprehend why French and British perceptions of popular opinion could be so different 
given the temporal and geographic proximity in which they were writing. By considering the 
political alliances, it can be argued that the French perceptions were coloured by their alliance 
with Muhammed Ali and Ibrahim Pasha, while the British alliance with the Sublime Porte 
affected their perceptions of the decree’s reception. Given that both parties had much to 
lose should the reforms succeed (French) or fail (British), there was a necessity to propagate 
the rhetoric that benefited their position and interests.   
 
In the British despatch, the consul continues that the public viewed the announcement of 
the decree as a prelude to the resumption of Ottoman authority in Syria. Effectively, with 
the Hatt-ı Şerif  in place, this would mean the abolition of the war tax (ferdeh), ‘conscription, 
statute labour, and requisitions’ and the restoration of the previous order of government and 
authority ‘all [of] which is congenial to the desire and feelings of the people’.57 On the other 
hand, the French consul in Aleppo wrote on January 21, 1840, that only a small portion of 
the public will benefit from this decree and it is this portion of the population who maintain 
an ‘unaccustomed happiness’ with being subjects of the Sultan, who will once again be 
offered protection.58 In contrast to earlier French reports, the British consul in Damascus 
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writes to John Bidwell at the Foreign Office in London, that the population in the Syrian 
provinces have begun strategising their extraction from under the Egyptian regime.59  
 
Yet, both the French and British positions come under doubt. The proposed French strategy 
of maintaining good relations with Muhammed Ali and Ibrahim Pasha in order to secure 
interests in North Africa is questioned by the French consul in Beirut who asks how he is to 
fulfil the wishes of King Louis-Philippe I (August 9, 1830-February 24, 1848) in maintaining 
good relations with Egypt when the people aim to remove Egyptian authority. The French 
consul in Beirut further relents that he is finding it difficult to construct a rhetoric that the 
French are the natural allies and protectors of the people, given their desire to return under 
the authority of the Sublime Porte.60 Furthermore, despite the British alignment with the 
Ottoman Empire and the transfer of material support to the Sublime Porte in combating the 
Egyptian occupation, there is uncertainty that prevails in how the Empire will be managed 
and governed once sovereignty is returned to the Sultan. The British consul in Damascus, 
writing to Lord Viscount Palmerston, wonders what kind of system of governance would 
become dominant once the Syrian provinces are returned to the Sultan and if it will, in turn, 
‘be able to maintain the same standards as is held in Europe’.61 For the French consul in 
Beirut, doubt was a shadow cast by the observed reality, forcing him to question the 
motivations and interests that had been framed as a humanitarian project. The British, on 
the other hand, doubted the ability of the Sublime Porte to institutionalise a form of rational 
and progressive governance similar to that of European states. Nevertheless, both European 
powers pressed on in a relentless manner.  
 
French doubt over the ability to establish influence while supporting Muhammed Ali and 
Ibrahim Pasha was being confirmed. On January 26, 1840, the French consul in Damascus 
writes that the promise of equality under the law has created a schism in the social fabric. 
The Muslims view equality as an offence to their socio-economic status because the 
admission of non-Muslim individuals to the civil administration, despite their religious belief, 
further dislodges Muslim prominence, pulling the Christian minority into the structure of the 
Empire, negating Christian relative autonomy, and threatening the Islamic identity of the 
Ottoman Empire.62 On the other hand, British doubt over the Sublime Porte’s desire 
regarding the system of governance that would be implemented was increased, not because 
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of the desire of the Sublime Porte to follow in the form of governance and authority 
prevalent in Europe, but with the contrasted desire of the populations under Egyptian 
authority who wished to re-engage with traditional Ottoman structures.63  
 
For the Muslim populations of the Syrian provinces, returning to Ottoman authority meant 
returning to a system that provided Muslim socio-economic dominance within the structures 
of the Empire. Returning to Ottoman authority for the non-Muslim minorities meant that 
they would once again have autonomy within these structures. In both cases, the return of 
Ottoman sovereignty in the Syrian provinces did not equate a form of governance modelled 
after the emerging modern state in Europe. The concept of equality, as experienced under 
Egyptian rule, was an attempt to secure the rights of the Christian population and to parallel 
the secularising judiciaries of European states. The attempt to replicate the secular practices 
of the European state in the Syrian provinces was produced in the framework that 
secularisation, as a modern phenomenon, was a practice separate to its Christian history in 
Europe. The changes being enforced during the Egyptian occupation constituted an affront 
to the social order that the populations had grown accustomed to.64 The ideas of order, 
rationality, and progress that were propagated by European states in the Ottoman Empire 
were viewed as chaotic and oppressive by the populations who desired decentralised and 
traditional Ottoman Authority.65 However, the Hatt-I Şerif , having been announced prior 
to the development of a concerted effort to overthrow the Egyptian occupation, sought to 
introduce a European form of governance, or at least, a modern European understanding of 
rational governance and equality.  
 
3.3.3 Domestic and International Constraints: The Return of Ottoman Authority  
By the end of 1840, the Egyptians and the French were facing a widespread rebellion in the 
Syrian provinces, blaming the English and the Russians for its emergence. With the 
possibility of suffering a defeat by the English, Russians, and Ottomans, the French consul 
questioned whether France should continue to provide support for Muhammed Ali, given 
that the insurrection and the alliance between the European powers posed greater threats to 
French interests than the possible gains they would receive by maintaining their alignment 
with the Egyptians. The French consul in Beirut states that Muhammed Ali and Ibrahim 
Pasha are, after all, Muslims, just like the Turks, and it is the Christian populations who 
																																																						
63 Reilly 2002, p. 126.  
64 Rajeev Bhargava (2011) argues that the Christian roots of secularism limited its ability ‘to cope with religions that 
mandate greater public or political presence or have a strong communal orientation. […] This group-insensitivity of 
secularism makes it virtually impossible for it to accommodate community-specific rights,’ p. 101.  
65 For a deeper discussion on Ottoman decentralisation and traditional authority see Barkey 2008.  
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should be privileged by France.66 Accepting their precarious situation, the French 
government was being forced to reconsider their interests. Although the French sought to 
protect the civilisational standards of secularism and equality, they viewed the Christian 
populations in the Syrian provinces as separate from the Muslims. This is insinuated with the 
argument that Muhammed Ali and Ibrahim Pasha, despite being advocates for secularism 
and equality, were still Muslim, suggesting a natural difference between them and modern-
French identity.  
 
Despite advocating secular policies, the French adhered to a civilisational Christian, primarily 
Catholic, worldview, not dissimilar to the Russians who sought to influence and ally 
themselves with the Orthodox Christian communities. The alliances that were formed 
created new political, economic, and social hierarchies and facilitated social schisms. 
Contributing to the development of divisions within the social field, was the administration 
of policies that attempted to centralise state power, the attempt to institutionalise equality, 
and the dissemination of ‘liberal’ ideologies similar to those in Europe. Here it is noted that 
Egyptian policies of equality altered the social balance in a radical way. The administration 
of equality by the Egyptian regime, which elevated the social, economic, and political position 
of the Christian populations in the Syrian provinces, led to Muslim sentiments of jealousy 
and social retribution. The changing social dynamics in the Syrian provinces and the use of 
force against those who rebelled against change, cemented the religious schisms within the 
policy of equality, creating a system of legal equality without social tolerance.  
 
The Mount Lebanon region, in particular, experienced a great shift in the balance of power 
caused by policies of equality, Christian military exemptions, and rearmament. Emir Bashir 
II, of the Chehab family, not one to relinquish his status and authority, converted from Sunni 
Islam to Maronite Catholicism in order to benefit from the changing social dynamics. Under 
the authority of Emir Bashir II, it is argued that issues relating to the transformation of 
taxation, feudal authority, and military conscription came to a boiling point, resulting in 
violent sectarian conflict.67 The summer of 1840 not only marked the emergence of sectarian 
conflict in Mount Lebanon, but the beginning of a rebellion against the Egyptian authorities.  
 
The rebellion, beginning in Mount Lebanon, transformed aspects of traditional and emerging 
social orders, drawing the population into a mass political conflict with two opposing sides: 
																																																						
66 92PO/A/24 June 16, 1840, Beirut. 
67 Al-Aqiqi 1959, pp. 2-3; FO/78/410 June 23, 1840 (no. 9), sent to Lord Palmerston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
from N.W. Ulerry, Damascus. 
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those who wished to maintain the Egyptian occupation and those who sought the return of 
the Ottoman Sultanate. The rebellion led to a schism in the Chehab family, as Emir Bashir 
II openly supported the Egyptian authorities while his son, Emir Khalil, vocally opposed 
Bashir’s alliance, lending support to the rebellion with the aim of reinstating Ottoman 
governance. The internal political division of the Chehab family was replicated by divisions 
among other notable families, including the Sha’ab family, a Druze dynasty.68  
 
Although the region was known for political divisions often taking form in class conflict, 
sectarianism, or family loyalty,69 conflict between the Egyptian loyalists and the Ottomans 
loyalists was fundamentally political regarding the distribution of power between religious 
communities. Conflict between the Egyptians and the Ottomans at the state level was 
concerned with governance, control, and sovereignty and at the international level, self-
interested European powers hid behind ideas of progress and modernity, with the aim to 
minimise what they perceived as despotic rule, and at the same time fulfil their greater 
geostrategic and economic interests.  
 
Ideas of progress and modernity that were being promoted by the European powers 
resonated with the domestic populations, who sought either their implementation with the 
guise of obtaining freedoms under the law, or returning to the previous political structures 
where freedom was obtained through autonomy. In an attempt to establish stability between 
the Egyptian government and the Sublime Porte over the Sublime Porte, the ‘The Additional 
Act’, or Acte Séparé, signed on July 15, 1840 in London, was – in many ways – a result of the 
international dimension of the conflict. The consuls representing Great Britain, Austria, 
Prussia, and Russia agreed to provide material support to the Ottoman Sultan in his campaign 
to regain the Syrian provinces if Muhammed Ali did not accept the proposed delineated 
boundaries of Egypt. Additionally, the Act promised that by accepting the territorial 
limitations, Muhammed Ali would secure the rule of his descendants in Egypt.70 With the 
backing from European powers, Muhammed Ali was forced to agree to the terms set out in 
the Act. However, his son Ibrahim Pasha refused and is quoted as saying ‘we will liberate 




68 FO/78/410 June 23, 1840 (no. 9). 
69 Cook 1976.  
70 The Tablet [Newspaper], September 19, 1840, p. 3.  
71 166PO/D1/46 August 17, 1840 (no. 53), sent to M. de Pontois, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from 
Henry Guys, Aleppo.  
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Following the acceptance of ‘The Additional Act’, the British government issued a letter to 
the consuls in the Syrian provinces, which was to be spread as wide as possible. The letter 
urged the Syrian people to revolt against the Egyptian authorities and promised the full 
support of Britain and the Sublime Porte. By resisting the Egyptian occupation, the British 
promised that the Syrian people would benefit from the Hatt-ı Şerif, guaranteeing their right 
to life and property as the Sultan’s subjects, an assurance supported by the European powers. 
The letter also offered a variety of concessions, including: permission for defectors of the 
Ottoman Army to return from the Egyptian forces, who will receive protection from Britain 
in the fight against Egypt, and forgiveness of past rents and debts of any soldier who joins 
the Sultan’s Standard.72  
 
With the revolt by the Syrian population against the Egyptian occupation underway, Ibrahim 
Pasha, on September 6, 1840, declared that Syria was officially under siege. Along with this 
declaration, Ibrahim Pasha also decreed a number of statutes that made it illegal for any 
individual, native or non-native, to participate in rebellion or revolt against the Egyptian 
forces. This included, making punishable by death, the writing, or circulation of writing, 
regarding revolt or rebellion.73 As the war between the Ottomans and the Egyptians 
developed, the French consul in Aleppo writes that there is growing fanaticism amongst the 
Muslim population, giving the example of Homs where 1,500 men were ordered by the 
Sultan to go into battle. The French consul argued in the despatch to Paris that the governor 
of Homs’ use of religious sentiment in expressing support for the Sultan and encouraging 
men to fight Egyptian forces was evidence of fanaticism.74 For the French consul, the 
relationship between religion and politics was a relationship that was inherently fanatical, and 
was distinctly Islamic. Yet, the use religious identity employed by the governor of Homs to 
direct political action was replicated by the French consul who asserted the importance of 
offering additional protections to the Christian populations. Although the French were 
employing a parallel narrative to that which they were opposing, they had done so on the 
premise of a moral superiority, evoking distinctions between Islamic fanaticism and Christian 
rationality.  
 
Despite French sentiment against the return of Ottoman authority in the Syrian provinces 
and support for the Egyptian forces, the French changed their strategy in October, 1840, 
																																																						
72 FO/78/412 Letter to the Syrians. 
73 FO/78/412 Order from the Egyptians. 
74 166PO/D1/46 October 12, 1840 (no. 57), sent to M. de Pontois, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from 
Henry Guys, Aleppo.  
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resulting in the withdrawal of Egyptian forces in 1841.75 The Egyptians, who had been 
abandoned by the French, were subsequently faced with an Ottoman force backed by 
European powers, resulting in the defection of Egyptian soldiers.76 With the withdrawal of 
Egyptian forces and the re-establishment of Ottoman authority came the implementation of 
the Hatt-ı Şerif, which disappointed the populations in Syria who had wished for a return to 
traditional social orders.77 On the other hand, those who had desired continuation of 
Egyptian governance were dismayed because of the Ottoman inability to provide Egyptian-
style authority.78 
 
The return of Ottoman authority resulted in a form of governance that was incapable to 
provide traditional forms of autonomy due to international constraints and unable to provide 
the form of governance that had been established under Muhammed Ali and Ibrahim Pasha 
due to domestic constraints. Although there was an effort to bring about change in the 
Ottoman Empire, many of the social provisions of the first Tanzimat decree did not come to 
fruition. For example, in a bid to establish political equality, the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839) sought to 
allow non-Muslims to partake in the local administrative councils. The administrative 
councils, also known as the Provincial Advisory Council, became the central point for the 
administration of villages, settling civil and commercial disputes, managing court cases, and 
overseeing village elections.79  
 
Commenting on these changes, Henry Guys, the French Consul in Aleppo, notes that 
disorder continues due to an absence of codified secular laws,  which has created a system 
where ‘justice is often served to those who have money in hand’ and that ‘the people follow 
the religion [practices] of the chiefs’, producing corruption that is akin to social disease.80 
The reforms that the Sublime Porte sought to establish pursued equality through 
administrative changes, but they had a negative impact on inter-group relations as the legal 
framework had not been clearly established. Within the Syrian provinces, the changes in 
authority, from Egyptian to Ottoman, and the establishment of reforms also created 
opportunities for a new class of notables to emerge.81  
 
																																																						
75 Douwes 2000, p. 61. 
76 166PO/D1/46 November 18, 1840 (no. 61), sent to M. de Pontois, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], 
from Henry Guys, Aleppo. 
77 Reilly 2002, p. 126.  
78 Palmer 1992, p. 112. 
79 Thompson 1993, p. 458. 
80 Guys 2009, pp. 89-215-216, 211-212.  
81 Khoury (1983) examines closely the co-constitutive development between urban notables and Arab nationalism. 
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Along with the structural and organisational reforms, the retreat of Egyptian forces and the 
reassertion of Ottoman authority emerged a new group of notable families, including the 
Abdi and Yusuf families in Damascus and the Durubi, Jundi, and Suwaydan families in 
Homs, that became competitors to the traditional group of prominent families, such as the 
Chehabs and Jumblatts in Mount Lebanon and the ‘Azms, Tayfur, Barazi, and Jijakli in 
Hama. This new group of notables acquired control of villages and farmlands, and crucially, 
maintained close relations with the Ottoman imperial centre. For the traditional dynastic and 
military families, their power began to wane but their fortunes and official appointments 
within the reformed Ottoman administration were maintained.82 Continuity of the traditional 
notable families was an important strategy for the Sublime Porte, due to their established 
relations with the administrative structures and the populations. The Sublime Porte, in turn, 
continued to appoint traditional local leadership into positions of prominence.  
 
Prominent families continued to maintain local leverage and relationships with the central 
administration of the Ottoman Empire, despite the institutional and structural changes, but 
unlike before they no longer had a near-direct and autonomous access to the Sublime Porte, 
creating a dislocation in how authority was to be practiced. First, the form of competition 
for political access between families changed. Prior to the reforms, families were co-opted 
by the central administration and given certain privileges and benefits. Following the reforms, 
a council of prominent individuals, chosen from leading families and religious leaders, 
governed the provinces as a coherent administrative council.83 This altered the kind of 
relationship a local leader maintained with the Sublime Porte’s representative in the province, 
removing autonomy from the local leader in favour of empowering a representative group 
of leaders tasked to administer authority evenly. This new structure required communal 
leaders to work together in an early type, and uneven form, of power sharing. However, in 
some ways, this new model of local governance entrenched identities and deepened conflict 
along ethno-sectarian divisions. The new administrative councils also diminished the 
authority of religious courts and altered the role of the provincial governor, empowering 
elected officials of the council.84 Authority was becoming structured and centralised, 
paralleling the political institutions of Western Europe, more power was handed to local 
authorities to do the bidding of the Sublime Porte.   
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83 Thompson 1993, p. 458. 
84 Masters 2013, p. 161.  
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3.4  Conclusion 
The characteristics of the modern state were viewed as being able to relieve the Ottoman 
Empire from being subordinated within the European state system. By undertaking reforms 
to centralise governance, Sultan Selim III and Sultan Mahmud II sought to transform the 
Ottoman Empire into a competitive state, one that would no longer be susceptible to the 
potential damage inflicted by European competition in a means to assert sovereignty. The 
reforms during the reign of Sultan Selim III and Mahmud II represented a concerted effort 
to centralise the institutions in a bid to assert consolidated authority across the territories 
Ottoman Empire. This included attempts to establish a new Army, the Nizam-I Djedid, to 
replace the Janissary Corps by Selim III, the Document of Agreement (1808) administered 
by Mahmud II, the establishment of the Eshkenjis, and the decree on male headdress in 1829. 
 
Although efforts were made by Selim III and Mahmud II to promulgate reforms that would 
provide the groundwork to strengthen the Ottoman Empire against European competition 
by replicating European institutions and structures, it was not enough. Russian interference 
in Greece, and more generally the Balkans, led to the politicisation of a Greek national-ethnie, 
culminating in a revolt against the Sublime Porte. The Greek War of Independence was aided 
by the European powers for the moral justification of supporting an enlightened civilisation 
against the oppressive authority of the fanatical Sublime Porte. 
 
The Greek War of Independence left the Sublime Porte in a state of relative weakness that 
provided an advantage to the Russians who declared war in 1828, securing access to the 
Straits of Istanbul, the Black Sea and territories along the Black Sea. Aid offered to Greece 
during the War of Independence and Russia’s subsequent strategy are a primary example of 
the Ottoman Empire’s subordination in the European state system, which expounded a 
specific form of legitimate civilisation, founded on a European worldview. By holding the 
Ottoman Empire to this standard of civilisation, the European states were able to extricate 
economic and political interests. This was justified based on the premise of Ottoman 
civilisational incapacity that required European aid.  
 
The losses sustained during the Greek War of Independence also provided Muhammed Ali 
and Ibrahim Pasha with the opportunity and justification for the occupation of the Syrian 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The occupation of the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire by Egyptian forces provided Britain and France with the opportunity to pursue 
national interests. On the one hand, Britain aligned themselves with Mahmud II while France 
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aligned themselves with Muhammed Ali. By entering into an alliance with the Sublime Porte, 
Britain sought to secure access to Mesopotamia and Persia, while France, who formed an 
alliance with the Egyptians, desired unimpeded access to Algeria. The French justified their 
support to the Egyptians by arguing that Muhammed Ali and Ibrahim Pasha brought order 
and civilisation to the Syrian provinces, having established equality and centralised control. 
The British, however, in defence of the Sultan, argued that the reforms that had been 
implemented by the Sublime Porte had been carefully applied in an effort to strengthen the 
Empire.  
 
Although European interests were propelling British and French decision making with 
regards to the Ottoman Empire, they were veiled underneath the façade of aiding the 
maintenance of a civilised order. For the Sublime Porte, the civilisational requirement was 
consequential, rather than a façade. The British had placed a considerable amount of pressure 
on the Sublime Porte to promulgate a new set of reforms, culminating in the Hatt-ı Şerif 
(1839). Although the reforms were not immediately applied to the Syrian provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire, due to the continued Egyptian occupation, they signalled to the European 
powers a willingness to replicate the characteristics, regarding knowledges and practices, of 
the modern state.  
 
The application of the Hatt-ı Şerif, however, created schisms with regards to the desired 
form of governance in the Syrian provinces. For the populations who desired continued 
Egyptian authority, the Hatt-ı Şerif was not sufficient in the kind of reforms that were 
promised, and for those populations who wished to return to the authority of the Sublime 
Porte, threatened the traditional form of decentralised and autonomous governance that they 
had fought for. The dislocation between the Sublime Porte and the social field in the Syrian 
provinces signified a crisis in authority and was taken advantage of by the European powers 
who began to form alliances with communities based on religious identification, using 
notables to gain legitimacy. Moreover, the authority of the Sublime Porte was constrained 
by the domestic demands for a return to traditional forms of decentralised governance as 
well as by the European states that continued to pressure the Sublime Porte into adopting 
reforms to replicate the modern state in Europe.
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Chapter 4: Governing the Syrian Provinces: Centralisation, Equality, and Sectarian 
Fragmentation 
 
4  Introduction 
The Egyptian occupation of the Syrian provinces (1831-1841) and the first reform decree of 
the Tanzimat period, the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839), advanced Western-style modernisation through 
institutional and bureaucratic centralisation founded on Western principles of rational 
governance and immersed in ideas of progress. The European justification for pressuring the 
Sublime Porte into promulgating modernisation reforms was under the premise that the 
modern European standard of civilisation would help bring the Ottoman Empire out of 
darkness.1 By requiring the Sublime Porte to promulgate reforms in exchange for help, as was 
the case for British help provided to the Sublime Porte during the Second Ottoman-Egyptian 
War (1839-1841), a specific relationship developed that subordinated the Sublime Porte to 
the European powers and constrained the decision making process.   
 
The administration of centralised authority and application of equality, regardless of religion, 
following the administration of the Hatt-ı Şerif, disrupted relations within the social field, 
particularly among religious networks, which in some cases, could be further subdivided into 
the political ambitions of kinship or clan factions. The new form of governance altered the 
means to which the populations could access power, the economy, and their relationship 
with the Empire, in terms of identity, but also with regards to the administration of the 
Empire. Ultimately, these changes dislocated the social field from the Sublime Porte and 
provided opportunities for the European powers, namely Britain, France, and Russia, to 
pursue economic and geo-strategic interests in the Syrian provinces, and elsewhere in the 
Ottoman Empire. By promising the Sublime Porte the advantage of recognised sovereignty, 
under the condition that modernisation replicated the modern state in Europe, the European 
powers validated their interference in the Syrian provinces as necessary to protect their 
interests where the Sublime Porte failed. 
 
This chapter explores the consequences of imperial reform within the context of the social 
field in Syria, examining how dislocation between the Sublime Porte and customary groups 
and networks within the Syrian provinces provided opportunities to the European powers 
in their pursuit of economic and geo-political interests. It begins by examining how the 
																																																						
1 Darkness, as a concept, persisted into the Enlightenment, despite its Christian foundations, that associated darkness 
with evil and light as good. To bring people out of darkness meant to deliver them from sin, to civilise their barbaric 
nature. Bastide 1967; Reichardt and Cohen 1998.  
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provisions outlined in the Hatt-ı Şerif created sectarian fragmentation, and looks at the 
specific cases of Mount Lebanon (1841-1843) and the case of Aleppo (1850). It subsequently 
examines the events leading up to the Crimean War (1853-1856), focusing on the relations 
between Russia and France and their impact on the Sublime Porte. This chapter considers 
these events and the series of developments that occurred during the Crimean War as the 
contextual basis for the subsequent reform, the Hatt-ı Hümayun (1856). 
 
4.1  Governing the Syrian Provinces under the Provisions of the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839): 
Equality as Sectarian Fragmentation and Social Dislocation 
Two years after the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839) was decreed and following the removal of Egyptian 
forces in the Syrian provinces (1841), the Sublime Porte was contending with a population 
that had been expressing dissatisfaction caused by failures regarding the restoration of 
Ottoman authority particularly in relation to the Ottoman Empire’s refusal to re-establish 
traditional forms of authority. With the return of Ottoman authority in the Syrian provinces, 
the conditions outlined in the Hatt-ı Şerif were established, including the provision of 
equality, new forms of taxation, and the clauses on military conscription. Fear that the 
Sublime Porte would enforce these conditions in the Syrian provinces sowed the seeds of 
discontent. As discussed in the previous chapter, the policy of equality had displaced Muslim 
privilege in the institutions of the Empire while the Christian communities no longer 
maintained political and legal autonomy. Military conscription and taxation also threatened 
the social foundations on which the Ottoman Empire functioned. The emergence of a 
standing military and the institutionalisation of taxation were cornerstones of the modern 
state in Europe, developing to strengthen centralised governance by counteracting the 
emergence of external threats and insure internal order.2 In the Syrian provinces, such 
provisions did not lead to an overarching national identity, as it had in Europe, nor did it 
promote popular loyalty in the Syrian provinces to the Sublime Porte, it did, however, lead 
to fragmentation and dislocation between the state and the customary social groups and 
networks. 
 
In the Syrian provinces, the establishment of the administrative councils under submission 
of the provincial governor removed the ability of communal chiefs to negotiate 
autonomously with the governors. Centralisation in this form meant weakening the political 
capabilities of land owning notables and changing the power dynamics between the Sublime 
																																																						
2 Tilly 1992, pp. 96-122; Smith 1998.  
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Porte and local notables and peasantry.3 This exercise in centralisation and bureaucratisation 
opened new areas of oppression, corruption, intimidation, and bribery. According to Colonel 
Charles Henry Churchill, a British army officer and diplomat, writing in a letter to Colonel 
Rose on August 23, 1841, the Governor of Damascus, Nedjib Pasha, allowed a system of 
anarchy to develop by ignoring the systematic prosecution of Christian and Jewish 
communities by Muslims.4 Such accusations included descriptions of Nedjib Pasha’s 
character as being ensconced in religious fanaticism, which was celebrated by notable 
Muslims.5 The Christian and Jewish communities, no longer responsible to their autonomous 
local and communal notables, were governed under his authority and direction, established 
through the creation of administrative councils, to which the Christian and Jewish 
populations saw as overbearing.  
 
In addition to centralising authority over the Syrian provinces, the Sublime Porte raised the 
rate of taxation in the Syrian provinces in 1841. The taxes were levied on consumable goods, 
and were raised from 1% to 9%; a rate of 10% was taxed on property; 6 and 20% on ‘the 
necessaries of life’. Additionally, Christians and Jews were forced to continue to pay an 
annual head tax, one that was applied during the Egyptian occupation. The head tax divided 
the population of religious minorities into three economic classes; requiring the first class to 
pay 60 piastres, the second class to pay 30 piastres, and the third class 15 piastres. The total 
amount collected by Ibrahim Pasha during the Egyptian occupation was the sum of 82,000 
piastres per year. The Sublime Porte continued with this form of taxation, viewing it as an 
easy method to extract and raise capital.7 
 
However, in an effort to maintain consent from the various religious networks, the Sublime 
Porte had also re-introduced a privileged category called the Baratakli, which was formed by 
notable Muslims, Christians, and Jews, and who were exempt from paying all taxes. Despite 
this exemption, the Sublime Porte demanded that they continue to receive the annual sum 
of 82,000 piastres. The taxation regime under the Ottoman Empire had created so much 
																																																						
3 Johnson 2001, p. 89. 
4 The European powers, particularly Britain, were not on good terms with Nedjid Pasha. He was viewed as embodying 
corruption and oppression, resulting in the cessation of tax payments by the population residing in Mount Lebanon. Fourier 
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grain from other territories and the imports will be subject to the higher tax rate. Parliamentary Papers 1842, vol. 20, pp. 
261-296. 
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discontent that the feeling of the general population in Damascus was that they were better 
off under Ibrahim Pasha.8 The Sublime Porte had reinstated this advantage to the privileged 
classes across the religious networks with the aim of appealing to powerful notables, who 
continued to maintain political influence over the peasantry. The Sublime Porte, anticipating 
widespread displeasure from the peasantry over the changes to governance and increased 
rates of taxation, sought to utilise the power and influence that the notable class maintained 
over the population.  
 
Despite the efforts to quell any discontent over the new taxation regime by privileging the 
notable class, a further despatch from Colonel Churchill stated that the Christians were 
unhappy, and unable to cope with the tax increases, feeling that new administrative 
developments have left them politically and socially diminished. Their treatment by the 
Muslim population left them feeling dismayed and their dismissal from public employment, 
in large numbers, where they had enjoyed jobs as writers and clerks have been given to 
Muslims who had managed to bribe their way into office or who gained prominence within 
society by propagating ideological ‘fanaticism’. In contrast to the provisions of equality that 
were decreed in the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839), the Ottoman Empire attempted to rectify the decline 
of status for the Muslim populations through the new institutional and structural 
arrangements.9  
 
In addition to the removal of Christian employees from positions within the administration, 
Christian councillors from the Mejlis (Governors) Council in Damascus were also removed 
when authority returned to the Sublime Porte. Under Ibrahim Pasha, seven of the twelve 
members of the council were Christians and all were replaced by Muslims following the 
reassertion of Ottoman control. To make matters worse, Christians approaching the council 
to make a formal complaint or to submit a petition were told to wear a black turban; an 
antedated symbol of the Christian faith, meant to embarrass Christians by reminding them 
of their place in the Muslim Ottoman social hierarchy.10  
 
In reinforcing the Muslim populations’ position within the Ottoman Empire, it was likely 
that two goals were trying to be achieved, the first, brought forward by fears of a revolt 
against reforms, the Sublime Porte was trying to appease the Muslim majority of the 
population. The second goal was to counter European interference on behalf of the Christian 
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9 FO/226/72 May 31, 1841 (no. 2). 
10 FO/226/72 May 31, 1841 (no. 2). 
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communities in an effort to appear independent from the demands of European states in 
order to pacify fears that the Sublime Porte had become subordinate to the desires of 
Europe. The Ottoman Empire had begun to appeal to a Muslim identity to maintain its 
internal legitimacy, given that concessions made to the Europeans over the administration 
of the Empire made the Sublime Porte look weak and submissive. In doing so the Sublime 
Porte had begun to alienate religious minorities and reinforce sectarian divisions, creating 
instability within the social field and justifying reasons for European offers of protection of 
religious minorities.11  
 
According to Churchill, ‘the general feeling, both amongst the Jews and Christians […] was 
that England will interfere to protect them, and the country in general, against the oppression 
of the Turks [Muslims]’. The social schism that developed, and the advantages that were 
afforded to the Muslim populations, created the perfect opportunity for the European 
powers to establish their position amongst the religious minorities of the Ottoman Empire. 
It was during this period that the French consul in Damascus declared France to be the 
official protector of the Christians in the Syrian provinces.12 Seeking to avert violence against 
religious minorities, the French and the British became increasingly involved in the political 
and economic well-being and physical protection of religious minorities. This alignment 
between European powers and, primarily, the Christian communities, but also the Druze, 
enhanced the perceived threat by the Muslim communities regarding their position within 
the Ottoman Empire, seeing the European powers as displacing Ottoman sovereignty and 
changing the character of the Empire from an Islamic Empire to a secular one.13   
 
The worsening sectarian relations were further amplified by being pulled into the dynamics 
of international competition, such as conflict between the French and Russians. Each 
European power viewed it as their right to protect their respective religious communities, 
while Britain attempted to counterbalance the French relations with the Catholics and the 
Russian relations with the Orthodox Christians by aligning themselves with the Druze, in 
the first instance, and subsequently by attempting to proclaim themselves as a Muslim 
																																																						
11 Davison, 1963. 
12 ‘The Jews have more causes for complaint against the Christians than against the Turks. The prejudices entertained 
against them by the Christians, continues undiminished and it is believed that violence could erupt at any moment’. On 
February 13, 1842, a child of 11 years old was missing from home. Immediately, the Christians thronged the Jewish quarter 
and accused the Jews of having made away with the child for the purpose of sacrificing it at their Passover. Fortunately, in 
an hour or two, the child was found, had the child not been found, it is believed that violent actions would have been 
committed against the Jews, at the instigation of the Christians. FO/226/72 May 31, 1841 (no. 2), June 10, 1841 (no. 4); 
FO/78/498 February 23, 1842 (no. 20), sent to the Earl of Aberdeen, Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from 
Richard Wood, Damascus; Hakim 2013, p. 41.  
13 The French and British had demanded that Nedjib Pasha be held accountable for his brutality, however, these protests 
were ignored. The Spectator Archive, 10 July 1841, p. 12; FO/226/72 August 29, 1841. 
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empire.14 However, unlike the French, the British were ‘careful not to commit [themselves] 
too far and, moreover, not to encourage separatist elements in the Lebanon’.15 With this 
policy in place, the British made sure that the Druze would continue to prosper under the 
auspices of a British alliance that provided economic relations and the development of 
educational institutions, on the condition that the Druze were strictly obedient to the Sultan. 
The Druze, on the other hand, had hoped to enter relations that were analogous to that of 
the French and the Maronite Catholics in Mount Lebanon.16 The relations between the 
French and Maronite Catholics provided the latter with greater political influence over the 
decisions of the Sublime Porte. The Druze sought a similar relationship with the British, 
fearing oppressive policies directed at them from the Sublime Porte and Maronite 
ascendency in politics, consequently displacing Druze influence in Mount Lebanon.  
 
The social schism that developed over the concept and application of equality was produced 
by the threat to the dominant Muslim social order and the fear that the political, economic, 
and social status of the minorities would be elevated within the institutions of the state. The 
schism was further deepened by attempts made by the Sublime Porte to reverse this 
sentiment by providing Muslim communities with new benefits, resulting in closer 
associations between the European powers and religious minorities, due to fear that under a 
centralised and Islamic form of governance they would be maltreated. For the European 
powers, discord between religious communities and the Sublime Porte provided new 
strategic options.   
 
4.1.1 Governing Mount Lebanon: Sectarian Fragmentation and European 
Interference 
Alliance formation between the European powers and religious communities within the 
Syrian provinces was especially prevalent in Mount Lebanon. Following the restoration of 
Ottoman authority in the Syrian provinces, Emir Bashir II was sent into exile from Mount 
Lebanon due to his alliance with the Egyptians during the Second Ottoman-Egyptian War 
(1839-1841). For the Maronite Catholics in Mount Lebanon and, by extension, the French, 
the exile was a threat to their power in the region. During the Ottoman-Egyptian War and 
the period immediately following the war and the restoration of Ottoman authority, the 
Sublime Porte had favoured the Druze community for their submission to Ottoman 
authority. The Druze, further stating that they would refuse to submit to the authority of any 
																																																						
14 Britain’s imperial crown jewel, India, contained ‘nearly 100 million […] Muslims’ and for this reason, the British were 
sympathetic to the Muslim population in the Syrian provinces. Sir H. Layard in Syria, Morning Post, Thursday October 23, 
1879, p. 5. 
15 Salih 1977, p. 251.  
16 Salih 1977, p. 251.  
96	
	
Christian member of the Chehab dynasty, from which Emir Bashir II originated, played into 
the desires of the Sublime Porte by requesting a Turkish Muslim Governor. The request for 
a Turkish Muslim Governor sought to displace the Chehab dynasty and upset the Christian 
population who had been promised the right to govern through the Chehab family.17 The 
request for a Turkish Muslim Governor had the adverse effect of increasing competition 
between the Druze and the Maronite populations, and with increased competition emerged 
violence.  
 
The Druze, however, were politically divided amongst themselves, and had difficulty in 
reconciling the request for a Turkish Muslim Governor. The Jumblatt family, one of the 
notable Druze families, in particular was opposed to the request of a Turkish Muslim 
Governor in Mount Lebanon as excessive and potentially equating to further losses of Druze 
privilege. The Jumblatt family viewed the initial favouritism of the Druze by the Sublime 
Porte following the second Ottoman-Egyptian War as an opportunity to make political gains 
by reasserting their authority and re-establishing their wealth and property rights following 
the banishment of Emir Bashir II from Mount Lebanon.18   
 
Although the Jumblatt family desired an elevated status with the Sublime Porte, by securing 
Druze privileges within the framework of the Ottoman Empire, they wanted to do so 
without providing too much control to the Sublime Porte. However, decentralised 
governance was no longer a viable option and the Sublime Porte also had to contend with 
increased French pressure on the governance of Mount Lebanon. Following the exile of 
Bashir II, the Sublime Porte appointed Emir Bashir III, Bashir II’s cousin, who had acted as 
Bashir II’s opposition on behalf of the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Ibrahim Pasha. 
The Druze viewed Bashir III as a feeble leader, but also an obstacle to Druze autonomy, one 
who upheld and defended the authority of the Ottoman Empire. The request by the Druze 
leaders to have full rights reinstated was denied immediately by Bashir III who subsequently 
undertook measures to rid Mount Lebanon of the Druze feudal authority that remained. The 
developments under Bashir III led to fighting between the Maronites and Druze in Deir el-
Qamar, spreading to other parts of the mountain soon after.19  
 
																																																						
17 FO/78/498 January 12, 1842 (no. 20), sent to Charles Bankhead, Her Majesty’s Minister Plenipotentiary, from Richard 
Wood, Damascus. 
18 Johnson 2001, p. 90. 
19 Johnson 2001, pp. 90-1; Kisirwani, 1980, p. 697.  
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The Druze who found themselves in a precarious situation, suffering under the authority of 
Bashir III and desiring to regain their political authority, could not retract the request of a 
Turkish Muslim Governor. Doing so increased the risk of being accused of insubordination 
and being subject to the heavy-handed consequences of the Sublime Porte. A third 
proposition was put forward by a small portion of Christian and Druze populations, who 
found common ground in seeking the division of Mount Lebanon into feudal districts 
administered by notable families acting as governors. This latter request was dismissed by 
Ottoman authorities,20 but managed to resonate with the European states.    
 
The precarious position was not exceptional to the Druze community. Following the 
application of the Hatt-ı Şerif, the Christians in Mount Lebanon also perceived their political, 
economic, and social position within the Ottoman Empire as being in a state of deterioration. 
Although the Sublime Porte had promulgated reforms to implement equality, the 
centralisation of the Sublime Porte and the need to acquiesce to the Muslim population for 
legitimacy, negatively impacted their relationship with authority. However, where they 
perceived their situation in a state of deterioration in the Ottoman Empire, their alliance with 
the French, in particular, helped to elevate their status. Fearing the close association between 
Emir Bashir III and the Sublime Porte, the Christians in Mount Lebanon requested that the 
French persuade the Sublime Porte to allow the return of Emir Bashir II.  
 
The French, seeking to fulfil their role as protectors of the Christian population and to 
establish their ‘legitimate influence’, procured an agreement with Emir Bashir II while he was 
in exile: in exchange for consular and political support in Emir Bashir II’s efforts to regain 
authority in the region, Emir Bashir II promised France his allegiance in advancing their 
‘mutual interests’ – such as the emancipation of the Christian population from the Ottoman 
Empire and developing an ever deeper allegiance to the French state.21 The French were 
effectively strategizing to undermine the authority and sovereignty of the Sublime Porte by 
building on a shared political identity of Catholicism with the Maronite community, 
strengthened through the identification of the Muslim, and the Druze identity, as being 
fundamentally different.  
 
																																																						
20 The British consul, Richard Wood, reports that the Christians are divided into three parties: the first support Emir Bashir 
III; the second advocate for the return of the ex-Emir Bashir II; and the third side with the Druze, arguing for a division 
based on Chief families and land ownership. FO/78/498 January 12, 1842 (no. 20). 
21 FO/78/498 February 23, 1842; Hakim 2013, p. 41. 
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Highlighting the French perceptions of the Maronite community in Mount Lebanon, the 
Vatican sent Archbishop of Laodicea Nicolas Murad to Istanbul in 1842 with the task to 
bear witness to and report on the treatment of the Christian population under the centralising 
administration of the Sublime Porte. Following his deployment, Murad wrote a pamphlet 
titled Notice Historique sur l’Origine de la Nation Maronite et sur ses Rapports avec la France, sur la 
Nation Druze et sur les diverses populations du Mont Liban,22 in it, he discusses the geographic limits 
of the Lebanese Emirate, stretching from Saida in the South to Tripoli in the North, covering 
Mount Lebanon, the Anti-Lebanon Mountains, and the Beka’a Valley. In the pamphlet, 
Murad discusses a network of nobility that reflects the order and authority found in Europe, 
noting it as evidence of a Christian civilisation spanning across Europe and into Mount 
Lebanon while highlighting the incivility of the Muslim population. Following Murad’s study 
of the Region, he moved to Paris to help the French restore the Christian Chehab dynasty 
in Mount Lebanon, seeing it as his duty to ensure that France and Christian Lebanon were 
united.23 The belief that the Christians of Mount Lebanon, particularly the Maronite 
community, formed a distinct civilisation from the Muslim population, was one that was 
based on a specific Christian European history that, with modernity, did not entirely 
disappear. Rather than disappearing, the ideas that had been prevalent in pre-modern Europe 
had become assembled onto ideas of modernity and scientific progress, which catalogued 
the world through scientific and absolute categories, such as a separate Christian civilisation.24 
The deployment of this reasoning also highlights a continuation of French imperial policy of 
expansion, not only based on economic and military grandeur but on a civilising and 
protectionist policy. 
 
The sectarian separation between the Christians from the Muslim and Druze populations in 
Mount Lebanon not only served the advancement of French interests but posed a domestic 
political problem by putting the religious communities into competition over political power 
and economic resources by insisting sectarian identities were constitutive of civilisational 
boundaries. The Christians, Muslims, and Druze of Mount Lebanon, however, had shared 
cultural similarities and traditions including the use and management of socio-economic 
institutions and not as distinct and separate communities.25 The development of a Christian 
identity that was perceived as inherently more civilised was one that developed through 
politicisation and a distinct European worldview. Indeed, the main reason that these religious 
																																																						
22 [A Historical Note on the Origins of the Maronite Nation and their Rapport with France, On the Druze Nation and the 
Diverse Populations of Mount Lebanon], Murad 1844.  
23 Hakim 2013, p. 53; Murad 1844. 
24 Donelly 1998, p. 6. 
25 Doumani 1998.  
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communities were set on a course of division, aside from their respective religious practices, 
were political and economic policies of modernisation and centralisation in the Ottoman 
Empire and communal alliances with European powers, who sought to fulfil their own 
interests – including economic expansion, unfettered access to peripheral colonies, and 
access to militarily important regions. Ultimately, this created the groundwork for incessant 
sectarianism in the mid-nineteenth century despite ‘a long history of non-sectarian 
leadership’ in Mount Lebanon among the various religious groups.26 
 
Although sectarianism was an ever increasing political problem due to the political 
environment and the various actors involved, objections to the Sublime Porte’s plan to install 
a Turkish Muslim Governor in Mount Lebanon were not only shared by the French and 
British and groups within the Druze and Christian communities, but also by the Governor 
of Damascus, Nedjib Pasha, who viewed the plan as possibly having the adverse effect of 
uniting the Christians and the Druze against Ottoman authorities. Instead, Nedjib Pasha 
encouraged the pacification of Mount Lebanon through the disarmament of the population, 
a strategy that was also proposed by the Sultan’s Grand Vizier. The British opposed these 
plans, viewing disarmament as perilous for the local populations, leaving them susceptible to 
abuse by Ottoman forces. Given that the French were seeking the appointment of Emir 
Bashir II, and Nedjib Pasha expressed the need for the Sublime Porte to assert its dominance 
by ensuring a monopoly of coercion, the British consul in Damascus, Richard Wood, 
proposed the appointment of Emir Said al-Deen (or Emir Saad el-Din), a Muslim prince of 
the Chehab family, and former Governor of Hasbeya. Should al-Deen be viewed as 
unacceptable to the Sublime Porte, Wood proposed Emir Amin, the son of Emir Bashir II, 
as an alternate given that he actively fought alongside Ottoman forces during the Second 
Egyptian-Ottoman War (1839-1841).27  
 
Wood’s recommendations of appointing a Muslim prince of the Chehab family, viewed as a 
compromise to all parties involved, went ignored by the Sublime Porte. On January 15, 1842, 
the Druze were successful in their struggle against the Maronite leadership in Mount 
Lebanon and Bashir III was deposed by the Sublime Porte. In turn, the Sublime Porte 
appointed Omar Pasha as governor of Lebanon from Tripoli.28 Omar Pasha’s appointment 
surprised the Druze and the Maronites, as well as the European states, who viewed the 
appointment as dangerous and flawed. Klemens Von Metternich, the Chancellor of the 
																																																						
26 Makdisi 2000, p. 77.  
27  FO/78/498 February 23, 1842. 
28 Churchill 1862, pp. 63-64.  
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Austrian Empire (1821-1848) was more sympathetic to this choice than his European 
colleagues, stating that Omar Pasha could provide impartial authority over the Maronites and 
Druze. Nevertheless, he perceived the appointment as a possible flashpoint for the Sublime 
Porte, given that none of the parties involved approved of this selection.29  
 
Dissatisfaction with the appointment of Omar Pasha created insecurity and rumours of a 
coalition between Christian and Druze leaders as feared by Nedjib Pasha. The rumours had 
some underlying veracity – with some Druze leaders inviting Christian leaders to discuss a 
possible alliance. The Christians were unable to refuse the invitation because of their inferior 
position in relation to the Druze under the eyes of the Empire, but they were also aware that 
any alliance between themselves and the Druze would result in the Druze retaining the upper 
hand. The Druze leaders that had called for the alliance were fearful of a loss of privilege and 
rights under the new governor. This provoked a split within the Druze community between 
those who had opposed and those who had supported the appointment of a Turkish Muslim 
governor.30  
 
Subsequently, Omar Pasha, seeking to assert the authority of the Sublime Porte and to display 
his ability to govern effectively arrested five Druze Sheikhs thought to be plotting a rebellion 
against his authority. The arrested Druze leaders included: Sheikh Nassif Abu Nakad (Nassif 
Bey), Sheikh Said Jumblatt, Sheikh Hussein Talhouk, Sheikh Hootoor Ahmad (Hootoor 
Bey), and Emir Ahmed Arslan.31 The arrest of these leaders, and the arrest of other Druze 
leaders and combatants that had taken place across the mountain resulted in deepening 
Druze animosity directed towards the Sublime Porte and the Muslim populations. Angered 
by the actions of Omar Pasha, the Druze viewed the Sultan as giving into the wills of the 
Christians who were perceived as overtaking the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, the 
Christians, particularly those who desired the return of the Chehab dynasty, offered their 
support to the Sublime Porte.32  
 
The unfolding disaster taking place in Mount Lebanon and anxious feeling caused by the 
European watchful eye, the Sublime Porte deployed Selim Bey, commissioner to the Sublime 
Porte, to Mount Lebanon with the task to uncover the desires of the Maronite and Druze 
																																																						
29 Farah 2000, pp. 140-2. 
30 FO/78/498 March 23, 1842 (no. 29), sent to Stratford Canning, British Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from 
Richard Wood, Damascus. 
31 Sheikh Nasif Abu Neked, Sheikh Said Djinblat, Sheikh Hussein Talhook, Sheikh Hootoor Amad, and Sheikh Ahmed 
Raslan; FO/78/498 March 23, 1842 (no. 29); Firro 1992, p. 92; The Sessional Papers, vol. XIII, p. 219. 
32 Farah 2000, pp. 171-175; The Sessional Papers, vol. XIII, pp. 235-236.  
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communities, persuade the Maronites into accepting a form of direct rule under the Sublime 
Porte, and to report back on the situation.33 Failure to acquire the acquiescence of the 
Maronite community would result in the appointment of a Christian and a Druze governor 
under the tutelage of a Turkish Muslim Governor.34 It was believed that the division of 
authority in the region had the potential to alleviate some of the tension between the Druze 
and Christian communities and allow the Sublime Porte to, at the very least only nominally, 
display to the European powers that it could maintain a central form of control over the 
region by retaining a Muslim governor to oversee a Druze and Christian Qaymaqam.35 Doing 
so would allow the Ottomans the chance to demonstrate their ability in establishing a rational 
and ordered government based on territorial sovereignty and administered through a central 
apparatus.36  
 
The British consul, Richard Wood, did not immediately like the proposition of divided rule, 
believing that the division of authority would create further conflict caused by mixed 
populations with land claims and feudal rights in certain areas.37 Additionally, Stratford 
Canning believed that traditional rule needed to be supported in Mount Lebanon while 
arguing that the commitments that were extracted from the Sublime Porte in return for 
British participation in the war against the Egyptian occupation (1839-1841) had to be 
privileged.38 Needless to say, traditional rule and the commitments of the Hatt-ı Şerif  (1839) 
represented contradictory forms of governance. In addition, French support of the Christian 
Chehab dynasty, general European arguments for the need to modernise structures of 
governance, and European interference in the communal relations of Mount Lebanon were 
activities that were bringing the European powers, the Sublime Porte, and the Druze and 
Maronite communities into conflict due to their contradicting interests and goals.  
 
In order to suppress the possibility of conflict, representatives from Britain, France, Russia, 
Prussia, Austria, and the Sublime Porte came together on May 27, 1842 to discuss the issues 
of governance in Mount Lebanon. The participants in the meeting agreed, in principle, on a 
partition plan, granting the Druze and Christians the right to authority through a split 
Qaymaqamship, under the supervision of an Ottoman governor, the Mushir of Beirut, Assad 
																																																						
33 Farah, 2000, pp. 183-186. 
34 The Sessional Papers, vol. XIII, pp. 379-380, no. 130.  
35 The Qaymaqam was a district governor.  
36 Deligiorgi 2002. 
37 The Sessional Papers, vol. XIII, pp. 379-380, no. 130. 
38 Farah 2000, pp. 186.  
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Pasha.39 However, the planning and implementation of the partition required that the 
Sublime Porte had to gain the unanimous consent of the European powers involved. This 
was a decision that was later endorsed by Ottoman ministers and commissioners, including 
Selim Bey, on September 7, 1842.40  
 
The constraints that were placed on the Sublime Porte regarding the necessity to gain 
unanimous consent from the European powers and the inability to assert independent 
control over Mount Lebanon reflected a diminution of Ottoman power within the region. 
Additionally, the decision regarding administrative appointments was handed to Assad Pasha 
who made the strategic decision to select ineffective Qaymaqams who would bend to his 
interests. The appointments of Emir Haidar Ismail Abi al-Lami as the Christian Qaymaqam 
and Emir Ahmad Arslan as the Druze Qaymaqam dissatisfied the population, who viewed 
the appointments as a barrier to accessing authority. This view consequently pushed the 
Christian and Druze population even further towards the French and British, respectively, 
with the aim of increasing political and economic security.41 
 
Split authority of Mount Lebanon, although managed under a single Ottoman governor, was 
viewed as a necessity to retain authority and to prevent further rebellious activity by the 
inhabitants of Mount Lebanon. It also served the purpose of allowing the Sublime Porte to 
fulfil their promise of local rule while modernising and centralising authority, which 
otherwise, had the adverse effect of placing the Christians and the Druze into conflict over 
control. On the other hand, the decision to divide authority in Mount Lebanon also 
legitimised perceptions of difference that deepened sectarian divisions among the Maronite 
and the Druze populations. In the context of the prevalent European language of scientific 
racism, the division of authority between Christian and Druze helped reinforce notions of 
the two religious communities belonging to separate civilisations and, indeed, separate 
races.42 Although the religious groups did not constitute the definition of race, as race, as a 
concept underwent transformation throughout the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty first 
centuries, the notion of the religious communities representing separate races slowly became 
entrenched in the political development of the Syrian provinces, affecting the relationships 
																																																						
39 The equivalent of a Field Marshall, or counsellor, a Mushir would also be given the title of Pasha. The Sessional Papers, 
vol. XIII, pp. 77-78, no. 58. 
40 Farah 2000, p. 220. 
41 Firro 1992, pp. 92-94; Hazran 2014, p. 21; al-‘Aqiqi 1959, pp. 7-8. 
42 Stratford Canning in his letter to M. Pisani, on May 27, 1842, writes that “Two races, in most things separate, divide 
Mount Lebanon.” The Sessional Papers, vol. XIII, pp. 105, 107, 109, 200, 228, 284.   
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between local populations, European powers and the Sublime Porte.43 This method of 
categorising the population was due to the difficulty of distinguishing the populations, 
requiring that the language and nineteenth century logic of race was to be applied to religious 
divisions.44 This was not only with regards to sectarian cleavages, but also emerging 
distinctions between Lebanese and Syrian populations.  
 
The division of Mount Lebanon and the production of European logics that distinguished 
sectarian communities had a negative impact on communal relations – particularly in the 
mixed districts, furthered by economic and political factors, and changes in the structures of 
social order. The latter was subject to the instability of decreasing power and wealth of the 
traditional nobility and the rise of a new merchant class made up of middlemen and bankers, 
bolstered by increased trade with the European powers.45 However, conflict was being 
determined by the consequences of divided authority on communal identities. The European 
powers believed that the violence they were witnessing in Mount Lebanon would erupt into 
a full-scale conflict and insisted that the Sublime Porte intervene to supress the violence. The 
Sublime Porte responded by sending the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shekib Effendi, to 
Mount Lebanon to report back on the unfolding conflict and to find a resolution.46 After 
bearing witness to the violence, Shekib Effendi decided that the only effective means to 
pacify the population included the deployment of Ottoman troops in Mount Lebanon and 
the reassertion of the Hatt-ı Şerif which was retitled as the ‘Tanzimat of Shekib Effendi’ or 
Shakib Effendi Règlement (1843), becoming the Organic Law for Lebanon.47 The European 
powers had managed to secure access and power within Mount-Lebanon without having to 
colonise or occupy it. Although their control was indirect, it was effective.  
 
The Shakib Effendi Règlement reintroduced provisions of the Hatt-ı Şerif and differed in the 
iteration of authority structures. The law included the reassertion of the Qaymaqam system, 
the development of a mejlis council for each Qaymaqam, which would be composed by a 
Qaymaqam, a judge, and an advisor from each religious community (Maronite, Druze, Greek 
Orthodox, Sunni Muslim, and Greek Catholic (Melkite)), and the two Qaymaqams were to 
																																																						
43 Historical definition of race at this time was beginning to shift from a taxonomic concept to a biological concept. In the 
early 1840’s it was generally accepted that race was objective, related to culture, material success, and interpersonal relations, 
and that race was a valid scientific category. Interestingly, scholars writing on race during this period labeled Arabs as white 
with the Arab countries containing ‘an astonishing diversity of aspect in the population; independently, to all appearance, 
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44 166PO/E/269 August 1, 1880 (no. 177), French Embassy in Istanbul [Constantinople], Syria: Mission of M. de Torcy in 
Syria and Palestine, to M. de Freycinet, Minister of Foreign Affairs.   
45 Hakim 2013, p. 50 
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submit to the authority of the governor of Sidon.48 In principle, the division of authority was 
meant to end violence by giving the Druze and the Maronite communities political rights 
over the territories in which they formed majorities. In practice, the division of authority and 
the development of the councils, which sought to uphold local authority but also centralise 
authority under the Sublime Porte, led to conflict over judicial and fiscal prerogatives within 
the councils. The latter was ill-defined and attempts to set boundaries by Ottoman officials 
produced new contradictions in the application of the law and governance.49 
 
The Hatt-ı Şerif (1839) sought to reform the Ottoman Empire in order to parallel the 
institutional order of European states. Doing so meant adopting notions of progress and 
equality, and undertaking a European form of rational governance based on territorial 
sovereignty rather than social authority. Implementing these reforms unintentionally 
disrupted and destabilised the established set of relations between the social field in the 
Syrian provinces and the Sublime Porte. The reforms removed authority from the communal 
leadership and centralised it through the establishment of centralised institutions. The 
dislocation of the social field from the Sublime Porte benefitted France and Britain, allowing 
them to take advantage of the situation by forming alliances with disaffected communities. 
The French, for example, pursued an alliance with the Maronite Catholics, arguing that such 
a relationship was legitimate due to their shared Christian civilisation. The British, on the 
other hand, balanced the French influence in Mount Lebanon by aligning with the Druze. 
The alliances between the Maronites and the French, on the one hand, and the British and 
Druze on the other, reinforced social schisms. 
 
The rest of the Syrian provinces were not insulated from Mount Lebanon and the preference 
given to the Maronites by the French and the French role in pressuring the Sublime Porte 
into allowing the return of the Chehab dynasty to power had created discontent throughout 
the Syrian provinces. The French were perceived as meddling in the domestic affairs of the 
Empire with the aim to change its character from an Islamic Empire to a secular-Christian 
Empire. Additionally, speculation of the emerging conflict between the Druze and Maronite 
communities in Mount Lebanon spread throughout the Syrian provinces, while news of 
continued institutional modernisation was met with dismay – and widely viewed as a 
Christian project. Although the Sublime Porte was under pressure from the European 
powers to modernise its institutions and governance and to reflect the form of government 
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practiced in Europe, it was also under domestic pressure not to appear weak to European 
demands.  
 
4.1.2 The Aleppo Uprisings (1850): Social Dislocation and European Interference  
Despite programmes of institutional and social engineering by the Ottoman Empire, 
incapacity to fully enact reforms altered the accepted social order, creating disorder by 
fracturing the historic economic and political norms steeped in social tradition. The 
modernisation of institutions and governance led to increased dissatisfaction among the 
population and as dissatisfaction grew, the French, the British, and the Russians allied 
themselves with segments of dissatisfied populations. These alliances were premised on 
sectarian identities and the right of European powers to protect minorities who would 
otherwise face oppression and violence. However, the European powers utilised these 
alliances in order to pursue economic and political interests, further creating disorder within 
the Syrian provinces, and impacting the ability of the Sublime Porte to administer reforms.50 
The impact of the Sublime Porte’s inability to assert authority in implementing reforms and 
continued European interference increased the sense of disorder within the social field, 
which took a violent form in Aleppo.  
 
On the second night of Eid al-Adha, in Aleppo, on October 17, 1850, some of the Muslim 
population in the city attacked the Christian population. The Aleppo Uprising took the 
European consuls by surprise due to the general high level of wealth that was present among 
the population of the city at the time. The British consul in Beirut, Joseph Rose, writing to 
Ambassador Stratford Canning on October 31, 1850, stated his astonishment at the events 
that unfolded in Aleppo. It was Rose’s understanding that high levels of wealth would ease 
social tensions.51 Despite the high levels of wealth among the population in Aleppo, which 
contradicted his assumptions that social tensions and violence occurs under conditions of 
economic inequality, the city was not immune to social tensions.52 The Aleppo uprising is 
described by Bruce Masters as a consequence of a fragile political and social order that 
emerged after the social reforms of the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839). That is not to say that there were 
no instances of instability and revolt before the reform period began, but the reforms, along 
with European interference, heightened social and political tensions by altering the 
organisation of the social environment.53  
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Similar to reports on social disorder and violence emerging from elsewhere within the 
Ottoman Empire, including Mount Lebanon, the reports on Aleppo, by the European 
consuls, largely construct the uprising as a sectarian issue, highlighting attacks on the 
Christian population by the ‘fanatical’ Muslims.54 While the uprising in Aleppo was a Muslim 
led uprising and it did target the Christian population, it can be further nuanced. As Masters 
argued, not all Muslims participated in the attacks, or even the uprising. In fact, it was solely 
the Muslim population of the city’s Eastern quarters that attacked the Christians of the 
Judayda quarter, largely populated by Uniate Catholics.55 The Muslim population of the city’s 
Eastern quarter had, for some time, been underrepresented in local politics while the Uniate 
Catholics had benefited from European interference, resulting in overrepresentation.56 The 
overrepresentation of the Uniate Catholic community in Aleppo was, in the eyes of the 
Muslim community, following a trend that at once diminished the political authority of the 
Muslim communities while increasing that of the Christians.  
 
The social dynamics of conflict that were produced was a consequence of the incorporation 
of the Ottoman Empire into the European state system and the application of a standard of 
civilisation that justified continued subordination of the Ottoman Empire. The standard of 
civilisation also made it extremely difficult for the Sublime Porte to assert sovereignty, which 
facilitated competing European interests within the Ottoman Empire, and increased the need 
to establish relations with communities in order for the Europeans to gain a foothold. The 
impact, however, was a renegotiation of the domestic social field that altered power and 
leverage of the various communities. Feras Krimsti examines social consequences of the 
incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the world economy in the 19th century, as do 
others.57 The incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the world economy meant pressure 
to function within the dominant capitalist structures, requiring the modernisation of 
governance and institutions, which ultimately resulted in a reordering of relations between 
communities.58 Accordingly, the world economy that the Ottoman Empire was incorporated 
into privileged the European states who began extracting raw materials and manufacturing 
products that would be sold back to the Ottoman territories at a higher rate. In doing so, the 
																																																						
54 Feras Krimsti (2014) highlights British and French perceptions of the Muslim population as fanatical in the Syrian 
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56 Several Christian churches were burned to the ground and there are reported deaths, all Christians. Masters 1990, pp. 3-
5. 
57 İslamoğlu-İnan 1987, p. 22; Sunar 1987, pp. 63-87; Wallerstein, Decdeli, and Kasaba 1987, pp. 88-97. 
58 Krimsti 2014. 
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European powers had also favoured a set of Christian producers and businesses by 
negotiating economic, political, and physical protections.59 The privileged position that the 
Christian communities enjoyed with the European powers can be attributed to perceptions 
that the Christians, because of their religion, were most like the Europeans. They were 
therefore predetermined to be rational.  This scientific racism not only aided in the 
development of relationships between the Christians of the Syrian provinces and the 
Europeans while dismantling the political privilege of the Muslim communities, but also 
shaped the interactions with the Sublime Porte, impacting the Empire’s interaction with 
modernity.  
 
4.2 The Christian Holy Places in Jerusalem and the Crimean War (1853-1856) 
French and Russian interests in protecting and elevating the status of Christians within the 
Syrian provinces was, it can be argued, civilisational, but it was also geo-political and 
economic. Competition between France and Russia within the European state system led to 
a specific set of interactions between these European states in the global peripheries. French 
and Russian interests within the Ottoman Empire were focused on political and economic 
imperial expansion, often using sectarianism as a means to access and create alliances with 
local populations and therefore make political and economic gains. By arguing that Catholic 
and Orthodox Christians of the Syrian provinces were the civilisational cousins of France 
and Russia, respectively, the governments of these European states assumed the right to 
protect these communities. The narrative used to justify French and Russian interference, 
however, was based on notions of scientific racism, arguing that the belief in a Christian God 
was evidence of moral and intellectual superiority that was a fact of biology.60 The Ottoman 
Empire, under pressure to modernise and develop institutions and a state structure similar 
to that of the European state, as well as subject to external interference in domestic affairs, 
also had to contend with global tensions resulting from the political upheaval of the 1848 
French Revolution and the threat of German unification. These incidents were compounded 
by the collapse of Hungary which led to the 1850 refugee crisis, where the revolutionaries 
sought refuge in the Ottoman Empire.61 Aggravated by Russian expansion into the Caucasus, 
the Sublime Porte refused to extradite the refugees back to Russian occupied territory, an 
attribute leading to the Crimean War of 1853, and instigating the formation of a Western 
European alliance.62 
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Through this alliance, the French, representing the Catholic communities, had been granted 
the rights to the Christian Holy Places. Angered by this development, the Russians tried to 
re-establish the dominant status of the Orthodox community by proposing the creation of 
an ‘eternal alliance’ that would have placed the Ottoman Empire under Russian suzerainty.63 
The Tsar, Nicholas I (1825-1855), argued that the Orthodox Christian community had 
become numerous, becoming a wealthy literate class, and were therefore worthy of increased 
rights. According to Nicholas I, it was Russia’s right to act in defence of the Orthodox 
community and thus reject the French status over the Holy Places, despite the French 
possessing a firman from the year 1740, issued by Sultan Mahmud I, that confirmed the rights 
and privileges of the Roman Catholic community to the Holy Places in Jerusalem.64  
 
The conflict between France and Russia over the Holy Places in Jerusalem and the decision 
of the Sublime Porte to protect refugees from the Caucasus, placed the Ottoman Empire at 
the centre of the conflict. To compete, and ultimately, to survive, the Sublime Porte was 
forced to increase Ottoman military capacity by enacting widespread conscription in the 
Syrian provinces, an unpopular decision amongst the Druze and the Christians. The former, 
refusing to join the ranks of the Ottoman military, began to migrate from Mount Lebanon 
to the Anti-Lebanon Mountains and the Hauran, forming a security alliance with the Bedouin 
Tribe Waled Aly. The Christians, primarily those residing in the districts of Ajloun and 
Arbella, on the other hand, were refusing to pay their taxes unless civil and military 
authorities agreed, in writing, to exempt them from conscription.65 Although the European 
powers had pressured the Sublime Porte to ensure equality among all imperial subjects, the 
Druze and Maronite communities resisted being treated in an equal manner during a period 
of need. The refusal to serve in the Ottoman military emphasises the dislocated relationship 
between the Sublime Porte and the religious minority communities in the Syrian provinces, 
caused by the reforms.   
 
The relationship between religious identity and political loyalty quickly became prevalent 
during the years leading up to the Crimean War (1853-1856). However, this had been a 
growing problem for the Ottoman Empire due to the fact that religious minorities in the 
Syrian provinces had been forming relations with the European powers.  As the conflict 
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64 The firman was a series of capitulations granted to France by Sultan Mahmud I, see Slade 1867, pp. 63-74; Goldfrank 
2013; Van Dyck 1881, p. 121. 
65 FO/78/910 March 17th, 1852 (no. 9), sent to Stratford Canning, the British Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], 
from Richard Wood, Damascus.  
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between France and Russia became increasingly focused on Ottoman territories, there was a 
greater risk of increased loyalty of the Christian communities being won over by the French 
and Russians. The Sublime Porte, as well as the British, viewed French and Russian advances 
as a threat. With the aim of facilitating an amenable environment for the Sublime Porte, the 
British consul in Damascus asked the rebellious communities to remain loyal to the Sultan 
and to submit themselves to the imperial ordinances. The reply to the British plea for loyalty 
to the Sublime Porte from these communities was an appeal asking that Britain govern their 
affairs instead.66 
 
By the end of 1852, the French announced their seizure of the Christian Holy Places, 
compelling the Russians to respond with force, arguing that the Ottoman Empire had fallen 
into foreign hands.67 The Russians were correct in their assessment but they were also to 
blame for encroachments on Ottoman independence that sought to fulfil similar interests. 
Control of the Holy Places by France and the response by Russia led to the Crimean War 
(1853-1856), which further damaged social relations and the economy in the Syrian 
provinces. The Crimean War required increased spending by the Sublime Porte but the 
capital required to fight could not be extracted and secured from the provinces. The shortage 
of capital forced the Sublime Porte to accept aid in the form of foreign loans, later becoming 
clear that the loans were squandered by the Sultan and his closest servants.68 In addition to 
requiring the repayment of the loans, there were political conditions that were attached, 
which deepened the ability of the French and British to influence the decision-making 
process in the Ottoman Empire, entrenching a hierarchy of relations between the Ottoman 
Empire, France, and Britain.69 The provision of loans by the French and the British to the 
Sublime Porte formalised the political hierarchy in the European state system.  
 
As the Crimean War (1853-1856) began, the Sublime Porte began spearheading a course of 
reforms that devolved more powers to local governors selected by the Sublime Porte. The 
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devolution of powers did not equate to decentralisation, rather powers that had been held 
by the imperial centre had been transferred to the provincial governors. Devolution included 
provisions regarding security, judicial responsibilities, and ability to raise taxes. The Mushir 
of Aleppo, Suleyman Pasha, for example, was granted increased powers that included the 
authorisation to punish all minor crimes without having to refer to the Sublime Porte. By 
mid-January, 1853, a second firman was issued, this time reiterating the new powers granted 
to the Mushir, which included the additional ability to administer the death penalty, the ability 
to dismiss Qaymaqams, a sub-governor, dependent on his province (Pashalik) – including 
the provincial administrative (Mejlis) Council – particularly if they were unwilling to fulfil 
their duties, and was given the role of managing provincial revenues as well as the 
maintenance and assurance of public security in villages, cities, and along major roads.70 
Other reforms included the reinstatement of the ferdeh, or war tax, on all adult males which 
was subsequently reversed once discussion of revolt and rebellion amongst the Muslim 
population made its way to the Sublime Porte.71 However, the reversal upset many property 
owners and influential families, particularly from the southern parts of Syria, which increased 
the potential of rebellion to spread into Damascus, Aleppo, and Mount Lebanon, where the 
threat of violent conflict remained high.72    
 
The Crimean War was a factor in exposing the precarious position of the Sublime Porte. 
Observing this position and wishing to put an end to the war while making gains, the French 
and Austrian governments put together the Vienna Note. The framework set out in the 
Vienna Note was extremely vague and created an environment of insecurity for the Sublime 
Porte by providing ample opportunity for the Russians and French to make gains over the 
Holy Places in Jerusalem at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. The Sublime Porte, upon 
receiving the Vienna Note, refused to accept the provisions, arguing that the rights of the 
Christian population within the territories of the Ottoman Empire depended solely on the 
Sultan.73 The authors of the Vienna Note were attempting to take advantage of the weakened 
position of the Ottoman Empire and in doing so attempted to impede on what little power 
and independence remained with the Sublime Porte at the time. The rejection of the Vienna 
Note and the accompanying statement by the Sublime Porte utilised international public law 
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against its creators, as had been done with the request for the Sublime Porte to extradite 
refugees to Russia in 1850. However, as with the use of international public law during the 
1850 Refugee Crisis, the Sublime Porte was unable to enforce their claims outright due to 
their subordinated status.   
 
4.2.1 The Crimean War (1853-1856) and the Social Field of the Syrian Provinces 
The Sublime Porte’s objection to the Vienna Note was forceful enough that the Note was 
subsequently revised and its stipulations were rewritten to be more acceptable to the Sublime 
Porte. Yet, the revised Note did not guarantee Ottoman sovereignty, it did include, however, 
the right to territorial integrity. Even though the Ottoman sovereignty was not guaranteed, 
the Russians refused to accept the revised Note. The article on territorial integrity meant that 
Russian territorial expansion and influence over secessionist movements would be limited, 
impeding Russian interests.74  
 
In July 1853, following the rejection of the revised Note, the Russians began to occupy the 
Danubian principalities of the Ottoman Empire.75 During this period, Russia made 
emboldened claims and demands on the Ottoman Empire, encroaching on domestic affairs, 
leading to increased anti-Russian sentiment within the Ottoman Empire, Muslim resentment 
towards notions of equality, and increased distaste for further reforms. On the other hand, 
Roderic Davison argues that sentiments of Ottoman brotherhood were bolstered by the 
emergence of the Russian threat.76 Perceiving the Russian threat as existential and under the 
assumption that France and Britain would support the Ottoman army and naval fleet, the 
Sublime Porte declared war on Russia on October 4, 1853. During the Crimean War, the 
Russians, British, and French took strategic advantage of their increased physical presence 
within Ottoman territories.  
 
Following the declaration of war, the Sultan issued a firman asking the local authorities across 
the Ottoman Empire to maintain ‘perfect tranquillity’ and for 1,500 volunteer soldiers that 
will be placed under the command of Ali Bey Sherif. Commenting on the firman, the French 
consul in Aleppo believed that the request for volunteer soldiers would be supported 
throughout the territories. Subsequently, on November 19, 1853, he described the 
‘remarkable way in which Muslims, Christians, and Europeans are working together with 
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great admiration for the Pashas who have worked hard to maintain order and tranquillity’.77 
As Davison argues, the emergence of a common enemy, Russia, led to increased cooperation 
among previously divided communities. While this is true to a certain extent, Davison and 
the French consul’s perception of events is overly optimistic: the Russians maintained an 
extensive network of Greek Orthodox officials in the Ottoman Empire, and used them as 
social capital during the war. The networks that the Russians had access to posed a threat to 
the Sublime Porte, but also to competing French and British interests in the region. 
 
Following the outbreak of the war, on January 14, 1854, the British consul in Damascus 
reported that two Russian emissaries were spotted in Damascus. It is believed that the 
Russian emissaries came to Damascus to influence the Greek Orthodox community and to 
emancipate the Greek Orthodox Church and its adherents from Muslim domination. By 
using the Prelate at the head of the Greek Orthodox Church, who was, for eight years, the 
tutor to the Archdukes of the Imperial Russian Family, as well as the Tsar’s confessor, Russia 
was able to influence a vast network of Greek Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire.78 
In an example of the extent of these networks, the Russian emissaries swayed the Greek 
Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch to permit the Archimandrite and the Superior of the Saint 
Elias (Mar Elias) Convent in Shwayya, Mount Lebanon, to covertly enter in and carry out 
relations with the Ansari and Bedouin tribes, whom were being incited into rebellion by the 
Orthodox Bishops of Hama and Aleppo.79  
 
Soon after the British observed the two Russian emissaries in Damascus, the French consul 
in Damascus wrote that the Ansari and Bedouin tribes outside of Hama, under the control 
of Fares al-Hadeb, allied with Russia, had come into contact with the tribes under control of 
Behin Khaled and Beni Khere, who had pledged allegiance to the Ottoman Empire and the 
Sultan. The battle that ensued following the encounter left the Ottoman allied tribes 
decimated, while those under the authority of Fares al-Hadeb were left emboldened and with 
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new weapons.80 The Russians had taken advantage of the dislocation between customary 
groups and networks and the Sublime Porte, which was caused by the implementation of 
modernisation reforms. The subsequent relations that were formed between the European 
powers and the customary groups and networks were not only based on religious identity, 
but as with the case of the Russians, had kinship and tribal elements.  
 
In addition to Russian alliances with tribal networks and the Greek Orthodox community, 
the British accuse the Russians of prolonging the insurrection of the Druze Yezbeck faction 
in the Hauran.81 According to the British, the Russian strategy included developing an alliance 
with Emir Amin and disrupting the social relations in the region. Emir Amin, on the other 
hand, used this alliance with the aim of increasing territorial claims and to make an argument 
for autonomy from the Sublime Porte. The strategy employed by the Russians and Emir 
Amin to fulfil their interests included reigniting the rivalry between Druze notables, the 
Jumblatts and Talhouks, a historic schism between the Jumblatts and Druze Yezbeck Clans, 
the latter being led by the Talhouks.82 The Russians were actively pursuing a strategy of 
destabilisation, targeting the social order within the Ottoman Empire and taking advantage 
of existing schisms, by using their network within the Greek Orthodox community; this gave 
them access to tribal networks, as well as helped them form alliances with notables who were 
locked into stalemates with the Sublime Porte, such as Emir Amin. The principal aims for 
the Russians was to coerce the Sublime Porte into conceding the right to protect and 
administer the Christian Holy Places, which had been given to the French, and unabated 
expansion into the Danubian principalities.83 
 
Taking advantage of the social conditions that had been created by Russian interference and 
the Sublime Porte’s focus on Russian activities, the French were actively engaging the 
Catholic communities with the aim to undermine Russian strategies, but also to deepen 
French influence within Ottoman territories. In October 1854, the French consul boasted 
that the influence of France  
 
is winning, without a doubt, and what better way to prove this 
than the legitimacy given by the Sultan and his government 
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regarding the French Christian charity the Lazarist Sisters of the 
Charity of St Vincent of Paul who had opened a school for girls, 
are treating the sick, and helping the poor.84 
 
The French intention to civilise and create an environment amenable to European 
conceptions of progress also sought to pacify the public and develop the institutions 
necessary to help forge a French form of household authority that would support the 
allegiance with the targeted communities.85 By creating social institutions, particularly centred 
on health care and education, the French sought to reorder the social field by disseminating 
French knowledges and by developing practices that emphasised the role of France in 
providing social wellbeing. The strategy employed by the French was to reconfigure popular 
consent and legitimacy in order to bolster sentiment towards France.  
 
4.3  The Hatt-ı Hümayun (1856): A European Reform 
Following the Crimean War, the Sublime Porte was in a position of submission as it tried to 
recover from economic and political losses that were sustained. Given the damages suffered, 
the need to rebuild, and the interests of the European powers, additional pressure was placed 
on the Sublime Porte to undertake a new programme of structural and institutional reform. 
The European powers approached the project from a seemingly benevolent standpoint, 
seeking to further rationalise the application of authority and order the Empire in an image 
that would replicate the European state and to protect against the possibility for Ottoman 
oppression against communities within the Empire who had worked in opposition to the 
interests of the Sublime Porte during the Crimean War. Due to the costs of the Crimean 
War, the Sublime Porte had little other option than to comply with the demands made by 
the European powers and promulgate a second reform decree, the Hatt-ı Hümayun of 
1856.86  
 
The Hatt-ı Hümayun is described as a result ‘of the solicitude of the powers’.87 The decree 
was engineered by the British Ambassador, Sir Stratford Canning, known at this point as 
Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, with the consent of the French Ambassador, Édouard 
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Thouvenel and the Austrian Internuncio, Anton Freiherr Baron Prokesch von Osten (Baron 
Prokesch), who wanted to secure their relationship with the Ottoman Empire and pre-empt 
the set of Russian demands to be made at the Congress of Paris, 1856. The announcement 
of reforms prior to the Congress of Paris forced the Russian delegation to accept a peace 
settlement framed by the provisions outlined by the Hatt-ı Hümayun, curbing Russian ability 
to impact the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire.88 
 
According to Robert Devereux, the decree was ‘a reaffirmation of the principles enunciated 
in the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839).89 Although there were similarities between the Hatt-ı Şerif and the 
Hatt-ı Hümayun, the latter was much more than a mere reaffirmation of the former. The 
Hatt-ı Hümayun granted more rights for Christian communities, attempting to appease the 
demands of European powers in the provision of full equality, by allowing Christians to give 
testimony in criminal courts, and the development of secular police courts. In turn, the 
Sublime Porte sought to abolish the civil powers enjoyed by the Christian leadership, further 
bringing the Christian population under control of the Sublime Porte and eliminating the 
remaining autonomy enjoyed by the population. More generally, the Hatt-ı Hümayun 
eliminated the death penalty for apostasy and outlawed the use of deprecatory epithets based 
on religion, language, or race by Ottoman officials and subjects. In addition, the 
administrative offices of the Ottoman Empire were opened to all Ottoman subjects, without 
distinction and full liberty of conscience was guaranteed with the promise of representative 
governing councils at provincial and communal levels of government,90 non-Muslim subjects 
became eligible for military service, yet the option to pay a tax for an exemption of duty was 
maintained. The Hatt-ı Hümayun also prohibited torture, promised prison reform, and 
allowed foreigners to acquire property under certain circumstances.91  
 
The Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856 provided more institutional and structural changes to 
governance and social order by outlining new means of attaining equality throughout the 
Ottoman Empire. In addition to the changes outlined above, the Hatt-ı Hümayun differed 
from the Hatt-ı Şerif  (1839) by leaving out explicit mention and reference to Islam and the 
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representative, instead they were hand-picked from prominent families in Istanbul ‘whose interests attached them closely 
to the Ottoman Porte’. Additionally, their powers were further restricted to matters that affected the general population of 
the Empire, having no say over issues specifically concerning the Muslim population. Davison 1963, p. 93. 
91 A law was later passed on January 18, 1867, that allowed foreigners the right to buy and own property in the Ottoman 
Empire. This law was further extended on the 28th of July, 1868, by a treaty signed between the British and Turkish 
Governments. The Hatt-ı Şerif is translated in (b) Hertslet 1875, p. 1002 (no. 188) and the Hatt-ı Hümayun can be found 
in (b) Hertslet 1875, pp. 1243-1248 (no. 263) and FO/881/882; Devereux 1963, p. 24; Davison 1963, pp. 55-57. 
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Qur’an as a justification for the decree and the laws outlined in the decree.92 The difference 
in wording between the two decrees most likely reflects the influence of the European 
powers, which is especially evident in the fourth paragraph of the Hatt-ı Hümayun that 
praises the ‘civilised nations’ and their assistance provided to the Sublime Porte.93 The Hatt-
ı Hümayun, as the product of European interference in the social and political affairs of the 
Ottoman Empire, emphasised the requirement for the Sublime Porte to rule through rational 
principles and the secular rights of man.94 Only once these principles were established could 
the Sublime Porte join the governments of ‘civilised nations’ and be granted full rights as a 
sovereign polity within the European state system.  
 
The central purpose for the Hatt-ı Hümayun, however, was as a tool for negotiating the 
Treaty of Paris (1856) to resist Russian interests and secure the Sublime Porte’s sovereignty 
within the territories of the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Paris, an agreement between 
the European powers (Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, and Sardinia) and the 
Ottoman Empire, explicitly referred to the Hatt-ı Hümayun as an acknowledgment of the 
Sultan’s good faith in governing his subjects and stated that the European powers have noted 
that they maintain no right, ‘under any circumstance, […] to interfere either collectively or 
individually, in the relations of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, nor in the internal 
administration of his Empire’.95 The acceptance of this article in the Treaty of Paris was 
contentious among the European signatories. The strength of the wording had been 
decreased by the European powers after the initial proposal by the Ottomans, which was of 
a formal acknowledgement and promise of non-intervention to a noted acknowledgement and 
promise.96 The diminution from a formal acknowledgement to a noted acknowledgment had 
legal ramifications. The former would have established in law the sovereign rights of the 
Ottoman Empire and the illegality of the Empire to be subjected to external political 
interference, overriding many of the privileges enjoyed by the European powers within the 
Ottoman Empire and amongst the Sultan’s subjects. The strength of a noted 
acknowledgement was such that the principle of sovereignty was legally understood, but 
could be disregarded.  
 
																																																						
92 The difference in wording between the Hatt-ı Şerif and Hatt-ı Hümayun could also be, in part, a reflection of the Western-
liberal ideas of the upper-most classes. The Hatt-ı Şerif is translated in (b) Hertslet 1875, p. 1002 (no. 188) and the Hatt-ı 
Hümayun can be found in (b) Hertslet 1875, pp. 1243-1248 (no. 263); and FO/881/882; Devereux 1963, p. 24; Davison 
1963, pp. 55-57. 
93 (b) Hertslet 1875, p. 1002 (no. 188), pp. 1243-1248 (no. 263); FO/881/882. 
94 Paine 1984, p. 208-9. 
95 (b) Hertslet 1875, pp. 1250-1264 (no. 264). 
96 (b) Hertslet 1875, pp. 1250-1264 (no. 264). 
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4.4  Conclusion 
The administration of the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839) was entangled in the European states ‘right to 
advise’ the Sublime Porte in exchange for the help that had been provided by Britain, Prussia, 
Austria, and Russia in recovering the territories occupied by the Egyptian forces. The 
modernisation reforms were viewed as an exchange, a requirement for the aid provided to 
the Sublime Porte in the recuperation of the Syrian provinces, but also necessary in order for 
the Ottoman Empire to be considered an equal within the European state system. The 
application of the reform decree in the Syrian Provinces significantly altered the relationship 
between the social field and the Sublime Porte – from one of negotiated autonomy to 
centralised administrative equality, the means to access authority, and relations between the 
sectarian networks.  
 
Following the application of the Hatt-ı Şerif, the relationship between the social field and 
Sublime Porte changed. The creation of administrative councils that attempted to assert the 
equal application of the law and governance was viewed as oppressive to the Christian and 
Jewish populations, who were still subject to an annual head tax, without the benefits that 
they had enjoyed before the application of the reforms. On the other hand, equality for the 
Muslim populations felt as if they had lost the privilege they had enjoyed.  
 
In a possible attempt to avert confrontation with the Muslim population, that were, 
according to European despatches, becoming increasingly hostile to the Christian and Jewish 
populations, the Sublime Porte manufactured methods to elevate the status of the Muslim 
population, including the removal of Christian and Jewish members of governing councils 
in the provinces. The limited access to authority created competition between the different 
religious communities. In Mount Lebanon, for example, a political section of the Druze was 
willing to submit to a Muslim governor in exchange for the Sublime Porte’s favouritism, 
particularly to combat Christian elevation of political and economic due to their alignment 
with the French-backed Egyptian forces during the occupation (1831-1841). However, for 
other political sections of the Druze community, there was resistance to the idea, fearing, as 
the Christians had, continued Ottoman oppression in Mount Lebanon.  
 
The change in how governance was administered altered the relations between the Sublime 
Porte and the groups and networks within the social field, transforming the means to access 
authority. Either because the Sublime Porte was unable to fully enact the reforms outlined 
in the Hatt-ı Şerif or it was incapable of evenly and properly supervising the administration 
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of authority in the Syrian provinces, or, possibly, a combination of the two. The consequence 
of this changing relationship and access created the incentive for the Christians, specifically, 
but also the Druze, to develop relations with the European powers, particularly the British, 
French, and Russians.  
 
The development of these relationships between religious minorities in the Syrian provinces 
and the European powers led to increased protections for the religious minorities, as well as 
access to European economic markets. The gains made by the Christian populations, 
particularly the Uniate Catholics in Aleppo, attracted the anger of the neighbouring Muslim 
community that subsequently attacked the Christians in 1850. For the European powers, the 
result of this event was a confirmation of the natural fanaticism of the Muslim population 
and requirement of increased security and physical protection for the Christians.  
 
Although French and Russian interests in protecting the Christian communities, the Catholic 
and the Orthodox Christians – respectively, was argued to be civilisational, it was also 
economic and geo-political. The pursuit of these interests placed the Ottoman Empire and 
the Sublime Porte in the centre, as was the case of the conflict over the Christian Holy Places. 
The Russians, in competition with the French for the rights over the Holy Places in 
Jerusalem, viewed the Sublime Porte’s acquiescence to France as a sign that the Ottoman 
Empire had fallen into foreign hands. Although Russia blamed the Sublime Porte for the 
situation, the Crimean War (1853-1856), had less to do with perceptions of increased French 
influence and more to do with the Russian interests, particularly with regards to control of 
the Black Sea and the Danubian Principalities, territorial interests that would have been 
hindered had the Russians accepted Ottoman Sovereignty in the Treaty of Paris (1856). 
 
In an effort to limit the demands made on the Sublime Porte by Russia, following the 
conclusion of the Crimean War, the British, French, and Austrian ambassadors, along with 
the Sublime Porte, strategized the promulgation of the Hatt-ı Hümayun (1856), a new reform 
edict that outlined new institutional and structural changes. The new reforms provided the 
European powers, particularly Britain, France, and Austria with the justification for 
continued support of the Sublime Porte within the European state system, in addition to 
limiting Russian advances. However, support did not equate equal status and sovereignty, 
rather, it provided the European powers with grounds to continue to legitimately interfere 
based on the premise that the Sublime Porte had not managed to accede to the civilisational 
expectations.   
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Chapter 5: The Standard of Civilisation: Social and Political Resistance in the Syrian 
Provinces and the Sublime Porte 
 
5  Introduction  
The Ottoman Empire, unable to accede to full membership of the European state system 
and obtain recognised sovereign rights, continued to be subjected to the interests of the 
members of the European state system. The resulting uneven relationship between the 
Ottoman Empire and the members of the European state system necessitated Ottoman 
reform, with the aim to replicate the conditions of European modernity, within the 
framework of a liberal worldview. However, the European interests required the continued 
suppression of Ottoman accession to the state system. The European states cited the 
Empire’s Islamic character and principles, particularly with regards to the Empire’s treatment 
of the Christian minority, who were favoured by France and Russia. Unable to assert the 
principle of equality, the Sublime Porte was viewed as fanatical and barbaric, inhibiting 
modernisation and its ability to join the civilised nations, despite attempts to replicate 
institutional centralisation in Europe.  
 
Although the Sublime Porte was unrelenting in its attempts to modernise its institutions and 
government in order to replicate those in Europe, with the aim of preventing continued 
European interference within its territories, it was not able to accede to the desired European 
standard. Interference by the European powers, despite being developed within the context 
of humanitarian intervention, favoured the Christian communities, in particular, and elevated 
their political and economic status within the social field. Combined with the consequences 
of Ottoman modernisation, the result was dislocation between the authority of the Sublime 
Porte and the social field. In addition to highlighting the development of violent sectarian 
politics and the consequence of those politics, this chapter highlights the emergence of the 
Young Ottomans faction within the Sublime Porte, and their role in attempting to normalise 
modernity and maintain the Islamic character of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
This chapter examines social resistance to European interference as a consequence of the 
Hatt-ı Hümayun (1856) by framing the Damascus Massacre of 1860 as a response to 
conditions that had been created within the Syrian provinces. This chapter continues by 
discussing the consequences of the Damascus Massacre, including the occupation of Mount 
Lebanon by a European military force led by France and the economic demands made by 
the European powers on the Sublime Porte under the premise of maintaining stability and 
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protecting the Christian population. Due to the application of a standard of civilisation a 
political resistance led by the Young Ottomans emerged. This chapter contextualises the 
political advances of the Young Ottomans until the end of the Russo-Turkish War (1877-
1878).  
 
5.1  Consequences of the Hatt-ı Hümayun 1856 
For many individuals and groups within the Syrian provinces, the international environment 
in which the Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856 was promulgated confirmed the subordinated status 
of the Ottoman Empire within the European state system. The Sultan, acknowledging the 
manner in which the Ottoman Empire and the Sublime Porte would be perceived by its own 
population, attempted to avoid vociferous discontent by proclaiming that the Hatt-ı 
Hümayun was a spontaneous act and separate from European influence. It was hoped that 
the proclamation of spontaneity would dislodge any discussion or belief that the Sublime 
Porte had submitted to the will of Europe and was a subordinate power to the European 
states.1 Despite the desire to appear strong and independent from European interests, it had 
quickly become apparent that the Sublime Porte had initiated the reform within the context 
of the Congress of Paris (1856).2  
 
In addition to viewing the reform as a consequence of European interests, the Hatt-ı 
Hümayun was not well received by the Muslim community in Syria because of the negative 
impact it had on Muslim status. Additionally, the Christian communities in the Syrian 
provinces became increasingly unsure of their place in relation to Muslim subjects. Both the 
Muslims and Christians were displeased with the reforms, the Muslims viewed the new 
framework as a threat to character of the Empire and their place within the framework of 
the Empire, while the Christians were wary of the new laws, particularly the law on military 
recruitment that called for all subjects, despite race and religion, to serve in the army.3  
 
The concerns of the Muslim and Christian communities regarding the promulgation of the 
new reforms were dismissed by the French Consul in Aleppo, who was focused on the 
elevated status of the Christian community. Following the announcement of the reforms, 
the French Consul in Aleppo organised a celebration for the prominent Christian families to 
																																																						
1 Davison 1963, pp. 51-54.  
2 166PO/D1/53 April 26, 1856 (no. 6), sent to M. de Thouvenel, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from 
M. Bentivoglio, Aleppo; Roederer 1917, p. 19. 
3 166PO/D1/53 March 10, 1856 (no. 46), sent to M. de Thouvenel, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from 
M. Geasset, Aleppo. 
121	
	
mark the occasion.4 In stark contrast to this celebration, Muhammad Sa’id al-Ustawani, 
member of the Mejlis Council of Damascus, wrote, in response to the declaration of reforms, 
that ‘all the Muslims were ashen-faced and we asked Him Most High to exalt the faith and 
give victory to the Muslims. There is no power or force except in God Most High’.5 The 
quote attributed to al-Ustawani highlights the depth to which the sectarian schisms had 
become entrenched in the political struggle over the Ottoman Empire. In the quote, he asks 
for victory, implying that there was a conflict over the Empire, placing the Muslims against 
the Christians, who were perceived by the Muslims with disdain due to their alliances with 
the European powers. 
 
Tensions between Christians and Muslims, the latter viewing the Christians as loyal to France 
and Russia, heightened following the establishment of the Hatt-ı Hümayun. On April 26, 
1856, the French consul in Aleppo, wrote that the city was agitated, the Muslims were arming 
themselves and there was a general sense of panic among the Christian population and 
government officials. The consul continued that should a revolution occur, it would be the 
Christians, Europeans, and the foreign consuls that would be targeted in attacks.6 Although 
violence or revolt did not immediately occur, the European community within the Ottoman 
Empire remained anxious and recalled the uprising that took place in 1850.7  
 
The agitation that was occurring in Aleppo was the result of a breakdown in household 
authority, the dislocation between the social field and governance. The form of governance 
that had been established through the reform provisions was viewed as foreign and failed to 
replicate the customary form of authority that the social field had become accustomed to; 
making it difficult for the customary groups and networks to access and navigate the 
structures and institutions of the Sublime Porte. For the Christian communities, the void 
that had been created was occupied by European alliances which promised status, capital, 
and protection, while such provisions for the Muslim communities had been denigrated 
through modernisation reforms.  
 
The relationship between the Sublime Porte and the social field had become increasingly 
strained, to the extent that the authorities were perceived by the local communities in Beirut 
as motivated by self-interest, with the aim of increasing wealth and to gain sustained and 
																																																						
4 Masters 2013, p. 173. 
5 al-Shaykh Muhammad Sa’id al-Ustawani in Masters 2013, p. 173.  
6 166PO/D1/53 April 26, 1856 (no. 6); Roederer 1917, p. 19. 
7 166PO/D1/54 August 7, 1858 (no. 15). 
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meaningful positions in public office with a lack of concern for the population, creating 
problems with the management of public affairs, order, security, and justice. The British 
consul in Beirut, writing on November 24, 1856, stated that the reform decree that had been 
issued has had a negative effect on the city of Beirut. The city had become a play-ground of 
petty thieves and criminals, who were emboldened by the lack of order.8 Echoing the state 
of affairs, an article published in The Daily News on September 29, 1856 described a lack of 
submission to the laws by Ottoman troops, who had been described as ‘seedy ruffians’ that 
are ‘ill-fed and worse paid, under no discipline’, and who hate the people of Syria. Their 
presence in the city had only increased the levels of disorder and corruption sanctioning the 
animosity of the Muslim population directed at the Sublime Porte, but the Ottoman troops 
were also described as holding a particular disgust for the Christian populations.9   
 
Although the Christian populations were being singled out in these despatches and news 
articles, they were not without fault. The French consul in Aleppo wrote that ‘the Christians 
in the city have become embedded in scandal and misconduct and they do not hold religion 
as close as their Muslim neighbours’. The consul described their actions as being ‘conducted 
with impunity, abusing the protections offered to them by the European powers, and they 
do little to convey a positive image of Christianity to the Muslim population’.10 The consul 
subsequently described the situation of the Christians as one that is ‘temporally enduring’,11 
but despite these faults, he argued that the Christian religion ‘is the only good and true 
religion’, and while justice should be served in the correct manner, it is the duty of the 
Europeans, and the French in particular to offer protection when Christians become the 
targets of Turks.12 From this despatch, it is evident that the premise of a rational civilisation 
that had been attributed to the Christian population by France, in particular, was in fact 
attributed to the Christian communities due to their religious identification rather than their 
supposed predisposition to rationality.   
 
Towards the end of December 1856, it had become increasingly evident that a lack of 
legitimate authority was having severe consequences for the social field. The British consul 
in Damascus described mass corruption in the city and wrote that property owners in 
Damascus were being forced to pay a tax to robbers in order to protect themselves from 
																																																						
8 FO/78/1219 July 2, 1856, October 6, 1856 (no. 13), November 24, 1856 (no. 58).  
9 The Daily News, from Beirut, September 29, 1856, published Thursday Oct. 16, 1856, p. 5. Of 8.  
10 166PO/D1/53 June 3, 1856 (no. 9), sent to M. de Thovenel, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. 
Bentivoglio, Aleppo.  
11 166PO/D1/54 August 7, 1858 (no. 15). 
12 166PO/D1/53 June 3, 1856 (no. 9). 
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plunder and potentially more serious repercussions.13 Where the Sublime Porte had once 
provided security, ensuring that the populations and territories within the Ottoman Empire 
were relatively free from plunder and threat, the disintegration of authority had led to a 
renegotiation, where bands and gangs were profiteering from the Sublime Porte’s inability to 
govern.  
 
The implementation of the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839) and the Hatt-ı Hümayun (1856) produced 
significant social and institutional changes with the aim to modernise the Sublime Porte in 
order to reflect the modern state in Europe. The result was the dislocation between the 
Sublime Porte from the customary groups and networks. The structures of governance that 
had once maintained consent and legitimacy from the social field to the Sublime Porte, 
particularly through decentralised governance that allowed for various degrees of autonomy, 
had changed significantly, making it difficult for customary groups and networks, primarily 
based on sectarian identities, to access authority as they once had. These changes resulted in 
the dislocation of sectarian groups and networks from governance and put sectarian groups 
and networks into competition with each other over what seemed like limited resources. 
While the sense of dislocation was from the institutions and structures of governance was a 
general sentiment, the Christian community in particular had been able to build alliances with 
the French and the Russians, filling the void that had emerged. The result was a Muslim 
community who increasingly felt alienated by the Sublime Porte which had been 
subordinated by the European powers and overshadowed by the elevated status of the 
Christian community.  
 
5.1.1 Dislocating the Sublime Porte from the Social Field: Resistance and Violence 
in Damascus, 1860  
By 1860, the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire had been the subject of an ongoing 
onslaught of European pressure exerted on the Empire to accept and administer a form of 
governance comparable to the form of modern governance prevalent in Europe, including 
the Ottoman Land Code of 1858. The Land Code ‘[…] recognised private property on land, 
significantly enlarged liberties of landholders, pushed inheritance rules further towards 
gender equality, and included some clauses that favoured landed interests.’14 In particular, the 
Ottoman Land Code reinforced the importance of the individual under the law and as the 
sole unit for property ownership, challenging communal and complex networks of 
ownership. According to E. Attila Aytekin the Land Code replicated many of the existing 
																																																						
13 FO/78/1219 December 19, 1856 (no. 62), sent to the Earl of Clarendon, from M. Moor, Beirut. 
14 Attila Aytekin 2009, p. 936.  
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blurred boundaries of public and private possession and ownership, but was still important 
with regards to the rights of transfer, sale, purchase, mortgaging and inheritance of, 
specifically, agricultural land.15 With regards to the latter, wealthy notables could accept land 
holdings from peasants as payment for debts, which helped notables increase land 
ownership- and by extension, wealth.16 The Sublime Porte , on the other hand, used the law 
to placate and sedentarise unruly and nomadic tribal sheikhs.17 In both uses, the Land Code 
altered the relationship between capital, politics, society, and territory. The Land Code 
provides an example of how, following a European legal tradition, the Sublime Porte sought 
to assert their capability to function within the framework of modernity, with the aim of 
limiting European interference. However, the European powers, motivated by colonial and 
imperial interests, were also engaged in inter-European competition over rights and access 
to the Ottoman Empire, which resulted in the exploitation of the dislocation between 
governance and the social field.  
 
Despite the intentions of the Ottoman Empire, the modernisation reforms helped reinforce 
social and political schisms with the social field in the Syrian provinces, further sanctioning 
European beliefs of the uncivilised, untameable, irrational, and fanatical Muslim, who had, 
for the most part, rejected the modern principles outlined in the decrees, specifically that of 
equality. The unintended consequence was a deepening of sectarian conflict within the 
Ottoman Empire, particularly in the Syrian provinces, illustrated by the events in Damascus 
in 1860, which reconfirmed, for the French, in particular, the inability of the Muslim 
population to escape their ‘predisposed’ and ‘natural’ fanaticism. The situation, according to 
French strategy, required protections to be granted to the Christian populations and the 
necessity of European interference in order to continue their efforts in helping the 
populations achieve the standards established in the European conception of modernity. The 
reaction to these ongoing developments was the rejection of European interference and 
anything or anyone who benefitted from Europe.  
 
In late March, 1860, the French consul in Aleppo, A. Chattry de la Fosse, wrote to Comte 
de Lallemand, the acting French Ambassador in Istanbul, about a quiet anxiety among the 
Christians in Djelloum, the Christian Quarter of Aleppo, where the population has requested 
guards, a request that was echoed by various Muslim notables in Aleppo who openly worried 
																																																						
15 Attila Aytekin 2009, p. 947 




about the safety of the populations in the city.18 Two months later, in May, 1860, the French 
consul in Damascus wrote to the French Ambassador in Istanbul that violence in Mount 
Lebanon was due to erupt because of the negative relations between the Druze and 
Christians. The consul blamed Ahmed Pasha, the Governor of Damascus, for engaging the 
Druze population in their animosity towards the Maronites. French sentiment against the 
Governor was made worse by Ahmed Pasha’s alliance with the Druze in the Hauran and the 
Shi’a communities in Ba’albek and the Beka’a Valley.19 According to the French consuls, 
Ahmed Pasha’s strategy was to build an alliance that could provide the Druze of Mount 
Lebanon the ability to take control of the mountain by capturing Deir el-Qamar and Zahlé, 
two Christian strongholds.20 The reported strategy incited the French to become increasingly 
active in the protection of the Christians, which had the negative consequence of deepening 
inter-communal religious animosity.  
 
In addition to providing protection and access to capital to the Christians, French 
interference in the social field emboldened the Maronites to fight against their local chiefs 
and the Sheikhs in the mixed districts of Mount Lebanon, which posed a threat to the Druze. 
Still, the French consuls dismissed their role in deepening the conflict.21 The French alliance 
with the Maronite population obfuscated power relations between the communities, 
enhancing the marginalisation of the Druze. Although the Druze were aligned with the 
British at various points, the alliance that had developed was not to the same calibre of the 
French alliance with the Maronites, and reflected the differences in colonial strategies. As the 
Maronites were drawn more closely into the French sphere of influence and protection, they 
were increasingly viewed as traitors, deepening communal conflict through the construction 
of identity, and the benefits they enjoyed of political impunity and access to new economic 
opportunities.  
 
On June 6, 1860, the village of Hasbeya, close to the province of Damascus, was attacked by 
the Druze who ‘annihilated’ the Chehab family, with the women being carried off to Wadi 
Ledja (Ledja), a mountainous region inhabited by the Druze. Following these events, the 
French consul, M. Outrey, restated his belief that Ahmed Pasha was to blame for the 
																																																						
18 166PO/D1/56 see documents dated 24 March, 1860 (no. 53), sent to M. de Lallemand, chargé d'affaires in Istanbul 
[Constantinople], from A. Chattry de la Fosse, Aleppo; and 7 July, 1860 (no. 10), sent to Marquis de Lavalette, French 
Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Geoffrey, Aleppo.  
19 166PO/D20/5 May 23, 1860 (no. 107), sent to M. de Lallemand, chargé d’affaires in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. 
Lanusse, Damascus, and 19 June, 1860 (no. 109), sent to M. Lavalette, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], 
from M. Lanusse, Damascus.  
20 166PO/D20/5 May 23, 1860 (no. 107), 19 June, 1860 (no. 109) 
21 Hakim 2013, p. 67.  
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violence. The French consul argued that it was Ahmed Pasha’s goal to rid the entire Syrian 
province of the Christians and their allies.22 Although Ahmed Pasha’s specific goals were 
unknown, there was an increased presence of French troops, citizens, diplomats, and 
missionaries in the Syrian provinces who were actively interfering in domestic political, 
economic, and social affairs. Through violent activities, the Druze were attempting to 
diminish French influence and interference in the Syrian provinces, to assert their power in 
a vacuous political environment, and therefore threatened French interests. The French 
consul, fearing further violence against the Christians and French citizens in the Syrian 
provinces, wrote to Emir Abd-el-Kader,23 agreeing to arm 1,000 Algerians under his 
authority with the sole purpose of protecting the Christians and the Christian Quarter of 
Damascus.24  
 
The desire to ensure security in Damascus was not the result of the French consul 
misconstruing the situation, the Chief Council of Damascus, witnessing the heightened 
anxiety among the population caused by violent events around the Syrian provinces, also 
procured a police force to protect the Christian quarter.  The group of officers and captains 
chosen to form the police force were, described by a ‘Muslim Turk’ in Damascus as, 
‘worthless and baser’.25 That being said, the British consul in Beirut also did not think highly 
of Ottoman troops, having previously described them as ‘seedy ruffians’.26 Given the 
questionable character of the officers that had been recruited to protect the Christians, it is 
believed that they instigated a few young boys to make crosses and lay them down in the 
streets of the city, allowing passers-by to walk on the crosses, while the kids yelled insults 
directed at Christians.27  
 
The authorities in the city, disturbed by the potential provocation, ordered the police to 
apprehend the boys and force them to sweep the streets of the market as punishment. The 
sight of the young Muslim boys being punished for their actions against the Christians drew 
an angry crowd who subsequently freed the boys from their punishment. The group, still 
angered by the treatment of Muslim children, and led by Selim Agha al-Mahayni,28 an officer 
																																																						
22 166PO/D20/5 June 19, 1860 (no. 109). 
23 Emir Abd-el-Kader was an Algerian religious scholar, released from French imprisonment by Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte 
after the 1848 French Revolution on the grounds that he would not interfere in Algeria. 
24 166PO/D20/5 June 19, 1860 (no. 109). 
25 FO/226/131 Account by a Muslim Turk in Damascus, the Massacre of the Christians there.  
26 The Daily News, from Beirut, September 29, 1856, published Thursday Oct. 16, 1856, p. 5. Of 8.	
27 FO/226/131; 166PO/D1/56 July 20, 1860 (no. 11), sent to M. de Lavalette, French Ambassador in Istanbul 
[Constantinople], from M. Geoffrey, Aleppo.  
28 FO/226/131; 166PO/D1/56 July 20, 1860 (no. 11) 
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of the irregular security force,29 entered the Christian Quarter of Damascus and began 
mercilessly attacking and pillaging the Quarter. The police force was overpowered and unable 
to suppress the group and force them to withdraw. Throughout the pillaging and destruction, 
the mob grew larger, with others, including the Druze, security forces, and Arab tribes, 
joining in. With the belated arrival of Emir Abd-el-Kadr to Damascus, and although he was 
incapable of bringing the violence to a conclusion, he had managed to save about 11,000 
Christians.30  The plundering and burning of the Quarter continued for a number of days 
until the area was completely destitute, with many of its inhabitants being killed, tortured, 
enslaved, or forced to convert to Islam.31 
 
The events that occurred in Damascus were the result of a deepening sectarian animosity 
and could not be divorced from the material factors of the social environment, such as the 
economic crisis in the Ottoman Empire following the Crimean War (1853-1856) and the 
restructuring of political and social governance that altered access to governance and 
provided opportunities for European interference. Nevertheless, following the Damascus 
Massacre of 1860, the French continued to blame Ahmed Pasha, arguing that he had 
masterminded the entire event with the support of the armies of notable Muslim Damascene 
families. The French believed that the strategy included populations throughout the Syrian 
Provinces, including Mount Lebanon and that these populations had become convinced that 
the French and Russians, in their quest to protect the Christians, wanted to exterminate the 
Druze and Muslims in Mount Lebanon.32 The other hypothesis explained by the French 
consul considered violence as a tool that was used to combat unwanted European 
interference. Viewing the Christians as aligned with the European powers, Ottoman officials 
sought to agitate the Muslim population in order to regain control.33 
 
5.1.2  The Repercussions of Resistance and Violence: European Colonisation 
After the violent events in Damascus in 1860, the Sublime Porte sent Fuad Pasha, the 
Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Damascus as an internal special envoy with the goal 
of restoring order and establishing a distinct and common Ottoman identity. To realise this 
goal, Fuad Pasha dissolved the Mejlis Council, arguing that all the members of the council 
had been compromised by the events. Following the dissolution of the Mejlis Council, Fuad 
																																																						
29 Fawaz 1994, p. 85. 
30 According to the French consul in Damascus. 166PO/D20/5 July 28, 1860 (no. 112).  
31 FO/226/131; 166PO/D20/5 July 17, 1860, sent to M. Lavalette, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from 
M. Lanusse, Damascus, and July 28, 1860 (no. 112) sent to M. Lavalette, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], 
from M. Outrey, Damascus; Roederer 1917, p. 19. 
32 166PO/D20/5 July 28, 1860 (no. 112). 
33 166PO/D20/5 July 28, 1860 (no. 112). 
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Pasha’s objective of restoring social order was impeded by the depressed economic situation 
and the embedded socio-political divisions between the Muslims, Druze, and Christians.34   
 
Because of Fuad Pasha’s inability to restructure and re-establish order and authority in 
Damascus, the Austrian, Prussian, British, French, and Russian governments decided among 
themselves to allow France to lead a military occupation in Syria with 12,000 European 
troops over a six-month period.35 Given the state of the Empire, the Sublime Porte was 
overpowered and was forced to submit to the European intervention. The Sublime Porte, 
however, did extract a compromise that restrained and limited European troops to Mount 
Lebanon.36 The establishment of European troops in Ottoman territory was the 
manifestation of the Sublime Porte’s loss of power in the European state system and 
authority within the Syrian provinces; making it easier for European interests to be achieved. 
Although it was procured as a humanitarian necessity, to protect the Christian population 
from further violence, it could not be divorced from European interests.37 Had the European 
powers, particularly France, been sincerely motivated by humanitarianism, there would have 
been better recognition of the socioeconomic and political disparities that led to the outbreak 
of violence in 1860, rather than exacerbate the political situation by reproducing a narrative 
of Muslim fanaticism and an Ottoman-Druze alliance that sought to eradicate the Christian 
populations.  
 
The occupation of Mount Lebanon provided the European states, specifically France, with 
the ability to further spread their influence and achieve their interests. This was made easier 
by the relationship that had developed between the Maronites, primarily located in Mount 
Lebanon, and the French. Additionally, many Christians from Damascus, following the 
violence, had migrated to Achrafiye, a suburb of Beirut on the foothills of Mount Lebanon.38  
The French-led occupation was guided by the idea that that colonisation could provide 
enlightenment, by dominating, pacifying, and educating the populations, it would be possible 
to replicate ideas of order, morality, governance, and a French high culture.39 However, the 
occupation of Mount Lebanon deepened the French relationship with the Christians, which 
helped increase Christian economic and political mobility, having a wider impact throughout 
																																																						
34 166PO/D20/5 August 9, 1860 (no. 116), sent to M. Lavalette, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from 
M. Outrey.  
35 6,000 troops would be despatched from France. Hakim 2013, p. 71; Roederer 1917, p. 19. 
36 Hakim 2013, p. 71. 
37 Menon 2016. 
38 The Consul also writes that many of the Christian inhabitants had fled to Beirut with many more settling in Achrafiye – 
a Christian enclave that was important in the formation of the state of Lebanon, the 1975-1990 Lebanese Civil War, and 
the demographic of Beirut afterwards. 166PO/D20/5 August 9, 1860 (no. 116).  
39 Connor 1994, p.41.  
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the Syrian provinces. Indeed, there were reports from Aleppo that the Christian communities 
had remained positive regarding their safety and future, while Muslims, on the other hand, 
were left feeling intimidated.40  
 
The European military occupation of Mount Lebanon maintained the goal of physically 
protecting the Christians and pacifying the Druze and Muslims who were described as 
fanatical and violent. The European occupation also led to more direct influence in the 
region, impacting the social networks within the Syrian provinces while maintaining pressure 
on the Sublime Porte. The consequence of this military occupation was a further 
reorganisation of the established social order between Muslim and Christian subjects. In 
addition to increasing the sectarian schism, the French led European occupation was 
motivated by the pursuit of interests.41 The extent to which this was the case was evidenced 
when the British Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Sir Henry Bulwer, made a public 
declaration in November 1860, that he was opposed to further occupation of Syria by 
France.42 Bulwer refrained from asserting that the occupation was European in character and 
implied that its raison d’être was to achieve French interests, which traditionally had been 
focused on Christian elevation in, or Christian emancipation from, the Ottoman Empire. 
The French occupation also hindered Britain’s ability to achieve their interests with respect 
to the Druze. Under the leadership of France, the occupation prioritised the wellbeing of the 
Christian population, and the French maintained control over the political, economic, and 
social affairs in the region, limiting British capabilities.  
 
The European occupation of Mount Lebanon reorganised the social field including its 
administration. The administration was reorganised, initially through new appointments, 
including that of Yusuf Karam, a favourite of the Maronite clergy, who was put forward to 
replace Bashir Ahmad Abi al-Lami, and who would serve as the last Christian Qaymaqam.43 
Following the initial reorganisation, the Qaymaqam system was destroyed in favour of the 
creation of the Mutassarifate, a system that gave leadership to a non-Lebanese Christian 
under the title of Mutassarif. The leader would then be advised by an Administrative 
Assembly, represented equally by the different sects in the region. These changes took effect 
in 1861, upheld by the constitutional arrangement known as the ‘Réglement Organique’ (the 
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Chattry de la Fosse, Aleppo.  
41 The French rhetoric and the reorganization of the established social order, led to increased resistance by the Muslims, 
who saw their rights and powers being stripped away. Hakim 2013, p. 71; House of Commons Debate, UK Parliament, 
May 10, 1861, vol. 162, Syria and Turkey, cc1870-94, in Hansard, Parliamentary Archives.  
42 Emphasis is mine. Liverpool Daily Post, 13 November 1860, p. 5 of 8. 
43 al-Aqiqi 1959, p. 27. 
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Organic/Natural Law of Mount Lebanon).44 The French, to ensure that the reforms that had 
been developed were being properly administered and that peace was maintained, extended 
the military occupation for three months.45 These changes dissolved Druze autonomy over 
their own affairs and placed power in the hands of a foreign Christian, which amplified the 
feeling of Christian domination in the form of foreign power.  
 
The new administration of the Mutassarifate, though still part of the Ottoman Empire, was 
given significant independence from the Sublime Porte through the Réglement Organique. The 
autonomy of the Mount Lebanon region meant that the governing bodies could bypass the 
bureaucracy of the Sublime Porte, but that they also became increasingly susceptible to the 
interests of the European powers. In December 1861, following the establishment of the 
Mutassarifate and the Réglement Organique, Yusuf Karam, a French ally in Mount Lebanon, 
refused to submit himself to a foreign leadership when the Qaymaqamship was destroyed 
and replaced with the Mutassarifate. Karam’s refusal to submit to a foreign Christian was 
seen as treasonous and he was arrested and sent into exile by order of Daoud Pasha, the 
Mutassarif.46   
 
The arrest and exile of Yusuf Karam, though ordered by Daoud Pasha, was fulfilled by Fuad 
Pasha, a perceived British agent that had been responsible for aiding the British forge a 
deeper relationship with the Druze, which made France indignant and created conflict 
between France and Britain.47 Seeking retribution, the French attempted to interfere with the 
developing relationship between the British and the Druze by offering the Druze amnesty 
for previous acts of violence. The Druze, however, were sceptical of this strategy and, 
according to British despatches, viewed the French attempt to seek revenge as desperate.48 
The near total recession of Ottoman sovereignty in Mount Lebanon created a power vacuum 
amongst the British and the French. It gave them the opportunity to affect the institutions 
and structures of power in Mount Lebanon; both powers attempted to engineer political 
dominance in the region by promoting the appointment of administrators amenable to their 
interests.  
 
5.1.3  Colonial Pacification through Economic Imperialism  
																																																						
44 Gordon 1983, p. 18; Zürcher 2016, p. 55. 
45 The Policy of France, Belfast Morning News, 02 January 1861, p. 4 of 8.  
46 Summary, Foreign, Liverpool Mercury, 03 December 1861, p. 6 of 10; 166PO/D20/5 May 5, 1861 (no. 139), sent to M. 
de Lavalette, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Outrey, Damascus. 
47 Summary, Foreign, Liverpool Mercury, 03 December 1861, p. 6 of 10; 166PO/D20/5 May 5, 1861 (no. 139). 
48 FO/226/163 September 30, 1864, sent to Henry Bulwer, from M. de Heidenstam, acting consul in Aleppo; FO/226/170 
October 13, 1870, State of Affairs in Damascus, Apprehensions of Christians and Foreign Consuls. 
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The restructuring of governance in the region and occupation of Mount Lebanon 
encumbered the independence of the Sublime Porte with the result being a better foothold 
in the Syrian provinces for the European powers – primarily France.  More importantly, by 
bringing Mount Lebanon under direct control of the European powers, they were able to 
gain a pseudo-colonial space from which power over the rest of the Syrian provinces could 
be asserted. In addition to the changes in the structure of governance and the occupation of 
Mount Lebanon, the European states continued to pressure the Sublime Porte in continuing 
with loan repayments owed to the European powers following the Crimean War (1853-1856) 
and to make reparations to the Christian populations that suffered from the attacks in 
Damascus.49 
 
The loan repayments to the European powers put more pressure on the Sublime Porte, 
which was forced to decree a new set of taxes. However, having the authority to influence 
monetary and economic policy, the Sublime Porte reduced the tariff of currency by pegging 
the Turkish Lira to other currencies, a strategy that was implemented by Fuad Pasha. This 
allowed the Ottoman Empire to collect more towards the reparation, showing higher figures 
regarding the collection of capital, but resulting in an estimated 25% decrease in actual 
purchasing power. The changes made to how the Turkish Lira was valued allowed the 
Ottoman Empire to offer full compensation to many of the Damascene Christians who 
suffered material losses because of the violence in 1860 by January 1863.50  
 
Although the Ottoman Empire was able to fulfil the demands regarding reparations, the 
devaluation of the Turkish Lira decreased the purchasing power of those who were 
dependent on the currency. This had a damaging effect on the population in the Syrian 
provinces who were faced with an increased cost of living and finding it difficult to make 
personal loan repayments. Aware of this problem and the potentially damaging impact it 
could have on the Sublime Porte, Fuad Pasha sought to act on their behalf, alleviating the 
population of their personal debts by forcing money lenders to submit to a reduction of 
interest and to allow for repayments of loans to be made in instalments over several years. 
The British protested Fuad Pasha’s plan, viewing it as detrimental to the interests of 
European money lenders working within the Ottoman Empire, over whom the Ottoman 
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Empire could not govern.51 The British consul in Damascus, E.J. Rogers, writes that a 
reduction in interest and the development of repayment options would destroy European 
and British influence while producing ‘the ruin of many British subjects’.52  
 
The British consul, concerned with the possible ramifications of Fuad Pasha’s proposed 
programme aimed at creditors, sent a draft agreement to Fuad Pasha on March 2, 1863. 
Given the reliance of the Ottoman Empire on the European powers for matters such as 
defense and international bargaining, it was not in the Empire’s interests to disregard British 
concerns. In turn, Fuad Pasha requested negotiations with the British, where a final 
agreement was concluded. The agreement stipulated that the rate of interest and credit owed 
would be respected where it was deemed honest and fair, the liquidation of debt held by the 
villages would be overseen by a commission headed by a president, and composed of a 
Muslim and a Christian member chosen by the authorities and an additional four members 
chosen by the consuls of the European powers. An additional stipulation was added that no 
individual owing money or lending money could become members of this commission and 
that decisions would be made by a majority vote. The British consul cautioned, however, 
that he could not be held responsible if the creditors rejected some of the terms of the 
proposal.53  
 
Despite the exercise of power by the European states over the Sublime Porte and within the 
Ottoman Empire, the Sublime Porte maintained authority over domestic policy, although 
not without interference. As is evidenced by Fuad Pasha’s engineering of monetary policy 
that led to the devaluation of the Turkish Lira and allowed for reparations to be paid more 
quickly. It is also clear, however, that the protection of British nationals was the responsibility 
of Britain. Domestic policy and the governance and protection of British nationals’ resident 
within the Ottoman Empire were not mutually exclusive. In Fuad Pasha’s attempt to govern, 
his policies impacted the livelihood of British residents. This follows the argument 
established by John Westlake, who points to civilisational standard being required in order 
for a government in the global peripheries to govern Europeans.54 Given the position of the 
Sublime Porte in relation to the British, and the dependence of the Sublime Porte on the 
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52 The total amount owed is estimated to be 160,000pounds, of which 25,000pounds is due to British subjects and protégés. 
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British within the European state system, Fuad Pasha was forced to withdraw his initial policy 
and concede to British terms. 
 
The Sublime Porte, defeated over the limits that could be imposed on British creditors, 
despite their residence status in the Ottoman Empire, pursued the expansion of its taxation 
regime. British economic expansion into the Ottoman Empire required the Sublime Porte 
to create its own periphery to which it could expand into. By bringing the nomadic and 
sedentary tribes under the submission of the Ottoman Empire, the Sublime Porte would gain 
new agricultural areas in Mesopotamia via the Syrian Desert. Tasked with this job, Sureya 
Pasha, the Governor General of the province of Aleppo, accompanied by Omar Pasha, the 
Military Commander, and escorted by a regular army, departed from Aleppo on September 
30, 1864.55 The British consul remarked that the Sublime Porte would find it beneficial to 
establish troops in the towns in which the sedentary tribes inhabit, including al-Qaryatain, 
Palmyra, Deir ez-Zor, Mudan, Sura, Raqqah, Qal’at Ja’bar, in doing so, a military cordon 
would emerge, extending from Damascus in the West to Deir ez-Zor in the East and from 
these two points northwards to Aleppo. With such a cordon in place, the Bedouin tribes 
would be forced southwards, back into the Nejd, giving the Sublime Porte access to vital 
resources while limiting the capabilities of the tribes.56 However, the British did not share 
their strategy with the Ottoman Empire.  
 
The pressures of being forced into the European state system, subjected to the interests of 
European powers and to capitalist expansion as a periphery to the European core, required 
the Ottoman Empire to replicate the institutions and structures of modern statehood, 
including the development of its own periphery. Imperial expansion of the Ottoman Empire 
into tribal areas of the Syrian Desert and into Mesopotamia placed additional strain on the 
Sublime Porte, considering the cost of the military power required, but concessions between 
the Sublime Porte and the tribes were eventually made with regards to the uncultivated 
territories, and villages began to emerge. Soon after Ottoman expansion into the region, the 
city of Deir was founded, the population swelled to 20,000 inhabitants, and a civil 
government was established under the administration of the Governor of Aleppo.57 The 
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Ottoman Empire, being subject to European imperial interests and demands, was forced to 
expand its own imperial dominance into territories and over populations that had previously 
enjoyed autonomy. Indeed, as the European state system expanded and the Ottoman Empire 
became subject to the standard of civilisation which included economic and political 
expansion, it was forced to adopt knowledges and practices of the European state. In a 
similar fashion, the Ottoman Empire, expanding direct control into the tribal areas of the 
Syrian Desert and through Mesopotamia, forcing the populations in this area to partake in 
the structures of governance established by the Sublime Porte.   
 
The violent events in Damascus in 1860 marked a major change in the Ottoman Empire. 
The violence that took place in Damascus confirmed to the European powers, although with 
fault, the Sublime Porte’s inability to govern and maintain relative stability. The consequences 
of which were increased European interference over institutional configurations and 
domestic policy. In Mount Lebanon, where European intervention and occupation led to 
the establishment of a new system of governance, it also heightened animosity between the 
Druze and Christians.58 The events of 1860 further impacted the economy of the Ottoman 
Empire as the Sublime Porte was compelled to pay reparations to the Christians who were 
the targets of the attacks in Damascus, the administration was forced to levy new taxes, 
devalue the currency, and limit the powers of foreign creditors, with the latter policy being 
obstructed by the British. Out of necessity, the Ottoman Empire expanded into the Syrian 
Desert and into Mesopotamia. The economic difficulties that the Ottoman Empire was 
facing also had wider effects and impacted security. Because the newly organised and trained 
mounted and foot police could not be paid, the men who had been hired to provide security 
throughout the Syrian provinces subsequently abandoned their duties, leaving many villages 
and cities, including those around Damascus, Hamah, and Homs, susceptible to violent 
plundering and pillaging by nomadic Bedouin tribes.59 
 
5.2  The Young Ottomans as Political Resistance  
During the period leading into the late 1860s there had been increased contact between 
European revolutionaries, particularly following the 1848 French Revolution, and liberal-
minded Ottomans, which led to the development of a new movement called the Young 
Ottomans (sometimes referred to as the New Ottomans). The emergence of the Young 
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Ottomans, established by Midhat Pasha, Ziya Bey, Namik Kemal, and Mustafa Fayzel Pasha 
– grandson to Muhammed Ali, and Simon Deutsch, a socialist and banker exiled from 
Austria and residing in the Ottoman Empire, was ‘a loosely organised group of liberal, 
westernised intellectuals who wanted to introduce constitutional government to the 
Ottoman Empire in order to save it from inevitable dissolution’.60 Although their presence 
within the institutions of the Sublime Porte was not immediately evident, the influence of 
their political ideas helped the Sublime Porte navigate European pressure.  
 
The Young Ottomans, largely made up of educated and economically established individuals, 
often part of the Ottoman bureaucratic class, borrowed liberal Western ideas and merged 
them with Islamic and Eastern traditions of the Ottoman Empire.61 Although the Young 
Ottomans aimed to incorporate some of the fundamental norms of rational governance that 
were constituted in nineteenth century European ideas of modernity, and in doing so, 
generated discussion in Europe of how the Ottoman Empire was becoming a part of the 
civilised world, the French consul in Aleppo stated that ‘[…] this is a romantic view based 
on [European] experience with [Istanbul] and the young Pashas, who we see in Paris and 
who speak French, who wear modern clothes, and who swell their brilliant phrases with large 
words, which are empty in meaning’, pointing to a high level of corruption, which he 
describes as unjust and oppressive having reinforced systemic poverty.62  
 
In opposition to the French perception, the Young Ottomans, as a political organisation, 
focused their efforts on establishing a national representative body, the elimination of foreign 
interference in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire, and solutions to reform projects 
while maintaining Ottoman and Islamic identity. Members of this movement had come 
together from politically diverse backgrounds, with many having been sent into exile in Paris 
and London in the early 1860s, primarily by high ranking supporters of the Tanzimat 
movement, and others being employed by the Sublime Porte as translators. The former 
group of exiles had lived and become accustomed to the political framework of Europe, 
while the latter group had the privilege of gaining experience abroad and becoming familiar 
with the political discourse and political systems of Western Europe. Indeed, it was from 
Paris that the Young Ottomans published their official statutes on August 30, 1867, followed 
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by the publication of two new newspapers, published in Paris and in London: the Hurriyet 
(Freedom) and the Muhbir (Reporter).63 
 
The Young Ottomans were not opposed to the reforms, particularly the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839) 
and the Hatt-ı Hümayun (1856), which had been decreed by previous Sultans, being 
advocates of largescale reforms themselves, but viewed the Tanzimat reforms as examples of 
European interference and power within the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire. The 
reforms that the Young Ottomans wanted to implement were largely concerned with 
transforming the bureaucratic institutions by creating a representative system based on a 
constitution.64 The propositions put forward by the Young Ottomans, despite being based 
on Western European knowledges of rational governance and social order, were not 
regimented or developed by the European powers; and similar to how the European 
experience of modernity was constructed on knowledges of European Christianity, the 
Young Ottomans desired to incorporate modern governance with Ottoman and Islamic 
knowledges and tradition.  
 
By appropriating the knowledges of European modern governance, and opposing the 
Christian foundation in which it existed, the Young Ottomans resisted the colonializing 
elements of the European state system while making use of some of its knowledges and 
practices in order to be viewed as legitimate.65 The Young Ottomans sought to rectify the 
administrative problems of the Sublime Porte through the creation of institutions that would 
allow for popular representation and provisions of equality. Yet, they desired to keep the 
Ottoman Empire distinctly Ottoman in character, drawing on traditional institutions for 
legitimacy and the characterisation of the Empire as distinctly Islamic. In doing so, they 
hoped to pacify the population by validating the Islamic identity, cultural traditions, and 
conventions of the Ottoman Empire while acceding to the benchmark of European 
modernity through institutional engineering and the establishment a codified constitution.  
 
The desire to establish parliamentary representation and supreme law, codified in a 
constitution, posed a threat to traditionalists within the Sublime Porte and members of the 
Ulema, who believed that Islam formed the basis of law and only the Sultan, through his 
interpretation of Islam, could disseminate and enforce imperial law.66 The ideology of the 
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Young Ottomans also posed a threat to the institution of the Sultanate, which would be 
restricted by the establishment of the constitution.67 The traditionalists, wanting to preserve 
the customary practices of the Empire, which was understood as being founded on 
interpretations of Islam, wanted to maintain a concentration of power under the Sultan. The 
traditionalists soon felt threatened by the propositions of the Young Ottomans, despite the 
Empire having already undertaken reforms to modernize under a Western conception of 
modernity from as early as the late eighteenth century.  
 
One such change, led by a group of reformers, including Midhat Pasha, was the Vilayet Law 
of 1864. The law was an attempt to streamline and make governance in the provinces more 
efficient and equitable. According to Walter F. Weiker, ‘the Vilayet Law was modelled closely 
after the French Prefet system,’ enlarging the geographic boundaries of the provinces of 
themselves and creating hierarchal subdivision of sandjaks, cazas, nahiyes, and villages. The 
provincial governor, in turn, was provided with authority over all officials in the province, 
which had now contained departments of civil, financial, police, political, and legal affairs. In 
addition to streamlining the organisation of the Ottoman provinces, the intention behind the 
Vilayet Law was to repair the relationship between society and government and bridge 
religious divisions through the application of mixed courts, general assemblies, and 
administrative councils. Although the provinces had been administratively reconfigured, the 
desired effects were minimal, at best. The populations did not trust their new governors and 
the institutions of governance alone could not repair inter-communal relations.68 Despite 
administrative bureaucratisation, centralisation of authority, and policies based on the 
provision of communal equality, the role and relationship between Islam and the Sultan had 
not been threatened. This, however was beginning to change with the development of 
modern nationalisms, which altered the notions of identity and belonging by transforming 
the relationship between government, population, and territory.   
 
While the developments that had been promoted by the Young Ottomans were occurring, 
for some of the Young Ottomans, government reforms were still too slow. In 1868, the 
Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances was split in two, forming the Council of Judicial 
Ordinances and a Council of State. These new bodies were then subordinated to the Council 
of Ministers. This transition incorporated representational transformations by establishing 
the right for all millets of the Ottoman Empire to be represented in the central law-making 
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bodies.69 However, the changes to the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances did not go 
far enough for some. Namik Kemal complained that ‘as long as members of the law-drafting 
body were not elected, changes would remain superficial’.70 This sentiment was echoed by 
the Muhbir, to the displeasure of Mustafa Fayzel Pasha, a member of the Young Ottomans 
and grandson to Muhammed Ali. Mustafa Fayzel Pasha believed that the attack by the Muhbir 
lacked diplomacy.71  
 
In addition to the structural reforms that had been implemented, which did not satisfy the 
idea of representational government desired by the Young Ottomans, there were significant 
changes directly impacting the Sublime Porte. First, two of the greatest proponents of the 
Tanzimat passed away. The deaths of Fuad Pasha in 1868 and the death of Ali Pasha in 1871, 
signalled a turning point in the administration and modernisation of the Sublime Porte.72 The 
deaths of Fuad Pash and Ali Pasha led to a declaration of general amnesty and many Young 
Ottomans who had been exiled subsequently returned to the Ottoman Empire from 
Europe.73 Also, during this period, the Ottoman Empire was experiencing ‘increased 
corruption, oppression, and misgovernment throughout the land’, made worse by the 
growing unrest caused by the extravagant spending of the palace.74 Financial mismanagement 
of the Empire was burdened by imperial debts to the European powers and increased 
personal debt within society, a devalued currency, administrative corruption, and higher rates 
of taxation.75  
 
5.2.1 Midhat Pasha, the Sublime Porte, and the Young Ottomans 
The situation in the Sublime Porte had become desperate due to increased European political 
pressure and increasingly dire financial problems. However, the Franco-Prussian War (the 
War of 1870) had forced the recession of French influence in the Syrian provinces that the 
Sublime Porte sought to take advantage of. In December 1871, the British Consul in Beirut 
writes, as a matter of urgency, that the Sublime Porte is attempting to take advantage of the 
French retreat. The Sublime Porte, had endeavoured to reassert its power over Mount 
Lebanon by annexing the northern half of the mountain to the Sandjak of Tripoli.76 The 
British and Russians, functioning under the premise that changes made to Mount Lebanon 
																																																						
69 The principle that all millets will be represented in the central law making body was confirmed in the 1876 Constitution. 
Davison 1963, pp. 93-4; Findley 1980, pp. 143, 169. 
70 Mardin 2000, p. 46. 
71 Mardin 2000, p. 47.	
72 Devereux 1963. 
73 Devereux 1963. Hanioğlu 2008, pp. 103-04. 
74 Devereux 1963, pp. 24-25. 
75 Pamuk 1999, p. 214.		
76 Sandjak is the administrative division of a province.  
139	
	
had to be agreed upon by the European powers, worked together to block the annexation. 
The British and Russians argued that allowing the annexation would set a precedent for the 
Sublime Porte to annex the rest of the mountain to the Syrian provinces.77 Legally this was a 
problem as the Europeans and Ottomans had established the principle that no administrative 
change could be made in Mount Lebanon without the consensus of the European powers. 
Strategically, the annexation of the northern half of the Mountain to the Sandjak of Tripoli 
would have been a setback to the European interests.  
 
During the period of receding French power, the Russians were also keen to make gains by 
expanding their imperial influence in the Ottoman Empire, but their growing influence was 
met with internal opposition, particularly from Midhat Pasha. Midhat Pasha, appointed as 
Grand Vizier on July 31, 1872, had been a member of the growing reform movement within 
the Sublime Porte and was praised by the Young Ottomans. He had previously served as 
Administrative Governor (Sandjak-Bey) for Nis, which was later joined to the Danube 
Province (Vilayet), where he then served a Provincial Governor (Vali), and prior to becoming 
Grand Vizier, Midhat Pasha had served as Governor to Baghdad. Unfortunately, Midhat 
Pasha’s appointment as Grand Vizier ended a few months later on October 18, 1872. 
Although it is believed that his removal was in relation to ongoing conflict with the with 
palace officials over the financial management of the palace and the economic management 
of the territories of the Ottoman Empire, the Russians were also working against him. They 
attempted to have him removed from his position, because he had come into conflict with 
Russia over their influence in the Danubian Principalities and the Balkans; regions that Russia 
sought to make gains in.78 The threat that Midhat Pasha posed to the European powers was 
evidenced, not only in his policies against external interference, but also his capability to 
make legitimate changes, transforming an ever-weakened Empire into one of strength.  
 
Midhat Pasha’s reputation with the European powers was prefaced by his conflict with the 
Russians over Russian interference with the Greek, Armenian, and Bulgarian populations, 
viewing Russian influence and interference as detrimental to the Ottoman Empire. However, 
the Russian Foreign Minister, Gorchakov, in talking to Rustem Pasha, the Ottoman 
Ambassador to St. Petersberg, claimed that the Russians wanted to keep the Ottoman 
Empire intact, and feared that the collapse of the Empire would lead to conflict over the 
territories with the Western European powers. Midhat Pasha, however, was unconvinced 
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and viewed all interference as damaging to the interests and wellbeing of the Empire. In this 
manner, Midhat Pasha had put forward proposals for constitutional reform, and giving the 
likelihood of this proposal being rejected, argued that a federal model, similar to the newly 
formed German Empire (1871), should be developed. These proposals had staying power, 
and were subsequently suggested by the Ottoman Foreign Minister, Halil Sherif Pasha, 
following Midhat Pasha’s dismissal from the position of Grand Vizier.79  
 
Despite Midhat Pasha’s efforts to resist European interference, the Sublime Porte was still 
subject to the debts owed to European lenders, amounting to more than 200million pounds 
sterling. This was exacerbated by overspending in the palace, and social unrest. Viewing the 
economic situation in the Ottoman Empire as untenable, lending by European financial 
markets to the Sublime Porte was terminated, forcing the Ottoman Empire to declare a 
moratorium on its payments. By October 1875, the Ottoman Empire was in a state of 
financial collapse that would continue until 1897.80  
 
The consequences of the economic problems were having a greater impact on the provinces 
than on Istanbul. In Mount Lebanon, the population petitioned the Sublime Porte, asking 
the government to reduce the rate of taxation due to the deteriorating ecological conditions, 
the downturn in silk prices on the international markets, the decrease in property and land 
values, and the burden of debt that the population had become subject to.81 Trying to soften 
the impact of the economic and agricultural problems, the Sultan, Abdul Aziz (June 25, 1861-
May 30, 1876), issued a decree exempting the population from a ‘quarter of the tithe formerly 
established’ as well as payments of ‘arrears of taxes accumulated up to the date of the year 
1872’.82 However, such policies were merely a superficial resolution to a wider and deeper 
set of problems.  
 
The Young Ottomans, aware of the problems facing the Sublime Porte, worried about the 
increasingly dire economic situation and the potential for continued exploitation by the 
European powers, for these reasons, they were urgently pressing for significant change. 
Midhat Pasha, also encouraging change and as the Minister of Justice, was attempting to 
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convince other officials that the promulgation of a constitution built on the principle of 
citizenship, regardless of religious distinction, and universal personal law – giving each 
individual a legal identity – was the only way to reclaim independence from and defend 
against European encroachment. Despite his best efforts, Midhat Pasha’s insistence for 
reform had little acknowledgment within the administration. He soon became frustrated with 
stagnation in the Sublime Porte and resigned from his post in early December 1875.83  
 
Midhat Pasha’s belief that an administrative reform based on the codification of supreme 
law, enshrining the principles of a modern and rational social order and governance, would 
be fundamental to the legitimate reclamation of sovereign rights and authority, was not 
without fault. While the argument that the Ottoman Empire required help in its 
administrative affairs because of its inability to govern in a modern and rational way had 
formed the foundation for perceived legitimate interference, at times under the scope of 
humanitarianism, such reasons for interference cannot be divorced from interests. Although, 
Midhat Pasha represented the change that the Europeans had pressured the Ottoman 
Empire into accepting in order to accede to the European state system, his ability to make 
these changes actually posed a threat to European interests.  
 
In the days following Midhat Pasha’s resignation, the Sublime Porte, on December 12, 1875, 
issued a new imperial decree (firman). It fell short of a constitution that promised individual 
rights and citizenship but the decree did outline institutional reforms that would provide 
better representation in government. The decree also outlined judicial and tax reforms, new 
laws regarding property titles, police forces, the abolition of forced labour and the promise 
of security to individuals employed in positions of physical labour that increase public 
resources, industry, and commerce, and equality with regards to state institutions, 
administration, land possession, and equal subjugation to legal procedure. The judicial 
reforms separated the judiciary bodies from the executive bodies, promising more 
independence within the legal system and the presidents and judges of the new judicial bodies 
were to be newly appointed with the hope that it would discourage prior convictions and 
practices that created mistrust. Going forward, and once the judiciary was separated from 
the executive, the subjects of the Empire would be allowed to elect judges – regardless of 
religion and ethnicity.84 The reforms that were promulgated paralleled the standard 
institutional configuration of the modern European state. It was clear that while Midhat 
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Pasha’s arguments for a constitution had been ignored, the Sublime Porte realised the 
necessity for modernisation without the international interference that plagued the Hatt-ı 
Şerif of 1839 and the Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856. 
 
Midhat Pasha desired the modernisation of the Ottoman Empire but without the European 
interference and through the creation of a distinct Ottoman national identity. His framework 
was founded on the ideas that were espoused by the Young Ottomans, and for the most 
part, paralleled the demands that had been made by the European powers on the Sublime 
Porte. The difference, however, was intent. Midhat Pasha’s interests conflicted with those of 
the European powers, particularly France, Britain, and Russia. By modernising the Ottoman 
Empire, Midhat Pasha, and, by extension the, Young Ottomans, sought to end the 
justifications for continued European interference.    
  
5.3 The Balkan Crisis (1875-1878): The Foundation to the Ottoman Constitution 
(1876)  
The decree promulgated in December 1875 was issued in the midst of a political rebellion in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was put forward with the intent of pacifying and containing 
this rebellion by attempting to fulfil some of the demands being made by rebellious 
populations. According to the travel journal of Arthur Evans, the political awakening against 
a weak government and the sectarian divisions of the population living in the Balkans were 
at the core of the uprisings that began to take shape in Sarajevo in August and spread into 
the other Balkan territories, threatening the stability of Istanbul.85 The decree was meant to 
re-establish control by affirming Ottoman authority and independence in the region. In 
doing so, the reforms came into conflict with the interests of the European powers, notably 
those of Russia, which was actively influencing the population in the Balkans. The decree 
also upset the interests of Germany and Austria-Hungary, both of which wished to expand 
their influence in the region.  
 
Although the events in the Balkans between the Sublime Porte, Russia, Germany, and 
Austria-Hungary had little direct impact on the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, it 
altered the situation of the Ottoman Empire within the European state system, the form of 
governance within the Ottoman Empire, and increased resistance within the Sublime Porte 
to European interference. In this manner, the fallout from these events had a direct impact 
on future governance of the Ottoman Empire, which impacted the administration of the 
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Syrian provinces, the Sublime Porte’s future relationship with the populations in the Syrian 
provinces, and was a crucial precursor to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878.86  
 
After a series of meetings between Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, the three 
European powers released the Andrassy Note in December, 1875. The Note demanded that 
the Sublime Porte consider the legitimate manifestation and demands of the insurgents in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.87 The measures outlined in the note drew the ire of the British who 
viewed the Andrassy Note as excessive and aggressive. Britain replied to the three powers by 
defending the Sublime Porte, stating that the changes regarding religious freedom had been 
properly executed and that they could no longer pressure the Sublime Porte any further.88 It 
was clear that the geopolitical interests were motivating all four European powers, with 
Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary viewing the revolt as an opportunity to expand. The 
British, on the other hand, viewed the secession of territories as a great source of instability 
for the Empire and a threat to the balance between the European states.  
 
Nevertheless, the Sublime Porte conceded to some of the demands made by Russia, 
Germany, and Austria-Hungary by promulgating a new set of reforms on February 11, 1876. 
These reforms consisted of a promise to ensure full and entire religious liberty, the abolition 
of tax farming, amelioration of the agricultural community, and the establishment of a local 
commission composed of equal numbers of Muslims and non-Muslims. In addition to the 
promulgation of these reforms, the Sultan wrote a reply to Count Andrassy explaining that 
the government was unable to provide reforms affecting financial redistribution due to the 
restraints on the financial accounts of the Ottoman Empire. Instead, the Sultan promised to 
provide a financial package to Bosnia and Herzegovina.89 Although the Ottoman Empire 
was being defended by the British, it was likely that the Sublime Porte knew it could not risk 
the defeat if war were to break out, nor could it enter into a conflict, backed by the British, 
with economic and political conditions attached. 
 
Aware of the demands that had been made on the Sublime Porte by the European powers 
and the concessions that were delivered in return, Midhat Pasha wrote the ‘Manifesto of 
Muslim Patriots’ published on March 9, 1876.90 Soon after the release of the Manifesto, it 
gained the support of liberal thinkers as well as students of Islamic Law (the Softas), Muslim 
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leaders, and the conservative ‘Old Turks’, such as the Minister of War, Husein Avni Pasha, 
who was responsible for strategising the successful removal of Sultan Abdul Aziz from the 
throne on May 30, 1876. The ‘Manifesto of Muslim Patriots’ led to increased resistance to 
European demands, which amplified opposition to European interference by the Muslim 
populations of the Ottoman Empire.91   
 
Increased opposition had a knock-on effect that brought the Sublime Porte into conflict with 
the European powers. On May 7, 1876, the German and French consuls in Salonika 
(Thessaloniki) were killed following an incident that raised tensions between Christians and 
Muslims.92 The incident in Salonika and the deaths of the European consuls were 
subsequently used by the Russians to release the Berlin Memorandum on May 13, 1876, 
which stated that Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia would ‘guard against the recurrence 
of events similar to those which have taken place at Salonika’ by despatching war ships to 
the regions of danger – Istanbul and Smyrna (Izmir). The memorandum further stated the 
necessity of the strategy, arguing that the Sublime Porte had been unable to implement 
previous reforms. The Berlin Memorandum outlined additional European doubt over the 
ability of the Ottoman Empire to enforce any future reforms that would seek to mitigate the 
recurrence of violence given that the populations in the Balkans were in revolt.93 
 
The Berlin Memorandum reiterated much of the sentiment that was expressed in the 
Andrassy Note, and was a blatant attempt by the parties involved to make gains within the 
Ottoman Empire through the imposition of conditions on the Sublime Porte by justifying 
their threatening actions on humanitarian grounds. Despite this justification and the fact that 
the Berlin Memorandum targeted the Balkans and avoided interfering with British and 
French interests, the British cabinet rejected the document. On May 19, 1876, the British 
stated that they were unable to cooperate with the other European powers and rebuked the 
possibility of an armistice on behalf of the Ottoman Empire as it would hamper the 
independence and governance of the Sublime Porte. The British also argued that an armistice 
between the Sublime Porte and the rebels would be impossible to maintain given that the 
insurgents were being armed through external actors; a rebuke directed at Russia. 
Additionally, the demands to place a concentration of troops in certain regions of the 
Ottoman Empire ‘would be delivering up the whole country to anarchy, particularly when 
the insurgents are to retain their arms’. In conclusion, the British argued that the request for 
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consular supervision and a naval force to protect foreigners and Christian inhabitants would 
impede on the Sultan’s powers and rights within his own territories. In the reply to Russia, 
the British also reminded them that a naval force in key positions off the shores of Ottoman 
territories was already maintained by Britain.94 With the rejection of the memorandum by the 
British, the Sublime Porte was in a position to ignore it.95 
 
The threats that were directed at the Sublime Porte also threatened the interests of Britain, 
in particular, the relationship with the Sublime Porte that provided continued economic, 
geographic, and political access. The threats made by the Russia, Germany, and Austria-
Hungary over the Ottoman Balkan territories and populations upset the balance of the 
European state system, with the British coming to the defence of the Ottoman Empire, 
noting the dangerous level of interference that had already taken place in the Balkans, which 
had fuelled the rebellion. While the Sublime Porte had attempted to appease the population, 
and Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, by promulgating a new set of reforms, amenable 
to the demands by the European powers and the populations in the Balkans, resistance to 
continued European interference was growing, culminating in Midhat Pasha’s manifesto and 
the deposing of Sultan Abdul Aziz. 
 
The European powers, led by Russia, were playing by the same framework established by 
the French and British governments, by establishing a standard of civilisation and 
subsequently undermining efforts to successfully attain such a standard by pursuing national 
interests. However, it could be argued that the British viewed the possibility of secession of 
the Balkan regions and their subsequent submission under Russian influence as a threat to 
the stability of the Ottoman Empire as well as the European state system.96 If such was the 
case, the British perception was not wrong. The secession of the Balkan territories through 
rebellion and under the influence of Russia significantly weakened the Ottoman Empire and 
created new opportunities of conflict over the remaining territories, particularly between 
France and Britain. The impact of a weakened and subordinated Ottoman Empire within 
the European state system created new strategic opportunities that threatened the stability 
within the European state system and affected the governance of the Sublime Porte within 
the Ottoman Empire.    
 
5.3.1 Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s Accession to the Throne 
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The state of affairs in the Ottoman Empire, including rebellion and revolution in the 
European provinces, the financial crisis, increasing European encroachment in domestic 
Ottoman affairs, and the emergence of the Young Ottomans as a strong political force 
helped foster political upheaval in the Cabinet to the extent that Sultan Abdul Aziz was 
dethroned on May 30, 1876. According to Mundji Bey, the Turkish consul-general in New 
York and a controversial figure,97 the deposing of Sultan Abdul Aziz provoked ‘great 
satisfaction’ among the Ottoman nation and the Europeans. Mundji Bey continues that 
succeeding Abdul Aziz, Sultan Murad V, was seen as progressive, generous, and a liberal, 
‘but the opportunity was denied him of putting into effect his reform schemes’.98 Murad V’s 
accession to the throne was viewed optimistically – the Muslim populations of the Ottoman 
Empire praised his authority and the Christian populations viewed change as a new 
beginning.99 
 
Despite the reported optimism, which had been shared by Midhat Pasha, Murad V sought 
to maintain the status quo, even though he had promised to promulgate a constitution. 
Explaining the new Sultan’s reluctance to bring major change, Mundji Bey stated that Murad 
V had been committed to the promulgation of the constitution but had been denied the 
power to do so by opponents within the Sublime Porte. These opponents had propagated 
claims that the Sultan was mentally ill and insane, while promising the throne to Murad V’s 
brother, Abdul Hamid II.100 It was under these circumstances that Midhat Pasha, undeterred 
by Sultan Murad V’s broken promise, released a draft constitution to the public.  
 
The public reception of the draft constitution was mixed, with many officials and members 
of the public concerned over the articles regarding citizenship. The reference to citizenship 
created unease as it would make Christians and Muslims equal in all manners related to the 
state and state authority, a concept that had been a problem during the implementation of 
the earlier reforms.101 Equality diminished the characteristic of the Ottoman Empire as an 
Islamic empire and citizenship reduced the Sultan’s role by devolving power from the 
Sultanate to the government, further transforming the relationship between the social field 
and governance.  
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Sultan Murad V’s reign came to an abrupt end a few months after his accession and on 
August 31, 1876, Abdul Hamid II succeeded him. Maintaining Ottoman tradition, Sultan 
Abdul Hamid II promulgated a new imperial edict, which confirmed the Grand Vizier, 
Mehmed Rushdi Pasha, and President of the Council of Ministers, as well as the Ministers 
and functionaries in their respective posts. The imperial edict further drew attention to the 
imperfect execution of laws and reforms, stating that an ever-expanding crisis in the 
Ottoman Empire, resulting in corruption, anarchy, administrative abuses, sectarian conflict, 
and class conflict had been the consequence.102 
 
Shortly after Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s accession to the throne and the promulgation of the 
imperial edict, violence erupted in Damascus on September 12, 1876. The French consul in 
Damascus, discussing the incident of violence, stated that the violence was ‘ignited by the 
actions of children’. The eruption of violence between the Sunnis of the Madinat el-Chabem 
quarter and the Shi’a of the Kharab Quarter had many similarities to the Damascus Massacre 
of 1860. As the violence unfolded, it slowly turned into a riot that moved towards Madinat 
el-Chabem, which functioned as a gateway to the Christian and Jewish quarters of the city. 
The riot had maintained such force that those involved attacked police forces and it was only 
later in the evening that security forces could pacify the rioters.103 Animosity between 
religious communities had become easily enflamed as the economic and political situation in 
the Ottoman Empire continued to deteriorate. 
 
The recurrence of violence in Damascus in September, 1876 highlights the inability of the 
Sublime Porte to assert authority,104 and the inability of reformers and liberal thinkers to 
establish a sustained based of support for their ideas within general Ottoman society. Many 
of the prominent liberal thinkers, who were the foundation of the reform movement, had 
developed and acquired ideas and worldviews from their close associations with the 
European powers by means of their roles within the Ottoman administration. Or, they had 
been exiled from the Ottoman Empire to European capitals, where they organised and 
manifested their political ideas. Nevertheless, their experience of the world was one of 
literacy, wealth, and knowledge of and, access to, political institutions. On the other hand, 
the general population was forced to contend with gross inequality, made worse by European 
interference and sectarian alliances and provisions.   
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5.3.2 Midhat Pasha, the Tersane Conference (1876), and the First Ottoman 
Constitution (1876) 
Sultan Abdul Hamid II, being confronted with the Tersane Conference (the Constantinople 
Conference), a British attempt to defuse the Russian threat of unilateral intervention in the 
ongoing Balkan crisis, dismissed Mehmet Rushdi as Grand Vizier and appointed Midhat 
Pasha in his place.105 The Sultan viewed Midhat Pasha as an individual who was logical, averse 
to impractical schemes, and believed that he could negotiate a settlement with the Europeans. 
Going into the Tersane Conference, Midhat Pasha had devised a plan that would help shift 
the balance of power in favour of the Ottoman delegation. Midhat Pasha’s plan focused on 
the promulgation of a constitution which would be drafted on the foundation of the 
previously circulated draft constitution. However, Midhat Pasha’s idea of presenting his ideal 
constitution at the conference never occurred. Instead, the official constitution that was 
presented at the Tersane Conference had dramatically changed, attenuating many of the 
important articles. Despite Midhat Pasha’s objections to the changes, the constitution was 
released on December 23, 1876, the same day as the beginning of the Tersane Conference.106 
 
The constitution referred to the Empire’s rights to territorial sovereignty, placing Ottoman 
sovereignty in the hands of the Caliphate of Islam, ‘the eldest of the princes of the dynasty 
of Osman’ and all powers over state affairs are the privilege of the Sultan, who can delegate 
as he chooses to those he chooses.107 The first set of articles, including the pre-amble, 
maintained the traditional powers and privileges of the Sultan, however, the following articles 
outlined a set of Western-liberal rights and freedoms that promised inviolable individual 
liberties. However, the explicit provision of equal citizenship was dropped in the final draft 
and replaced with the continued promise that all Ottoman subjects are subjects of the 
Empire, without religious distinction.108 The constitution upheld the relationship between 
the Sultan and Islam, which sought to give the Ottoman Empire its character and legitimacy 
as an Islamic Empire. Despite the provisions of rights and liberties that the constitution 
decreed, it was still the right of the Sultan to repeal or uphold the rights and liberties 
proclaimed.  The constitution that was promulgated and presented to the European powers 
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defied the European logic and standard of rational and secular governance, which was further 
contradicted by the absence of establishing citizenship.   
 
At the conference, the Ottoman delegation was unable to divert the attention of the 
European parties and Midhat Pasha’s plan to argue that the constitution established a 
foundation and framework to ensure the appropriate reforms were being implemented, it 
also failed to diminish the desire of the European powers to further intervene.109 Britain 
sought to defend and promote its liberal values and viewed the Ottoman position as 
unchanging. Although the constitution outlined the application of these values, they were 
not dependent on an absolute law, rather they were dependent on an absolute leader. The 
result was a leadership who had the ability to dismiss individual rights and liberties and 
therefore required further European involvement. The Ottoman delegation was incapable of 
gaining traction against European demands, which reflected those made through the 
Andrassy Note and the Berlin Memorandum. Unsurprisingly, the Ottoman delegation found 
these demands to be unacceptable.110  
 
The European proposals that were put forward at the conference regarding citizenship and 
equality, and European supervision of the administration of imperial reforms were ultimately 
rejected by the Ottoman General Council, despite pressure from Lord Salisbury on Midhat 
Pasha to accept the terms. Lord Salisbury argued that an official rejection of the proposals 
would ultimately result in war with Russia, to which the other European powers, including 
Britain, could not get involved in, warning that such a war would result in the loss of territory 
for the Ottoman Empire and the possibility of the destruction of the Empire in its entirety. 
Following this discussion, Midhat Pasha asked the General Council to vote again on the 
proposals of the Tersane Conference. Again, the proposals were almost unanimously 
rejected. With the decision of the council in hand, Midhat Pasha asked the European 
delegates to reconsider consenting to the constitutional reforms. Ultimately, due to the 
Ottoman rejection of the proposals,111 the plenipotentiaries representing the European states 
were ordered to leave Istanbul with no agreement.112 It was unlikely that the Russians would 
have accepted anything short of the demands that they had made, which were impracticable 
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for the Sublime Porte. By establishing a civilisational benchmark through their demands, the 
Russians were able to justify the use of force as a last resort.  
 
Following the failures of the Tersane Conference, Midhat Pasha sent his long-time associate, 
Odian Efendi, to France and Britain on the false premise of discussing the possibility of a 
loan. Midhat Pasha avoided making the request himself in order to discourage suspicion 
from oppositional parties in the Sublime Porte. His plan was to send a delegate to France 
and Britain to explain that the European proposals that had been made at the conference 
were impossible for the Sublime Porte to accept, especially with regards to those of European 
supervision or ‘guarantees’. In addition to explaining the position of the Ottoman Empire at 
the Tersane Conference, Odian Efendi was to ask for European support in the promulgation 
of the constitution and the development of a parliamentary system. Despite, British Prime 
Minister, Benjamin Disraeli’s admiration of this proposal, France and Britain rejected the 
terms and insisted that reforms would have to be supervised.113 The supervision of reforms 
would allow for continued European interference in the domestic affairs of the Sublime 
Porte, while the acceptance of the constitution by France and Britain would require them to 
respect the territorial sovereignty of the Sublime Porte, and thus function as a barrier to 
maintaining and fulfilling their interests.  
 
The constitution, heavily criticised within the Empire and in Europe, was viewed as a new 
set of reforms that would not provide substantial change and a largely diplomatic tool rather 
than a sincere attempt to affect change.114 In response to these criticisms, the French 
newspaper, Débats, published on February 1, 1877, an article reminding cynics that the 
Constitution was not ‘suddenly devised’ nor was it ‘intended to cut the ground under the feet 
of the Conference, but a system over which the Grand Vizier [Midhat Pasha] had long 
pondered’. The article continued that with the constitution came the politics of revolution, a 
reanimation of the Empire and ‘Midhat Pasha governs today the great ‘Sick Man’ risen from 
his bed’.115 However, the European powers argued that this simply was not enough, that the 
Ottoman Empire had not yet joined the ranks of the ‘civilised nations’ and therefore could 
not be afforded the same rights and privileges.  
 
5.3.3 The Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) and the Loss of the Ottoman European 
Provinces 
																																																						
113 Turkey and the Great Powers: The Constantinople Conference, New York Times, January 15, 1877; Davison 1986, pp. 
168-169. 
114 The Affairs of Turkey, The Leeds Mercury, Saturday, February 10, 1877, Issue 12118. 
115 Letter from Paris, The Pall Mall Gazette, Thursday, February 1, 1877, Issue 3730. 
151	
	
The inability to procure a diplomatic agreement based on reform provisions at the Tersane 
Conference led to the fulfilment of Lord Salisbury’s predictions. Russia was incentivised to 
act unilaterally to protect its interests in the Balkans. Despite protests from the Sublime 
Porte, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire on April 24, 1877. Following the 
declaration of war, on April 30, 1877, Britain stated that it could not provide economic or 
military assistance to the Ottoman Empire. Instead, Britain proclaimed its neutrality under 
the condition that the conflict remained in the Balkans.116 With regards to the latter, Edward 
Henry Stanley, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, wrote to Count Shuvalov, counsellor 
to Tsar Alexander II, that the interests of Great Britain must be protected: ‘should the war 
now in progress unfortunately spread, interests may be imperilled which they are equally 
bound and determined to defend’. The interests that he refers to include the maintenance, 
neutrality, and freedom of passage regarding the Suez Canal, the Bosporus, the Dardanelles, 
and the Persian Gulf, and the freedom of the city of Istanbul.117 
 
Although the war was focused in the Balkans, where the Ottoman Empire remained on the 
defensive and in retreat, the impact was more widespread.118 In December, 1877, the French 
consul in Damascus reports that ‘the Muslim populations were no longer supporting the 
campaign of ‘fanaticism’ and Holy War preached by the Ulema’. The consul describes a lack 
of enthusiasm, that the Muslim population has been broken and their indifference is a 
consequence of general misfortune in the country. Above all, the conflict with Russia 
fatigued Ottoman forces, diminished their courage, and pushed the population of Syria into 
a pacifist state. The tales of the war impacted the Syrian communities to the extent of 
agitation and terror, motivating many men, who were eligible for conscription, to move to 
the plains of the Hauran or deep into the mountains to avoid being forced to fight.119 The 
Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) had left the Ottoman Empire in a weakened state and 
further alienated the Syrian population from the authority of the Sublime Porte.  
 
Fearing a loss of authority, Sultan Abdul Hamid II concluded the first Ottoman 
constitutional period with an imperial decree, dated February 14, 1878. The termination of 
the constitutional period was the consequence of domestic and international events. 
Domestically, the members of the Chamber of Deputies, the Ottoman parliament, had 
																																																						
116 (c) Hertslet 1875, pp. 2586-2614 (no. 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498); Davison 1986, p. 170. 
117. (c) Hertslet 1875, pp. 2615-1617 (no. 499). 
118 In June 1877, Romania declares independence and on June 30 of the same year, the Ottoman Empire declares Holy War 
against Russia; asking the Muslim population to rise and protect the nation and country. Devereux 1963, p. 16; Sir Edward 
Hetslet, 1875, The Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. 2, 2643-4 No. 505. 
119 166PO/D20/10 December 28, 1877, (no. 3), sent to Comte de Mony, chargé d’affaires for France in Istanbul 
[Constantinople], from M. Ranneau, Damascus. 
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become extremely critical of the Sultan and his close advisers, and persisted in their requests 
to require some of the Sultan’s advisers to stand trial. The Chamber was also critical of the 
Sultan’s refusal to assent to certain bills and his suppression of the Grand Vizierate. The 
Sultan, however, was acting within the framework of the constitution using the prerogatives 
granted to the Sultanate and did not welcome the criticism.120 The decree that suspended the 
constitution and dissolved parliament referred to ‘the present exceptional circumstances’ of 
the Russo-Turkish war, explicitly stating ‘the form and direction which our general affairs 
have now taken are not suitable for Parliament to correctly to perform all of its duties’.121 
Fearing possible repercussions, many of the Young Ottomans went into exile following the 
termination of the constitution. The exiled Young Ottomans, however, persisted, even 
abroad, with some of these figures becoming important to the development and future of 
the Young Turk movement – and by extension, the Committee of Union and Progress.122 
 
Given the circumstances of the war and the lack of material, legal, and economic support 
from France and Britain, who had continuously pressured the Sublime Porte to engage with 
Westernising reforms, Sultan Abdul Hamid II no longer believed it necessary to maintain or 
adopt a Western liberal order that criticised and threatened his authority. The conclusion of 
the constitutional period also coincided with the end of the Russo-Turkish war on March 3, 
1878, with the signing of the San Stefano Peace Treaty, which stipulated Bulgarian, 
Montenegrin, Serbian, and Romanian independence. In addition, the treaty stipulated 
relinquishing Batoum to Russia.123 Although some of these losses were mitigated by the 
British intervention through the Congress of Berlin (June 13 – July 13, 1878),124 the loss of 
territory in the Balkans also marked the loss of much of the Ottoman Empire’s non-Muslim 
population. In turn, the Sultan, going forward, demanded that his administration stress the 
Islamic character of the Ottoman Empire, his title as Caliph, and the necessity of Islamic 
unity against a hostile Christian world. Given the change in discourse regarding the identity 
of the Ottoman Empire, Sultan Abdul Hamid II began to turn his focus to the Arab 
provinces and started promoting Arabs to important positions within the administration.125 
																																																						
120 Devereux 1963, pp. 237-239.  
121 Devereux 1963, p. 236. 
122 Such figures include Samipasazade Sezai, the future editor of Sura-ui Ummet, Ismail Kemal Bey, and Murad Bey. Devereux 
1963 p. 15; Mardin 1962, p. 171.  
123 Zürcher 2016, pp. 74-75.  
124 The Ottoman Empire ceded control of Cyprus to Britain in exchange for British help in the negotiations with Russia. 
The Cyprus Convention can be found in Hill 1952, pp. 300‑303. News of the agreement created a positive response from 
the Cypriot population, who reportedly are keen to welcome the British administration and dispose of weak and insufficient 
Ottoman authority, see FO/226/194 July 29, 1878 (no.4), sent to Marquis of Salisbury, Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, from M. Henderson, British Occupation of Cyprus; The Treaty of Berlin and the Convention of Constantinople, 
pp. 12-13; Zürcher 2016, p. 75. 
125 Deringil 1991, p. 346.  
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While focus within the Ottoman Empire became fixated on the Arab provinces, particularly 
the Syrian provinces, the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) turned the region into a centre of 
explicit European conflict with the goal of controlling political and economic activity.126  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
Interference in the Ottoman Empire by the European powers had been focused on the 
modernisation of the Sublime Porte and protection of the Christian minority within the 
Empire’s territories. European actions were justified by the application of a standard of 
civilisation, which, in the initial period promised accession to the European state system and 
recognition of the Sublime Porte’s sovereignty. However, failures of the Sublime Porte to 
administer reforms in a manner that the European powers found suitable led to increased 
interference and pressure to reform and modernise. The consequence of which was 
dislocation between the customary groups and networks from institutions and structures of 
authority and increased economic and political disparities within the social field, which 
developed into sectarian animosity, and eventually led to violence, as was the case of the 
Damascus Massacre in 1860. 
 
The Damascus Massacre of 1860 was the consequence of increased pressure on the Ottoman 
Empire to reform and modernise, and can be linked back to the larger reforms of the Hatt-
ı Şerif (1839) and the Hatt-ı Hümayun (1856), specifically with regards to their impact on the 
social field in the Syrian provinces. In this context, the Damascus Massacre can be described 
as a form of resistance to the changing situation of the Muslim community in comparison to 
the Christian communities within the Ottoman Empire. However, the event did not register 
as resistance caused by the denigration and subordination of the Sublime Porte, the Muslim 
community, and the importance of Islam in the Ottoman Empire. It was viewed by the 
European powers as the natural and untamed state of the fanatical Muslim, which justified 
European intervention into Mount Lebanon in order to protect the Christian communities 
in the Syrian provinces. 
 
The occupation of Mount Lebanon by a European military force led by France quickly 
turned into a form of colonial governance that altered governance and the administrative 
institutions within Mount Lebanon. The result of this occupation was colonisation and active 
engagement in the production of knowledges and practices that reflected those in France, 
including ideas of order, morality, and governance. However, it also privileged the Christian, 
																																																						
126 Ismail 1976, vol. 14, pp. 281-282, January 19, 1881.
154	
	
specifically the Maronite community. Mount Lebanon was not the only manner in which the 
European powers had asserted authority over the Sublime Porte, the British continued to 
exert pressure on the Sublime Porte regarding its debts to the European powers that it had 
accrued following the Crimean War (1853-1856). The economic constraints on the Sublime 
Porte regarding the implementation of domestic economic policies led to Ottoman imperial 
expansion, replicating the knowledges and practices that the Ottoman Empire had been 
subjected to by the European powers.  
 
During the period of increased social agitation and violence against the changing conditions 
within the Syrian provinces, caused by imperial reforms, a political resistance had emerged 
that was actively reproducing the knowledges of European socio-political civilisation. The 
Young Ottomans, which, along with the violent reactions, were also a result of social 
dislocation from authority, had formed to circumvent increased European interference in 
the matters of government, and to help the Sublime Porte navigate modernisation by 
merging principles of modern statehood with Islamic and Eastern tradition. Although the 
Young Ottomans did not completely transform the structures of governance, they had an 
influential role in strategizing responses to demands made by the European powers, 
particularly through Midhat Pasha. Crucially, they had attempted to produce liberal reforms, 
aligned with the demands that the European powers had previously made on the Sublime 
Porte, in order to discard European interference.  
 
Midhat Pasha attempted to help the Sublime Porte navigate the threats and demands during 
the Balkan Crisis (1875-1878). However, his proposals for the promulgation of a liberal 
constitution fell short due to the devolution of power that threatened the role of the Sultanate 
and the sensibilities of the more conservative and traditional elements within the Ottoman 
Empire. Although a constitution was eventually promulgated, specifically to manage the 
threat of increased European interference stemming from the Tersane Conference (1876), it 
did not garner the support of the European powers, particularly Russia, which desired the 
realisation of national interests above Ottoman modernisation, resulting in the Russo-
Turkish War (1877-1878). Britain and France, on the other hand, argued that the constitution 
did not succeed in providing all the required aspects of a civilised nation, and therefore 
refused to provide help to the Sublime Porte – and on the condition that Russia did not 
interfere in British and French interests in the Arab provinces. The loss of territory from the 
war resulted in increased focus from the Sublime Porte on the Arab provinces and 
heightened inter-European conflict over influence in the Syrian provinces.    
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Chapter 6: Rejecting the Standard of Civilisation: Ottoman Centralisation, Arab 
Nationalism, and Transformations in European Strategy 
 
6 Introduction 
The rejection of the Ottoman Constitution by the European states at the Tersane conference 
(1876) led to the abandonment of the liberal modernisation programme by Sultan Abdul 
Hamid II. The European powers justified the rejection of the Ottoman Constitution at the 
Tersane Conference because it failed to accede to the benchmark of a liberal modern state, 
particularly with regards to the omitted provision of citizenship and the enduring executive 
status of the Sultan over the administrative and governmental affairs of the Empire. Without 
support from Britain and France regarding the constitution, Russia declared war (1877-1878). 
The culmination of these events provided Sultan Abdul Hamid II evidence that the 
promulgation of modernisation reforms would not provide equal status within the European 
state system and the consequences of attempting to accede to the standard of civilisation was 
being exploited by the European states. The reality of continued subordination in relation to 
the European states led to the abandonment of the liberal programme of governance and 
the reconfiguration of Ottoman governance.  
 
This chapter examines the consequences of Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s abandonment of the 
liberal modernisation project following the Russo-Turkish War and the losses sustained in 
the Balkan territories. Sultan Abdul Hamid II became increasingly concerned with the 
survival of the Empire, directing his efforts to ascertain stability within the Syrian provinces 
through centralised governance and the promotion of an Islamic identity in an attempt to 
maintain legitimacy. The result was the Sultan’s rejection of liberal principles that had failed 
to cultivate the Ottoman Empire’s accession to the European state system as a recognised 
sovereign member, but the maintenance of the state’s bureaucratic institutions, which 
provided him with the ability to assert his authority over the population and territories of the 
Empire. Although, the European standard of civilisation, which had been applied to navigate 
the philosophical and practical problems of the pursuit of European interests in the Syrian 
provinces, was obstructed, Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s authority was challenged by populations 
within the Empire, as they came to reproduce some of the liberal ideas of governance 
prevalent in Europe.  
 
The reconfiguration of governance in the Ottoman Empire, through the rejection of the 
liberal modernisation project and the centralisation of authority under the Sultan led to the 
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development of secessionist and nationalist sentiments within the Syrian provinces. This 
chapter highlights the changing dynamics within the Syrian provinces, the Sultan’s attempts 
to maintain control and stability, as well as the attempts by the British and the French to 
continue in the pursuit of economic and geopolitical interests, and the emerging Arab 
nationalist sentiments, highlighting the advent of nationalist discourse and the altered the 
relationship between identity, territory, and governance.  
 
This chapter begins by examining the political and economic environment of the Syrian 
provinces following the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), highlighting the French attempts 
to continue to influence the Syrian province, the Sublime Porte’s attempts to gain legitimacy 
with the populations in the Syrian provinces, and the emergence of an Arab nationalist 
movement. It follows by analysing the development of the secessionist and nationalist 
movements, and the declining status of the Sultan which required the delineation of the 
legitimate pursuit of French and British interests. This chapter then examines the 
foundations to which the French administration in the Syrian provinces sought to pursue 
their interests going forward.   
 
6.1 The Impact of Centralised Governance on the Syrian Provinces after the 
Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) 
Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire during the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) 
and the loss of the European provinces, the Sublime Porte became increasingly focused on 
the Arab provinces. Focus on the Arab provinces was framed by a suspicion of potential 
dissent and concern over further territorial losses. Viewing the application of liberal reforms 
as the reason for sustained losses, Sultan Abdul Hamid II began to apply a controlled and 
centralised form of governance. He maintained the modern institutions of the state, which 
replicated the modern state in Europe, but abandoned the liberal programme of a 
constitution and parliamentary representation.1 Discussing the reforms and the application 
of authority, the French consul in Damascus was sceptical of the means of governance that 
had been implemented, commenting on the dislocation between local practices and customs 
from the modern institutions of the state, and noting the emergence of a despotic form of 
governance.2 However, Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s reign, although centralised, was concerned 
with imperial survival and maintaining legitimacy without devolving power, and while force 
																																																						
1 Ahmad 1968, pp. 20-21 
2 Ismail 1976, vol. 17, pp. 357-362, January 12, 1907.  
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was used to pacify rebellious populations, he had also made concessions.3 It is, therefore, 
debatable whether Sultan Abdul Hamid’s reign was truly despotic.4  
 
Due to the losses sustained in the Balkans following the Russo-Turkish War, renewed focus 
on the Arab provinces was applied, attempting to amass support through the emphasis on 
an Islamic identity and the appointment of provincial Governors that would serve the 
interests of the Empire rather than the interests of the provinces; resulting in a widening 
cleavage between the Syrian population and the authority of the Sublime Porte. The renewed 
emphasis on the Syrian provinces and the importance placed on imperial survival led to the 
appointment of Cevdet (Djevdet) Pasha as Governor of the Damascus Province, in March 
1878. The appointment was heralded by the French consul in Damascus as a constructive 
development, stating that Cevdet Pasha’s ‘previous experience as Governor of the Aleppo 
province had a positive impact, he is an intelligent man, active, and hardworking’.5 However, 
the optimistic sentiment was misdirected and in late June an article in the newspaper Stamboul 
detailed the high levels of suffering caused by increased taxation in the Syrian provinces, 
made worse with the arrival of Cevdet Pasha who imprisoned anyone who complained about 
his leadership or the activities of his friend ‘Arab’ Izzet Pasha. The accusations of 
administrative corruption limited the Sultan’s ability to rebuild a base of support among the 
Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire,6 despite the renewed emphasis on an Islamic 
identity.  
 
Commenting on the situation within the Syrian provinces, the French consul attempted to 
distance himself from his previous praise of Cevdet Pasha, and noted that only after the 
appointment of the new administration was there vocal criticism of the appointed governor. 
The French consul explained his surprise at the reaction towards Cevdet Pasha, stating that 
the residents of Damascus had been ‘known to become enchanted by their governors’ and 
had previously kept complaints they may have had to themselves.7 The French consul 
continued, writing of his anxiety over the growing sense of misery and discontent in 
Damascus, criticising the ‘despotic regime’ as the source of the problem.8  
																																																						
3 For example, with the Druze in the Hauran who were rebelling, in 1883 and from 1890-1897, against the Sublime Porte 
with the aim to achieve autonomy, see 166PO/E/269 March 5, 1896 (no. 17), sent to M. de la Boulinière, chargé 
d’affaires for France in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Guillois; Salih 1977. 
4 Deringil 1991. 
5 166PO/D20/10 March 9, 1878 (no. 8), sent to M. Fournier, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. 
Rousseau, Damascus. 
6 166PO/D20/10 Extract from the newspaper, Stamboul, June 26, 1878.  
7 166PO/D20/10 July 30, 1878 (no. 16), sent to M. Fournier, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. 
Rousseau, Damascus. 




While the application of authority, which had been centralised by the Sublime Porte 
following the termination of the first constitutional period (1876-1878), enhanced feelings 
of discontent in the Syrian provinces, such feelings were linked to the depressed economic 
environment and the unfavourable social and political conditions, which had previously 
helped enflame the Damascus Massacre of 1860. The sense of administrative corruption and 
the deteriorated economic environment in the Syrian provinces had a disastrous impact on 
the populations’ perceptions of the Sublime Porte. Although such feelings were evident 
throughout the modernisation period, it had, for the most part, gotten worse over time, 
forcing the political classes to establish strategies in order to justify emancipation.  
 
The French consul, for example, wrote to the French Ambassador in Istanbul, M. Tissot, of 
an increasingly distressing situation on the Eastern border of the province of Aleppo. The 
consul stated that a rebellion had been provoked by the administration of the Provincial 
Governor Izzet Pasha of Diyaberkir. The rebellion, beginning on June 15, 1880, was 
instigated by members of Izzet Pasha’s administration who had started to hoard grains, 
depriving the population in the province of Aleppo access to vital food supplies.9 The French 
consul noted that the situation in Aleppo was desperate, recounting the famine that occurred 
during the previous winter (1879), and worried of a possible rebellious contagion that could 
spread over the eastern border of the province. The consul stated that the situation in Aleppo 
remained dire due to the weak leadership of the Governor and the diversion of the Koik 
River (Queiq River or River of Aleppo) by three villages in the Sandjak of Aintab (Gaziantep), 
and while a plan had been put in place to build a canal from the Euphrates to the Koik, it was 
acknowledged that until the plan came to fruition, there would be a shortage of produce. 
The French consul continued by describing the potential increase of prices on essential goods 
and a lack of potable water, which raised the risk of an epidemic.10  
 
The problems faced by the Sublime Porte following the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) 
were not restricted to Damascus and Aleppo. In the desert region, where Ottoman Troops 
had established control in 1864, giving way to the emergence of the city of Deir,11 the French 
consul remarked that the once prosperous region was ‘no more’, and since the Russo-Turkish 
War, the Sublime Porte lost control, and the population became rebellious. The French 
																																																						
9 166PO/D1/72 June 19, 1880 (no. 81), sent to M. Tissot, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from Destrée, 
Aleppo. 
10 166PO/D1/72 July 3, 1880 (no. 85), sent to M. Tissot, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from Destrée, 
Aleppo.   
11 Discussed in Chapter 5, section 5.1.3. 
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consul stated that ‘the tribes have returned to their instincts of independence’; and although 
the Sublime Porte had strategized to send a small army to re-establish control, the consul 
warned that the army would be outnumbered and overpowered, warning that any 
provocation could lead to rebellion.12 Although the Sultan had centralised power, taking 
many of the decision-making abilities away from the government, his control over the 
activities of administrators was poor.    
 
The general feeling of discontent in the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire was the 
consequence of the political and economic environment, which were amplified following the 
Sultan’s centralisation of power. In these circumstances, the populations of the Syrian 
provinces became even more dislocated from the institutions and structures of authority 
than they had previously. In addition, the rejection of the liberal modernisation project by 
the Sublime Porte and of European interference, placed the Sultan in opposition to the liberal 
programme advocated by the European powers, which had been disseminated among some 
of the political classes in the Syrian provinces. 
 
6.1.1 The Emergence of Secessionist and Nationalist Sentiment: Early Arab 
Nationalism in the Syrian Provinces 
The source of discontent in the Syrian provinces can be tied back to the poor economy, 
centralised governance, a general lack of accountability for governors, and a history of 
European interference and modernisation that increasingly dislocated the social field from 
governance and authority. The accumulation of factors, rather than any single cause was the 
probable reason of dissatisfaction in the Syrian provinces. However, dissatisfaction had 
become so great that it developed into public denouncements of the Sublime Porte and the 
propagation of Arab, and other, nationalist sentiment. Reflecting on these developments, 
posters were placed throughout the city of Damascus, which disparaged the conduct of the 
authorities and called for the emancipation of the Syrian people from their enslavement by 
a foreign administration.13  Although it was not explicitly stated on many of the posters, it 
was alluded to that the foreign administration to which the Syrian populations were enslaved 
was that of the Sublime Porte.14  
 
Other posters that had been placed throughout the city, however, were more explicit, stating 
that the Ottoman administration had transgressed in their role by leading the Syrian 
																																																						
12 166PO/D1/72 October 26, 1880 (no. 98), sent to M. Tissot, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from 
Destrée, Aleppo. 
13 166PO/D20/10 July 30, 1878 (no. 16), Sommer 2015, p.281. 
14 Other posters denouncing the Sublime Porte as a foreign power appeared throughout 1880 in Beirut, Damascus, and 
other Syrian towns. Shamir 1974, p. 116. 
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population to ‘abandon the religion of Mohammed for that of France and the disbelievers’.15 
The posters on the walls of the city emphasised growing Syrian anger and disassociation with 
the politics of the Sublime Porte. In addition to viewing the Sublime Porte as an oppressive 
and foreign authority, there was recognition that France was also responsible for the 
conditions that had produced dissatisfaction with the Sublime Porte.16 The ideological 
premise accentuated through these posters was one of Islam, to which the responsible parties 
had accused the Ottoman Empire of abandoning, noting France’s role in leading the Sublime 
Porte astray. In this context, secessionist sentiment was emerging in the Syrian provinces.  
 
In an attempt to quell dissent in the Syrian provinces, particularly in the aftermath of the 
publications highlighting anger directed at the Ottoman Empire, Cevdet Pasha was removed 
from his post as Governor on November 22, 1878 and replaced by Midhat Pasha,17 who 
remained in the post until 1881, and inherited a situation of general social disorder. 
Specifically, Midhat Pasha had to immediately contend with a revolt in the Hauran, where 
the Druze had come into conflict with the Muslims,18 and in Hounin, near Sour, where the 
Christians and Shi’a had come into conflict, resulting in the deaths of two Christians at the 
hands of the Shi’a.19 In addition to the developing disorder in the Syrian provinces, there 
were rumours of European strategies to occupy the Syrian provinces if the general social and 
political environment continued to deteriorate,20 increasing pressure on Midhat Pasha to find 
and develop solutions.   
 
Trying to limit and contain the growing environment of instability, as well as restrict 
European justifications for a potential occupation of the Syrian provinces, Midhat Pasha 
undertook a conciliatory approach and began to meet with various communal leaders, 
influential notables, and members of the intelligentsia. In one instance, Midhat Pasha, despite 
his restricted political powers, began secret negotiations with the Druze in the Hauran, asking 
for 20,000 men, and in return, Midhat Pasha promised a percentage of the profits from a 
proposed tax on meat. The tax, was anticipated to generate half a million francs per year 
																																																						
15 It is unclear who is responsible for the posters, however, it would have to be a well-educated individual or group of 
individuals, given that literacy rates in the Ottoman Empire among Muslim men in 1912 was only about 25%: Sommer 
2015, p.281; 166PO/D20/10 July 30, 1878 (no. 16). 
16 166PO/D20/10 July 30, 1878 (no. 16). 
17 166PO/D20/10 October 26, 1879, sent to M. Fournier, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. 
Gilbert, Damascus.  
18 The conflict is ongoing, though it seems to cease once the British Ambassador, Henry Layard, makes official visits in the 
areas, once he departs the attacks recommence. 166PO/D20/10 October 26, 1879.  
19 92PO/A/120 January 6, 1879, sent to M. Peritié, French Consulate General in Syria, in Beirut, from Dierighelly, Saida. 
20 Salih 1977, pp. 252-253.  
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from Damascus alone.21 In the context of Syrian discontent, Midhat Pasha was attempting 
to pacify the populations within the delineated and restrictive legal framework that was 
established by the Sultan.  
 
However, Midhat Pasha’s efforts were questioned by the French administration in 
Damascus. By attending to the leadership of the rebellious populations, the French consul, 
M. Rousseau, believed that Midhat Pasha had embraced the ideas of the rebellious leadership, 
which had been responsible for the emergence of these nationalist sentiments. Following an 
investigation, the French consul, concluded that many of the discussions had been focused 
on the Syrian provinces becoming autonomous from European interference and 
independent from the Ottoman Empire. Although Midhat Pasha had previously objected to 
European interference, the conclusion of Rousseau’s investigation was misconstrued by 
ascertaining that Midhat Pasha’s entertainment of these discussions reflected his intentions 
to establish a small independent Syrian state with the goal of becoming Prince or King of 
Syria.22  
 
The conviction that Midhat Pasha was planning to establish an independent Syrian state 
threatened the pursuit of French interests in the Syrian provinces and motivated the French 
consul in Damascus to verbally attack Midhat Pasha, stating that he had become fanatical, 
abandoning his ideals of liberty, equality, and citizenship.23 The French consul noted that 
there had been a shift in Midhat Pasha’s rhetoric, that ‘Midhat Pasha had vehemently 
criticised the effects of Christian empowerment’, and argued ‘that the Ottoman Empire 
would have been better off to keep the Christians ignorant, using the Christians as tools to 
fulfil strategies against the European powers’.24  
 
The French consul, in his assessment of Midhat Pasha’s ideological shift away from the 
promotion of liberty, equality, and citizenship, argued that Midhat Pasha had become 
illegitimate and illiberal, that it conflicted with the civilisational standard of the European 
state system. In this attack against Midhat Pasha, it was apparent that the configuration and 
application of modernity as a civilisational benchmark was tied to a Christian-European 
history and worldview, specifically with regards to the French consul’s use of ‘Christian 
empowerment’ rather than equality. The influence of knowledges and practices from 
																																																						
21 166PO/D20/10 April 23, 1879, sent to M. Fournier, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. 
Rousseau, Damascus.  
22 166PO/D20/10 April 23, 1879.  
23 166PO/D20/10 April 23, 1879. 
24 166PO/D20/10 April 23, 1879. 
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Christian-European history in the application of modernity to the Ottoman Empire and the 
Syrian provinces was not lost on Midhat Pasha, especially given the socio-political context in 
which he was appointed as governor. Midhat Pasha was contending with a deprived, angry, 
and often overlooked area of society, which had made public declarations of the Sublime 
Porte’s turn away from Islam and submission to the European powers,25 a sentiment that 
was exacerbated by relational changes within the social field.  
 
The belief that Midhat Pasha was propagating ideas of a separate Syrian state disregarded the 
important detail that, above all, Midhat Pasha was an Ottoman patriot. Due to his personal 
political convictions, it was more likely that Midhat Pasha sought to incorporate an already 
developing Arab national sentiment into the structures of the Ottoman Empire.26 It was 
therefore doubtful that Midhat Pasha was responsible for the posters condemning the 
Sublime Porte, or that he even supported the narrative that had been used. The accusations 
by the French consul that Midhat Pasha’s use of the sentiments expressed in the posters was 
evidence of his desire to become a Prince or King of Syria was also unfounded. Although 
Midhat Pasha was attempting to persuade Sultan Abdul Hamid II to undertake a plan of 
decentralised governance, it was done in order to help reconcile the growing nationalist 
sentiment with Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s desire for stability and security within the Ottoman 
Empire.27 
 
Contrasting with the Sultan’s strategy to achieve stability and security by centralising 
authority and promoting an Islamic identity, the sentiment within the Syrian provinces 
regarding the changes in governance, particularly with regards to the termination of the 
constitution and the previous abandonment of Islam during the modernisation periods,28 led 
to the development of a secret society, formed by influential and notable individuals, which 
had been propagating ideas of Syrian autonomy and independence under the name the Secret 
Society of Beirut or the Arab National Movement.29 Commenting on this nationalist group, 
the French consul, Gilbert, was surprised, not only by the establishment and organisation of 
the secret society, but that it had been founded by Christians and quickly spread beyond the 
																																																						
25 Midhat Pasha was also contending with a population that had been impacted by the economic downturn, a labour 
shortage caused by conscription and emigration, and violent attacks by Bedouin and Arab Tribes. 166PO/D20/10 July 16, 
1879 (no. 15), sent to M. Fournier, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Gilbert, Damascus. 
26 Saliba, 1978, pp .320-322; Shamir 1974, pp. 117-118, 122-5. 
27 Shamir 1974, p. 126 
28 Although there is a lot of scholarship on the use of Islam by Sultan Abdul Hamid II as a means to gain support, it is 
also noted that the provincializing of Syria led to a distinct Arab-Syrian identity, see Keddie 1966; Abu-Manneh 1979, pp. 
143-146.  
29 Initially formed in 1875 at the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut. Antonius 1939, p. 79; also see Tauber 1993, p. 19. 
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borders of Damascus and Beirut, with Bedouins and individuals from other Syrian cities 
proudly declaring their membership.30  
 
The progression of the Arab nationalist movement was also a concern for Sir Henry Layard, 
the British Ambassador to Istanbul. After being made aware of these developments within 
the Syrian provinces, Layard met with Midhat Pasha, who revealed that the society had been 
propagating ideas of establishing an Arab Kingdom, inclusive of the provinces of Damascus, 
Aleppo, and Baghdad. The Arab Kingdom would be ruled by an Arab Sultan, potentially 
Abd-el-Kader, and maintain relations with the Ottoman Empire in a similar fashion to the 
relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Egypt.31 
 
Attempting to attenuate the demands of an Arab Kingdom, Midhat Pasha petitioned the 
Sultan, asking for decentralised governance in the Syrian provinces. However, his requests 
were ignored in favour of continuing the Sultan’s project of deploying Islam as a means to 
gain legitimate support from the population in the Syrian provinces. The Sultan’s strategy 
was not functioning as planned, and in October, 1880, the French warned that there was 
growing discussion in Arabic language newspapers published outside of the Ottoman 
Empire that stressed the illegitimacy of the descendants of Osman, who, according to the 
authors, had no right to the Caliphate. The French consul stated that ‘the day that the mass 
populations no longer buy into this [the Caliphate], the higher the chance of insurrection that 
could trail from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean’.32 In order to preserve the ability to 
pursue French interests and avoid large-scale insurrection across the region, the French 
administration warned the Sultan of impending disorder.   
 
In addition to ignoring Midhat Pasha’s warnings, Sultan Abdul Hamid II ignored the 
warnings from the French administration, rejecting further European interference in the 
activities of the Sublime Porte, and refusing to provide autonomy to the Syrian provinces. 
The Sultan’s refusal to govern in a decentralised manner, provided a stronger base for anti-
Ottoman rhetoric in the Syrian provinces, which became increasingly acrimonious and 
divisive. On December 31, 1880, the French consul reported of a notice on the walls in the 
city of Tripoli: 
 
																																																						
30 166PO/D20/10 August 15, 1879 (no. 19), sent to M. Fournier, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from 
M. Gilbert, Damascus.  
31 92PO/A/120 October 9, 1879 (no. 19), Direction Politique, Beirut.  
32 166PO/D1/72 October 26, 1880 (no. 98). 
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Compatriots, you know the insolence of the Turks, their tyranny, 
and unsociable character; you know that you are dominated by 
elite men of this race, you are liable to their oppressive yoke and 
must walk the line for your existence and your property. They 
have confiscated your rights, destroyed your honour and the 
respect owed to your beliefs (holy books). They have created 
regulations that condemn your noble language to oblivion and 
they employ all the means to disunite and weaken your forces. 
They take the fruits of your labour […] and they have taken all 
avenues of progress, they insult you, you serve them, and they 
treat you like slaves, like you are not men. But in your defence, 
remember that you have been the masters, that you have 
produced illustrious men in all the branches of knowledge and 
human activity, that you have brought back the schools, 
populated the country, have made vast conquests, and it is on 
the base of your language that the Caliphate was established and 
that the Turks have since taken.33  
 
The language used in the posted notice directed dissatisfaction towards the Turks, as 
opposed to the Sublime Porte, highlighting a division of peoples that established the 
foundation of an ethno-nationalist programme in Syria and in Turkey. This division was also 
based on the assumption that a racial impulse, or the natural state of the Turks, was a 
predisposition to rule through tyranny, to dominate, and to take historic and cultural 
symbols, in order to rule with legitimacy. What was occurring in the deployment of these 
accusations was the nascent production of ethno-nationalism, the use of history and culture 
in an effort to forge a popular and common identity for political means.34  
 
As a means to separate themselves from the Turks, the populations in the Syrian provinces 
were using the cultural characteristics prevalent in the Syrian provinces to ask for 
independence ‘in common with our Lebanese brothers’, the use of Arabic as an official 
language, freedom of thought and the press, and ‘employment of our soldiers in the sole 
service of the [Arab] nation’.35 The development of nationalist sentiment was employing 
																																																						
33 Ismail 1976, vol. 14, pp. 275-6, January 15, 1881. 
34 For a discussion on the various theories of nationalism as a phenomenon of modernity, see: Özkırımlı 2010, pp. 72-
137.  
35 Ismail 1976, vol. 14, pp. 275-6, January 15, 1881. 
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liberal and modern European ideas and concepts and redeveloping the populations’ socio-
political relations between identity, territory, and governance. In other words, the Arab 
identity had become distinct from the Turkish identity and governance, and was deployed 
within and bounded to an ethno-linguistic region.  
 
Threatened by the emergence and intensification of this sentiment, the Sublime Porte 
dismissed several Muslim Arab functionaries from the Syrian administration. Many of these 
functionaries were suspected by the Sublime Porte of conversing with Midhat Pasha on the 
independence and autonomy of Syria. However, according to the French consul, what 
plagued the Sublime Porte was not the threat of an Arab rebellion but the inability to 
administer the Ottoman provinces, the disorder in the judiciary, and the superiority of the 
Arabs in grasping European ideas of liberty.36 The idea of a separate Arab state was justified 
by deploying ethno-cultural categories, forming an ethno-nationalism that had its foundation 
in modern liberal European political ideas. The deployment of modern liberal European 
political ideas by the Arab nationalists and the rejection of European interference by the 
Sublime Porte changed the patterns of relations between the French and the British in the 
Syrian provinces with regards to the pursuit of interests. The inability of the Turks to grasp 
ideas of modernity, in comparison to the ability of the Arabs, coupled with the Sultan’s 
rejection of European interference, confirmed, for the French administration, the 
incapability of the Ottoman Empire to become a civilised nation.  
 
6.1.2 The Declining Status of the Sultan in the Syrian Provinces: (re)Negotiating 
French and British Influence and Strategies 
The rejection of European interference by Sultan Abdul Hamid II and the emergence of 
Arab nationalist sentiment in the Syrian provinces disrupted the French and British 
application of a standard of civilisation. In the immediate emergence of Arab nationalist 
sentiment, both the French and the British attempted to contain the sentiment by warning 
the Sultan and advocating for decentralised governance. However, the attempts made by the 
British and French administrations, as well as Midhat Pasha, to convince the Sultan to 
administer a decentralised form of governance with regards to the Syrian provinces, were 
denied. Support was subsequently offered to Midhat Pasha by the British Ambassador in 
Istanbul, Sir Henry Layard. Using his diplomatic abilities, Layard offered to help Midhat 
Pasha reconcile relations with the Sultan, which had been damaged following the failure of 
the Young Ottoman strategy to promulgate a constitution. Layard believed that if Sultan 
Abdul Hamid II and Midhat Pasha could reconcile their differences, it would be possible to 
																																																						
36 Ismail 1976, vol. 15, pp. 126-128, December 6, 1884.  
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find a solution to the problem posed by the emerging Arab nationalist sentiment in the Syrian 
provinces.37  
 
Following the obtainment of Midhat Pasha’s permission, the British put pressure on Sultan 
Abdul Hamid II and Mahmoud Nadim Pasha, the Minister of Interior,38 stating that the 
Empire was in danger if the Sublime Porte did not act on implementing the promised 
reforms. Worried that the British advice would be ignored, Britain subsequently threatened 
to send a fleet into Turkish waters if reforms regarding ‘the protection of Christians and 
other subjects’ outlined in the Treaty of Berlin (1878) and the Cyprus Convention (1878) 
were not upheld.39 However, the threats failed to amount to any significant change and 
unable to reconcile relations between Midhat Pasha and the Sultan or deliver institutional 
decentralisation, the British and French sought to actively fill a void that emerged following 
the Russo-Turkish War, which ‘destroyed the prestige of the Sultan’.40 As the populations of 
the Syrian provinces were becoming enthralled by ideas of autonomy and independence, and 
managing the worsening material and political conditions of the Syrian provinces, the 
European powers, primarily France and Britain, were coming into conflict over influence.  
 
British and French strategy initially sought to limit the damage of nationalist and secessionist 
sentiment within the Syrian provinces,41 however, British relations with functionaries in the 
Sublime Porte and Midhat Pasha threatened the interests of the French administration in the 
Syrian provinces.42  The French administration believed that the British had been making 
gains in areas that had traditionally been dominated by French influence, including in Mount 
Lebanon, where Said Bey Talhouk, a Druze notable from the dynastic Talhouk family, had 
been favoured by the Sublime Porte and appointed Governor in Djebel Druze. Under these 
circumstances, the French believed that the British had deepened their relations with the 
Druze community,43 which threatened French influence in Mount Lebanon and with the 
Sublime Porte. Although the appointment of Said Bey Talhouk to Governor of Djebel Druze 
had little impact on the governance of Mount Lebanon, French unease over the British 
																																																						
37 92PO/A/120 October 9, 1879 (no. 19).  
38 Mahmoud Nadim Pasha was widely perceived as a Russian agent and was thought to be under the influence of Nicholas 
Pavlovich Ignatiev, the Russian Ambassador, who was in favour of the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878).  
39 FO/78/2968 October 26, 1879 (no. 711), November 6, 1879 (no. 727), November 14, 1879 (no. 737), telegraphs from 
Sir. H. Layard; Munro 1918; Annexation of Cyprus by Great Britain, 1915. 
40 166PO/D1/72 December 8, 1880 (no. 106), sent to M. Tissot, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from 
M. Destrée, Aleppo. 
41 92PO/A/120 October 9, 1879 (no. 19). 
42 166PO/D20/10 November 25, 1879 (no. 30), sent to M. Fournier, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], 
from M. Gilbert, Damascus. 
43 It is noted that Sir Henry Layards’ visit to Beit-Eddin, was accompanied by a group of Druze who were ‘singing [the 
British] national anthem’. 92PO/A/120 October 9, 1879 (no. 19); Moreh 1976, pp. 35-40; Akarli 1993, p. 43. 
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relationship with Midhat Pasha and the Druze was magnified due to the state of the French 
relationship with the Maronite community at the time. The Maronite community was 
dissatisfied with the French, who, according to the Maronite leadership, failed to act on their 
grievances against Rustem Pasha, the Mutassarif in Mount Lebanon, who had been 
appointed from 1873 until 1883.44    However, the British had been strict in the delineation 
of their relationship with the Druze, and the British had refused to protect them as the 
French had protected the Maronite community.45  
 
Although the French were worried about the influence of other European powers, namely 
Italy and Austria, they viewed Britain as the largest threat to their interests in the Ottoman 
Empire.46 Demarcating British influence, the French consul in Aleppo noted that the Turks 
had been excellent clients of the British, but with the weakened Sultanate, ‘the heterogeneous 
elements that make up the Ottoman Empire’ would become disaggregated, providing 
opportunities for the French.47 The French consul, de Torcy, describing European interests 
in the Syrian provinces, argued that France had maintained influence primarily in the region 
from the Mediterranean to the Euphrates and southwards to Arabia, particularly with the 
Catholic communities, and he believed that the latter would continue to support the French 
presence, particularly in Mount Lebanon. However, he feared that French influence in the 
Mountain would be challenged by Druze, specifically the communities in the Chouf and 
Djezine, which remained loyal to the British.48   
 
The British, on the other hand, had developed considerable influence throughout 
Mesopotamia and Arabia. In addition to British influence with the Druze population, the 
British were also viewed as the protector of Asia Minor, maintaining considerable influence 
in Egypt, and possessing Cyprus – a strategic base for operations given British naval power. 
Their influence in Asia Minor, according to de Torcy, had been established due to 
development projects such as the construction of tramways in Baghdad and a train line 
linking Syria to the Persian Gulf. Additionally, there had been increased activity by British 
																																																						
44 As mentioned in Chapter 5, the French had been required to step-back their influence in the Syrian provinces due to the 
damages caused by the Franco-Prussian War (1870). Rustem Pasha was a secularist who provided equal access to authority 
and the economy, regardless of religion, upsetting Maronite dominance in Mount Lebanon. 166PO/D20/10 November 
25, 1879 (no. 30); FO/226/206 May 18, 1882 (no. 26), sent to the British Embassy in Istanbul [Constantinople], Reporting 
on intrigues in the Lebanon in connection with the reappointment of Rustem Pasha; Akarli 1993, p. 43. 
45 The British strategy in forming alliances with customary groups and networks had been consistent in their difference 
from the French relationship, as is discussed in chapter 4, section 4.3. 166PO/D20/10 November 20, 1879 (no. 29), sent 
to M. Fournier, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Gilbert, Damascus.  
46 Ismail 1976, vol. 14, pp. 281-284, January 19, 1881. 
47 166PO/D1/72 December 8, 1880 (no. 106). 
48 ‘Maronites, who are the largest number of Christians are in the hands of the French, such as the Montenegrins are in the 
hands of Russia’ 166PO/D1/72 December 8, 1880 (no. 106). 
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and American missionaries who, the French believed, were trying to circumvent French 
religious influence.49  
 
In addition to increased British influence and a strategic positioning in Cyprus, de Torcy 
stated that the British had agents in Aleppo, Beirut, and Damascus who used ‘intrigues, 
warmth, intimidation, and all other possible tactics’ to increase British influence. It was 
believed that these agents had spread a rumour that France was the enemy and only desired 
to protect communities under the Holy See. The French consul claimed that the rumour was 
used by the British to increase influence among the non-Catholic communities, particularly 
the Druze and Muslim populations, knowing that the French maintained a strong base of 
support with the Christian, and specifically the Catholic communities.50 The French noted 
that the in maintaining a close alliance with the Catholic communities, the French had 
employed ‘a loyal form of politics’ emphasising equality, which ‘has won the sympathies of 
the Syrian people’, noting that this method made ‘French influence […] incontestably 
preponderant’.51  
 
The fear that the British could supersede French influence, through interventions made by 
individuals in the administration, had the potential to damage the pursuit of French interests 
in the Syrian provinces. One proposal to combat this threat included French language 
instruction and the dissemination of French ideas – including that of secularism – in French 
schools in Syria.52 Shortly after this proposal was put forward by the Marquis de Noailles, 
the Ambassador of France in Istanbul, M. Sienkiewicz, the French consul in Beirut wrote to 
the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Barthelemy Saint-Hilaire, that all foreign run 
schools have become extremely political, with the schools representing the views of an 
external influence.53  
 
As external influence grew through the establishment of French schools, they eventually 
became the target by the Sublime Porte, who perceived them as detrimental to the 
establishment of an Ottoman and Muslim identity.54 In addition to viewing the foreign run 
schools as a threat, the Sublime Porte was attempting to reduce the prestige and importance 
of foreign consular offices within the Empire, as the system of consular protection had 
																																																						
49 166PO/D1/72 December 8, 1880 (no. 106). 
50 166PO/D1/72 December 8, 1880 (no. 106). 
51 166PO/D1/72 December 8, 1880 (no. 106). 
52 Ismail 1976, vol. 14, pp. 281-284, January 19, 1881. 
53 Ismail 1976, vol. 14, pp. 298-320, March 10, 1881.  
54 FO/226/208 March 21, 1887 (no. 14), sent to Sir William White, from John Dickson, Damascus. 
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become corrupted by European representatives.55 This provided an advantage to the French 
administration, who had consistently strategised the use of sectarian and communal 
factionalism in order to maintain their interests. In contrast to French strategies, the British 
were interested in maintaining influence through diplomatic means. With the emergence of 
modern and liberal nationalist sentiment, the French were able to navigate the Sultan’s 
centralisation without abandoning the application of a standard of civilisation. The French 
administration therefore shifted their position in order to provide support to a widespread 
movement that they believed was temporary, unable to last beyond its purpose of contesting 
the Sublime Porte.  
 
6.1.3  The Syrian Provinces and France: Interests, Worldviews, and Strategy 
It had become increasingly apparent to the French administration in the Syrian provinces 
that there was a lack of cohesion between the social field in the Syrian provinces and the 
Sublime Porte, primarily due to the way that the administrations and institutions were 
structured under the authority of the Sublime Porte. According to the French consul, 
decentralisation between the Sublime Porte and the provinces had become the only 
sustainable option.56 The French consul’s argument for a decentralised administrative 
structure, contradicting previous demands made on the Ottoman Empire, helped the French 
establish a new base of support within the Syrian provinces, which had the potential to 
mitigate the Sultan’s rejection of European influence. Also, by supporting decentralisation, 
the French administration could moderate the threat of secession, fill the void created by the 
declining prestige of the Sultan, and provide opportunities to the French to continue to 
pursue interests while evading conflict with Britain.  
 
The French administration, despite previously attacking Midhat Pasha, had begun to 
advocate for the establishment of a decentralised government. Generally, the French 
administration tried to support the populations in their resistance to the Sublime Porte, as 
they viewed the latter as increasingly despotic. The support provided to some communities 
within the Syrian provinces in their resistance against the Sublime Porte had advantages for 
the French administration. For example, Ahmet Pasha Chama’a, a well-known and influential 
notable from a respected family in Damascus, had publicly stated that the Sublime Porte had 
come to view the Syrian provinces and its populations as an area that could be dominated 
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and controlled.57 Due to Chama’a’s status within the Syrian provinces, and the importance 
of the prominent families, the Sultan could not order his arrest or punishment without 
potentially provoking a rebellion.58 Instead, the Sublime Porte threatened the notable families 
in Damascus, demanding that they obey and remain loyal to the Sultan and his 
administration. The threat garnered a response from some of the notable families in Syria, 
who subsequently asked the French administration for protection.59 For the French consul 
in Damascus, this news was met with delight as it signified that the Sublime Porte had 
become significantly disconnected from its subjects, enough so that France became a 
legitimate alternative, which, in some ways validated the dominant French worldview.60 By 
supporting nationalist and secessionist ideas, the French were able to gain access to ‘the 
heterogeneous elements that make up the Ottoman Empire’,61 including some of the notable 
families in Damascus.  
 
The request that had been made by some of the notable families in Syria in late March, 1897, 
was accompanied by a rumour that the French were preparing to occupy Syria, beginning in 
Beirut and making its way to Damascus. ‘The rumour has created a great emotion and many 
of the notable families have expressed happiness that there will be European domination 
rather than Turkish’ authority. However, many also expressed concern that French 
domination would give prevalence and authority to the Christians.62 The request by the 
notable families was met with widespread caution and in an article published in the 
newspaper titled al-Sham, the author, Adib Effendi Nazmi, called to attention the hypocrisy 
of the European powers and argued that the reforms suggested by the European powers, 
particularly those concerning modernisation and decentralisation, were not in the best 
interests of the Muslim nation and it was the Muslim nation that should be deciding the state 
of rule and authority.63 Despite the efforts of the French administration, an opposition to 
French interference in the Syrian provinces was maintained, and often evoked the French 
relationship with the Christians and their disdain for Islam. 
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The conflicting desires of the Syrian populations were disregarded by the French who argued 
that whatever the goal, the population maintained ‘a special hatred for the ‘Turk’’.64 The idea 
that the Syrian population maintained a general disposition against the ‘Turk’ rather than the 
Sublime Porte was an important distinction. The use of the term ‘Turk’ conjured an identity 
of ethno-racial difference, which could be described as being predisposed to a particular set 
of illiberal characteristics. The use of the term ‘Turk’, rather than the Sublime Porte, to label 
the target of discontent in the Syrian provinces racialised the differences between the 
communities. It directed discontent towards this specific identity, and its attached 
characteristics,65 rather than the legitimate institutions of government. This diverted 
discontent against the institutions of government, placing blame on those in charge,66 and 
allowing the French to position themselves against Turkish domination.  
 
Although there was an emerging conception of racial and ethnic difference between Arab 
and Turk in Syria, French perceptions of identity in the Syrian provinces remained focused 
on religion because it was understood that the qualification of ‘Arab’ as a race was 
insignificant. Commenting on the Arab nationalist sentiment, the French consul in Beirut, 
M. Fouques-DuParc, wrote that he was not convinced, stating ‘that it will probably not 
amount to a large enough difference’.67 This was due to a lack of prejudice with regards to 
skin colour among the population, as confirmed by French military captain, M. de Torcy, 
who wrote that ‘it is difficult to distinguish between race, as much of the primitive population 
has bred with the Arabs and even the uniqueness of the Turks has nearly disappeared in 
Syria’. For the French, given the lack of racial discernibility between the populations, it was 
easier to categorise society through religious associations – with the Muslims being 
representative of the privileged class and the Christians living an existence of servitude. Yet, 
the Muslims of Syria, unlike the Muslims of Turkey, the latter being described as being 
Muslim only in name, according to de Torcy, were not attached to Ottoman governance and 
instead wished to establish an Arab government.68 The French maintained a perception of 
the Syrian provinces that facilitated the division of the population into easily discernible 
categories, which were ascertained by a Christian-French history that informed colonial 
administration and strategy.  
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While the French supported the plea by the Arab nationalists to be granted autonomy from 
the Sublime Porte, the French worldview remained focused on religious categorisations. 
Following from de Torcy’s comments, the French consul of Beirut, M. Patrimonio, argued 
that the population in Syria wished to establish an Arab government, however, there was a 
difference between the population in Mount Lebanon, who desired independence more than 
anywhere else in the Levant, and the rest of Syria. Difference between the populations in 
Mount Lebanon and the rest of the Syrian provinces came down to religion, according to 
Patrimonio, ‘who said religion says nation in Syria, and if the religious ties between the 
communities dissolve, there will, during the final crisis, be disorders and no other national 
force for the inhabitants to rally around’.69 Inferred in this statement was a division between 
Christians in Mont Lebanon, who were not Arab, and the Muslims of Syria, who shared a 
common, although weak, Arab identity. This was not surprising due to the French perception 
of race as having little significance in the pursuit of interests, and the need to justify the 
continued pursuit of interests, which required the maintenance of Mount Lebanon as a 
French stronghold. Although there was veracity that Mount Lebanon viewed itself as a 
separate entity from the rest of the Syrian provinces, this was in part due to the communal 
composition, the regions’ historic political autonomy, and the strength of European 
influence in Mount Lebanon. 
 
6.2 Conclusion 
The centralisation of authority under Sultan Abdul Hamid II following the Russo-Turkish 
War (1877-1878) obstructed the application of a standard of civilisation, making it difficult 
for the European powers to pursue their interests as they once had. The employment of a 
standard of civilisation helped the European states, particularly France and Britain, to 
navigate philosophical and practical problems that developed during periods of economic 
and political expansion. The standard of civilisation, created a benchmark for the Ottoman 
Empire to be considered a ‘civilised nation’, imposing a set of political, economic, and 
cultural frameworks that were historically specific to European development. In the case of 
the Ottoman Empire, the Sublime Porte was required to modernise its institutions, to apply 
a specific concept of equality and citizenship, and provide ethnic and religious minorities 
with protections. Without the application of these concepts and protections, or without 
meeting the standard to which the European powers had adhered to, the European states 
justified continued interference and interventions, and withheld help in times of crisis. 
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Continued refusal by the European powers to provide legitimacy to the Sublime Porte’s 
liberal modernisation project by acknowledging the Ottoman Empire’s sovereignty, created 
the opportunity for Sultan Abdul Hamid II to reject further European interference. The 
rejection of European interference and European legitimacy emerged following Midhat 
Pasha’s failed efforts to adhere to a liberal modernisation project in order to evade territorial 
losses and war. Despite Midhat Pasha’s efforts, France and Britain refused to intervene to 
prevent a costly war with Russia (1877-1878), leading to the loss of the Balkan territories, 
Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro. In turn, Sultan Abdul Hamid II viewed the liberal 
modernisation project as a failure and pursued stability by centralising power and promoting 
the Islamic character of the Ottoman Empire. The standard of civilisation that had previously 
been applied to the Ottoman Empire to help navigate the philosophical and practical 
problems and to justify European interference had been obstructed. 
 
Although the modern institutions of the state were maintained, power was centralised under 
Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s direct authority. The centralisation of authority under the Sultan 
did not represent the form of customary authority that existed prior to nineteenth century 
modernisation projects, nor did it attempt to replicate European norms of governance that 
had been imposed through the standard of civilisation. Rather, Sultan Abdul Hamid II 
maintained the existing institutions of governance and consolidated his authority, fearing 
continual territorial losses and subordination to European desires. However, the Sultan’s 
strategy to secure the Ottoman Empire in the face of external threat led to increased 
discontent within the social field, resulting in the employment of ethno-cultural nationalist 
frameworks to assert legitimacy against the rule of the Sultan and a Turkish Empire.  
 
The changes in governance and the emergence of Arab ethno-national sentiment altered the 
social field and led to the utilisation of an Arab ethno-nationalist identity as a means to assert 
and justify a new relationship between governance, territory, and identity. The addition of a 
growing Arab ethno-nationalist identity premised on liberal concepts of equality, liberty, and 
nationalism, provided an opportunity for Britain and France to modify their strategies in the 
pursuit of their interests. Although the previous method of applying a standard of civilisation 
in the Ottoman Empire had been obstructed, the framework of the standard of civilisation 
helped France and Britain navigate changes in the Sublime Porte.  
 
The French validated their hesitant support for Arab nationalism by arguing that the Sultan’s 
changes in governance had led to despotism. It was therefore necessary to support a liberal 
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and secular programme in opposition to the illiberal centralised governance of the Sultan. 
However, the French were cautious of supporting Arab leaders, who happened to be Muslim, 
due to the threat it posed to the French relationship with the Christians, the autonomy of 
Mount Lebanon, and the sustained belief of Muslim fanaticism. Additionally, the French 
administration disregard the Arab identity as weak and maintained that the prevalent religious 
identities within the Syrian provinces formed a stronger foundation for nationalist 
movements. Despite the French perception of identities in the Syrian provinces, they 
attempted to achieve their interests by support for the nationalist movement, as hesitant as 
it was, in order to amass a stronger base of support. 
 
The British, however, sought to maintain relations with the Sultan and the administration in 
the Sublime Porte by promoting reconciliation between liberal-minded leaders, particularly 
Midhat Pasha, and the Sultan. The British supported the nationalist and secessionist 
movements to an extent and had tried to find an acceptable concession by arguing for 
decentralised authority. The British administration desired the maintenance of the Ottoman 
Empire, specifically because of capitulations and the advantageous relationships that had 








Chapter 7: A Domestic Standard of Civilisation: The Young Turks and Imperial 
Collapse 
 
7  Introduction 
The centralisation of authority by Sultan Abdul Hamid II and the emergence of nationalist 
and secessionist sentiment in the Ottoman Empire created a tenuous situation as 
centralisation led to increased animosity directed at the Sublime Porte within the Syrian 
provinces. This was particularly evident with regards to the dismissal of a number of Syrian 
functionaries and accusations that the Sublime Porte had abandoned Islam, resulting in a loss 
of the Sultan’s legitimacy. The Sultan’s programme of centralisation and the dismissal of the 
liberal modernisation project was accompanied by a rejection of European interference and 
intervention. This rejection obstructed the ability of European states to apply a standard of 
civilisation in the manner they had grown accustomed to. Despite the rejection of European 
interference and interventions by the Sultan, the development of a liberal and modern 
nationalist movement provided Britain and France with the ability to continue to pursue 
interests and apply the principles that the modern state was a standard of civilisation, which 
continued to guide and justify European pursuits in the Syrian provinces. 
 
While these movements did not engage in a replication of the modern European state, they 
did seek to adopt and uphold liberal principles of ‘modernity’ and ‘civilisation’ in order to 
pursue their own interests and obtain external legitimacy. This chapter examines the changes 
in the Sublime Porte and the social field in the Syrian provinces between 1908 and 1919. It 
considers the development of nationalist and secessionist sentiment as a consequence of 
Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s centralisation of authority, the dissemination of knowledges and 
practices through nineteenth century European interference, and as a result of changes 
within the European state system. It highlights the changing political environment of the 
Sublime Porte and within the Syrian provinces caused by nationalist politics, which produced 
‘liberal’ and ‘modern’ forms of politics that sought to reform authority and governance. In 
doing so, this chapter discusses how institutions, structures, and concepts of modern 
statehood were accepted, yet the character of the Ottoman state was still contested, by the 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and the Young Turks, the Party of Freedom and 
Understanding (PFU), Lebanese nationalists, and the Arab nationalists, and how these 




The emergence of these nationalist movements adopted aspects of the civilisational 
framework which had been applied to the Ottoman Empire and Sublime Porte by the 
European states throughout the nineteenth century. By examining the political changes 
within the Ottoman Empire and the Syrian provinces, this chapter examines the role of 
revolutionary movements, including the CUP, Young Turks, and the PFU, their application 
of a civilisational framework in governance and their relationships with the European states, 
customary networks in the Syrian provinces, as well as the Lebanese and Arab nationalist 
movements.  
 
This chapter first examines the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 and the establishment of the 
second constitution in the Ottoman Empire, and the response to this development within 
the Syrian provinces and among the Arab nationalists. It subsequently examines the 
environment of political instability that developed following the CUP’s victories in the 
Sublime Porte and their response to instability, focusing on the consequences for Mount 
Lebanon and Aleppo. It then examines the impact of the changing patterns of relations 
within the European state system, and the negative impact these changes had on the Sublime 
Porte, which created renewed impetus for independence by the Arab nationalists with the 
assembly the Arab Congress (1913) in Paris. This chapter further analyses the successive 
developments regarding the First World War, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Arab Revolt, 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and the renegotiation of relations between France and 
Britain and the former Syrian provinces at the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920).  
 
7.1  The Second Constitutional Era: The Young Turk Revolution (1908) 
The management of the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Abdul Hamid II had provoked 
opposition from nationalist and secessionist movements, and many liberal-minded 
individuals. Although the Sublime Porte had managed to maintain authority over the Syrian 
provinces, the Sultan was contending with a growing political movement under the name 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) that had incorporated the Young Turks (among 
other political organisations). Once the Sultan had heard of the threat that CUP posed, they 
became the subject of an official inquest, which sought to examine their membership, 
activities, and political aspirations.  The inquest was carried out by the Governor of the 
Damascus province, Nazim Pasha, who had received an order to survey the movement and 
take the necessary steps to combat their growing influence.1  
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Sultan Abdul Hamid II was fearful of the effects of liberal ideas that had become popular 
following increased contact with the European powers throughout the nineteenth century, 
which were propagated by the Young Turks. Although Sultan Abdul Hamid II was engaged 
in promulgating reforms, his reforms were not concerned with governance or legitimacy, but 
the application of authority through pacification and bureaucratic modernisation. Due to the 
resulting dislocation between the institutions of the Sublime Porte and the local practices in 
the Syrian provinces, requests for the restoration of the constitution that were proposed by 
the Young Turks began to expand in Syria. The populations requesting the restoration of the 
constitution, primarily those who supported the Young Turks in their initial emergence, 
argued that the constitution could prevent a brewing crisis by providing the population with 
greater political access, quell separatist national movements, and provide rights to ethnic and 
religious minorities.2  
 
The appeal of the Young Turk movement reflected the changes that had manifested in the 
social field; ideas of modernity had become prevalent, particularly with regards to emerging 
forms of modern ethno-nationalism, but they were assembled on to customary knowledges 
and practices. Unlike their predecessors, the Young Ottomans, the Young Turks were 
‘products of the, modern secular, military, or civilian professional schools’.3 The Young 
Turks, borrowing ideas from their European mentors, including scientific rationality and the 
rejection of religious guidance,4 they maintained and propagated a worldview that reflected 
elitist theories of the late nineteenth century, which prioritised the role of elites in politics.5 
This was evident in the use of notable families by the Young Turks in order to eventually 
attain and maintain a parliamentary majority.6 Although the Young Turks had adopted the 
mentality of rational governance, separate from religious influence, they had formed alliances 
with notable families, combining modern politics with customary networks.   
 
Increased civil engagement in the Young Turk movement and military engagement through 
the CUP provided the necessary scope in the revolutionary movement to put pressure on 
the Sultan. Following the revolution that broke out on July 3, 1908 the Sultan was forced to 
concede to the demands of the Young Turks, agreeing on July 23, 1908 to reinstate the 
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parliament and the 1876 constitution.7 However, the Sultan’s concession early in the 
revolutionary movement is argued to have ‘robbed the revolution of its raison d’être’,8 given 
that ‘their common goal was opposition to Hamidian absolutism’,9 and the removal of his 
executive power. What followed was a ‘delicate balance between the Palace, the Liberals, and 
the CUP’ that gave way to political factionalism with the liberals propagating ideas of 
constitutionalism, science, progress, and social Darwinism; the CUP acting as vanguards to 
the revolution; and the Sultan who attempted to backtrack from the liberal promises that 
were made immediately following the reestablishment of a parliamentary regime.10 
 
7.1.1 The Arab Nationalist View of Constitutional Reform and the Young Turks 
Following the promulgation of the second Ottoman Constitution in early August 1908, the 
French consul in Latakia, M. Geoffrey, noted that ‘the consular agents in the Syrian provinces 
still do not know what to make of the July 1908 revolution’. Rumours concerning the 
concessions made by the Sultan, particularly that of the constitution, emphasised the idea of 
liberty, and ‘have created a belief amongst the poorest classes that they can now act on their 
passions’. On the other hand, the richest classes believed that ‘they have the right to humiliate 
all functionaries who do not please them’. Despite these antagonistic attitudes, the consul 
reported that there had been no violence to report and Muslims and Christians were 
celebrating in peace.11 This was echoed by Stanford Shaw, who stated that ‘happy mobs of 
Turks, Arabs, Jews, Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars, Armenians, and Europeans embraced in the 
streets and made eternal vows of brotherhood for the common good’.12 In Beirut, it was 
reported that the population largely supported the rapid changes that were being 
implemented, however, there had been trouble in Tripoli, a conservative Muslim city, where 
the population viewed the liberal regime as a further abandonment of Islam. Yet, the promise 
of a constitution generally produced an enthusiastic response.13 The establishment of a 
constitution and parliamentary representation provided the Syrian provinces with greater 
potential opportunity for decentralisation and autonomy over provincial and local affairs, as 
had been desired with the emergence of the Arab nationalist movement.  
 
The reinstatement of constitutional governance was supported by the Arab nationalists 
within the Syrian provinces, but also those who had been sent into exile. Commenting on 
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the reopening of parliament in Istanbul and the promulgation of the new constitution, the 
Comité Central Syrien (CCS), based in Paris, and founded by Rachid Moutran, Choukri 
Ghanem, and Georges Samné, released a statement on the developments within the 
Ottoman Empire through their president, Rachid Moutran. In line with their goal to guard 
against the return of absolutism, the statement thanked Sultan Abdul Hamid II, and urged 
those responsible, including the Sultan, to grant Syria the right to self-govern.14 Although the 
CCS was operating in Paris, in exile, it was an important and critical movement in the 
development of an Arab nationalism that later expanded beyond the borders of Syria. Due 
to censorship within the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Abdul Hamid II, only those 
in exile, with the help of the European powers, could deliver such critiques.15 
 
Although Moutran supported the establishment of a constitutional regime, he did so under 
the premise that it would facilitate self-governance for the Arabs. He argued that the Syrian 
provinces had been subject to an absolutist regime for too long, and the implementation of 
a constitution and the creation of a liberal regime composed of populations that hold 
different national identities would ‘naturally lead to the disintegration of the Empire’.16 By 
arguing that the Empire would eventually collapse, particularly due to the emergence of 
numerous and various national identities, Moutran also sent a word of caution to the Syrian 
population, stating that it was necessary for them to establish the institutions and structures 
of statehood, to prepare for the possibility that the constitution could fail to provide a viable 
basis for politics. He justified this by arguing that in the scenario that the Ottoman Empire 
did not collapse, ‘Syria will stay standing with its self-government and an internal organisation 
that is strong enough to help the Empire in case of danger, and to defend against the 
encroachments of central power’. He continued that if the Ottoman Empire did collapse, 
that the Syrian provinces would otherwise be prepared.17 Although the CCS supported the 
establishment of a constitution and parliament in the Ottoman Empire, they were foremost 
concerned with Syrian autonomy, and possibly secession, framed by the idea of an Arab 
identity separate from the Turks.    
 
The members of the CCS, who were in exile in Paris, were deeply influenced by their 
environment, informed by French ideas of nationhood in the early nineteenth century, which 
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were tied to an enlightened morality.18 The CCS propagated a national identity that was 
territorially delineated by the idea of greater Syria but based on an Arab identity that was 
constructed on a cultural distinction, separated from other cultural forms prevalent in the 
Ottoman Empire, and was a ‘nationalism that [was aimed at] a moral regeneration of the 
community’.19 In propagating these ideas, the aim of the CCS was to inject the political 
institutions with a cultural foundation that could reflect the negotiated social field in order 
to build ‘autonomous state institutions’.20  
 
Although the CUP had gained momentum in the Syrian provinces, Arab nationalist 
sentiment was still prominent, and held the view that the Turks had a natural urge to 
dominate other ‘races’. From Paris, Moutran wrote of a Turkish biological inability to ‘persist 
in the voice of equality and of true tolerance necessary to the development of the legitimate 
aspirations of the other nationalities of the Empire’.21 Using the same argument used to 
justify European interference in the Ottoman Empire, Moutran promoted a separate Arab 
national identity, stating that Turkish domination had led to disorganisation, where Arab 
organisation could help ensure the Empire’s survival. Within this ideological framework, the 
CCS argued that under an Arab organisation, it was possible to abandon the need for 
European maintenance, now that Syria ‘wakes from a slumber […] the duration [of] suffering 
sanctified the obtaining of rights to develop a better future’ and to reject domination of 
European power should the Empire collapse.22  
 
The articles that were published by Moutran reflected the ideas of rational order, progress, 
and scientific ethno-racial categorisation of peoples that was prevalent in French politics and 
reinforced through the standard of civilisation. Moutran commended the developments that 
had taken place with the CUP, particularly with regards to the establishment of a constitution 
and parliament, but he was doubtful that this form of Turkish domination would be any 
different from previous forms, believing that the Turks maintained a natural urge to 
dominate. In this manner, Moutran argued for the immediate creation of modern state 
institutions in the Syrian provinces that would be recognised by the European powers at the 
inevitable moment when Turkish domination over Syria ends. It was evident that European 
knowledges and practices regarding civilisation and the state had become adopted by leading 
political figures and promoted within the social field.  
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7.1.2 The Counter Revolution: Responding to Instability through Social 
Homogenisation 
The CUP, had become the dominant political block in parliament, gaining a majority due to 
their alliances with local notables – specifically prominent families – who ran as Unionist 
candidates in the Syrian provinces. Although the CUP chose candidates from notable classes, 
the notables did not, in large part, represent the ideologies or convictions of the CUP 
platform. Instead, the choice of candidates by the CUP was strategic, while the candidates 
representing the Syrian provinces, for the most part, viewed the opportunity as a means to 
secure power within the new parliamentary system.23  
 
Despite advocating liberal and secularist policies, the CUP made it difficult for the main 
opposition parties to participate in parliament. In turn, the main opposition parties viewed 
CUP domination as despotic. The opposition parties, notably the Party of Ottoman Liberals 
(Osmanli Ahrar Firkasi) and Muslim Fraternity (or Muhammedan Union, Ittihad-I Muhammedi), 
grew tired of being excluded from the political system, and started to pose a serious threat 
to the authority of the CUP. By early April 1909 the opposition parties, working closely 
together, started publishing anti-CUP articles and staging demonstration and protests. Soon 
after, on April 12, 1909, ‘an armed insurrection broke out in [Istanbul] in the name of the 
restoration of Islam and [Shari’a]’.24  
 
In the days following the April 12 insurrection, the CUP were forced underground and the 
Muslim Fraternity released an official list of demands, including the dismissal of the Grand 
Vizier and the ministers of war and of the navy, the replacement of several Unionist officers 
and of the Unionist president of the Chamber of Deputies, the banishment of several 
Unionist deputies from Istanbul, restoration of Shari’a, and amnesty for the rebellious troops. 
Following these demands being made, the Grand Vizier submitted his resignation, and was 
replaced by Tevfik Pasha.25 Commenting on the impact of the events in Istanbul on 
Damascus, the French consul in Damascus wrote that  
 
The Muslim Fraternity, led by Emir Abdallah Pasha - son of 
Abd-el-Kader, had organized a joyful demonstration that carried 
into the following day. The Muslims of the city see it as a return 
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to their rightful order and prominence while the Christians are 
fearful.26   
 
The French consul remained unconcerned, stating that ‘the CUP are likely to be triumphant 
and have an interest in returning public order to the city’.27 By April 24, 1909, the Action 
Army, organised by the CUP entered Istanbul and established martial law, regaining control 
over the capital and parliament, and deposing Sultan Abdul Hamid II on April 27, 1909, with 
Mehmed V acceding to the throne. Following the counterrevolution at the end of April 1909, 
the Young Turks, according to Erik Zürcher, became like the government before them, 
paranoid about the security of their power, and wanting to hold onto it completely. In August 
1909, following the proclamation of what the French consul in Beirut, M. Ponsot, called, the 
‘Liberal Constitution’, which established a constitutional and parliamentarian regime that 
limited the powers of the Sultan,28 should have established a decentralised government, 
instead it placed even more power in the hands of the CUP.29  
 
Following the reestablishment of control by the CUP, the parliament passed laws limiting 
freedoms of association and press, and disregarded requests from decentralist parties seeking 
legislation granting political autonomy in the provinces.30 The CUP had become vocal in 
their protests against the capitulation regime, arguing that the Ottoman Empire had 
succumbed to providing special rights to European states within the Ottoman Territories, 
harming the interests of the Ottoman Empire.31 The CUP continued with educational reform 
programmes, viewing mandatory public education as necessary for the maintenance of 
constitutional and liberal ideas, the institutionalisation of law and order, and modernisation 
in various economic sectors – including agriculture and industry.32 The CUP were actively 
pursuing a civilising process, which sought to modernise the Syrian provinces and 
homogenise the populations to become Turks.   
  
The policies put forward by the CUP led to an increase in opposition from the parties 
advocating decentralisation as well as those who were against the application of a liberal 
constitution. The former viewed European economic and political influence as beneficial 
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and progressive, while the latter, the anti-constitutionalist parties, viewed any European 
interference and influence, including the adoption of European forms of politics, as 
oppressive; invoking Islam as a response to the secular constitutional government. The 
response by the CUP to the increasing opposition was a strict form of Ottoman nationalism, 
one that held the Ottoman identity as emanating from Istanbul and framed by the Young 
Turk leadership. The CUP desired assimilation in social, political, and cultural practices and 
wanted to discard ethnic and cultural differences in favour of Turkification.33  
 
The stringent application of Ottoman nationalism through policies of Turkification by the 
CUP had a profound impact on the provinces of the Ottoman Empire as it eroded the very 
foundations to which the Ottoman Empire had been built on, such as the assertion against 
forced assimilation.34 The enlargement and establishment of the Ottoman Empire was not 
founded on the necessity to culturally cleanse or ‘denationalise’ the people and territories, 
but corresponded to the principles of decentralised governance.35 The politics of identity 
through forced cultural assimilation played an important role in Arab-Turkish relations 
during this period. Additionally, the Turkish centralisation of governance further 
encumbered relations between the CUP and the political parties in the Syrian provinces.36 
Increased attempts to homogenise the populations and centralise governance within the 
Ottoman Empire through projects of cultural assimilation alienated the populations in the 
Syrian provinces.  
 
The consequence of Turkification policies undertaken by the CUP heightened conflict 
between the Sublime Porte and the Syrian Provinces in the Ottoman Empire, increasing the 
desire for autonomy based on ethno-cultural principles.37 The establishment of a stringent 
Ottoman nationalism based on the politics of the Young Turks threatened the social order 
on a new basis, targeting religious groups inclusive of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish 
identification, and the deployment of an ethno-cultural framework, such as language, and 
social practices, which sought to homogenise Ottoman society and politics.38 However, the 
intended outcome of these policies was never achieved and the application of Turkification 
policies created a growing resistance, both in terms of identity and political desires for 
autonomy. Crucially, the CUP’s worldview and promotion of Ottoman nationalism, 
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deepened ethno-nationalist sentiment – particularly among the Arabs and validated broad 
anti-government coalitions.  
 
7.1.3 The Young Turks’ Civilisational Standard in Mount Lebanon and Aleppo  
The policies of Turkification included linguistic assimilation in the use of the Turkish 
language in schools and administration, the denial of ‘political representation on a religious-
communal basis’, the ‘denunciation of decentralisation’, and the ‘inflexible attitude towards’ 
social and political rights of religious minorities.39 The CUP was opposed to decentralisation, 
to the extent that under the new constitutional and parliamentary order, they attempted to 
regain authority over Mount Lebanon by forcing Ottoman legislative power on Mount 
Lebanon, reversing its privileged protection by the European powers.40 The CUP argued that 
European protections were no longer necessary with the emergence of a secular and liberal 
regime and by assimilating the population into a Turkish identity a sustainable and stable 
modern state would emerge.41 The conviction of the CUP that their government was based 
on ‘liberal’ and ‘modern’ principles motivated their pursuit to create stability and regain areas 
that had been lost to European interference. 
 
The Young Turks’ secular and liberal regime prioritised a Turkish identity, creating friction 
with the Arab and Lebanese nationalists. The decision to assume authority over Mount 
Lebanon by the CUP provoked the ‘Arab Fraternity’ (la Fraternité Arabe or Arab 
Brotherhood), a group of Syrian and Lebanese Arabs, composed of Muslims and Christians, 
who had been ignored and turned away from political life in Istanbul, to request help from 
the European powers. The advances on Mount Lebanon contradicted the goal of the Arab 
Fraternity, which was to obtain a decentralised administration for the benefit of Syria, 
Mesopotamia, and Palestine, making demands just short of requests for autonomy.42 Help 
from the European powers was also requested by activists in Mount Lebanon who had 
formed the groups the Lebanese Alliance (Alliance Libanaise) and the Lebanese Committee 
(Comité Libanais). Unlike the Arab Fraternity, who desired the establishment of decentralised 
administration in Syria and encompassing Mount Lebanon, the Lebanese Alliance and the 
Lebanese Committee petitioned the French consul in Beirut for the establishment of 
decentralised administration for Mount Lebanon, under the protection of France, separate 
to Syria, and with a geographic enlargement of Mount Lebanon to include Beirut and 
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Baalbek.43 The Arab Fraternity, the Lebanese Alliance, and the Lebanese Committee, 
threatened the stability of the government in Istanbul and led the Young Turks to deepen 
the nation-building project, which took form through the dissemination of a set of moral 
values to the Syrian provinces,44  sharing similarities with earlier European interference.  
 
The relationship between the Syrian provinces and the Sublime Porte worsened because of 
the decision of the government to send officers and officials to the Syrian provinces who 
could only speak Turkish and were ignorant of, and looked down on, the local customs and 
traditions. More generally, the British consul, M. Devey writes that the decision to appoint 
individuals unaccustomed to the language and the traditions of the people has deepened 
antagonistic sentiments between the Arabs and the Turks. The British consul cites  
 
hasty or somewhat autocratic behaviour on the part of the office 
holders, or […] their occasionally contemptuous or discourteous 
manners towards local notables, or […] the over-advanced views 
of those connected with the ‘Young Turk’ party which are 
manifesting themselves, in a distinct tendency towards 
xenophobia [as the reason for the antagonism. He also fears that 
the] sentiment between Turk and Arab is beginning to permeate 
downwards to the lower classes; and will soon […] no longer 
[be] confined to the Ulema, notables, and grandees, and official 
circles.45 
 
The British consul noted that the discontent was particularly present among the Ulema and 
the notables, who felt as if their role in society was being usurped by Turkish consolidation 
of power and a general disregard for the role of the Ulema and notable classes.46  
 
Reflecting on the worsening relations between the populations in the Syrian provinces and 
the Young Turk government in Istanbul, the French consul in Aleppo, M. Laronce, writing 
to the French ambassador in Istanbul, M. Bompard, stated that ‘the press seeks every, and 
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any, opportunity to attack the government’.47 For example, on January 28, 1910, an article in 
Al Cha’ab newspaper attacked the Sublime Porte for the collapse of a roof in the bazaar in 
the Bahoussa quarter in Aleppo, stating  
 
We [the population in Aleppo] demand that the municipality, as 
an obligation, refrain from killing people through their 
negligence. The municipality does nothing, they do not occupy 
themselves with anything, the mud and dirt is piling up in the 
street. The existence of the people makes no difference to 
them.48 
 
The article was revelatory with regards to the acrimonious relation between the state and 
society. It separated the municipal government, the state, from the social field, accusing the 
former of being negligent and uncaring, rather than viewing the state and government as an 
extension of society. In the article, the municipality was treated as an oppressive force, 
detached from any meaningful sentiment that would provide legitimacy, obscuring the state 
and governance as a form of household authority. This was evident, not only in the 
discussions in local newspapers, as reported by the French consul, but also in the 
appointment of Ottoman administrators and functionaries who held a blatant disregard for 
the social customs and language of the Syrian provinces.49  
 
The disregard for local social customs and language was thought to be rectified by 
emphasising the status of Islam in the Ottoman Empire. The governor of the province of 
Aleppo, Kiazim Pasha, in an attempt to respond to the antagonistic sentiment directed at the 
Sublime Porte, wrote a letter in the newspaper called ‘The Progress’ (al-Takaddoum) that was 
published on November 1, 1910. In the letter, the Governor had taken a religious tone to 
gain the sympathies of the Muslim populations. By using religious language, Kiazim Pasha 
wanted to show to the clerical parties, who were close to the notable families, that the 
populations in the Syrian provinces would no longer have to answer to the traditional 
hierarchies of notable and clerical classes, but would have a more direct relationship with the 
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government.50 The letter referred to traditions of corruption and tyranny that had been at 
the centre of notable politics, arguing that 
 
the government, has yet to reform the jurisdiction of the empire 
to the point of rendering it morally capable of guaranteeing, 
equitably, the rights of all classes of society. But know this – the 
current situation cannot continue because the population is 
weathered and demands justice […] You should know that I am 
one of those people that is searching the tranquillity of the 
Empire and the prosperity of the people. You should also know 
that I believe in redemption, those oppressive notables should 
take note of the words prescribed by God: Put distance from 
harm as you are obliged to in favour of the oppressed. In 
agitating the population, I am doing nothing but completing my 
tasks and functions vis-à-vis the people.51 
 
Kiazim Pasha was attempting to justify the actions and decisions of the Sublime Porte, which 
had come under the control of the CUP. In doing so, he argued that the oppression in which 
the population had become subject to was a problem of notable politics, rather than the 
politics of the current government. Kiazim Pasha was arguing that the modern state under 
the Young Turk government offered representation and freedom.  
 
Kiazim Pasha’s rhetoric drew the attention of the French consul in Beirut, who thought 
highly of him, stating that ‘he is someone who is liberal and able to think within the 
framework of the constitution, he has endeavoured to bring justice to the people by taking a 
stance against the aristocracy of Aleppo, who have tried to oppose his every move’.52 On the 
other hand, Gertrude Bell, a British traveller, political officer, anthropologist, and 
cartographer, known for her work in the formation of the British Mandate of Iraq, had come 
to meet Kiazim Pasha in 1905 and described him as a ‘farceur – a comedian, a performer’.53 
Still, the French consul’s support of Kiazim Pasha was due to his propagation of a modern 
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liberal political structure that encompassed the conditions of modernity and stability 
recognised as legitimate in the French worldview.  
 
By attempting to enforce a modern political structure that bypassed customary social and 
political groups, Kiazim Pasha isolated important networks in the Syrian provinces; the same 
social aristocratic networks that the European powers and the Young Turks had previously 
formed alliances with. The European powers, including France, Britain, and Russia created 
alliances with a variety of notable leaders throughout the nineteenth century in order to fulfil 
their own political interests. On the other hand, the Young Turks had created alliances with 
the leaders of notable families throughout the Syrian provinces in order to maintain a 
parliamentary majority. Arguably, the formation of alliances by the European powers and 
the Sublime Porte with these social networks only reinforced their importance.  
 
Kiazim Pasha’s attempts to dominate over the notables and clerical parties placed him in a 
weakened position, facing an increased potential for violent attacks carried out in resistance 
to his governorship of Aleppo. The French consul in Aleppo writing to M. Bompard, the 
French ambassador to Istanbul, stated that ‘everything has been done [by his enemies] to try 
to force him to reconsider his difficult task [of subordinating the social environment] that he 
has assumed’. The French support of Kiazim Pasha had been maintained due to parallels in 
political ideologies, with M. Ronflard, stating that ‘the people of Aleppo […] are ignorant, 
disunited, they respect the established order and rebel against innovations’.54 The rejection 
of political innovation, was not due to a condition of ignorance, as argued by M. Ronflard, 
but by the necessity of maintaining political familiarity and establishing consent, whereby the 
desire to subordinate the populations under this form of governance threatened to oppress 
the populations in the Syrian provinces by changing the accepted social, political, and 
economic framework.55 While the French and the CUP viewed political innovation, including 
the homogenisation of society as being modern, liberal, and rational,56 resistance contradicted 
their conceptions of modernity.  
 
The refusal of the population to accept the reforms put in place by Kiazim Pasha was 
subsequently blamed on a political paralysis in the notable class. In an article published in 
the newspaper ‘The Progress’ (al-Takaddoum) in February 1911, the author argues that the 
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general population is paralysed by fear. The article noted that the livelihoods and customs of 
the general populations were dependent on the political and social environment established 
by the notable class, which was under threat by Kiazim Pasha and the CUP. Because of this 
threat the actions of the notables, according to the article, triggered a tyrannical, barbaric, 
and oppressive response. The article continued by arguing that once the notables were 
removed from power and the reforms were established, the population would no longer 
resist.57  
 
The alienation of notables in the province of Aleppo by Kiazim Pasha was doing little to win 
over the population. Following the attacks on notables in the newspapers, the notables were 
refusing to pay taxes on all land and property in their ownership, selecting a single property 
of little worth to be valued and taxed by the government. Seeking to rectify the situation and 
pacify the populations, the government had sent several functionaries to value all the 
properties in the region and extra security force with the aim of avoiding the possibility of a 
coup against Kiazim Pasha.58 In addition to the deteriorating political environment in 
Aleppo, it was reported that the situation in Mount Lebanon had become untenable, caused 
by the governments’ attempts to gain control over Mount Lebanon.59  
 
Underlying the promotion of liberal politics and a constitution that sought to replace the 
established customs of notable political prominence,60 was a conflict between tradition and 
European conceptions of modernity which had produced a standard of civilisation. The 
Young Turk administration in the Sublime Porte had come to rely on promotion of a 
constitution and parliament as a sign of modernity and legitimacy, while developing an 
assimilationist project that attempted to reconfigure identities and terminate the prominence 
of customary social and political groups. The French and Kiazim Pasha viewed bureaucratic 
modernity, cultural assimilation, and the removal of customary forms of governance as 
modern and rational, focused on the development of the modern state based on national 
ideals. In doing so, and acting on this worldview, Kiazim Pasha, and by extension, the CUP, 
produced a state of governance that was divorced from the social field.  
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7.2 Instability within the European State System: The Resulting Failure of the 
Sublime Porte 
Under the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, the Ottoman Empire had obscured the pursuit 
of European imperial interests by rejecting the liberal modernisation project and European 
interference. Although this impeded the ability of the France and Britain to make demands 
on the Sublime Porte,61 the European state system had otherwise remained stable, which 
provided stability for the Sublime Porte during periods of internal upheaval. The Sublime 
Porte, under renewed control of the CUP, was in a state of disorder due to its active pursuit 
of Turkification and the alienation of the Arab population. In addition to internal upheaval, 
changes in the European state system had begun to create a new set of problems for the 
Sublime Porte. 
 
Changes in relations between European states provided the opportunity for Italy to 
diplomatically manoeuvre in a manner that secured European recognition to an Italian ‘right’ 
to occupy and influence Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Italy had formed an alliance with 
Germany, which had been in conflict with France over Morocco, and had also provided 
diplomatic support to Britain in their occupation of Egypt. They revised the terms of the 
Straits Convention in Russia’s favour and supported the Austro-Hungarian annexation of 
Bosnia.62 In addition to providing consent and aid to the other European powers in the 
pursuit of their interests, Italy had sought to take advantage of the weakened domestic 
environment of the Ottoman Empire. Following the revolution (1908), the counter 
revolution (1909), and the reestablishment of control by the CUP in Istanbul, the Sublime 
Porte was facing increased instability, providing the European powers, in this case, Italy with 
an opportunity to realise their interests.  
 
Having received explicit and implicit consent from the European powers, Italy justified the 
issuance of an ultimatum to the Sublime Porte on September 28, 1911 by arguing that there 
had been large-scale maltreatment of Italian merchants and traders by the Sublime Porte. 
The Italian government gave the government the choice to either cede control over the 
province of Tripolitania or go to war. Attempting to evade war and maintain control over 
the province, the Sublime Porte responded that it would give Italy control over the affairs in 
the province, but retain suzerainty over it – as it had done with Britain regarding Egypt. The 
offer, however, did not satisfy Italian interests and Italy subsequently declared war.63  
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As the war progressed into late December, Sheriff Pasha, the political editor of the 
newspaper ‘Constitutionnel Ottoman’ wrote that there was heightened concern that the war with 
Italy would have resounding consequences on the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire. The 
article further highlighted that the war with Italy could open the Ottoman Empire up to 
imminent threats from Russia and threats emerging from Austria.64 In addition to the 
external threats that sought to take possession of various Ottoman territories, a weakened 
Ottoman government provided opportunities for the local secessionist parties to wield an 
advantage.  
 
The beginning of the war between Italy and the Ottoman Empire enhanced instability within 
the Sublime Porte. The CUP, once the placeholder for revolutionary and liberal pan-
Ottoman politics was being challenged by a new party, the Party of Freedom and 
Understanding (Hurriyet ve Itilaf Firkasi or Entente Libérale – hereafter referred to as PFU), 
founded by Sadik Bey, and was an alliance of oppositional parties to the CUP.65 Sadik Bey 
argued that the ‘many manifestations and revolts, culminating in the July 1908 revolution’ 
which should have prompted reform and assured security and tranquillity, only led to the 
demolition of institutions and elevated the revolutionary organisations’ level of power 
through centralisation. Although the CUP attempted to institute reform, it produced a 
narrow vision of governance and cultural assimilation that alienated the Syrian provinces and 
failed to assure security and tranquillity. The CUP had failed to deliver on the values that 
formed the initial aims and mobilisation of the revolutionary movement, which provided the 
PFU with the impetus to act on the values enshrined in the constitution in addition to 
respecting the social life and natural activities of each group within the Ottoman Empire. 
Sadik Bey’s message reflected the dynamics of the PFU, as an anti-CUP coalition, but also 
in the rights of each group to practice its customary ‘social life and natural activities’, 
acknowledging the diversity of ideologies and practices of the individual parties within the 
alliance. 66 The PFU differentiated themselves from the CUP by promoting the possibility of 
establishing a negotiated state, one that preserved the diverse customary social and political 
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The position that had been promoted by the PFU posed a significant threat to the CUP, who 
had maintained power through centralisation, repression, and alienation. While the idea of 
the modern state was generally accepted, what and who the state represented was still 
contentious. When Lutfi Fikri Bey, the head of the PFU, visited Aleppo to give a brief talk, 
the CUP issued a call to protest the speech. The protest, however, was described as small 
and short-lived. M. Grapin, at the French consulate in Aleppo, wrote to M. Bompard in 
Istanbul that Lutfi Fikri Bey has ‘won the approval of a great majority of the population of 
Aleppo’.67 Yet, given that the population in Aleppo had been unhappy with Kiazim Pasha, 
and the policies of the CUP, which alienated the role of notable classes, his reception in 
Aleppo was not surprising.  
 
The PFU had quickly gained in popularity, threatening the stability of the CUP government. 
Under these conditions, the CUP engineered the dissolution of parliament. The CUP secured 
the replacement of Ibrahim Hakki Pasha as Grand Vizier with Said Pasha, although the latter 
was an experienced statesman who served as Abdul Hamid II’s Grand Vizier eight times, he 
did not subscribe to the Unionist ideology or programme. By appointing Said Pasha as Grand 
Vizier, the CUP desired to create a political crisis within the Sublime Porte.68   
 
Once the political crisis had developed between parliament and the Grand Vizier, the CUP 
controlled government urged the Sultan to dissolve parliament and call for early elections. 
Following these developments in Istanbul, the French consul in Damascus became weary of 
the CUP, noting that they had gained effective control over many aspects of the state. The 
political control that the CUP had come to exercise created a situation that led the French 
consul to believe that, no matter the outcome of the elections, the CUP would be victorious 
across the country.69 Similarly, the The French consul in Aleppo warned that ‘all the means 
taken, have been to make the Unionists triumphant. Many of the functionaries suspected of 
sympathising with the PFU have been removed from their positions, without explanation’.70  
 
The practices of the CUP during the election were criticised as undemocratic, and not 
without reason; it was reported that the first votes that had come in from the Djemilie and 
Farafra quarters in Aleppo had been cancelled by order of the provincial governor, Kiazim 
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Pasha, as they were in overwhelming majority in favour of the PFU. It was further rumoured 
that once the other ballot boxes were turned over to the officials, the ballots supporting the 
opposition were destroyed and replaced by ballots containing the names of official Unionist 
candidates.71  
 
Following the early elections and the proclaimed victory by the CUP, the PFU organised a 
military wing, known as the Saviour Officers (Halaskar Zabitan Grubu), who, in early July 
1912, staged a coup d’état against the CUP.72 On July 17, 1912, the coup d’état against the 
CUP government was successful, forcing the Grand Vizier, Said Pasha, to resign, with the 
Saviour Officers becoming the backers of the new government.73 The general opinion, across 
religion and class in Syria, regarding these events, as recorded by the French consul in 
Aleppo, M. Laporte, was one of welcomed change. It was believed by many that the coup 
d’état would eclipse members of the CUP, including the governor Aleppo; ‘everyone had 
remarked, the man who has ‘done’ the last elections must feel threatened, counting the days 
left of his government’s reign’. The French consul remarked that there was a renewed 
confidence in the Ottoman Empire and he hoped that with the ascendance of a truly liberal 
ideology, the Ottoman Empire would enter into a period of regeneration. However, he also 
noted that the failures of this government could result in ‘Turkey, and the sick man, [dying] 
in agony’.74 Despite the positive outlook regarding change, the French consul further 
highlighted that the population in Beirut was petitioning the Sultan for devolution, as was 
the population in Aleppo.  
 
The coup d’état by the Saviour Officers created a crisis in the Sublime Porte, leading to the 
establishment of an interim government formed under Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, a military 
officer and former governor to Crete. Delivering his throne speech on April 12, 1912, Sultan 
Mehmed V acknowledged the necessity for political equilibrium following the coup d’état, 
and stated that it was therefore necessary to eventually dissolve the chamber of deputies and 
call an early election. The Sultan argued that the dissolution was to conform to constitutional 
law, allowing for the politics of the Empire to be constructed on the foundations of justice 
and equality. In addition to his attempt at promoting a just form of politics by dissolving the 
chamber, Mehmed V highlighted the need for a secure environment that could enable 
development and progress into modernity. As a matter of urgency, the Sultan stated that the 
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Minister of Interior would be sending missions to the provinces, to rectify issues of territorial 
contestation and to assign lands to nomadic tribes, with the aim to make the latter 
sedentary.75  
 
The sedentarisation of the nomadic tribes in the Syrian provinces by the Sublime Porte 
provided an opportunity for the government to transform the security and economy of the 
Syrian provinces. Crucially, it made it easier for the Sublime Porte to maintain a monopoly 
on the use of force and to extract capital from new sources of taxation. The Sultan also noted 
that the Arab populations were not happy with the previous state of affairs and 
acknowledged the state of disorder, insecurity, and a lack of justice which had consolidated 
into anarchy, a situation that was rampant throughout the administration. The Sultan’s 
concern, according to the French consul in Aleppo, was believed to have developed from 
notables that had expressed desire to be placed under the suzerainty of foreign powers in 
order to end the oppression of the Turkish government.76  
 
In addition to notables in the Syrian provinces requesting the suzerainty of foreign powers, 
requests had been made by the notable classes to the Sultan. The requests from populations 
in Beirut, Damascus, and Aleppo, were concerned with the dissolution of parliament and the 
call for new elections:  
 
The nation is irritated with the parliament because it is the tool 
of the former fallen ministry, who were menacing, and employed 
injustice, strain, arbitrary rulings, and violence to elect notorious 
schemers and traitors of the nation. We are sending you, your 
Majesty, this letter in faith that a decree is promulgated to 
ordinate the dissolution of the chamber and the renewal of 
elections to give the nation reason to rejoice over the advent of 
a regime that holds justice and liberty and the constitution – 
which should be saved against all manoeuvres.77 
 
The French consul in Aleppo, commenting on the request that had been sent from the 
notables in Aleppo, concluded that they had not forgiven the delegates of the CUP, nor their 
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functionaries, for the transgressions made on the customary social order, including 
institutional centralisation, social dislocation from authority, and attempts to replace cultural 
customs and the Arabic language with liberal practices of modernity and the Turkish 
language.78 
 
The request for new elections was fulfilled on August 5, 1912, when the Sultan called for 
new general elections following the establishment of the interim government by Ahmed 
Muhtar Pasha, which led to the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies. The beginning of 
this election period was known as the ‘election with a stick’, due to the CUP’s forceful 
activities – including placing many opposition notables and journalists into exile – creating a 
feeling of ‘habitual fatalism’ in the Syrian provinces. However, the conclusion of the election 
was never realised and the electoral campaigns were suspended in October due to the 
outbreak of the Balkan Wars (October 8, 1912 – May 30, 1913 and June 29, 1913 – August 
10, 1913). 
 
The outbreak of war between Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire had a significant impact 
on the Sublime Porte. In addition to the election campaigns being suspended, Ahmed 
Muhtar Pasha was decried as a weak leader for his decision to demobilise sections of the 
First Army in Thrace. The CUP framed the decision to demobilise as a sign of weakness and 
organised pro-war demonstrations. Feeling pressured concede to the CUP and the 
demonstrators, Ahmed Muhtar Pasha declared war on October 17, 1912 and resigned twelve 
days later.79 The outbreak of the Balkan Wars not only interrupted the general elections in 
the Ottoman Empire, but also weakened the Ottoman Empire to the extent that Italy viewed 
it as an opportunity to extract significant concessions from the Ottoman Empire.80  
 
Following the declaration of war, the French consul in Damascus wrote to the ministry of 
foreign affairs in France that there had been large demonstrations of a patriotic nature in 
many of the provinces, including Damascus, and at the request of the Ottoman authorities.81 
He continued by stating that despite these demonstrations, Christians and Jews, and even 
some of the Muslim populations, have been using whatever means available to avoid military 
service. Christians and Jews have emigrated in large numbers or have paid a tax to exonerate 
themselves from service, while Muslims have deserted and fled the region. The French 
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consul continued that the Christians and Jews, if they were given the opportunity, would join 
the ranks of the Balkan armies, as they were hostile to the Turks and rejoiced in Turkish 
defeats; fearing the eventual Ottoman defeat and its consequences.82  
 
Following the remarks on the situation in Damascus by the French consul, on November 
10, 1912, the consul in Aleppo, M. Laporte, wrote that an Ottoman functionary had informed 
him that Turkey had endured its final blow. 83  Although Germany had trained the Ottoman 
military and provided the Empire with arms, Kaiser Wilhelm II refused to offer them any 
further support, which the Ottoman Empire desperately needed.84 The functionary cautioned 
that the Empire would be forced to admit their weakness in governing, citing the pitiful state 
of the soldiers, a growing famine, and a season of severe weather that would then deliver its 
territories to Europe,85 an important goal for France.  
 
With the Ottoman Empire in such a weakened state, the French and British were proceeding 
with caution given Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests in Serbia and Albania. To settle 
the issues regarding borders and territorial ownership, the European powers met in London 
on December 16 and 17, 1912. The Ottoman Empire, represented by Reshid Pasha, was 
willing to concede on Macedonia, but refused to let go of Adrianople (Edirne) and Thrace, 
while Albania was to be granted autonomy under the supervision of the European powers.86  
 
The CUP was unhappy that Reshid Pasha had been willing to succumb to the demands of 
the European powers, and strategised a coup against the interim PFU-leaning government 
led by Mehmed Kamil Pasha, the Grand Vizier to Sultan Mehmed V following the 
resignation of Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, with the aim of restarting the war and taking the 
territories back by force. Given the position of the Ottoman Empire and the implicit threats 
that were made by the European powers at the conference in London, including the threat 
of a Russian intervention, the Grand Council put the conditions to a vote, with a clear 
majority of 69 to 1 of the councillors agreeing to a peaceful settlement, despite requiring the 
abandonment of Adrianople. The following day, on January 23, 1913, the CUP staged a coup, 
forcing the government, which had been backed by the Saviour Officers, to resign at 
gunpoint.87 
																																																						
82 166PO/D20/19 November 4, 1912 (no. 64). 
83 166PO/D1/89 November 10, 1912 (no. 49), from M. Laporte, Aleppo. 
84 McMeekin 2015, p. 74. 
85 166PO/D1/89 November 10, 1912 (no. 49). 
86 McMeekin 2015, pp. 76-77. 




The return of the CUP to the Sublime Porte created a general sense of anxiety in the Syrian 
provinces, with the population fearing the re-emergence of excessive and brutal 
Turkification. In Beirut, the French consul notes that the feeling of despair was shared by 
the populations, regardless of religion and class, the population generally wished to be 
removed from Turkish oppression, to be free from Turkish taxes, military service, and the 
consequences of war.88 In Aleppo, however, it was believed and openly discussed, that the 
Ottoman Empire was coming to an end. The general spirit, noted by M. Laporte, was very 
pessimistic – stating quite simply that the situation in the provinces was one of ‘chaos’.89 
During this period of pessimism and chaos, the CUP had re-engaged the Balkans in war, and 
by the end of May the Ottoman Empire was forced to concede by signing the Treaty of 
London (1913) without making any territorial gains.90 
 
7.2.1 Liberté: The Arab Congress (1913) in Paris 
The consequence of instability in the Sublime Porte, particularly with regards to the conflict 
between the CUP and the PFU and the war with the Balkan states, was the increased desire 
for autonomy and secession from the Ottoman Empire on behalf of the Syrian population. 
Accompanying these events was the growing sentiment of a separate Arab identity, which 
had been accentuated throughout attempts to culturally assimilate the Arab population into 
a Turkish identity. Coupled with the growing belief that the Ottoman Empire was going to 
collapse, the Arab nationalists were incentivised to move forward with the possibility of 
secession and independence.   
 
Prior to the Ottoman Empire signing the Treaty of London, bringing the First Balkan War 
(October 8, 1812 – May 30, 1913) to an end, rumours were circulating in Damascus that the 
CCS was planning an Arab Congress in Paris to discuss the desires of the Arab populations 
in the Ottoman Empire. The purpose of the Congress was to discuss the rights of Arabs 
living within the Ottoman Empire and the desire for reforms and decentralisation. 
Participants that had been invited to the congress were mostly of Syrian origin and there was 
near equal representation between Muslims and Christians.91   
 
News of the Arab Congress was met with anger by Damascene Unionists, some of whom 
came from notable families. The notable class who had joined the Unionists did not 
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necessarily subscribe to Unionist policies of Turkification, but had enjoyed the benefits and 
privilege that came with membership. The Unionists, argued that the participants of the Arab 
Congress, particularly the CCS, were not representative of the populations of Syria and went 
as far as explicitly referencing their status as part of the notable class in an attempt to diminish 
their activities:  
 
Those who are taking part are saying that they are doing so for 
the benefit of the country. We are the principal notables of 
Damascus. It is us that represents Syria and we have not 
delegated our powers to anyone. The Syrians who assemble in 
Paris are men without mandate and are largely unknown. We 
protest this usurpation that they are committing. At the same 
time, we proclaim to the highest degree, our loyalty to the 
Ottoman Empire. 
 
The declaration made by the Unionists in Damascus argued that the CUP had made many 
efforts to satisfy the populations in the Syrian provinces through reforms such as making it 
obligatory to teach Arabic in schools and making Arabic the official language of the Syrian 
courts. Accompanying the rejection of the Arab Congress by the Arab Unionists in 
Damascus, the Ottoman Ambassador in Paris asked the French government to ban the 
meeting from taking place in Paris.92  
 
Despite the objections from the Unionists in Damascus and the Ottoman Ambassador in 
Paris, the French allowed the Arab Congress to take place in Paris. However, it was a source 
of tension throughout Syria that reflected the ongoing hostility of Unionists and Ottoman 
loyalists to ideas of decentralisation and a Syrian Arab nationalism.93 Public sentiment in 
support of the Arab Congress had become widespread, and in an editorial published by the 
newspaper ‘al-Takaddoum’, the author, a Maronite, who was later assaulted in the streets 
following the publication, argued:  
 
the just man can never share this opinion [that the Arab 
Congress should not proceed] and would find that the conduct 
of our Arab delegates are not in contrast or in conflict with the 
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interests of our government, these men had to travel to a foreign 
place in order to discuss liberty because of the opposition by 
local authorities.  
 
The article continued that had the Sublime Porte been more amenable to differences in 
opinion, then the Arab Congress would have possibly taken place in a city within the 
Ottoman Empire. The choice to hold the Arab Congress in Paris was to ensure liberty of 
action,  
 
[…] for their part, France, a great nation, has an altruistic 
sympathy for other people and does all it can to manifest its 
solicitude to everyone in considering everyone like a brother or 
parent. A just man must then consider France like the best friend 
of Turkey. […] It is the most noble nation, the most sublime in 
everything and in every occasion, it is her that has given the most 
generous hospitality to our liberals during the regime of 
oppression, it is France who has brought up our great men, and 
who has, so to speak, been the case of their moral victory.94 
 
Although France allowed for the Arab Congress to take place in Paris, the decision was 
motivated in the pursuit of French interests. French interests in Syria included maintaining a 
strategic base of support with the Christian community, particularly in Mount Lebanon. By 
allowing the Arab Congress to convene in Paris, the French administration was able to 
propagate a particular narrative of being a ‘just’ and ‘noble’ nation, which had continuously 
sought to help liberal ideas flourish against oppression. Buying into this framework, the 
Christian delegates from Beirut had voiced their desire for the creation of Greater Lebanon, 
encompassing Beirut, and under French protection.95 Despite French maintenance of a 
strong base of support among the Christians, the British consul wrote that the Arabs express 
desire to ‘pass under British rule’.96 Following this despatch, the British consul continued: ‘all 
the Muslims here were in favour of some form of British Administration being extended […] 
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and that they hoped the [Damascus] Province would be placed under the Egyptian 
Government’.97  
 
This contradiction between the desires of the Christian populations seeking official French 
protection and some of the populations in Syria wishing to be placed under British or 
Egyptian rule reflect the disparate political ideas within society. The delegates at the Arab 
Congress who were requesting this separate status under French protection were 
perpetuating the early civilisational discourse that separated the Christians and Mount 
Lebanon from the populations and geography of Syria. By portraying themselves as leaders 
in the fight against oppression in the Syrian provinces, the French administration was 
attempting to build on sentiments that were already accepted by the Christians in order to 
widen their support in the Syrian provinces and reduce British influence.  
 
The pursuit of French economic and geopolitical interests made it difficult for the CUP to 
discourage the French government from allowing the Arab Congress to take place in Paris. 
Because of the French position, the CUP decided to send a delegate, Midhat Shukri, to attend 
the meetings. At the Arab Congress in Paris, Midhat Shukri, the Secretary General for the 
CUP, had engineered an agreement that conceded to some of the demands that had been 
made by the participants at the Arab Congress, including the right for a regional Arab military 
service and the use of Arabic as the official language.98  
 
The procurement of the agreement between the delegates at the Arab Congress and Midhat 
Shukri created the excitement over the prospect of progress with regards to Arab rights in 
the Ottoman Empire. However, the Arab delegates were later let down by the Sublime Porte. 
On August 18, 1913, an imperial decree was issued, declaring the accepted terms of the Paris 
Agreement. The decree had weakened the language and provisions of the initial agreement, 
between the Arab delegates and Midhat Shukri, limiting Arabic as the official language to a 
language that would only be taught in elementary schools. The decree made no further 
attempt at promulgating the other promises.99 By backtracking on the Paris Agreement, the 
Turkish government deepened the socio-political chasm that had been developing since the 
initial programme of Turkification in 1909 by the CUP. In their attempt to create a stable 
political environment and a Turkish distinct nationalism, built on a cultural framework and 
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justified by ideas of liberty, secularism, and rationality, the CUP had nourished an 
oppositional Arab nationalism in Syria.  
 
7.3 The First World War: French and British Victory and the Fragmentation of 
the Middle East 
The losses endured by the Ottoman Empire caused by the Balkan Wars (October 8, 1812–
May 30, 1913 and June 29, 1913–August 10, 1813) and the threats to internal stability caused 
by factionalism within the Sublime Porte and the pursuit of European interests – particularly 
from Russia, led the CUP to believe that in order to survive, the Ottoman Empire had to 
become a ‘nation in arms’.100 To be able to come out victorious and persevere in a European 
system, the Ottoman Empire required military power for security. Under these conditions, 
the Sublime Porte exploited converging interests with Germany over the fear of growing 
Russian power, believing that should any European war break out, the Germans would 
emerge victorious and the Sublime Porte would be able to recuperate some – if not all – of 
the territories that had been lost during the Balkan Wars, with the potential of expanding 
further.101  
 
The supply of aid to the Ottoman Empire by Germany was reciprocated by granting 
Germany access to Aleppo as a zone of influence that could be exploited for material 
interests. After learning of this agreement, the French consul in Aleppo, M. Laporte, 
expressed his frustration by comparing French material interests in the Syrian provinces with 
those of Germany, arguing that the Germans do not possess nearly the same amount of 
leverage as the French, citing commercial, as well as social interests. Regarding the latter, the 
French consul argued that the population ‘looks to the French for moral guidance while the 
Germans remain unpopular’.102  
 
The alliance with Germany was an alliance of convenience and short-sighted. Although the 
Sublime Porte desired to create a strong military, a ‘nation in arms’, it was not prepared for 
further conflict, and the Ottoman-German relationship placed the Sublime Porte in the 
centre of inter-European politics. This included an article on German relations with Russia, 
which arranged that ‘in the event of war with Russia, Turkey will take direct and significant 
action’.103 The article put the Sublime Porte at risk of being drawn into a major confrontation, 
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and indeed, that risk became a reality following the July Crisis of 1914, which was precipitated 
by the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.104 
 
The assassination led to a series of diplomatic agreements and manoeuvres with an ultimatum 
being presented to Serbia, which had been rejected. The rejection of the ultimatum 
subsequently led to the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on July 28, 1914. Soon after, 
the other European powers were drawn into a growing conflict with Russia and Germany 
declaring war on each other on August 1, 1914, followed by declarations of war between 
Germany and France on August 3, 1914.105 Because of the agreement between the Ottoman 
Empire and Germany, the Sublime Porte quickly found itself at war with the more powerful 
European powers – notably Britain, France, and Russia.   
 
The entrance of the Ottoman Empire into the war as an ally of Germany, created tensions 
within the Syrian provinces, particularly with the Christian populations in Mount Lebanon 
who did not feel compelled to support the Sublime Porte or the Germans. Georges Picot, 
the French consul in Beirut, writing to the French Ambassador in Istanbul, described in the 
despatch how ‘the Lebanese have come to the base of Mount Lebanon, ready to defend the 
French with doctors, students from French schools, and a desire to work with the Red Cross’. 
He continued that some had even asked if they could go to Marseille, using whatever savings 
they had, stating that the return does not matter, due to the likelihood of their death. Picot 
remarked that some had already made the voyage from Beirut to Marseille, while others had 
donated their savings to help the plight of France in the war.  
 
It is understood by all the Lebanese that the war that is raging 
between the European powers is also their war, playing an 
indirect part in the plains of Belgium is the liberties won for 
Lebanon so laboriously through the protection provided by 
France.106  
 
The relationship that had been cultivated between the French and the Maronite communities 
in Mount Lebanon over the nineteenth century had a clear impact on identity and loyalty, 
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with some of the population willing to fight for the French state, while evading enlistment 
into the Ottoman army throughout the nineteenth century.  
 
Realising the depths of the divisions that existed with the population in the Syrian provinces, 
the Sublime Porte, reacted with force, attempting to bring the populations into submission. 
During the First World War, the Sublime Porte sought to ensure complete security in Syria 
as it would serve as the foundation for the expedition against Egypt. Djemel Pasha, 
commander for Turkey’s Fourth Army, was based in Damascus and was conferred a great 
deal of power in order to discourage any potential for rebellion. To maintain control through 
a display of strength, Djemel Pasha executed several Syrians and Lebanese on charges of 
espionage in March and August 1915.107 
 
While the French had maintained support from the Christians in Mount Lebanon and the 
Sublime Porte had been actively pursuing individuals accused of conspiring, the British, 
through Sir Henry McMahon, began negotiations with Sheriff Hussein of Mecca, King of 
the Hejaz, with the support of the Arab Nationalist Committees in Syria and North 
Mesopotamia.  
  
As a result of the negotiations [between McMahon and Sheriff 
Hussein] the British Government undertook to “recognise and 
support” the independence of the Arabs within a certain area, 
without prejudice to existing treaties between the British 
Government and Arab chiefs, or to the special interests of our Ally 
France.108 
 
McMahon had been the British High Commissioner in Egypt during this period, and had 
helped with the promotion of a general revolt from Hejaz into the Syrian provinces against 
the Ottoman Empire.  The movement that developed was a national movement, 
unconcerned with religion, and an expression of difference between the Arab national 
identity and that of the Turkish national identity. The goal of the revolt was to vindicate and 
accomplish the desire for Arab autonomy from the Ottoman Empire.109 
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British support for Hussein’s revolt came with conditions and although the relationship that 
had been fostered between Hussein and McMahon had established British support for a 
future Arab state, or confederation of Arab states, the French and British had also divided 
the territories of the Syrian provinces and Mesopotamia into zones of influence in which 
they would maintain legitimate leverage. The French and British argued that the purpose of 
the plan was to bring the Arab state or confederation of Arab states to a standard that would 
warrant independence. However, this plan could not be divorced of French and British 
interests, and based on those interests, the European powers forced the Arabs to accept 
compromises on promises of independence and unity. This included giving the French a 
‘free hand along the Syrian littoral from the ladder of Tyre northward and priority of political 
advice and economic enterprise in a wide hinterland, including Damascus, Homs, Hama, and 
Aleppo’.110  
 
In addition to agreeing on British and French zones of influence throughout the Arab 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire and agreeing between themselves the near unlimited 
privileges over resources and populations, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, of May 16, 1916 
outlined the responsibilities and rights of both European powers:  
 
France and Great Britain are prepared to recognise and uphold 
an independent Arab State, or a Confederation of Arab States 
[…] under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. That in area (a) 
France, and in area (b) Great Britain, shall have priority of right 
of enterprise and local loans. [They will also, in their respective 
areas,] supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of 
the Arab state, or Confederation of Arab States. [That in their 
respective areas each power is] allowed to establish such direct 
or indirect administration or control as they desire, and as they 
may think fit to arrange with the Arab State, or Confederation 
of Arab States.111  
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The two governments agreed to maintain effective control over the economy and the ports 
in their respective geographic areas, while also controlling the influx of arms into the Arab 
territories.112 Although the agreement was premised as a state building project with the aim 
of developing and preparing the populations in their respective territories for independence, 
it also divided the spoils of war between France and Britain and established mutual legal 
recognition of their respective rights in the Syrian provinces and Mesopotamia. While King 
Hussein had supported the idea of establishing an independent Arab state, or confederation 
of Arab states, he protested the exclusion of the Syrian littoral from the independent Arab 
areas, as well as split authority between France and Britain; stating that both powers had 
different desires and different means of social and political organisation. Hussein argued that 
the establishment of an Arab state on these different organisational principles obstructed any 
future potential for unity between divided region following independence.113 
 
Although King Hussein had been privy to the agreement, it excluded the explicit acceptance 
of a legitimate and locally recognised leader in the Arab provinces. Despite the previous 
proclamations that the Arabs had a superior understanding of European ideas of liberty in 
contrast to the Sublime Porte, which had been under the control of Sultan Abdul Hamid 
II,114 the Arabs were not awarded the privilege to be recognised as a ‘civilised nation’. Rather, 
the foundation of Arab independence and autonomy was confined to the subjective 
perceptions of French and British civilisational standards, which desired the replication of 
French and British institutions to order society, politics, and the economy in a manner that 
was recognised and simplified the facilitation of relations to retain political and economic 
access.   
 
7.3.1  The Arab Revolt (1916): The Betrayal of Hussein 
Despite the conditions that had been placed on British support for a general Arab Revolt led 
by King Hussein, Hussein viewed support as an opportunity to overthrow the despotic rule 
of the Young Turks and subsequently claim victory. The Young Turks, however, had begun 
to suspect Hussein of treachery. In an attempt to force Hussein into a position that favoured 
the Sublime Porte and gain support from the Muslim populations in the Ottoman Empire, 
the Sublime Porte proclaimed that the Ottoman Empire was engaged in a Holy War, with 
the support of King Hussein, against France, Britain, and Russia. Hussein, however, rejected 
this announcement and argued that he had made no such declaration of support.115 
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Following King Hussein’s rejection of the announcement made by the Young Turks, the 
Arab nationalists, who had also been engaged in secret negotiations with the British and 
French administrations, declared their support for Hussein.  The political mobilisation in 
favour of a separate Arab state, independent of Turkish authority, had further developed 
among the populations in the Syrian provinces after Djemel Pasha ordered the arrest of all 
individuals involved in decentralisation movements which remained active, collecting the 
names of individuals by searching through documents following a raid on the French 
consulate in Damascus. The information collected from the consulate led to a largescale 
manhunt and the application of the death penalty for individuals who were perceived as 
traitors.116 On May 6, 1916, a number of executions had been committed in Beirut and 
Damascus, and a month later, on June 5, 1916, Hussein led the Arabs into revolt, with the 
backing of Britain against the Ottoman Empire and the CUP controlled government.117  
 
The historical narrative of the Arab Revolt, specifically the account that is described by 
George Antonius, describes the Arab Revolt as a great movement which amassed widespread 
support.118 However, Antonius’ account of the Arab Revolt is disputed, despite coinciding 
with previous French and British despatches noting the high levels of membership in secret 
Arab societies following the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), the Arab Revolt failed to 
gather widespread support as many Arab nationalists viewed it as an Islamist revolt due to 
Hussein’s desire to claim Islamic rights from the Ottoman Sultan. Indifference can also be 
attributed to the nature of customary authority, with many notables refusing to partake in 
the revolt in fear that they would forfeit their power to Hussein. Additionally, many tribal 
groups and networks refused to join Hussein due to inter-tribal rivalries, while those who 
did join, believed that there would be an economic advantage waiting for them at the 
conclusion of the revolt.119  
 
While many individuals were indifferent to the Arab Revolt because of suspected religious 
undertones, the forfeiture of power, and the inter-tribal rivalries, opposition to Hussein had 
also developed. Opposition to Hussein had emerged from some families in Mecca due to 
their dependence on Turkish pensions, while Indian Muslims opposed Hussein’s claims to 
the caliphate, and the Ulema refused to recognise Hussein’s claims regarding his role within 
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the Islamic community as long as the Ottoman Empire continued to exist.120 In addition to 
opposition from various sectors of society, Hussein’s position and demands were opposed 
by the British administration:  
 
He wanted to be recognised as king of all the Arabs, considered 
himself the rightful claimant of the caliphate of Islam, and was 
unwilling to recognise the arrangements which the Allies were 
determined to introduce.121  
 
Although King Hussein’s efforts to lead an Arab Revolt was met with indifference and 
opposition, Thomas Edward Lawrence, a British intelligence and military officer, nicknamed 
‘Lawrence of Arabia’, had forged an alliance with Faisal bin Hussein bin Ali al-Hashimi 
(Faisal), who Lawrence believed was a suitable individual to lead the Arabs into revolt. As 
Hussein’s revolt moved northwards into Mesopotamia and Syria, Faisal had become 
persuaded by the idea of creating a separate Syrian empire from the Kingdom which his 
father desired.122  
 
The divisions that were exposed between Faisal and his father, Hussein, were made worse 
by a lack of clarity regarding the future establishment of a future Arab state. Despite various 
plans having been proposed and discussed, including establishing a separate Syrian empire, 
an autonomous Arab Kingdom, and the creation of dual sovereignty between the Turks and 
the Arabs, similar to Austria-Hungary, there had been no unifying vision for the period 
following the successes against Ottoman forces in the Syrian provinces.123 The lack of 
agreement over the status of the Arab provinces and the creation of an Arab state was made 
worse by the divisions within the Hashemite dynasty, and left the question of Syria open to 
the desires of Britain and France without a credible singular opposition.  
 
In an attempt to bring clarity to the state of disorder that had developed with regards to the 
question of a Syrian state, the British government issued a Memorandum on British 
Commitment to King Hussein, clarifying the British position that they were not legally 
committed the promises made to King Hussein, as there had never been any formal 
agreement or treaty signed by both parties, or acknowledgement by both parties. Instead, the 
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British guaranteed against the restoration of the status quo and the recognition of King 
Hussein’s office, refusing to guarantee the independence, rights, and privileges of the 
Sheriffiate.124 In this manner, the British abandoned responsibility to Hussein and continued 
to observe the agreement that had been established with France.  
 
7.3.2  The Collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the Paris Peace Conference (1919-
1920) 
Leading up to the armistice between the Ottoman Empire and the allied European powers 
on October 31, 1918, the Young Turk government, led by Enver Pasha, collapsed. Following 
the collapse of the Sublime Porte, the British had established control over Syria and 
Mesopotamia and the French, in the Syrian littoral and throughout Lebanon, established a 
military administration. To prevent the possibility of public anger, the French and British put 
together a joint declaration on November 8, 1918, assuring the populations in the Arab 
provinces that the establishment of military administrations was provisional and that the 
French and British administrations would consider the desires of the populations in 
developing the governments.125  
 
The Anglo-French Declaration of November 8, 1918 began with the promise of ‘liberation 
of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of national 
governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice 
of the native populations’.126 The declaration continued by stating that assistance to these 
new governments and administrations in the liberated territories would be provided by 
France and Britain, with the promise to then recognise the governments 
 
as soon as they are effectively established. So far from desiring 
to impose specific institutions upon the populations of these 
regions, their sole object is to ensure by their support and 
effective assistance, that the governments and administrations 
adopted by these regions of their own free will shall be exercised 
in the normal way.  
 
The declaration also promised justice (for all), economic development through local 
initiatives, and education, and to ‘put an end to the divisions too long exploited by Turkish 
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policy’.127 On this foundation of ethical humanitarianism the French and British state 
building projects were conceived. However, once in practice, the projects became mired in 
the pursuit of European interests, often disregarding or exploiting the populations. For 
example, the French used the fears of Muslim domination within the Christian communities 
in Lebanon and Beirut to maintain protection over and favour Christian leadership, while 
many others in the region, not necessarily based on religious or sectarian identity, but on 
nationalist identities, disliked French presence because they were viewed as a symbol of 
sectarian divisions.128 Contradicting the French promise to end the divisions ‘too long 
exploited by Turkish policy’, the French administration in the Syrian littoral exploited 
Christian fears of Muslim domination in order to maintain a presence and a favourable 
alliance.  
 
The Anglo-French Declaration contained parallels to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s 
twelfth point in the Fourteen Points: to ensure that the non-Turkish portions of the Ottoman 
Empire ‘should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested 
opportunity of autonomous development’. However, the principles for peace that had been 
released by the American President called for ‘effective support and assistance’ rather than 
institutional engineering.129 Wilson’s vision of global governance following the end of the 
First World War went beyond the establishment of bilateral and multilateral treaties to create 
an institutional legal framework that encompassed all sovereign states as equal members, 
asserting itself as ‘universal, open, and cosmopolitan’,130 however the development of global 
governance retained many of the characteristics and logics of the previous European state 
system.  
 
Institutionalisation of global governance through the establishment of the League of Nations 
at the Paris Peace Conference (January 18, 1919-January 21, 1920),131 necessitated the 
continuation of a standard of civilisation. States would be accepted into the League of 
Nations only if they could fulfil a specific set of criteria to become recognised, including 
institutional progress, order, and modernity. Validating the institutionalisation of this 
standard was the belief that institutions provided a rational, ordered, and progressive 
distribution of power that could be easily maintained.132 The role of the French and the 
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British administrations following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was therefore to 
prepare the former Ottoman provinces for accession to the League of Nations.  
 
Although the Anglo-French Declaration had promised ‘the establishment of national 
governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice 
of the native populations’, free choice of the native populations was subjected to a limited 
selection of appropriate choices established by the French and the British.133 Independence 
was subject to the desires of the French and British administrations in the League of Nations. 
Despite being established to bring in a new era of ‘universal, open, and cosmopolitan’ 
internationalism, the states that were responsible for admission into the League of Nations 
were the same states responsible for the administration of the former territories of the 
Ottoman Empire. Because of their multiple roles, the French and the British administrations 
were able to pursue their own desires as the single legitimate and valid desire, disregarding 
the ‘free choice of the native populations’,134  and condemning resistance and the pursuit of 
independence by the native populations as irrational.  
 
The future of the Arab provinces following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire had become 
an increasingly difficult puzzle to solve, not merely because of resistance to the French and 
British plans, but the inability to create a settlement that was satisfactory for all parties 
involved.135 While Faisal had desired the establishment of a ‘self-conscious civilisation’,136 an 
undivided pan-Arab nation, the French and British, as well as the various localised national 
movements, found this vision to be unsatisfactory in the pursuit of disparate interests. As an 
example, the Lebanese delegation at the Paris Peace Conference sent a letter to the French 
and British delegations asking them to reconsider their support for a Syrian or Arab state, 
believing that the establishment of such a state would ‘condemn us [the Lebanese] … this 
would mean death to our independence, which we have safe-guarded for centuries at the 
cost of countless sacrifices’. In the same letter, the Lebanese delegation maintained that in 
order for their independence to succeed, they must remain as a French Protectorate.137  
 
The desire for independence by the Lebanese delegation at the Peace Conference, was not 
concerned with sovereignty, but instead, was a plea for autonomy. The Lebanese delegation 
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insisted on a political separation from the Syrians and the Arab nationalists and wanted to 
maintain French dominance within its territories for physical and political protection. Faisal, 
however, argued that despite the cleavages that exist due to the various national parties, ‘they 
are all agreed to perish utterly, rather than witness the division and mutilation of this 
country’.138 However, for the Lebanese delegation, the protections from the nineteenth 
century French administration in Mount Lebanon with the Maronites provided them with 
political and economic power and prosperity, accompanied and justified by the narrative that 
they were of a different civilisation that contrasted Muslim fanaticism.  
 
The inability to create a unified single voice within the Arab provinces, such as the desire for 
continued French protection expressed by the Lebanese delegation, helped validate the 
French and British pursuit of interests through the establishment of the Mandate system. 
However, Faisal noted that the division of the territories under the leadership of France and 
Britain would be perceived as a failure by the Muslims, leading to ‘a very strong reaction, 
which will carry ruin and disaster in its steps’,139 cautioning that their vision risked ruin:  
 
The future government of the Arab provinces will be the last 
lesson to be given by Europe to the East. If it does not turn out 
to be in accordance with the wishes of the people, confidence 
will be lost in every future official treatment, and a wide channel 
opened for intrigues and troubles.140  
 
Similarly, Sati ‘al-Husri had argued against the divisions of the Arab territories, stating that 
any such development would be akin to opening a ‘Pandora’s Box’.141 
 
7.4  Conclusion 
The application of a standard of civilisation to the Ottoman Empire throughout the 
nineteenth century required the Sublime Porte to accede to a benchmark of modernity in 
order to be accepted as a ‘civilised nation’. Its application provided the Sublime Porte with a 
blueprint to modernity, but also validated the pursuit of European interests. European 
interference and interventions within the Sublime Porte and the Syrian provinces had led to 
a dissemination of knowledges and practices, particularly concerned with the promotion of 
																																																						
138 F/59/10/3 May 1919, Letter sent to the British Prime Minister’s Government, from Faissal. 
139 F/59/10/3 May 1919. 
140 F/59/10/3 May 1919. 
141 Bassam 1971, p. 116; Mansfield 2013, pp. 1-71; See chapter 2.  
212	
	
‘liberal’ and ‘modern’ political frameworks, which were deployed by various nationalist 
movements, including the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and the Young Turks, 
the Party of Freedom and Understanding (PFU), the Lebanese nationalists, and the Arab 
nationalists. The European concepts employed by these nationalist groups sought to justify 
the pursuit of interests, including political power, and, in the case of the Lebanese and Arab 
nationalists, independence. 
 
The use of ‘liberal’ and ‘modern’ political frameworks by the Young Turks, under the 
umbrella of the CUP, had provided them with legitimacy as the liberal opposition to Sultan 
Abdul Hamid II’s previous centralisation of authority. Following the Young Turk Revolution 
(1908), which led to the establishment of the second constitutional era, there had been 
growing sense of hope that the political landscape within the Sublime Porte had improved. 
From Paris, the Comité Central Syrien (CCS) reacted positively to the news that the Young 
Turks had been successful in their Revolution to establish a constitutional regime with a 
parliament. However, the positive reaction to these changes was with the hope that authority 
and governance would become decentralised, and the Arab nationalists would be able to 
establish modern institutions of governance that could function independently to prepare 
for the eventual demise of the Ottoman Empire. The goal for the CCS, a leading Arab 
Nationalist organisation in exile, was the removal of Turkish domination over Syria.  
 
Although the CUP had promoted themselves as a liberal party, their domination within 
parliament made it difficult for oppositional forces to participate and their use of notable 
individuals to maintain power. On April 12, 1909, two oppositional parties, the Muslim 
Fraternity and the Party of Ottoman Liberals staged an armed insurrection to remove the 
CUP from power. The break in service did not last long, and by April 24, 1909, the CUP had 
regained control of the government institutions, and established martial law, limited 
freedoms of association and press, and disregarded requests from decentralist parties. Facing 
a threat to their status, the CUP had begun to pursue a civilisational programme that would 
modernise the Syrian provinces and homogenise the populations under a Turkish cultural 
identity.  
 
The policies of Turkification led to emerging conflict within the Sublime Porte, notably with 
the PFU, and within the Syrian provinces, particularly in Aleppo and Mount Lebanon. While 
the European concepts had been adopted and deployed by all of these movements, in a 
variety of ways, the characteristics of the Ottoman state were being contested. With the 
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Sublime Porte, already in a state of disorder caused by the CUP’s centralised form of 
governance, changes within the European state system created a new set of problems for the 
government in Istanbul. The development of Italian demands on the Sublime Porte 
regarding the status of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in September 1911 led to war (September 
1911-October 1912) that provided the PFU with the opportunity to challenge the CUP’s 
hold on power and form of governance.  
 
The consequence of disorder in the Sublime Porte and the weakened status of the Ottoman 
Empire led to the regeneration of Arab nationalist demands for autonomy and 
independence, which were largely disregarded, helping to procure alliances between 
Lebanese and Arab nationalists with Britain and France during the First World War. Division 
within the Ottoman Empire during the First World War worked against the Ottoman war 
efforts and facilitated the collapse and division of the Empire in 1918.  
 
Although the Arabs had been made a myriad of promises by the West regarding liberation, 
free choice, and the native authority, these promises were made under the conditioned of 
British and French guidance. The French and British governments argued that under their 
supervision, the Arab territories of the former Ottoman Empire could ascend to a civilised 
status and accede to the newly established League of Nations as an equal member. They 
asserted that the Mandates of Lebanon and Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine, would not be 
colonial ventures, but a limited intervention to order and modernise the populations, with 
the necessary institutions and programmes. The development of the British and French 
Mandates, also provided the European powers with the ability to undertake the near 
unimpeded pursuit of interests by developing long-term relations with political actors, the 
creation of political offices, and the delineation of strategic boundaries, that could continue 




Chapter 8: Formalising the State in Lebanon and Syria: Establishing the French 
Vision for Lebanon and Syria 
 
8  Introduction 
The failures of the liberal programme in the Sublime Porte led to instability within the 
Ottoman Empire and the strengthening of the Arab nationalist movement. While the CUP 
had attempted to deploy liberal and modern frameworks of statehood that were prevalent in 
Europe, they also sought the homogenisation of the Empire to facilitate governance. The 
result of the CUP’s attempts to establish a civilisational standard on the Arab provinces of 
the Empire was increased friction between the CUP and the Arab nationalists, who had 
developed a separate ethno-national identity. In the effort to formalise the establishment of 
a separate ethno-national state during the First World War, the Arabs, led by King Hussein, 
had formed a relationship with the British, while the Lebanese had developed an alliance 
with the French. Despite promises of independence, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, 
provided an opportunity for the British and the French governments to pursue their interests 
in the former Arab provinces, justifying the division of the Middle East region into zones of 
influence by proclaiming a civilising project that would lead to eventual independence.  
 
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire is often discussed as the conclusion of a social and 
political era in the Syrian provinces and the introduction of a new social and political era 
developed under French authority and state building. Although control over the region 
changed hands, the idea of a rupture during this period fails to contend with social and 
political continuity within the region. Given, as this thesis argues, that the modern state 
building project began in the early nineteenth century, a period of institutional and social 
transformations that laid the foundation for the social and institutional architecture for the 
independent modern state in Lebanon and Syria, it is necessary to examine how the state 
building project continued until independence within the framework of a civilising project. 
Here it is argued that the French Mandate constituted a continuation of the French – 
specifically – and more broadly European – civilising project that cannot be separated from 
previous interactions. 
 
It was apparent from the vocalised desires of the Arab nationalists that they had adopted a 
European framework of politics and statehood. Although there were competing visions of 
what an Arab state would look like among the populations in the former Ottoman Arab 
provinces, it was generally accepted that a secular state based on cultural commonalities and 
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language could emerge. However, the French government, in establishing the Mandate of 
Lebanon and Syria, sought to produce states and governments that were amenable to the 
pursuit of French economic and political interests in the region. Under the guise of a 
preparing Lebanon and Syria for independence, the French undertook a strategic programme 
that aimed to provide the ability to maintain favourable relations in the continued pursuit of 
interests following Lebanese and Syrian independence. 
 
This chapter examines how the French Mandate of Lebanon and Syria was established using 
coercive pacification and state building, which had been legitimised through liberal global 
governance. It analyses the division of Syria, the creation of Greater Lebanon and the 
preservation of customary networks and sectarian divisions to maintain the pursuit of 
interests. This chapter continues by examining the case of the Druze Revolt in 1925, as an 
act of resistance to the French assertion of authority, developing into a widespread rebellion. 
It subsequently discusses the result of the rebellion and the government reforms presented 
by the French authorities to the Syrian population, the failures of which increased animosity 
between the French and the Syrian populations, leading to increased contact between the 
Arab nationalists and Germany during the Second World War (1939-1945). This chapter 
then examines the precursory year to independence, focusing on the Syrian elections and the 
role of the French administration in trying to obtain a favourable outcome.   
  
8.1  Establishing the French Mandate: The Broken Promise of Independence 
Towards the end of the Paris Peace Conference, on November 1, 1919, the British military 
evacuated from Syria and French soldiers were deployed into their positions. Following the 
evacuation, the British communicated to Faisal and the French administration that they had 
officially abdicated their responsibility in the areas now under French control.1 In response 
to the British communication, Faisal sent a letter of protest, stating that the arrangement 
agreed on by the French and the British was ‘detrimental to the rights of the Arabs and in 
direct opposition to what they expected from the British and French governments in 
particular, and from the civilised world in general’.2 The implementation of the agreement 
was in opposition to, not only British assurances made to the Hashemite family, but to the 
promise made by Woodrow Wilson of ‘unmolested opportunity of autonomous 
development’,3 which was believed to have ushered in a new era of international politics. 
																																																						
1 F/205/3/16, September 13, 1919, Aide-mémoire in regard to the Occupation of Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia 
pending the decision in regard to Mandate (Communicated to Foreign Office, September 18). 
2 F/205/3/17, September 24, 1919, His Highness Emir Faisal to the Prime Minister of Great Britain (Communicated to 
the Foreign Office September 24). 
3 Woodrow Wilson 1918, no. XII. 
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While Wilson’s Fourteen Points and the establishment of an institutionalised system of global 
governance characterised as ‘universal, open, and cosmopolitan’4 re-established the standard 
of civilisation through a new, liberal discourse to frame the practices of global politics, the 
dynamics of those practices remained unchanged from periods before. 
 
Knowledges and practices of coercive pacification from the colonial era continued into the 
French mandate of Lebanon and Syria, most notably when French occupation forces entered 
the region with the aim of disarming the Muslim populations while ignoring the aggressive 
actions of the Christians. Following the establishment of French occupation forces, the 
Christians reportedly felt emboldened, and in one instance, in the interior of Syria, near 
Zahlé, they entered a Mosque, insulted the Qur’an, and fired a gun at the Muslim governor. 
In a letter to the British government, Faisal stated that the Arabs were unsettled by the 
‘pressure used by the French officials to prevent the people from showing their desire for an 
Arab government’, and that the French were imposing their will by force, exploiting ‘the 
sectional [sectarian] passions which are unhappily so easily aroused in my country’.5 
 
The use of sectarian divisions in the Syrian provinces to establish control, went beyond the 
schism between Christians and Muslims. Faisal accused the French of enflaming tensions 
between the Druze and the Shi’a in Djebel Amil, the Maronites and the Druze in Mount 
Lebanon, the Circassians and Arabs in Hola, the Ismailis the Alawites in Banias, and the 
Alawites and the Sunni Muslims in Latakia. In addition to enflaming sectarian tensions, Faisal 
accused the French of reproducing civilisational allegiances between the French government 
and the Maronites, in order to undermine the Arab Nationalists. However, it is noted that 
the populations were not completely complicit with French provocations and had also acted 
in retribution against French officers. In response to these activities, the French carried out 
punitive actions: attacking, burning down, or shelling villages, seizing crops, and driving off 
cattle and other livestock.6 Nevertheless, by exploiting communal divisions, the French had 
strategized an efficient means to establish control over Syria that justified the separation of 
Greater Lebanon from Syria and the federalisation of Syria.  
 
In an effort to resist French violence, the Lebanese Administrative Council, which had been 
the representational organisation for Mount Lebanon at the Paris Peace Conference, passed 
a resolution asking for independence without French assistance with the aim of forming a 
																																																						
4 Anghie 2002, pp. 513-514.	




political agreement with the government in Damascus. The resolution surprised the French, 
who had come to rely on legitimacy from the Lebanese population to justify their actions in 
Syria, and who had previously asked for autonomy with French protections. To silence their 
critics, the French quickly arrested and exiled the council members on charges of treason 
before the resolution could be delivered to the other European members of the Peace 
Conference.7  
 
The resolution passed by the Lebanese Council was subsequently followed by a similar 
declaration in Damascus, on March 8, 1920. The declaration, accepted by communal 
representatives, proclaimed independence for Syria with Faisal as the King. The 
representatives argued ‘that if the allies were sincere, they would recognise this decision of 
the popular will, which was only putting their promises into execution, and the Turks, at the 
same time, would be proved liars’. With regards to the latter, the Turks had been arguing that 
Britain and France were not concerned with delivering Arab independence, rather the French 
desired the fulfilment of their imperialist interests in the region.8 Summarising the state of 
affairs and the developments regarding ‘the Arab Question’ and echoing the Turkish 
government, the British indicated that ‘it was clear the French were pursuing a purely 
colonial, imperialist policy’.9  
 
The establishment of the Mandate was reflecting a colonial strategy with the use of violence, 
sectarian divisions, and the dismissal of Lebanese independence and subsequently the 
dismissal of the Syrian declaration as well. The Syrian declaration of independence made by 
the Syrian General Congress, which had been established as the governing administration 
for Syria following the conclusion of the First World War, split British and French consensus 
on ‘the Arab Question’. The treatment of the Syrian population by the French and the 
aggravation of sectarian and communal conflict for the purpose of French strategy, 
contradicted the terms of the Mandate agreement and the Anglo-French Declaration, which 
gave credence to the British Foreign Office’s decision to recognise the independent state of 
Syria. Although British recognition seemingly contradicted the Sykes-Picot Agreement 
(1916), the agreement did not specify a minimum length of time that territories had to remain 
under French authority, the agreement did stipulate that France would help establish the 
institutions of government required for independence.10 In contrast to the British Foreign 
																																																						
7 Hakim, 255; F/205/4/7. 
8 F/205/4/7; Hokayem 2012, pp. 127-134 (no. 92, 93, 94, 95, 96).  
9 F/205/4/7. 
10 F/205/4/7; Hokayem 2012, pp. 127-134 (no. 92, 93, 94, 95, 96)	
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Office’s decision to recognise the Syrian declaration of independence, the French viewed the 
Syrian declaration as a threat to their interests and sent General Gouraud, the French 
representative in Lebanon and Syria, to Mount Lebanon. Gouraud was instructed to incite 
the population to protest the decisions of the Congress particularly with reference to the 
inclusion of Lebanon in the proclamation of an independent Syrian state.11  
 
Although the British Foreign Office had recognised the Syrian declaration of independence, 
the British government had not, and the Treaty of Sèvres, completed in San Remo on April 
18 and April 26, formalised the French Mandate for Syria (greater Syria, including Lebanon) 
and the British Mandate for Mesopotamia and Palestine to the British.12 The Treaty of Sèvres 
provided the legal justification for the French to use force against Syrian rebels who had 
been expressing their dissatisfaction with the peace settlement and French occupation.  
 
Addressing the use of force by the French administration, Faisal wrote to the British 
administration that ‘the French artillery and aeroplane explosives are promiscuously and 
without pity destroying the villages and tearing to pieces the defenceless inhabitants. More 
than 21,000 are already left homeless and are dispersed everywhere’. In addition to the use 
force in order to pacify the population into submission, the French occupation forces 
blocked the ports, forcing the Syrian economy to a standstill.13 The French administration in 
Syria had effectively established a siege, veiled by humanitarian intent with the aim of 
establishing a modern state that could accede the standard required of ‘civilised nations’. 
Within this framework, force was perceived as necessary to pacify the populations, giving 
justification to the members of the League of Nations to ignore French activity in Syria. 
 
Resistance to the French occupation and the establishment of a government in Damascus, 
led by Faisal, following the declaration of Syrian independence on March 8, 1920 was short-
lived. The French administration, highlighting the legitimacy of the French Mandate due to 
its legal standing, put forward conditions for Faisal, including the cessation of rebellious 
activities, the necessity of establishing a military with obligatory conscription, Syrian 
banknotes being accepted in the form of commercial exchange but not as the official state 
currency, and the acceptance of the mandate.14 Gouraud, unable to come to an agreement 
with Faisal on French terms, argued that the government of Damascus was unjustified in 
																																																						
11 F/205/4/7; Hokayem 2012, pp. 127-134 (no. 92, 93, 94, 95, 96); Hurewitz, 1979, 180-182.  
12 F/205/2/1, Timeline of events as related to Syria, p. 14.  
13 During this period, on April 23, 1920, Mustafa Kemal was elected to govern Turkey, provoking a civil war that ended in 
August 1920. F/59/10/11 June 1, 1920, Letter to Lloyd George from Feisal. 
14 Hokayem 2012, pp. 462-464 (no. 341).  
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their pursuits, they had employed gangs, while the French have sought to establish order and 
freedom, not a colonial administration. Gouraud further argued that the government in 
Damascus had used every attempt to block French strategy, using military force to fight 
French troops and placing restrictions on the movement of goods, particularly grains, that 
have had a negative economic impact on the population.15   
 
In response to French demands and accusations, and viewing the continued resistance 
against the French occupation as increasingly hopeless, Faisal prorogued Congress in 
Damascus on July 20, 1920. He disbanded the Arab troops and accepted the conditions that 
Gouraud had outlined. By accepting Gouraud’s conditions Faisal lost the trust of the 
Congress members, who wanted to continue to oppose French demands by force. Gouraud, 
however, claimed that he had never received formal notification from Faisal and continued 
his advancement to Damascus, capturing Arab troops, who had been ordered to treat the 
French troops as allies, and making advances through a ground and air offensive. Four days 
later, on July 24, 1920, the French had managed to enter the city of Damascus, establishing 
the occupation of Syria and on September 1, 1920, once Damascus had been occupied, the 
French administration proclaimed the establishment of Greater Lebanon (from here on, 
referred to as Lebanon) and divided the Syrian provinces under their possession into the 
State of Damascus, the Alawite State, the State of Aleppo, and the Djebel Druze State.16  
 
When Faisal returned to Damascus on April 24, 1921 he found that the French had occupied 
the city and all government offices. After learning of Faisal’s return to Damascus, the French 
exiled him, on April 27, declaring him persona non-grata and precluded any further 
negotiations.17 Upon learning of his son’s exile from Damascus, King Hussein, sent a letter 
of protest against the French occupation of Damascus, stating that the occupation is ‘a 
violation of the Treaty of Versailles, which the French are ever insisting must be observed in 
its entirety’.18 Hussein argued that French actions had been twofold, first the French sought 
to devastate the Hashemite family and in doing so, fulfilled their second object, to diminish 
British influence in the region.19 
 
																																																						
15 Hokayem 2012, pp. 479-486, 501-503 (no. 356, 373).  
16 F/205/4/7. 
17 F/205/4/7. 
18 Hussein’s protests with regards to breaches of the Treaty of Versailles had to do with the issue of territorial sovereignty, 
see Wright 1923. 
19 F/205/4/7.  
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In addition to Hussein’s statement that attempted to hold the French to account by 
employing international law, Faisal brought further attention to the contradiction in action 
and statement, citing the Anglo-French Declaration of November 11, 1918, which stated 
that the two powers would work to establish native governments and administrations. Faisal 
wrote: 
 
Far from wishing to impose particular institutions on the 
populations of these regions, their only desire is to ensure by their 
support and assistance the proper working of government and the 
administration they have freely given themselves.20  
 
Faisal noted that his feelings were not unique, that the Arabs felt betrayed by the French and 
British occupations.21 But Gouraud and his Secretary General, M. de Caix, did not care, and 
wished only to, as stated by de Caix, ‘cultivate and maintain all the phenomena, requiring our 
arbitration, that [the social] divisions give [us]’.22 By using these inter-group divisions the 
French politicised sectarian identities, this was particularly evident with the creation of the 
modern state of Lebanon, whose foundations were built on the intersection of French 
political and economic interests and a worldview that ascertained a moral Christian 
superiority.  
 
For Faisal and the Arab Nationalists, the use of force by the French administration and the 
British refusal to intervene was viewed as a betrayal of the promises that had been made 
during and immediately after the First World War. Faisal argued that in return for their loyalty 
to Britain and their opposition to the Turks during the First World War, they had been 
promised the ability to make decisions regarding government and the establishment of an 
Arab state, which would become independent. The activities of the French government in 
Syria contravened the promises that had been set out prior to the establishment of Mandate, 
including ‘the liberation of the peoples’, ‘the establishment of national governments and 
administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native 
populations’, and ‘unmolested opportunity of autonomous development’.23 Although the 
Arab populations had been liberated from the Ottoman Empire, the ability to engage in 
autonomous decision making had been obstructed through forcible geographic divisions and 
																																																						
20 F/205/4/7.  
21 F/205/4/7.  
22 Barr 2011, pp. 119-120.  
23 F/205/3/7, The Syrian Question; Woodrow Wilson 1918.		
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the active removal, pacification, and silencing of individuals who opposed the occupation, 
whether through force or government decrees.24 The general environment during the 
establishment of the French Mandate in Syria was evidence that a civilised Syrian state was a 
subordinated state, where dissent was to be limited, unless it was favourable to French 
interests.  
 
8.1.2 State Building in Lebanon and Syria: Strategising the Continued Pursuit of 
French Interests 
The forceful establishment of the French Mandate and the strict control of political 
institutions created a general sense of submission among the populations in Lebanon and 
Syria. The French administration in Syria maintained control over every aspect of politics in 
the region, including political representation in the Federal Council of the Syrian States, 
which opened its first session on December 12, 1922 in Aleppo. The Federal Council 
excluded the regions of Greater Lebanon and Djebel Druze,25 and was composed of fifteen 
members, all of whom were appointed by the French and selected from the administrative 
councils of Aleppo, Damascus, and the Alawite region.26 Although this formula changed 
slightly in 1923, with the Council system becoming more representative after the replacement 
of Gouraud with the appointment of General Weygand as High Commissioner, the changes 
brought forward by Weygand replicated the Ottoman system of representation, except the 
council members had very little power and could only issue complaints to the French 
administration. The council members were, however, allowed to generate political factions 
within society, as long as they did not impede French strategies and interests.27 
 
The exclusion of Lebanon, encompassing Mount Lebanon, Tripoli, Beirut, and Saida, from 
the Syrian Confederation, which included the State of Damascus, the Alawite State, and the 
State of Aleppo, created anger among the populations of these cities. They viewed the 
division of the port cities from Syria as artificial, as it had severed the established customary 
social, economic, and political networks between the coast and the interior.28 The separation 
of these cities from the Syrian interior and their exclusion from the Syrian Confederation 
was viewed as an instance of French despotism that provided the Maronite community with 
imbalanced political leverage and served French interests rather than the interests of the 
																																																						
24 F/205/4/5, sent to the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, from G. Haddad, Brigadier General. 
25 FO/141/453 December 12, 1922, Alleged Capture of Gun-Running Caravans, M. Palmer; FO/684/1 December 1922, 
French Intelligence Summaries, Beirut; the Syrian Confederation consisted of representatives from Aleppo, Damascus, and 
the Alawite regions.  
26 Subsequently, in July, 1922, the League of Nations approved the French Mandate of Lebanon and Syria, giving the 
occupation legal status, see ‘French mandate for Syria and the Lebanon’.  
27 Fieldhouse 2008, p. 259. 
28 FO/684/1 January 1923, French Intelligence Summaries, Damascus. 
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population. The pursuit of French economic and geopolitical interests during the early years 
of the Mandate reflected their desire to maintain a foothold in Lebanon and Syria. By 
separating the port cities of Tripoli, Beirut, and Saida and placing them under the tutelage of 
the Maronites, with whom the French maintained close relations, the French were able to 
control imports from the Mediterranean and therefore the economy of the Syrian interior. 
This provided the French administration with strategic control over the economy and politics 
in the rebellious Syrian interior. 
 
It was understood by the French, that whoever controlled the port cities controlled the 
economy, and therefore possessed power. For this reason, it was unlikely that the French 
would cede to demands that had been made by the populations in Tripoli, Beirut, and Saida.29 
The inclusion of the port cities in the administration of Lebanon served French interests and 
provided subsistence to Mount Lebanon as an autonomous region. While the protesting 
populations in the port cities stated that they were not hostile to the French mandate, 
probably out of fear of reprisals, they argued that these cities were never geographically or 
politically considered part of Mount Lebanon prior to the proclamation of the establishment 
of Lebanon on September 1, 1920. For the Muslims, their history was one that was 
unequivocally tied to Syria, specifically, and the Arabs, generally.30  
 
The Muslims in the port cities perceived their inclusion in Lebanon as unnatural, while the 
Maronites argued that the unification of the port cities to the Syrian interior would 
dismember historic Lebanon. The Christians, in contrast to the Muslims, sought to legitimise 
their claims with regards to a Greater Lebanon through the use of the historic myth of 
Phoenicia, a narrative which only became prominent in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.31  The employment of the narrative of Phoenician history was used to 
highlight racial difference between the Arabs of Mount Lebanon and those of the Syrian 
interior in an attempt to validate the inclusion of the port cities into the project of a Greater 
Lebanon. The political undertones of this narrative were used by the Christian communities, 
specifically the Maronite community, to give credence to their desire of a separate Lebanese 
state, which would otherwise be unsustainable due to the landlocked status of Mount 
Lebanon. Indeed, exclusion of the port cities from Lebanon would have altered the balance 
of power, forcing Lebanon to become an enclave of a Syrian state, subject to the will of a 
																																																						
29 FO/684/1 January 1923. 
30 Salibi 2005, pp. 171-173.  
31 Salibi 2005, pp. 171-173.  
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Syrian government.32 Rather than allow this to occur, it was in French interests to calm the 
anxieties of the Maronite community, who wielded administrative power in Greater 
Lebanon, by maintaining that there would be no changes to the frontiers of Lebanon.33 While 
it had become extremely unlikely that the borders of Lebanon would change, the protests of 
the populations from the port cities continued.   
 
It had been relatively easy for the French to maintain control of Lebanon, despite the protests 
from the populations in the port cities, particularly because of allied Maronite control. In 
contrast, the French administration was finding the maintenance of Syria to be costly. In an 
effort to manage the rising costs, the French administration had tasked the Federal Council 
in Aleppo to establish institutions of public services, while keeping the expenses of the 
administration low. The Federal Council was also asked to build stronger cohesion between 
the representatives and the population, in a manner that would aid the state building project 
and general security of the Syrian Federation, which would be followed by the creation of a 
ministry of justice and the codification of law and subsequently by the centralisation of the 
gendarmerie into a federal structure. Although the Federal Council was being provided with 
more responsibility, it did not have control over the implementation of policy, nor did the 
Syrian administration have control over the deployment of military force.34  
 
In addition to these changes that aimed to facilitate governance over Syria and reduce the 
costs of the French administration, the French intended to centralise the state in Syria, to 
abolish the Federation completely; merging the representative councils of Aleppo and 
Damascus. There was also discussion of separating Alexandretta from Aleppo, to create 
three separate provinces: Damascus, Aleppo, and Alexandretta.35 The separation of 
Alexandretta from Aleppo, and the continued autonomy of the Alawite State from the 
centralised administration of Syria, provided the French with the ability to maintain control 
over the entire coast, creating ‘a permanent cleavage between the coastal states and the Sunni 
interior, [the latter] as Monsieur de Reffye once remarked […], [the French] can never hope 
to gain’. The French were aware that by separating the Christians and the Alawites from 
Syrian interior, these regions and their populations could be ‘drawn into the orbit of the 
French, as opposed to Syrian, interests’. In doing so, France remained in control of the coast, 
from where they could dominate the Syrian interior, strategically but also economically.36 
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In addition to the administrative changes stated above, it was reported on February 14, 1923, 
in the newspaper ‘Le Réveil’, that Damascus was to become the capital of the Syrian 
confederation, with the duties of the delegate to the State of Damascus to be merged with 
those of the delegate to the Syrian Confederation.37 News of these impending changes, the 
merging of the roles of the two delegates and the capitals’ transition from Aleppo to 
Damascus, increased frustration among the populations in the Syrian interior, and was 
particularly expressed in Aleppo. The transition of the capital from Aleppo to Damascus was 
perceived as a loss of status and a punishment for the previous violence that had been 
produced in the city.38  
 
Growing resentment towards the French in Aleppo threatened the possibility of renewed 
violence, mimicking the revolt that had occurred from 1919 to 1921 during the Turkish War 
of Independence (1919-1923), under Ibrahim Hananu, an Ottoman municipal official who 
propagated the idea that northern Syria, including Aleppo, was geographically part of Turkey. 
During the Hananu Revolt in Aleppo, the Turks, under Mustafa Kamal, had been arming 
Hananu and his rebels in Aleppo as well as aiding a revolt in Latakia against the French. 
Following the pacification of Hananu’s revolt, Hananu sought refuge in Jordan where the 
French could not enter, otherwise risk a confrontation with Britain. Reflecting Hananu’s 
rhetoric, the threat of renewed revolt in Aleppo in 1923 carried with it calls to join the 
Republic of Turkey.39 The sentiments of Aleppo’s population can be attributed to French 
oppressive activity at the beginning of the occupation, the transfer of the capital from Aleppo 
to Damascus, and the continued dominance of French interests over those of the Syrian 
populations. In addition to these reasons, the desire to join Turkey could be attributed to 
their material support during the rebellion against France, but also because Aleppo had 
traditionally been economically connected to Anatolia rather than Syria.40  
 
In response to the developing anger in Aleppo and the developing possibility of rebellion, 
General Weygand attempted to quell anxieties by stating that there would be fiscal 
decentralisation, allowing Aleppo to continue to develop economically and independently 
from Damascus, given that economic ties to Anatolian markets had been severed, resulting 
																																																						
37 FO/141/453 February 20, 1923, Damascus News: Syrian Capital to be Here, sent to British Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, from M. Palmer, Damascus; and August 24, 1923, Consul Palmer to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Damascus. 
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in the downgrading of Aleppo’s economic prosperity.41 Additionally, the French sought an 
alliance with Kamal al-Qudsi, a French collaborator who was part of a notable land-owning 
family from Aleppo, appointing him as Governor. The appointment of a local notable to the 
position of Governor was with the goal of rebuilding confidence in the Mandate by 
exploiting customary loyalties.  Following al-Qudsi’s appointment, he placed ‘some sixty 
members of his family to official posts’, with permission from the French, as long as the 
family members were loyal.42 By appointing al-Qudsi, the French sought to use loyal 
customary networks to their advantage, given the ability of notables to sway popular 
sentiment.43 
 
The continued employment of communal networks and ethno-sectarian identities had been 
strategically deployed to maintain order. By using communal networks, such as the notable 
al-Qudsi family network in Aleppo, and ethno-sectarian identities to justify the division of 
the coastal regions from the Syrian interior, the French administration had favoured the 
pursuit of their national interests rather than the independence of Lebanon and Syria.44 While 
the appointment of notables to positions of authority did not represent a new strategy, its 
continued use by the French administration, for the purpose of retaining control, had adverse 
effects on the political environment. By upholding customary, pre-modern political groups 
and networks, wedding them into the institutions of the modern state, the French 
government were actively reproducing aspects of the socio-political field that were contrary 
to the French standard of civilisation.   
 
Commenting on the French mandate and French governance, Nuri Pasha, an Arab 
Nationalist and Iraqi politician who had been close to Faisal and eventually served as Prime 
Minister of Iraq, in conversation with the British Consul, M. Smart, noted that the Syrians 
were under the complete subordination of the French, who employed a ‘direct, though 
veiled, government’. He stated that he could see ‘no sign of any tendency on the part of the 
French to modify the only method which they have ever practiced in their colonies or 
mandated territories’.45  
 
The aversion of the French administration to any form of dissent or critique, which would 
otherwise be viewed as a sign of weakness and lack of control, had censured discussions of 
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the French occupation in the Syrian press, while establishing no such restraint on anti-British 
publications. In early April 1925, Lord Balfour, on a trip to Syria, noted a rise of anti-British 
sentiment and propaganda, claiming that the French are redirecting anger towards the British 
in the heart of Arab world.46 The French strategy, however, appeared to have limited effects. 
Despite the censure of news articles that contradicted French interests, proposals for Syrian 
Unity continued to gain traction.47  
 
Although there were groups within the French mandate of Syria who opposed plans of Syrian 
unity, resistance against the French administration was stronger than the resistance against 
the British. Despite an unfavourable British strategy in Palestine, the French took the brunt 
of Arab anger, and their methods of governance made the British appear to be enlightened 
in comparison. The British High Commissioner for Palestine, M. Samuel, stated ‘whatever 
may be the criticism in Palestine of the British administration, there is probably not one 
among the Arab critics who would wish it replaced by a French’.48 The French had 
undertaken strategies that reflected their colonial histories, actively working against the 
desires for autonomy and independence by governing through allies, exploiting communal 
and ethno-sectarian divisions to maintain control, and had strategically formed alliances and 
constructed geographic borders to sustain political and economic power, while maintaining 
that the purpose of the French administration in Lebanon and Syria was for an altruistic 
purpose.  
 
8.1.3 French Colonial Pacification: The Druze Revolt 1925  
The French alignment with the Christians that had developed during the early nineteenth 
century, provided the French administration with a strategic advantage in Lebanon and Syria. 
Maurice Sarrail, the new High Commissioner, replacing General Weygand in June 1924 and 
described as an avid atheist,49 had been appointed following the victory of the anti-clerical 
party in France, and believed that for too long the French had pandered to the Maronite 
minority when they should have been allied with the Muslim majority. Seeing that his 
predecessors had given too much power to a minority, Sarrail rejected the advances made by 
the Christian communities, ultimately blocking the election of a Catholic general, Emile 
Eddé, as Governor of Lebanon by the Lebanese Representative Council, and appointed a 
French Governor in his place. The Lebanese nationalists quickly became furious with 
Sarrail’s takeover of Lebanon, and Sarrail, to appease them, offered direct elections. 
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However, Édouard Herriot, the Prime Minister of France, rejected the plan, and Sarrail was 
forced to return to an angry population, unable to deliver on his promise.50 Although Sarrail 
rejected the supremacy of the Maronite community in Lebanon and attempted to undertake 
a secularist approach to governing the Mandate, he maintained the primacy of French 
interests over independence.  
 
The central strategy for the French administration in Lebanon and Syria was the pacification 
of the population and the assertion of authority over the territories that had been legally 
attributed to the French administration. In an attempt to assert authority over the Druze in 
Djebel Druze, Sarrail desired to make a statement reflecting French strength in the region 
and pursued retribution for attacks that occurred under the governorship of General 
Gouraud. During the period under Gouraud, the Druze of Djebel Druze had come into 
conflict with the French administration, who were trying to coerce the population into 
submission, and on June 23, 1921, Gouraud’s caravan was attacked. Following a period of 
quiet, Gouraud had learned that Sultan al-Atrash had been harbouring one of the 
perpetrators of the attack, and in 1922, Gouraud arrested the perpetrator and sent him to 
Damascus. On the way to Damascus, however, the caravan carrying the perpetrator was 
ambushed by Sultan al-Atrash and his men, resulting in the death of a French officer. In the 
fight that followed Sultan al-Atrash’s ambush, the perpetrator had been set free.51 In an 
attempt to administer justice for the French administration, Sarrail ordered the four main 
Druze leaders in Djebel Druze to Damascus. Three of the leaders accepted the invitation, 
and upon arrival in Damascus, they were arrested. Sultan al-Atrash was the sole leader to 
refuse, having seen his father succumb to the same ploy, which had led to his father’s death.52 
In late July 1925, al-Atrash responded to the French strategy by rallying his tribal and peasant 
troops, beginning an onslaught and uprising against the French.53 
 
Although Sarrail had made two strategic mistakes in his short period in office, first with the 
obstruction of Emile Eddé’s appointment as Governor and then with his subsequent upset 
of the Djebel Druze, it was not until a change of government in France in April 1925 that 
Sarrail was replaced by Henri de Jouvenel in November 1925. The change in the French 
administration slowly led to increased French control through the use of force, beginning 
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with Damascus and spreading outwards once the capital city was back under French 
authority.54 
 
Despite increased use of force by the French administration, the Druze continued the 
rebellion with the aim to combat French authority, repression, and violence, and soon after 
the rebellion started, the Druze had acquired the support of the Arab nationalists. However, 
the Druze and the Arab nationalists were quickly losing access to vital resources, and neither 
Britain nor the League of Nations had agreed to support their cause.55 By July 1926, de 
Jouvenel was replaced by Henri Ponsot, and with much of Syria back under French control, 
the new High Commissioner strategised the implementation of an Organic Law for Syria,56 
which helped conclude the rebellion on July 26, 1927.57 
 
Although the rebellion had failed to procure the desired autonomy and independence of the 
nationalists and the Druze, failure was not caused by a lack of willpower, but an absence of 
capital. In combatting the rebellion, the French had also suffered economically, and began 
to view the mandate as too expensive to maintain, threatening to abandon Syria to the British. 
The threat was a ploy to ensure continued British support of the French, and was successful. 
Following the threat, the British began to clear our rebel strongholds in the Jordanian desert 
region. Despite the conclusion of the rebellion, the French reputation had been damaged 
within Lebanon and Syria, as well as internationally.58  
 
While the rebels in Syria were unable to achieve their goal, they did manage to alter French 
administration following the conclusion of the rebellion. In February 1928, M. Ponsot issued 
a general amnesty to the Druze and the Arab nationalists and called for elections of a 
Constituent Assembly which was held in April that same year.59 The general amnesty and the 
creation of a Constituent Assembly was an attempt to pacify the rebellious populations by 
conceding on a new form of representational governance. However, it required that the 
population accept a specific form of governance and order that could be sustainably managed 
by the French administration.  
 
8.1.4  Limited Governance: The False Promise of Political Representation 
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The constituents elected to the new Syrian assembly in April 1928 were mostly moderates 
from the countryside, but because they lacked cohesion, the nationalists dominated the 
Assembly and succeeded in forming a party, the National Bloc, which included Ibrahim 
Hananu, Hashim al-Atasi, Saadullah al-Jabiri, Shukri al-Quwatli, Nabih al-Azmah, Amir Adil 
Arslan, and Riyadh al-Solh. In dominating the Assembly, Hashim al-Atasi became President 
of the Assembly and Ibrahim Hananu was appointed President of the Commission in charge 
of drafting the Constitution. While much of the draft constitution was amenable to the 
French High Commissioner, M. Ponsot objected to the declaration ‘that all Syrian territories 
detached from the Ottoman Empire constituted an indivisible political unity’, to which M. 
Ponsot believed was ‘irreconcilable both with France’s international obligations and with the 
existing situation in fact and in law’. In addition to M. Ponsot’s objection to this specific 
article, he objected to four others, which he found to be in conflict to French ‘obligations’ 
in Syria.60  
 
Unable to come to an agreement with the representatives over principles of self-
determination and geographic claims, M. Ponsot prorogued the Assembly. The prorogation 
was viewed by the Syrian population as an abandonment of the Constitution that had nearly 
come to fruition.61 The decision escalated tensions between the nationalists and the French 
administration but also deepened the schism between the nationalists and the moderates. 
The latter believed that the nationalists’ uncompromising vision threatened to alienate Syria 
further. The moderates would have preferred to establish cooperation with France and 
obtain guarantees on rights and freedoms rather than continue to resist. In contrast, the 
nationalists refused to yield and demanded a treaty that could replace the Mandate and offer 
Syrians the right to self-govern.62 
 
It had become clear that the French administration in Syria had abandoned the pursuit of 
legitimate representation following the inability of the French and Syrian representatives to 
come to a joint agreement over the status of autonomy and geographic limits of the Syrian 
state. The French and the nationalists each had a specific conception of Syria, and neither 
were willing to concede. However, the French were bound to a set of criteria established in 
the provisions of the Mandate, and in an effort to justify the lack of French concessions, de 
Caix lied in reports that had been submitted to the League of Nations, blaming the nationalist 
																																																						
60 The articles included, Article 2, 73, 74, 75, and 112 of the Draft Constitution. Hourani 1946, pp. 191-193. 
61 Longrigg 1958, pp. 182-185; 1SL/1/V/394 March 9, 1930, Source Cheikh Ismail el Hariri. 
62 Hourani 1946, 193. 
230	
	
party for the suspension of the Constituent Assembly on February 5, 1929.63 The French 
were operating in order to succeed in the realisation of their interests, which came at the 
expense of the legitimacy of the Mandate project and the League of Nations. 
 
By January 1930, Arabic language newspapers were reporting on a growing political and 
economic crisis in Syria. The French administration in Syria was a key cause to the 
development of this crisis, particularly due to the severance of economic and political 
networks across the region, through the oppressive application of French authority, akin to 
practice of politics pursued in Morocco, impacting all areas of trade, especially the trade of 
grain.64 Further to the constraints placed on the trade of goods in the region, the economic 
crisis was characterised as the ‘simple exploitation of […] natural resources’ by the French.65  
 
The inability of the League of Nations to hold the French responsible for their continued 
manipulation and oppression of the Syrian populations strengthened the alliance of the 
nationalists within the National Bloc.66 With a wider base of support, the National Bloc urged 
the population to engage in protests and strikes against the French, to demonstrate their 
anger and resolve, against their treatment by the French administration and complicity of the 
League of Nations. Following the call to protest, one of the National Bloc’s prominent 
nationalists, Hashim al-Atasi, released the ‘Manifesto to the Nation’, in April 1930. The 
Manifesto stated that the Syrians had suffered under French occupation for too long and had 
been subjected to various forms of oppression, the Syrian population was being forced to 
uphold systems of governance that had been opposed to by the population, which they had 
been resisting for eight years.67  
 
Following the release of the manifesto, the newspaper Al Cha’ab, published an article titled 
‘M. de Caix, Emissary of Colonisation’. The article highlighted the inability and the 
unwillingness of the French administration to acknowledge the rights of the Syrian people 
and accused de Caix of continuously engaging in the repression of Syrian aspirations. The 
article continued that the long history of French involvement in Syria and the sustained 
practices of French involvement, whether permitted through a mandate provided by the 
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League of Nations, or carried out prior to its establishment, could only be explained as an 
enduring effort by France to colonise the region.68  
 
Nationalist sentiment in Syria against the French administration and widespread feeling and 
perception that Syria had been colonised increased following M. Ponsot’s decision, on May 
14, 1930, to dissolve the Assembly and unilaterally promulgate a constitution for Syria that 
would come into force following the election of a Chamber of Deputies.69 The constitution 
that was promulgated by M. Ponsot was practically identical to the version that had been 
previously drafted. However, the articles that had been a source of animosity between the 
French and the Syrians regarding geographic claims and self-governance had not been 
included as per the original draft. Despite the communication of the constitution to the 
League of Nations, it had not come into force until 1932.70 The unilateral decision to 
promulgate a constitution made the French administration seem as if they were fulfilling 
their state building duties in Syria, but also manufactured the delineation of the political 
environment to their satisfaction. 
 
Following the promulgation of the constitution and the communication of its existence to 
the League of Nations by de Caix, Nazih Bey al-Mouayad, secretary general of the Syrian 
Peoples’ Party, sent a memorandum on June 29, 1930, to the press and Syrian politicians. 
The memorandum accused de Caix of filling the communication to the League of Nations 
with lies, including that the Syrian people had been calm and welcomed the suspension of 
the assembly. In response, al-Mouayad urged the Syrian people to hold the French to account 
for the situation that they had created,71 to protest and petition the League of Nations against 
the acceptance of the French report.72   
 
Growing discontent in the Syrian provinces was not only targeting French oppression, 
leaders of the Syrian parties, including Loutfi Haffar, Fares al-Khoury, and Ihsan al-Cherif, 
had become disillusioned with the League of Nations, stating that it was the ‘largest theatre 
in the world’, providing a stage for the ‘comedians […] who come periodically to play their 
role’ but never actually provide justice.73 Despite the protests and the petition that had been 
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sent to the League of Nations, the Syrian population had not received a reply, prompting 
Haffar to declare:  
 
We have no one to trust except ourselves. The League of 
Nations is composed of muted puppets by France and England. 
The Orient, although rights are unknown and usurped, must exit 
its passiveness to march with one positive voice that consists to 
augment its richness in boycotting the Occident.74  
 
Following this series of events, an ideological framework emerged that sought to reject 
Occidental norms of governance and politics, including the system of global governance, 
and uphold those of the Orient. Although, the Syrian nationalist leadership had come to 
reject the establishment of a Western political framework, it had already accepted, developed, 
and reiterated much of it. Although this had been done to be a recognised and independent 
state, and to resist continued interference and intervention, it had reconfigured the social 
field, changing the socio-political boundaries and the perception of legitimate governance.  
 
Despite the rejectionist approach to the French Mandate and the League of Nations, the 
nationalist parties engaged in the January 1932 elections for the Chamber of Deputies in 
Syria. As it had been the case in the Assembly, the nationalists were a minority in the 
Chamber, but their unity had prevailed and they quickly became the dominant voice once 
again. Following the election of the Chamber of Deputies and the approval of the Cabinet, 
negotiations began between the Chamber and the High Commissioner. As the nationalists 
had done before, they urged the French High Commissioner to concede on the inclusion of 
Latakia and Djebel Druze in Syria, arguing that their separation from the Syrian government 
was unnatural, the nationalists had also come into conflict with the High Commissioner on 
the status of Syro-Lebanese relations.75  
 
The High Commissioner and the nationalists were again drawn into a deadlock, with the 
nationalists resigning from the Cabinet in April 1933. Following the resignation of the 
nationalists, the moderates and Comte de Martel, who succeeded M. Ponsot as High 
Commissioner, continued deliberations over a Franco-Syrian draft treaty that would 
conclude the Mandate. The treaty that had been negotiated, which was heavily in favour of 
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French interests, provided the French Government the ability to maintain military forces in 
Syria and the ability to intervene on behalf of Syria should conflict with a third state develop. 
It also established that Latakia and Djebel Druze would not be included in the future Syrian 
state. Following the negotiation between de Martel and the moderates, the treaty was put 
before the Chamber where it was rejected by the nationalists. The High Commissioner 
subsequently suspended the Chamber, withdrew the terms of the treaty, and allowed the 
President of the Republic, Izzet Pasha al-Abid, to govern through decree.76 
 
After the rejection of the initial decree in 1934, Hashim al-Atasi travelled to Paris, in 1936, 
to renegotiate a new Franco-Syrian draft treaty, which included the slow relinquishment of 
French sovereignty over a twenty-five-year period.  Following the negotiation of the Treaty, 
al-Atasi returned to Syria and was appointed as President. The Nationalist Bloc, led by Shukri 
al-Quwatli, claimed that the draft agreement was a victory for the Syrian people, and argued 
that  
 
the treaty between the liberal French people and the noble Syrian 
people after a fight of 16 years, during which the Syrians have 
tasted the bitterness of a foreign regime and have pulled some 
eloquent and final lessons [is complete…The Nationalist Bloc] 
renews its call to the militant nation, men, women, children, to 
show today like yesterday that it has dignity in liberty and 
independence. Our heroes, the members of the faithful Wafd 
(nation), will re-join us bringing the charter of sovereignty and 
of independence, the day has come and will be the expression of 
joy from all the nation.77 
 
While the treaty had been ratified by the Syrian government, opposition to its provisions 
were growing in France. Jamil Mardam, the Syrian Prime Minister (1936-1939), travelled to 
Paris in order to save the treaty, and after three months of negotiations, was forced to 
concede on the safeguarding of the French language in schools and the French right to search 
for and exploit the country’s oil deposits. The agreement between Mardam and the French 
was opposed in Syria and a complete breakdown of relations between the Syrian government 
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and France opened the gates to political crisis in 1939 which led to the disintegration of the 
Syrian government and the suspension of the constitution.78 
 
8.2 The Second World War (1939-1945): German Challenges to French Interests 
in Syria 
Throughout the 1930s there had been increased militarism and friction in the European state 
system, which escalated tensions throughout Europe, and led to the fragmentation of the 
established legal framework of global governance. In particular, the legitimacy of the 
Mandate system was being challenged. For example, by 1934 Italy had begun to engage in 
hostile anti-British radio broadcasts that targeted British interests and influence in the Middle 
East. In response, the British launched a new form of cultural diplomacy through the Foreign 
Office. Over the next four years, Italian and Nazi propaganda were beginning to have costly 
effects on British and French interests. Acknowledging the necessity of the British to push 
back against Italian and Nazi propaganda, Winston Churchill requested that the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) launch a foreign language service in Arabic.79  
 
In addition to Italian efforts to delegitimise the British administration in Palestine, Jordan, 
and Iraq, the French and the British suspected the Nazis of being involved in youth 
movements in Syria and Palestine, particularly through the Arab Club, which reportedly 
received financial assistance from Berlin, with members of the Arab Club, including its 
founder, Sa’id al-Fattah Imam, travelling to Nazi Germany in 1936.80 Germany had begun to 
take advantage of the schism between the Arab nationalists and the French administration 
in Syria, with French intelligence noting an increase in German activities by early 1939, stating 
that the Syrian Nationalist Bloc had encouraged al-Fattah’s further contact with Hitler in 
1936. German strategy targeted French and British prestige by forming alliances with Arab 
nationalist movements, through these alliances Germany also sought to expand trade into 
Syria.81  
 
While German propaganda targeted the relationship between the French administration and 
the Arab Nationalists, it was also trying to draw France and Britain into conflict. On June 
16, 1939, the German newspaper, Hamburger Tageblatt, published a story accusing the British 
of using anti-French propaganda within Lebanon and Syria. According to the article, the 
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British goal was to take over Syria from the French and propose a unified Arab state with a 
monarchy.82 The claims made by the German newspaper were not baseless and there was a 
small group of British agents, notably in the Arab Bureau in Cairo, who had actively 
encouraged the second son of King Hussein, Emir Abdallah I bin al-Hussein, to be 
appointed to the throne, becoming King of Syria, Transjordan, and Palestine. The French 
noted that without the encouragement coming from the Arab Bureau with regards to Emir 
Abdallah’s establishment, ‘it would be hard to understand, in effect, the tenacious 
propaganda that does not cease’.83  
 
German propaganda regarding the British desire to establish Emir Abdallah as King of Syria, 
Transjordan, and Palestine, was not well received by Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud, first monarch and 
founder of Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud warned that the establishment of a Syrian throne ‘would 
only serve foreign interests and would be an instrument in their politics’.84 The French 
administration and Ibn Saud viewed the appointment of Emir Abdallah as King of Syria as 
an affront to their interests, with the French administration desiring the establishment of a 
republic that was amenable to French influence following independence. Additionally, the 
French perceived the Hashemite family as too close to the British. On the other hand, Ibn 
Saud, viewed the establishment of the Hashemite family in the heart of the Arab world as a 
threat to his claims to the Hejaz.85 
 
Ibn Saud and the French had made their criticisms known, and while they both knew that 
the information was a matter of propaganda, there had been a real threat posed to their 
interests. Responding to criticisms made by the French administration and Ibn Saud, Emir 
Abdallah stated that ‘Syria is a single country. Any policy which has a different basis would 
be doomed to fail’. The Emir’s response did not quell concerns or suspicions of a strategy 
that would conclude with him being established as King of Syria. However, Emir Abdallah 
insisted that his desire for a single Syrian state encompassing the former Syrian provinces of 
the Ottoman Empire was the definitive goal,  
 
If I have to succeed, I will assign my efforts to fulfil two goals: 
realise independence and the well-being of the nation; and gain 
at the same time the friendship and confidence of the two 
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mandatory states. This policy is, excluding all else, the condition 
of success.86  
 
Although he did not explicitly deny his interest in becoming King of Syria, he did place 
importance on the establishment of friendship and confidence of France and Britain.   
 
The British High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir Harold MacMichael, further denied 
German claims regarding the strategy to appoint Emir Abdallah as the King of Syria. 
MacMichael reiterated that federalising the Arab territories of Palestine, Syria, and 
Transjordan was not part of British policy, and any discussion of the contrary was an attempt 
to create discord.87 Despite not being formally part of British policy, French intelligence was 
suspicious of Lebanese and Syrian politicians, as well as journalists, traveling to Amman. The 
French administration was claiming that following their return to their homes, the politicians 
and journalists have advocated for the Emir, ‘as agents’. The French administration 
concluded that these politicians and journalists needed to be watched closely and to restrict 
future travel in order to dissuade further publication supporting the Emir.88 
 
Although German propaganda had not led to an explicit conflict between the British and the 
French administrations, the French were beginning to notice that their influence in Syria was 
declining. The French wrote a general notice with the aim of assuring the Syrian population 
of French intentions, which were primarily to prepare the Levantine states for independence 
and to assure the protection of minority groups within the population. From a French 
perspective, the prior form of governance under the Ottoman Empire, was a history of 
domination that paralleled Catholic political superiority in France prior to the Edict of 
Nantes (1598). In turn, the French had tried to establish the principles of a secular equality 
that had become dominant in France with the goal of building peace in Syria and establishing 
unity between the various groups.89 Despite, French perceptions that their state building was 
attempting to establish secular equality, the administration maintained sectarian views that 
characterised and classified the populations based on religious identity. This included the 
enduring conviction that the Sunni Muslim population was fanatical.90 The French strategy, 
reflected their colonial interests in the Syrian provinces by enabling the development of 
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distinct ethno-sectarian based politics, as well as elevating customary forms of governance, 
for example with the appointment of al-Qudsi, 91 which conflicted with the French standard 
of civilisation. 
 
8.2.1 French Concessions on Governance and Arab Concessions on Geographic 
Limits 
Despite the desire to establish principles of French secularisation, the French administration 
continued to reproduce and politicise religious identities, particularly with regards to the 
creation of Lebanon as a state with a Christian majority and Beirut as its capital, whereas 
Syria would retain its Muslim character. The French administration also believed that it was 
necessary to establish an independent or autonomous Alawite state and Druze state, in order 
to avoid disorder and the threat of oppressive Sunni functionaries. The creation of states 
based on a sectarian character, and justified by the belief that any other formula would result 
in the oppression of religious minorities by dogmatic Sunni Muslim forces, perpetuated ideas 
of difference that tied religious identity to civilisation, and framed those identities through a 
specific set of characteristics.92  
 
The characterisation of Lebanon as a state that would retain a Christian identity negatively 
impacted the role of the Muslim community in Lebanon. Muhyi al-Din al-Nsouli, the 
founder of al-Najjadé, an Arab socialist unionist party that began as a youth club in 1916 also 
founded Bayrut in 1936, a daily newspaper that had a sympathetic orientation to the Arab 
nationalist cause, attempted to expose the sectarian French worldview and strategy. Al-
Najjadé distributed a pamphlet in Beirut arguing that the French had been applying the 
principle of divide and conquer between Christians and the Muslims in Lebanon and Syria. 
The French attempted to pass this off as another example of Muslim fanaticism, exacerbated 
by pro-German sentiment, but sentiment against the French was strong, and resulted in an 
alliance between the Phalangists, which had started as a Maronite paramilitary youth 
organisation, and al-Najjadé.93 In addition to the party’s opposition to French strategy, the 
newspaper, Bayrut, was particularly critical of discriminatory policies that had been 
established against the Muslims.94 
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The French attempt to explain al-Najjadé’s criticisms as Muslim fanaticism only served to 
justify al-Nsouli’s argument regarding the French strategy of divide and conquer between 
Christians and Muslims. On the other hand, French criticisms of German influence were not 
out of place, according to British intelligence, Germany was attempting to challenge the 
status quo in Lebanon and Syria by cooperating with Arab Nationalists. In addition, the 
relationship between the German’s and the Arab Nationalists, had been buoyed by the 
deterioration of the political situation and the economy, made worse by the shipment of 
necessary food products from Lebanon and Syria to France to help the French war effort 
against the Nazis.95  
 
The shipment of food from Lebanon and Syria to France led to ‘the bread crisis’ in January 
1941 and a general strike by the end of February, led by Shukri Quwatli. Although the 
German Foreign Minister, Otto Von Henting, travelled throughout Lebanon and Syria, in 
1941, meeting with religious and nationalist leaders with whom he encouraged protests 
directed at the French. Von Henting did not light the fuse leading to opposition and protests 
the French administration, but likely shortened it by providing external validity.96 
 
By March 1941, the strike had spread throughout the major cities of Lebanon and Syria. 
Emphasising popular opposition to the French administration, Quwatli stated that the 
mandate system was no longer legitimate due to the collapse of the League of Nations and 
the formal withdrawal of France from the organisation. The strength of the protests and 
Quwatli’s narrative threatened the Vichy government who attempted to suppress dissident 
activity in the region by arresting and killing a number of protestors. The French 
administration realised that force alone could not restrain the protests and on April 1, 1941, 
Henri Dentz, a Commander in Chief of the Army of the Levant and the High Commissioner 
of the Levant, issued a declaration restating French support for Lebanese and Syrian 
independence and offered a series of administrative reforms, including the establishment of 
a council of directors, headed by a ‘head of state’ with a consultative assembly. The French 
administration appointed Alfred Naccache as head of state, who was to be assisted by Ahmad 




95 el-Solh 2004, pp. 117; Firro 2003, p. 178. 
96 el-Solh 2004, pp. 117; Firro 2003, p. 178. 
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The pressure that had been placed on the French administration due to the opposition 
protests had resulted in reforms, but for Jamil Mekkawi, a leader of al-Najjadé, the reforms 
fell short of the demands that were being made. On November 29, 1941, Mekkawi 
proclaimed that the national awakening, embodied by his organisation, was ‘to conserve 
Lebanon’s Arab character’ and that they would  
 
seek to defend it against all foreign politics tending to fraudulent 
manoeuvers, that wish to compromise the profound ties where 
we find these particular traditions, sentiments, ideologies, that 
make Lebanon an integral part inseparable from all Arabs. 
 
He continued that the ‘goal is simple, we agitate not only to unveil and stop all foreign games, 
but it would do Lebanon no good to detach it from Arabia, to hold it in isolation and 
constrain its life in a delineated territory that is not natural’.98 
 
The idea of a separate Lebanon was still a point of contention for Mekkawi, however, in 
1942, a year after Mekkawi’s speech that argued Lebanon was integral and inseparable from 
‘Arabia’, the Syrian Prime Minister, Husni al-Barazi delivered a speech in Damascus in late 
November 1942, which omitted any mention of Lebanon and pan-Syrian unification. 
Instead, al-Barazi focused on how far Syria had come, noting how the Syrian population had 
developed many syndicates, including a syndicate for the press, so that journalistic integrity 
could be upheld, however, he noted that there was one syndicate that was missing in the 
country. This, he proclaimed, was ‘the syndicate of honour, prestige, and independence. This 
syndicate should be our highest aim in the present historical circumstances the country is 
passing through, for it precipitates the fulfilment of our national aspirations’. al-Barazi 
remarked that what needs to happen, first and foremost, however, was recognition amongst 
the Syrians that ‘we are independent, and exercise our independence as an actual fact […] If 
we ourselves do not feel that we are independent, how can we request others to recognise 
our independence?’  
 
In addition to drawing on nationalist sentiment and using independence as a focal point, al-
Barazi argued that for independence to work in favour of the Syrian people the status of the 
state must be upheld, meaning that ‘the population should not betray the treasury while 
crowding around the gates of the Supply Department’, that the population should pay what 
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is owed in taxes for the government to fulfil its duties and responsibilities, including 
maintenance of the army and foreign representation, which the Prime Minister argued as 
being essential to the state and the independence of the state.99 Apparent in this speech, al-
Barazi had conceded to function within the parameters of statehood that had been 
established in the European state system, the League of Nations, and by the French and 
British Mandate administrations, whereby the functions of the state were to reflect the 
functions of statehood that had been apparent in Europe. This included, treating the modern 
state in Syria as a form of household authority, with expectations from the population to 
remain loyal to the state, to pay what is owed to the state, and in return resources would be 
redistributed. Although this was a logical conclusion, the Arab character of Syria had been 
negated throughout the Mandate, with the French administration continuously engaging in 
sectarian politics.  
 
8.2.2 Electoral Engineering: Attempting to Establish Amenable Governance to 
French Civilisation 
Despite al-Barazi’s willingness to work within the framework of the state as established by 
the French administration throughout the Mandate, the French administration in Lebanon 
and Syria had been unwilling to accept that the Lebanese and Syrian governments had 
acquiesced to a modern form of politics, framed by French interests regarding 
institutionalisation and geographic limits. The refusal of the French administration to 
continue progression towards Lebanese and Syrian independence yielded accusations by the 
British that General de Gaulle was attempting to re-establish a repressive regime of colonial 
administration. Pressure from the British led to French concessions on the administration of 
elections in the spring of 1943 to help Lebanon and Syria become independent. In addition, 
the French agreed to abandon their claim over the command of the Allied Troops in the 
Levant. Following the agreement between the French and the British regarding the terms of 
Lebanese and Syrian independence the French attempted to alter the terms, but the British 
forcefully declined stating that there was no room for negotiation.100 
 
The British noted that while preparation for elections were underway in Lebanon, there had 
been instances of interference by the French authorities. It was reported that the French 
Advisors in Tripoli and Saida established lists of candidates who were aligned with, or whose 
interests were favourable to, the French. The candidates who did not make the lists were, 
according to British intelligence officers that had been stationed in Lebanon and Syria, being 
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cajoled or threatened in order to prevent them from running for election and upsetting the 
pursuit of French interests. 101  
 
M. Pruneaud, working in South Lebanon, formed his list of acceptable candidates that were 
amenable to French interests. In doing so, he had been in consultation with local notables, 
and used every means possible to try and ensure that his candidates would be elected. M. 
Pruneaud, using intimidation tactics ensured that opposition candidates became the target of 
the Délégation Générale de la France Libre au Levant, the organisation that replaced the High 
Commissioner, which M. Pruneaud openly stated ‘will run the elections’. In particular, the 
French administration, including M. Pruneaud, was particularly concerned with Adel 
Osseiran, who was viewed as being pro-British, and Riyadh al-Solh, who was viewed as a 
strong nationalist. Commenting on the situation, the Lebanese Governor of Saida was also 
concerned by M. Pruneaud’s efforts and argued that if he was not stopped, his list of 
candidates would win the election. Similar tactics were also being employed elsewhere in 
Lebanon such as in Tripoli, where Hamid Frangieh had been excluded from the French 
list.102   
 
Riyadh al-Solh, witnessing the strategy of intimidation that was being used by the French, 
argued that elections in Syria should be held before those in Lebanon because the election 
of ‘a reasonably independent Syrian Chamber’, despite likely French interference, would 
encourage the Lebanese to resist French interference.103 While al-Solh suggested that the 
Syrian elections be scheduled to occur before the Lebanese elections, given that Syrian 
politics were more inclined to independence than the politics within Lebanon, the British 
argued that French interference could be circumvented if the nationalists aligned themselves 
with the allied World War Two states. In doing so, the French would not be able to claim 
that the nationalist candidates posed a security threat, and General Catroux would be forced 
to backtrack on barring nationalist candidates. The British argued that this could allow for 
the freest elections possible.104  
 
The reaction to the creation of lists of candidates who were amendable to French interests 
generated a rumour that the elections were not a free contest between politicians representing 
Lebanese and Syrian interests, but a contest between Britain and France. This rumour was 
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further provoked by candidates who failed to be placed on the French lists and who 
positioned themselves as ‘British Candidates’. Due to Britain’s history of favouring a 
monarchist system, and the support for the Hashemite family, the population believed that 
the British supported ‘one kingly candidate or another’, with Sheikh Daham ibn Meheid of 
the Fed’an tribe105 stating that ‘it was common knowledge that the British authorities were 
conducting a vigorous campaign, and spending large sums of money, with a view to 
popularising the Emir in Syria’. The British, however, were uncomfortable with these 
assertions and actively repudiated the rumours.106 The rumours that had developed were 
subsequently used by the French administration with the aim of developing support for their 
preferred candidates. The French argued that those who claimed to be British candidates or 
who were not placed on the French lists intended to achieve the British goal of forcing 
Lebanon into a federation with Syria, and allowing Muslim domination of the Christians.107 
 
Despite the threats made by the French administration in Lebanon and Syria, and the 
censuring of many nationalist candidates, the National Bloc in Syria managed to obtain an 
overwhelming victory and in early August, following the elections, Quwatli was elected 
President of the Syrian Republic by the new Chamber of Ministers.108 Following his election, 
Quwatli stated that ‘no nation, whether great or small, can anymore live isolated or separate’. 
In his speech, Quwatli cites the Atlantic Charter (1941), which acknowledged the rights of 
sovereignty, freedom, and security from domination or interference by any other nation.109 
In Lebanon, French attempts to influence the election by supporting candidates amenable 
to French interests failed to materialise. Quite possibly, as Riyadh al-Solh had previously 
stated, the election of the nationalists in Syria had an impact on the vote in Lebanon. On 
September 21, 1943, the newly elected Chamber of Ministers met in Beirut and elected 
Bishara al-Khoury as President with Riyadh al-Solh as Prime Minister.110  
 
Following the establishment of governments in Lebanon and Syria and the recognition of 
Lebanon and Syria as independent states by Iraq, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, efforts were made 
by the governments to establish complete control within their respective borders. In Syria, 
plans were developed to sedentarise and disarm the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes,111 and 
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in Lebanon, the government attempted to silence subversive pro-French individuals, 
including Emile Eddé and Colonel Elias Medawar.112 By sedentarising and disarming the 
nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes and by silencing subversive pro-French individuals, the 
governments in Lebanon and Syria employed laws established during the French mandate, 
upholding the colonial framework in the period of post-independence decolonisation.113  
 
In Syria, the sedenterisation of the population exhibited the kind of logic and practice 
employed during the nineteenth century programme of modernisation in the Ottoman 
Empire and the French administration during the Mandate. This was a logic of rational 
organisation and statehood that was tied to a centralised government intended on pacifying 
and civilising the populations, in order to retain centralised control. In Lebanon, the 
employment of colonial laws reinforced the means of coercion and force of the former 
colonial administration. While the nationalist and anti-French parties had won the elections, 
their victories did not alter the structures of colonial governance that had been put in place, 
maintaining many of the institutional, legal, and geographic facets of colonial governance. 
The emergence of the independent modern state is one that immediately reflects its colonial 
construction, an exercise in a European conception of civilisation. 
 
In a speech given to the Syrian Parliament regarding Arab unity, Quwatli stated that the 
government in Syria had fulfilled the necessary requirements of a proper government, 
according to the ‘civilised nations’, including a legal government, balanced budget, and the 
maintenance of public order. He continued that the internal affairs of the country were not 
of concern to foreign powers, who view themselves as ‘the giver of orders, the ruler and the 
one who really possesses every power’. To which Quwatli argued, ‘the struggle then is for us 
to take over all those powers, to take back everything’.114  
 
8.3 Conclusion  
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the French Mandate for 
Lebanon and Syria provided the French administration with a renewed opportunity to 
enforce a standard of civilisation through state building. The French state building project, 
was veiled by French assertions of minority protections and the desire to establish modern 
and liberal government officials within the political institutions of the state. However, 
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implementation of the project disregarded the desires of the various Arab nationalists and 
proceeded to develop a system of governance and geographic division that would benefit the 
enduring pursuit of French interests.  
 
This chapter examined the final two and a half decades before Lebanese and Syrian 
independence, specifically from 1919 to 1944. It considered how global governance through 
the establishment of the League of Nations created a civilisational framework to which the 
populations of Lebanon and Syria could accede to in order to gain independence and 
sovereignty. Critically, however, the state building project replicated and institutionalised the 
standard of civilisation that had been present throughout the nineteenth century European 
state system.  
 
The standard of civilisation that had been asserted throughout the nineteenth century 
became institutionalised through global governance, which subjected the populations in 
Lebanon and Syria to a specific structural framework of statehood. However, the application 
of this framework was left to the policies of the Mandate state, France. The result was a 
coercive form of pacification, which rejected the proclamations of independence and 
autonomy in its initial establishment. The French state building project in Lebanon and Syria 
subsequently established a means of continuity regarding the pursuit of French interests 
following the eventual independence of the states. This included the division of Syria, and 
the segregation of the coastal regions from the Syrian interior, to control the economy within 
the Syrian interior and maintain a strong alliance with religious minorities along the coast. 
Control was also facilitated through the development of political institutions, the 
centralisation of politics within Syria, and the establishment of loyal factions within 
governmental positions.  
 
Although the French administration reformed the governments in Lebanon and Syria to 
provide improved representation, the French administration constrained decision making of 
these governments when government decisions did not coincide with French interests, as 
was the case with the development of a Syrian constitution. The creation of a draft 
constitution in Syria created additional tensions between the Arab nationalists in Syria and 
French administration. The representatives of the Syrian Assembly, specifically the Arab 
nationalists, sought to delineate the geographic boundaries of a Syrian state to include 
Lebanon, while the French were systematically opposed, fearing that it would infringe on 
their ability to maintain a foothold in the region through the Maronite population. The 
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disagreement between the French administration and the representatives in the Syrian 
Assembly led to the dissolution of the Assembly and the unilateral proclamation of a Syrian 
constitution that was favourable to French interests. By proclaiming the constitution, and 
reporting that the population were in favour of its promulgation, the French administration 
had managed to complete the requirement of institutional state building while retaining 
control over areas of interest.  
 
Following the disagreement with the French administration over the political and geographic 
limits of Syria, the Arab nationalists in Lebanon and Syria forged relations with Germany. 
For the German government, the relationship with the Arab nationalists posed a direct 
challenge to French and British interests. To regain some leverage over the political 
environment and reduce the possibility of agitation, the French administration conceded on 
several political appointments, and seemingly, in return, the Syrian government relinquished 
the desire to annex Lebanon and the coastal cities of Tripoli, Beirut, and Saida. It was evident 
that the Syrian political class was not passive, and the nationalists, in particularly, 
continuously rejected the state of affairs imposed by French Mandate. Yet, they maintained 
the logics, structures, and institutions that had been in development from the early 
nineteenth century Ottoman modernisation project and into the French Mandate.  
 
While independence was eventually granted, the electoral period that preceded independence 
provided another opportunity for the French administration to pursue their interests by 
selecting a specific set of candidates from the notable classes that were amenable to 
continued French involvement. Although the government and the population were bound 
to the norms, institutions, and laws that had been established during periods of imperial 
modernisation and the French Mandate, they were assembled on customary knowledges and 
practices. However, the engagement with modern institutions and structures provided a 





9.1 Re-Conceptualising the State in the Non-West as the Product of a Standard 
of Civilisation  
This thesis argued that the state in the non-West, or global peripheries, is a product of a 
European application of a standard of civilisation, which emerged during the nineteenth 
century interactions between the European states and the global peripheries. It examined 
how the export of knowledges and practices of modern statehood associated with a standard 
of civilisation, impacted the development of the modern state, authority, governance, and 
institutions in Lebanon and Syria. It followed the development of statehood in Lebanon and 
Syria, formerly the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, from 1800 until 1944, by 
considering the impact of interactions, actions, and reactions between the social field, 
imperial authority, and the European powers, specifically Britain and France, until the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. It continued by examining the interactions, actions, 
and reactions between the developing systems of global governance, the French Mandatory 
administration, and the social field in Lebanon and Syria.     
 
In making this argument, this thesis found that the production of the state as a standard of 
civilisation created enduring institutions, structures, and political and social frameworks that 
were not replications of those which existed in the context of the modern state in Europe, 
but were assembled through the pursuit of interests and as a consequence of political decision 
making. Although the modern state is often discussed as a set of institutions that has 
universal applicability, due to its apparent objective and methodical nature, providing state 
authority with the means to manage the economy, politics, and provide social order in a 
modern and rational method, its application to the Ottoman Empire, the Syrian provinces, 
and Lebanon and Syria during the French Mandate was tied to a set of specific worldviews 
that helped the European powers, specifically France, Britain, and Russia navigate the pursuit 
of interests.  
 
In examining how the standard of civilisation was applied in the development of the modern 
state in Lebanon and Syria, and the consequences of its application, the thesis makes a 
contribution to conceptualising the state in the non-West, as an assembled set of knowledges 
and practices that were the result of a European civilisational standard and framework that 
guided the pursuit of economic and political interests. These assembled knowledges and 
practices included the acceptance of modern standards of statehood as well as the rejection 
of European hegemonic interference and interventions, the development of sectarian and 
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nationalist politics, the construction of modern institutions and the reproduction of notable 
politics within them. 
 
9.2  How the Standard of Civilisation was Applied to Lebanon and Syria  
The state in Lebanon and Syria emerged from nineteenth century interactions between the 
European powers and the Ottoman Empire, with the Europeans navigating the global 
peripheries under the assumption that the modern state, and - more generally - the conditions 
of modernity, represented a set of methodical and objective institutions and structures that 
could be applied to any society, providing them with the ability to become rational and 
modern. The presumed teleological nature of modernity was civilisation, with civilisation 
being achieved through the application of modern thought, a scientific and rational 
understanding of the world, providing the ability to order and categorise society.  It was 
within this framework, that institutions and structures of modernity were believed to be 
objective - not influenced by emotion, culture, or history only by factual and scientific 
reasoning - and methodical - produced and established through a systematic procedure. 
However, as shown in this thesis, modernity and the modern state did not represent a rupture 
from pre-modern worldviews or conditions. Rather, the export of modernity and the modern 
state through imperial modernisation and followed by early twentieth century state building 
had enduring effects because the institutions and concepts were functions of European 
histories and worldviews, and in their application to the global peripheries, they were 
influenced by interests. 
 
Modernity and the modern state, as it was applied to Lebanon and Syria, were not objective 
and methodical, rather history, meaning, and interests were embedded in its functions and 
application. This resulted in an assembled set of knowledges and practices of European 
history, modern Western worldviews, and the knowledges and practices prevalent in societies 
where they were being applied. As discussed with regards to the evidence presented in this 
thesis, the development of state building projects through global governance, for example, 
cannot be separated from the history of nineteenth century European imperialism and 
colonialism and the application of a standard of civilisation. Similarly, European imperialism 
and colonialism cannot be separated from the logics of pre-modern Christian Europe. In 
many ways, the development of state building through global governance, the successor to 
the nineteenth century European state system, is the result of the combination of colonial 




The nineteenth century interactions between Europe and the global peripheries established 
a benchmark for the global peripheries to accede to. This benchmark required the replication 
of institutions and structures that made the West, or Europe, civilised, and was established 
in order to provide the non-West, the global peripheries, with the ability to accede to the 
European state system as equal members. Although modernisation was premised on the 
conviction that it would provide the Ottoman Empire, and subsequently Lebanon and Syria, 
the ability to accede to an international standard of civilisation, the knowledges and practices 
of order, organisation, and rational governance had emerged through the specific history of 
state formation in Europe.  
 
The relationship in European societies between society and modern institutional frameworks 
are representative of this history of state formation and modernity, produced through a 
specific set of social and political interactions that led to a scaled-up form of household 
authority. Similarly, the emergence of institutions of global governance, the knowledges and 
practices that are produced therein, are the result of a set of knowledges and practices framed 
by history. For the European states, the institutions of global governance were based on the 
ability to wield and apply international law to equal ‘civilised’ members of a state system. Like 
the modern state, the institutions of global governance, for the West, were representative of 
the delineation of a set of acceptable and legitimate actions that provided civilised 
interactions, formalising a global standard of civilisation. 
 
The standard of civilisation, applied to the global peripheries, intended to civilise the non-
West, by developing institutions that could produce order, frame legitimate action, and 
punish illegitimate action. The construction of these institutions in the global peripheries 
provided the means in which non-Western societies could become ordered and rational, 
developing the frameworks that would provide actors in the European state system, or 
international state system, with similar-enough institutions, which could be mutually 
recognised, facilitating the application of law, trade, and diplomacy.  
 
With regards to the development of the modern state in Lebanon and Syria, the application 
of a standard of civilisation, which necessitated the creation and maintenance of institutions 
of governance and authority, also embedded relations of Western dominance and local 
subordination. This was evident in the binary of civilised and uncivilised, the extraction of 
Western economic and political interests at the expense of native populations, and the 
delineation of physical boundaries attached to Western interests and worldviews. Although 
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the application of the standard of civilisation was meant to alleviate the global peripheries 
from unmodern conditions of barbarianism, and fanaticism, it provided the justification and 
the means to dominate, embedding colonial knowledges and practices within the institutional 
framework. 
 
Britain and France had attempted to bring order, to modernise, and rationalise the Ottoman 
Empire, generally, and Lebanon and Syria, specifically, to provide the institutions and 
structures that would allow the polities to become ‘civilised nations’, and guided by a logic 
justified by an altruistic reasoning of relieving the populations of their unmodern 
characteristics. What is revealed in this study is that the modern state in Lebanon and Syria 
was produced within a conceptual dichotomy and specific understanding of civilised and 
uncivilised. This had a direct impact on the production of the modern state, where the use 
of force became connected to ideas of order and modernity, the use, and reproduction, of 
religion as a key identifier was associated with racialised characteristics, and the reproduction 
of customary networks within modern institutions of the state contradicted the form of 
scaled-up household authority Europe. 
 
The inability of the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon, and Syria to attain the standards constructed, 
and reconstructed, by the European states, validated continued interference, providing the 
European states with the ability to pursue economic and political interests, impacting the 
development of the modern state and its institutions. Although the modern state and its 
institutions were generally accepted and upheld with the desire to assert independence, the 
character and identity of the modern state and its institutions became contested. The modern 
state and its institutions became something to dominate, and through domination, reordered 
the social field.  
 
9.2.1 Summary of Evidence and Findings 
The application of the modern state as a standard of civilisation to the Ottoman Empire, the 
Syrian provinces, and Lebanon and Syria under the French Mandate, developed following 
increased interactions between the West, the modern European states, and the Ottoman 
Empire. These interactions had developed a hierarchy in the relations between the European 
states and the Ottoman Empire, which subordinated the Ottoman Empire to the emerging 
hegemony of the European states and European state system. This subordination created 
instability within the Ottoman Empire, placing its survival in danger. Under these conditions, 
Sultan Selim III and Sultan Mahmud II sought incremental change through modernisation 
reforms. While these early reforms, including the Document of Agreement (1808) 
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administered by Mahmud II, the establishment of a new army, the Eshkenjis, the destruction 
of the Janissary Corps, and the decree on male headdress in 1829, were implemented 
following a series of military defeats, they were not implemented under direct guidance from 
the European states. 
 
In contrast, the modernisation reforms of the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839) and the Hatt-ı Hümayun 
(1856), had been developed under the direction, or assistance, of various European powers, 
and promulgated within the context of continued threats of territorial losses. The position 
of the Ottoman Empire with regards to the application of these reforms is revealing. The 
Ottoman Empire, faced with the threat of territorial losses and impediments on the 
application of the Sublime Porte’s authority, was forced to compromise on a variety of 
political, economic, and legal customs and values, in order to replicate the existing 
institutions in the West. By transforming the means of governance to replicate the modern 
European state, the Sublime Porte was promised equality within the European state system 
and recognition of its independence and sovereignty.  
 
The requirement to accede to the European state system by undertaking modernisation 
reforms was a condition of the European standard of civilisation. It was believed that the 
standard of civilisation was ‘guided by a more realistic understanding […] of human 
existence’,1 through the development of a rational understanding of the world, emancipated 
from the confines of religious frameworks. However, modernisation of governance and 
authority in the Ottoman Empire altered the relations between the social field and 
government, changing the means for society to access state power and resources.  
 
Failure to establish a recognised and modern social order, premised on the rights of the 
individual and all individuals’ equal relationship with the state justified continued European 
interference and interventions within the Sublime Porte and the Syrian provinces. For 
example, French interventions on behalf of the Maronite community, and the Catholic 
communities more generally, was justified through the premise of protecting a minority 
group due to the failures of policies of equality within the Ottoman Empire. It is evident that 
the failure to accede to the standard of civilisation, to apply policies of equality, provided the 
justification that the French administration required in order to pursue a particular set of 
political and economic interests. A similar justification was deployed by the French 
administration during the Egyptian occupation of the Syrian provinces (1831-1841). The 
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French aligned themselves with the Christian, specifically the Catholic, populations, arguing 
that the French nation and Catholic communities shared civilisational characteristics.  
 
The French alliance with the Catholic communities created an uneven political, social, and 
economic environment. The elevation of Christian status in the Ottoman Empire, under the 
provisions of legal equality, but also due to French interference, led to growing antagonism 
directed at Christian communities by Muslim communities, as well as the Druze.2 The 
changes in governance in the Sublime Porte and continued European interference and 
intervention, had a direct impact on the social field, enflaming sectarian animosity between 
Muslims and Christians, resulting in the outbreak of violence in Aleppo in 1850 and 
Damascus in 1860.  
 
The French alliance with the Catholic communities, and the provision of equality that had 
been instituted during the Egyptian occupation, but also throughout the promulgation of 
modernisation decrees, including the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839) and the Hatt-ı Hümayun (1856) 
embedded sectarian politics into the state. The elevation of the Christian, specifically the 
Catholic communities, due to their alliance with the French government and the provision 
of equality, replacing the principle of toleration through modernisation led to the 
displacement of the Muslim communities as a privileged class that shared a religious identity 
with the Empire. Anger by Muslim communities directed at the Christian population, due to 
their changing status within the Ottoman Empire and their allegiances to the French 
administration, was explained by the French administration throughout the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century as a result of a natural fanaticism, in fact, it was caused by significant 
social, political, and economic transformations. The application of a standard of civilisation 
dislocated the social field from authority. The customary practice of governance was 
transformed into centralised modern institutions, alienating groups and networks from 
access to structures of authority, requiring a renegotiation of the social field which had been 
impacted by the pursuit of European, in this case - French, interests. 
 
The result of dislocation, renegotiation, and reorganisation of the social field from authority, 
was that of violent social resistance, leading to continued French interference and, more 
specifically, a European military and political occupation of Mount Lebanon in 1860, which 
established Mount Lebanon as an autonomous political region. The development of Mount 
Lebanon’s political autonomy eventually facilitated a separate Lebanese nationalism, based 
																																																						
2 See discussions on the Aleppo Uprising, 1850 (Chapter 4.2) and the Damascus Massacre, 1860 (Chapter 5.1) 
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on sectarian difference and subsequently on ethno-cultural difference through the 
propagation of a Phoenician heritage.  
 
The demands that had been made on the Sublime Porte to promulgate reforms in order to 
accede to the European state system as a ‘civilised nation’ were actively being undermined 
by the European states through the pursuit of interests veiled in altruistic frameworks. 
Sustained subservience of the Sublime Porte to the demands of the European states 
produced resistance, in the form of social violence and rebellion, but also in emerging 
political networks, such as the Young Ottomans. This political movement desired to 
establish control within the Sublime Porte, to promote principles of modern statehood, 
which had been applied through the standard of civilisation, but also promote the Islamic 
identity of the Empire, reject European interference, and reject the continued subordination 
of the Ottoman Empire to European interests. The Young Ottomans sought to challenge 
European political and social interference in the Ottoman Empire by developing a distinct 
Ottoman constitution and parliamentary system.  
 
Faced with the Balkan Crisis (1875-1878) and emerging threats of war from Russia, the 
opportunity to withstand European demands through the promulgation of an Ottoman 
constitution presented itself at the Tersane Conference (1876). Midhat Pasha attempted to 
deliver an Ottoman constitution at the Conference with the aim to prevent further territorial 
losses caused by war with Russia. Although Midhat Pasha had attempted to accede to the 
standard of civilisation established by the European powers, he was constrained by Sultan 
Abdul Hamid II’s perception that the provisions of citizenship and the limitations on the 
Sultan’s executive powers presented a threat to the sultanate. The presentation of the 
constitution following the removal of the provisions of citizenship and parliamentary 
supremacy failed to gain traction with the European states at the Tersane Conference, and 
was ultimately rejected. Although the constitution would have produced a radical change, 
modernising the Ottoman Empire and replicating many conditions of the European state, 
its perceived failures resulted in its dismissal by the European powers. Rather than accepting 
the constitution, the European states made further demands, which would have authorised 
increased European interference in political and domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
The result of the Tersane Conference and the conditions of the ensuing Russo-Turkish War 
(1877-1878), prompted Sultan Abdul Hamid II to withdraw the constitution and dissolve 
parliament, strengthening the role of Islam, and centralising authority and power. Ultimately, 
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Sultan Abdul Hamid II rejected the continued European attempts of applying a standard of 
civilisation, however, he retained many of the institutions of governance that had been 
established by previous modernisation reforms, as they provided him with the ability to 
maintain authority over the Syrian provinces. The Sultan’s position was clear, he was 
interested in the survival of the Ottoman Empire and the Sultanate, and therefore rejected 
European interference, which had created detrimental hierarchal relations between the 
European states and the Ottoman Empire, as well as within the Ottoman Empire.  
 
The obstruction of European interference by Sultan Abdul Hamid II and the increased 
administrative centralisation led to the emergence of Arab nationalism and the establishment 
of the Young Turks. Rejecting the Sultan’s form of governance and authority, European 
knowledges and practices of modernity had become assembled on customary knowledges 
and practices. While the Arab nationalists were requesting autonomy, if not independence, 
the Young Turks, desired the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, both nationalist 
movements desired the application of modern and liberal conditions that contrasted with the 
form of governance of Sultan Abdul Hamid II. It was clear that the members of a political 
class had adopted the logics of the modern state, however, the character of the state differed 
between the various movements.  
 
After coming to power, and following a series of revolutions, the Young Turks had 
established their own civilisational standard under the assumption that homogenisation 
would produce political stability. However, policies of Turkification created increased 
resentment towards Turkish domination of the Syrian provinces and encouraged Arab 
nationalist sentiment. The animosity between the Young Turk government and the Arab 
nationalists provided the British and the French governments with the ability to develop 
relations with the latter, given their interests in the Syrian provinces rather than Anatolia. 
The French had done so by providing and protecting the platform of the Arab Congress 
(1913) in Paris, and the British had actively fostered alliances with members of the Hashemite 
dynasty, with the aim to defeat the Germans and their allied partner, the Ottoman Empire, 
during the First World War (1914-1918).  
 
During the First World War, the British and French governments had anticipated the 
secession of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire and devised, among themselves and 
with the consent of Russia, a plan to divide the region into zones of influence, through the 
1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement. Following the conclusion of the First World War in 1918 and 
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the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the League of Nations was established at the Paris 
Peace Conference (1919-1920) and the French Mandate for Lebanon and Syria was 
permitted.  
 
The aim of the French Mandate of Lebanon and Syria was to prepare the regions for 
independence by engaging in a modern form of state building. However, the region had been 
engaged in a state building process since the early nineteenth century, resulting in the 
acceptance of the characteristics of the modern state, evidenced by the administrations in 
Lebanon and Syria declaring independence. Still, the claims for independence were forcefully 
rejected by the French administration, who justified their advances by claiming a legal right 
that Lebanon and Syria were not allowed to acquire, due to a lack of recognition within the 
institutions of global governance., particularly the League of Nations. Under this premise, 
the French Mandate developed as a means to establish institutional structures of statehood 
that would be recognised through independence and which would also provide the French 
government with the ability to continue to influence the region after Lebanese and Syrian 
independence.   
 
With the aim of preserving French access in the pursuit of interests, the French 
administration obstructed the development of a constitution in 1928, due to constitutional 
provisions regarding geographic limitations. The obstruction of the constitution led to the 
dissolution of the Representative Assembly and the promulgation of a constitution drafted 
by the French Administration, which came into effect in 1932. The reaction to the French 
Mandate by the Arab Nationalists in Syria was a developing relationship with Germany, 
which had sought to undermine the French Mandate of Lebanon and Syria and the British 
Mandate of Jordan, and Palestine.  
 
Towards the end of the Second World War (1939-1945), the French administration in 
Lebanon and Syria was under increased political pressure to permit Lebanese and Syrian 
independence, and eventually conceded to allowing elections prior to the provision of 
independence. Although the French administration allowed elections, they used this 
opportunity to restrict participation of unfavourable candidates, fearing that French 
influence following independence would come to an end. Much to the detriment of French 
interests, the elections in Lebanon and Syria resulted in the appointment of two nationalist 





Throughout this history, the deployment of customary groups and networks in order to gain 
and maintain legitimacy was recurrent. Although the formation of alliances between 
European states and customary groups and networks was most prevalent with regards to 
notable families, alliances had also formed between European states and tribal 
confederations. For example, during the Crimean War (1853-1856) the Russian 
administration had secured an alliance with the Ansari and Bedouin tribes controlled by Fares 
al-Hadeb. The maintenance of tribal structures and networks throughout the modernisation 
process is also evident during periods of deteriorating authority, as was the case in 1860 
following the violence in Damascus, and following the Russo-Turkish War (1878-1877).  
 
Although the tribal networks were not discussed at great length in the documents surveyed 
for this thesis, evidence of customary networks maintaining relevance within the modern 
political institutions and structures of the emerging state, was evident. Individuals from 
notable families comprised the modern political classes in the Syrian provinces throughout 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The notable classes, their pursuit of authority 
within modern state institutions and structures, as well as their ability to provide European 
states and national movements with legitimacy, bolstered their role and resilience within the 
framework of the modern state as the state emerged. For instance, the Young Turks sought 
allegiances with notable families in order to gain popular support and legitimacy within the 
Syrian provinces. Similarly, the British and French administrations in Mount Lebanon, 
attempted to have their activities validated by supporting the appointments of individuals 
from notable families to governmental positions. This practice carried on into the French 
mandate, when the French administration, seeking to gain legitimacy, appointed Kamal al-
Qudsi as governor of Aleppo. The reproduction of these customary networks in political 
institutions, as well as nationalist movements, further disrupted the development of scaled-
up household authority within the state, fortifying customary loyalty and animosity, and 
creating contention with regards to character of the state.  
 
By understanding historical development as a process, rather than periods of rupture and 
change, the evidence summarised in the conclusion and provided throughout the thesis, tells 
of an assembled set of institutions, structures, knowledges, and practices. Specifically, this 
thesis has examined how the European framework and conception of civilisation had been 
assembled in the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire and, subsequently, in the French 
Mandate of Lebanon and Syria. In doing so, it has examined how the pre-modern and the 
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modern knowledges and practices were assembled in the production of the modern state, 
producing difference with regards to the conceptualisation the modern state.  
 
9.3  Concluding Remarks  
European interference and interventions in the Ottoman Empire, the Syrian provinces, and 
the following establishment of the French Mandate for Lebanon and Syria, was premised by 
the goal of civilising and modernising the global peripheries, to create the form of legitimate 
scaled-up household authority that existed in Europe. The standard of civilisation, as it was 
applied to the state in the global peripheries, was influenced by the histories of European 
state formation, which explained their progression into modernity and the development of 
European worldviews, as well as their political and economic interests. By tracing how 
European knowledges and practices were applied to the Ottoman Empire, the Syrian 
provinces, and subsequently during the French Mandate of Lebanon and Syria, it has been 
possible to understand how European knowledges and practices of modern statehood were 
assembled onto and interacted with pre-existing knowledges and practices, particularly with 
regards to institutions and structures of statehood, influencing such areas as sectarianism and 
nationalism, and – more generally – knowledges and practices of statehood.  
 
This thesis has focused on the application of the state as a standard of civilisation, which 
provided the European powers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with the 
justification for the development of modernisation projects. It has examined its use in 
constructing the modern state, to produce favourable outcomes, and to help the European 
powers navigate the philosophical and practical problems of the pursuit of interests. Failure 
to replicate the conditions of the European state through these modernisation projects 
justified further interference and interventions within the Ottoman Empire, and 
subsequently with the French Mandate of Lebanon and Syria. Although many of these 
projects failed to deliver the desired results, they created enduring institutions and structures 
of governance, and motivated the development of nationalist movements and competition 
and renegotiation between customary identities within the social field.  
 
By analysing and understanding the production of the state in Lebanon and Syria as the result 
of the application of a standard of civilisation that helped the European powers navigate the 
practical and philosophical problems of imperial and colonial interactions, and which had 
enduring effects on state institutions, structures, and societies, it is possible to challenge the 
prominent assumptions of statehood. This includes the logics associated with the modern 
state, such as those deployed in development and state building, institution building and the 
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credibility, and ability, of institutions to order society in an efficient manner. It is also possible 
to uncover the kinds of assembled knowledges and practices that developed within the 
institutions and structures of the state. By understanding these assembled knowledges and 
practices within the institutions of the modern state, their histories of interactions with the 
international actors, it is possible to properly decolonise the post-colonial and move towards 
a research agenda that places importance on historical difference. 
 
By employing this kind of analysis, taking into account the actions, reactions, and responses 
to reactions, further research can be produced to examine how the state, as a standard of 
civilisation, has been reapplied within different regions of the international state system, 
particularly to the post-colonial state following independence. The approach applied within 
this thesis can also be applied to better understand difference within the post-colonial state, 
the international state system, and to move away from conceptualising the state as bound to 
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